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ABSTRACT 
 
If human rights are to be effectively protected in any country, the judiciary has to 
recognise that it also has a role to play in this regard. The primary basis of this 
construction is that one of the roles of the judiciary is that of enhancing and protecting 
human rights. This is an important function which is best implemented through judicial 
independence. Across Africa and most notably in Zimbabwe, political interference has 
been noted as a factor that limits judicial independence. The judiciary‘s lack of 
independence has made it impossible for it to protect human rights in Zimbabwe. This 
signifies that a new approach to judicial protection of human rights in the country is 
required. Constitutional reform could be the appropriate legal tool to achieve this 
objective. Zimbabwe has undertaken constitutional reforms which may help in 
addressing the human rights situation in the country. These reforms have captured legal 
principles which will ensure an improvement in the human rights situation. Key to the 
reforms, has been the independence of the judiciary. The Constitution guarantees the 
independence of the judiciary. Despite such guarantees there are a number of 
challenges with regards to this independence. The aim of this research is to show what 
measures need to be taken for the judiciary to adequately protect human rights and to 
establish other measures that can be taken to address the human rights issues in 
Zimbabwe. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF STUDY 
 
1 Introduction and Background of Study 
The protection of human rights is one of the most fundamental aspects of any 
democracy in the modern world. As a result, a number of countries around the world 
have adopted constitutions that seek to promote and protect various rights.1 At the 
epicentre of human rights protection is the role played by the judiciary in the protection 
of human rights.2 The judiciary plays a crucial role in the protection of human rights and 
this role is a fundamental aspect of a democratic society.3  The failure of the judiciary to 
protect human rights in Zimbabwe has been a major highlight of the human rights 
situation in Zimbabwe.4 As a result of its human rights track record, a new Constitution 
has been adopted5 (hereinafter Constitution of Zimbabwe) to address concerns 
regarding the independence of the judiciary and consequentially judicial protection of 
human rights. This research therefore makes an in-depth analysis of the new 
Constitution of Zimbabwe to establish whether the undertaken reforms can suffice in 
improving the independence of the judiciary, thus leading to improved judicial protection 
of human rights.  
  
                                                          
1
To show the importance of human rights protection around the world a number of African countries have 
a Bill of Rights in their Constitutions. Such countries with the Bill of Rights in brackets include South Africa 
(Chapter II) Botswana (Chapter II), Lesotho (Chapter II), Nigeria (Chapter IV) and Namibia (Chapter III). 
2
Apple J ‗The Role of Judicial Independence and Judicial Leadership in the Protection of Human Rights‘ 
in Cotran E and Yamani M (eds) The Role of the Judiciary in the Protection of Human Rights (1997) 197. 
3
Ruppel C.O The Role of the Executive in Safeguarding the Independence of the Judiciary in Namibia 
(2008) 207. Paper Presented at the Conference on the Independence of the Judiciary in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: Imperial Beach Hotel Entebe Uganda from 24 to 28 June 2008. 
http://www.kas.de/upload/auslandshomepages/namibia/Independence_Judiciary/ruppel.pdf (Accessed 10 
June 2011). 
4
International Bar Association Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI) and Open Society Initiative for Southern 
Africa (OSISA) Zimbabwe: Time for a New Approach (2011) 25. 
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=268BE2D5-5E46-4713-B3BE-
A982798A314A (Accessed 14 June 2012). 
5
The new Constitution of Zimbabwe was signed into law by the President in May 2013. See All Africa 
‗Mugabe Signs New Constitution Into Law‘ 22 May 2013. 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201305230285.html (Accessed 3 April 2014). 
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Zimbabwe, like most nations around the world, has a Constitution and the constitutional 
reforms have resulted in the adoption of a new Constitution. The new Constitution has 
replaced the previous Constitution of Zimbabwe (hereinafter Lancaster House 
Constitution), which was a product of negotiations between the British government, the 
then Rhodesian government led by Ian Smith (then Prime Minister), and nationalist 
politicians from the liberation movements at the Lancaster House negotiations in 1979 
in London.6 The Lancaster House Constitution, modelled on the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR)7, guaranteed the protection of civil and political rights. 
However, it should be noted that the enjoyment of these rights had been severely 
watered down over the years through constant amendments8  and the passing of 
repressive legislation9, most of which are still applicable up to today contrary to the 
Global Political Agreement of 200810, in which the political parties to the agreement 
(Movement for Democratic Change- Tsvangirai (MDC-T), Movement for Democratic 
Change- now led by Welshman Ncube (MDC-N) and the Zimbabwe African National 
Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) agreed to the repealing of such legislation. The 
constant amendments to the Lancaster House Constitution and the enactment of 
repressive legislation greatly contributed to the abuse of human rights in the country as 
                                                          
6
De Bourbon A ‗Human Rights Litigation in Zimbabwe: Past, Present and the Future‘ (2003) 3 African 
Human Rights Law Journal 195 221. 
7
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950, signed 
at Rome 1950. 
8
The Lancaster House Constitution was amended nineteen times since the attainment of independence. 
Examples of Constitutional Amendments that have watered down the enjoyment of human rights in the 
country include Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act 23 of 1987 ( commonly referred to as 
Constitutional Amendment Act No.7) which includes a number of provisions that entrenched executive 
power and various other land reform amendments;  Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act 5 of 2000 
(commonly referred to as Constitutional Amendment No.16) which removed the obligation of paying 
compensation for land acquired from the Zimbabwean government to the British government and 
Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act 5 of 2005 (commonly referred to as Constitutional Amendment 
No.17) which ousted the jurisdictions of the courts from hearing any matter pertaining to land reform and 
seizures. 
9
Examples of such repressive legislation include the Public and Security Order Act 5 of 2002 (POSA), 
Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act 1 of 2002 (AIPPA), Criminal Law (Codification and 
Reform) Act 23 of 2004 and The Broadcasting Services Act 3 of 2001 (BSA) amongst many others. 
10
Human Rights Watch False Dawn: The Zimbabwe Power Sharing Government‟s Failure to Deliver 
Human Rights Improvements (2009) 15. 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2009/08/31/false-dawn-0 (Accessed 12 March 2013). 
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most of the amendments had watered down the enjoyment of rights in the Declaration 
of Rights.11 
A brief historical analysis of human rights issues in Zimbabwe clearly portrays the long 
history of human rights abuses and how the judiciary over the years has handled 
various challenges from the executive. The judiciary, under the leadership of Justice 
Enoch Dumbutshena,12 was faced with many political challenges that included the 
Matebeleland civil war where atrocities were committed by the Fifth Brigade against the 
Ndebele people for alleged dissident activities.13 This period also saw the nation placed 
under a state of emergency14 with thousands of people being killed. This state of 
emergency came to an end in 1987 when the Unity Accord was signed between ZANU-
PF and the Zimbabwe African People‘s Union Patriotic Front (ZAPU-PF).15 This period 
was mainly characterised by detentions without trial, rape, beatings and 
disappearances.16 However, as De Bourbon notes, judicial involvement and 
accountability for human rights were minimal and he attributes such lack of involvement 
to the state of emergency and the lack of human rights experience on the part of the 
judiciary.17 As a result the government got away with various human rights abuses as 
seen with the Matebeleland atrocities.18 Despite these political challenges, the judiciary 
                                                          
11
See footnote number 8 above on some of the amendments to the Constitution that have watered down 
the enjoyment of rights.  
12
Dumbutshena CJ served as Chief Justice from 1984-1990. 
13
Mapfumo T Whither to the Judiciary in Zimbabwe? A Critical Analysis of the Human Rights 
Jurisprudence of the Gubbay and Chidyausiku Supreme Court Benches in Zimbabwe and Comparative 
Experiences from Uganda (  LLM-thesis, University of Pretoria, 2005)  19. 
14
Hatchard J Individual Freedoms and State Security in the African Context: The Case of Zimbabwe 
(1993) 35. 
15
International Bar Association Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI) and Open Society Initiative for Southern 
Africa (OSISA) (2011) 11.  
16
Bourne R Human Rights in Contemporary Zimbabwe Paper Presented at the Uppsala Conference 
(2011) 3. 
http://www.nai.uu.se/ecas-4/panels/21-40/panel-29/Richard-Bourne-Full-paper.pdf (Accessed 25 June 
2012). 
17
De Bourbon A (2003) 206. 
18
De Bourbon A (2003) 206. See also Clemency Order 1/1988 which granted immunity to those 
implicated in the Matebeleland atrocities which meant that no single individual was brought before the 
courts to be held accountable for the Matebeleland atrocities. 
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showed great character and was able to main its independence and made various 
rulings that contributed to the cause of human rights.19 
The judiciary, under the leadership of Gubbay CJ (appointed in 1990), was well-known 
for its independence.20 Although faced by various political challenges at the time, such 
as the State of Emergency and the use (by government) of legal means to circumvent 
the implications of various judgments by passing amendments to the Constitution21, by 
passing legislation, and by making extensive use of clemency orders, the judiciary 
served with distinction and showed great character in upholding its independence and 
fighting for the cause of human rights in the country.22  Widner and Scher note that prior 
to the introduction of the land reform, the courts stood firm in the face of executive 
pressure on a variety of issues, from suspension of habeas corpus and trials within a 
                                                          
19
See amongst many other rulings Slatter v Minister of Home Affairs HC 313/83 a case in which the 
judiciary condemned the use of torture. See also Minister of Home Affairs v Dabengwa 1982 (1) ZLR 236 
(SC); 1982 (4) SA 301 (ZS) a case where the Supreme Court had to deal with the application of 
Emergency Powers Regulations that still existed in Zimbabwe, and in particular the rights of persons 
detained without trial to have access to their lawyers. In this case prominent members of ZAPU had been 
arrested and tried for treason. They were acquitted of the charge of treason, but immediately detained in 
terms of emergency legislation. They were denied access to their lawyers, and sought an order from the 
High Court that such access was their right. This order was granted by McNally J, after which the 
government appealed, and the appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court.   
20
Widner J and Scher D ‗Building Judicial Independence in Semi-Democracies‘ in Tom G and Moustafa T 
Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes (2008) 249. 
21
See the case of  Catholic Commission for Peace and Justice in Zimbabwe v Attorney-General 1993 (1) 
ZLR 242 (S) in which the Supreme Court had held that delay in the execution of the death penalty was 
inconsistent with section 15(1) of the Lancaster House Constitution as it amounted to cruel, inhuman 
degrading punishment. However, it should be noted that this decision was reversed by the Zimbabwean 
Legislature which proceeded to amend the Constitution through the enactment of Zimbabwe Constitution 
Amendment Act 9 of 1993, which legalised delays in execution with the inclusion of section 15(5) which 
read ‗Delay in execution of a sentence of death, imposed upon a person in respect of a criminal offence 
of which he has been convicted, shall not be held to be a contravention of section 15(1).‘ See also the 
case of S v Juvenile 1989 (2) ZLR 61 (S) which dealt with the constitutionality of sentences of corporal 
punishment imposed upon juveniles in terms of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act Chapter 9:07. 
In this case the Supreme Court ruled that corporal punishment was unconstitutional as it was in violation 
of section 15(1) of the Constitution which provided that ‗no person or individual shall be subjected to 
inhuman and degrading punishment.‘ The legislature amended the Lancaster House Constitution and 
added a derogation that allowed corporal punishment to be carried out. Through the Zimbabwe 
Constitution Amendment Act 30 of 1990, section 15(3) which read ‗[n]o moderate corporal punishment 
inflicted (a) in appropriate circumstances upon a person under the age of eighteen years by his parent or 
guardian or by someone in loco parentis or in whom are vested any of the powers of his parent or 
guardian; or (b) in the execution of the judgment or order of a court, upon a male person under the age of 
eighteen years as a penalty for breach of any law; shall be held to be in contravention of section 15(1) on 
the ground that it is inhuman or degrading‖ was incorporated into the constitution.‘ 
22
Saller K The Judicial Institution in Zimbabwe (2004) 3. See also the cases of Catholic Commission for 
Peace and Justice in Zimbabwe v Attorney General and S v Juvenile discussed above. 
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reasonable time to freedom of speech.23 The courts were thus, truly independent and 
the period before the 2000 land reform program has been characterised as 
‗The golden period of human rights litigation in Zimbabwe where the court did not always 
find for the ordinary litigant, but one knew that whatever point was being raised was 
carefully considered, and one knew even when the court found for the state that the 
judgment represented the honest view of the judges who heard the matter.‘
24
 
De Bourbon praised the Zimbabwean judiciary for its strong reputation for human rights 
protection before the commencement of the land reform programme.25 The Supreme 
Court of Zimbabwe achieved a lot as most of its judgments are regularly referred to in 
South Africa and other countries, including by the Privy Council, and it also handed 
down various judgments that sought to comply with various international law 
principles.26   
Despite the great work and example displayed by the previous bench in upholding its 
independence through difficult times, the same, however, cannot be said of the present 
judiciary under the leadership of Chidyausiku CJ.27 Although this research recognises 
the difficult political environment that the judiciary has been operating under, the author 
recognises that after many years of institutional independence in Zimbabwe, the current 
political problems in the country have put the judiciary to the test.  As a result, the 
judiciary has displayed a new philosophy of human rights protection which has been 
below standard when compared to the approach adopted by the previous benches.28  
More crucially, the weak constitutional guarantees under the Lancaster House 
Constitution resulted in the independence (of the current judiciary) being consistently 
eroded through the use of various tactics by the executive and the manner in which the 
                                                          
23
Widner J and Scher D (2008) 249. 
24
De Bourbon A (2003) 206. 
25
De Bourbon A (2003) 206. 
26
See Pratt v Attorney-General for Jamaica 1993 ALL ER 769 (PC). This was a case in which the Privy 
Council considered whether Jamaica lawfully could execute two prisoners held for fourteen years after 
sentencing. The Privy Council noted that Jamaican law authorised the death penalty, but however 
concluded that ―it was an inhuman act to keep a man facing the agony of execution over a long extended 
period of time. The Privy Council  made reference to the Zimbabwe‘s Supreme Court  case of Catholic 
Commission for Peace and Justice in Zimbabwe v Attorney-General 1993 (1) ZLR 242 (S). 
27
Chidyausiku CJ was appointed as Chief Justice in July 2001. 
28
Mapfumo T (2005) 20. 
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executive sought to appoint ZANU-PF party loyalists to the bench. Legislative 
inadequacies in the appointment of judges cast serious doubts on the capacity of the 
current bench to discharge its constitutional mandate of protecting human rights.29 The 
constant interference with the independence of the current judiciary contributed to the 
lack of human rights protection in the country. It is therefore the aim of this research to 
establish the significance of the new constitutional dispensation with regards to its 
protection of the independence of the judiciary, and whether such will bode well for 
human rights protection in the country.  
The lack of judicial independence of the current bench has been a major highlight in its 
failure to protect human rights. The manner in which judges were appointed and the 
calibre of the individuals raised several questions about the independence of the current 
bench.30 With regards to the appointment of judges, the Lancaster House Constitution 
established a Judicial Service Commission (JSC) which acted in consultation with the 
President, in order to ensure that the appointment of judges was done impartially and in 
a fair and transparent manner.31 It should be noted that transparency in judicial 
appointments is crucial so as to maintain and protect judicial independence because an 
independent judiciary is the hallmark of the protection of human rights in any 
democracy. This is so because the judiciary is the primary body from which victims of 
                                                          
29
The mandate of the judiciary in the protection of human rights was dealt with under section 24(1) of the 
Lancaster House Constitution which read ‗if any person alleges that the Declaration of Rights has been, is 
being or is likely to be contravened in relation to him (or, in the case of a person who is detained, if any 
person alleges such contravention in relation to the detained person), then, without prejudice to any other 
action with respect to the same matter which is lawfully available, that person (or that other person) may 
subject to the provisions of subsection 3, apply to the Supreme Court for redress.‘ 
30
It should be noted that a similar scenario arose in South Africa with reference to the appointment of 
Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng. See Daily News ‗Controversy Follows Mogoeng Appointment‘ 5 
September 2011. 
http://www.iol.co.za/dailynews/news/controversy-follows-mogoeng-appointment-
1.1131436#.UoMtYVLEPcs (Accessed 12 March 2012).  
31
Section 84(1) of the Lancaster House Constitution read ‗The Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice, Judge 
President and other judges of the Supreme Court and other judges of the High Court shall be appointed 
by the President after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission.‘  For the Composition of the 
Judicial Service Commission see section 90 of the Lancaster House Constitution. 
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human rights violations obtain formal redress, and therefore plays a unique role in 
nearly all societies with regards to the protection and promotion of human rights.32 
However, despite the existence of such provisions ensuring impartiality in the 
appointment of judges, Saller was of the belief that the situation on the ground was 
different as the appointment of judges in Zimbabwe was not as open as it appeared on 
paper, and the appointment process was strongly influenced by various political 
considerations.33 Thus, the JSC under the Lancaster House Constitution was widely 
viewed as an extension of the President‘s office in that the President appointed virtually 
all the members of the Commission.34 The nomination process was shrouded in 
controversy as the President could act against the advice of the JSC. Although the 
Lancaster House Constitution stipulated that if such a scenario occurred, the President 
had to inform Parliament, it was, however, silent on the action that Parliament had to 
take.35 
The legislative inadequacies led to the controversial appointment of a number of judges 
to the bench most notably that of Chidyausiku CJ, who had previously served in 
government and was widely perceived to be sympathetic to the government.36 
Chidyausiku CJ was appointed in 2001 at the height of land invasions in Zimbabwe. 
Justice Chidyausiku had previously chaired the 1999-2000 Constitutional Commission 
and had also previously served as a Deputy Minister for Justice (under the ZANU-PF 
                                                          
32
Gibney M and Frankowski S Judicial Protection of Human Rights: Myth or Reality (1999) vii. See also 
Kirby M Strengthening the Judicial Role in the Protection of Human Rights-An Action Plan Inter-Regional 
Conference on Justice Systems and Human Rights (2006) 12. 
33
Saller K (2004) 18. 
34
Section 90(1) of the Lancaster House Constitution. 
35
Section 84(2) of the Lancaster House Constitution. It should be noted that although the Lancaster 
House Constitution was silent on the action that Parliament had to take, in other countries such as 
Uganda, Parliament performs an important role in the appointment of judges. Article 142(1) of the 
Constitution of Uganda states that ―The Chief Justice, the Deputy Chief Justice, the Principal Judge, a 
justice of the Supreme Court, a justice of Appeal and a judge of the High Court shall be appointed by the 
President acting on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission and with the approval of Parliament.‖ 
The example of Uganda shows the need to have a strong and well-functioning Parliament which will 
always check the exercise of executive powers. A strong and well-functioning Parliament, representing 
the people, is essential for democracy. However, Zimbabwe has for many years had a Parliament, which 
has not been able to assert itself in relation to the executive power. 
36
Chigara B Southern African Development Community Land Issues: Towards a New Sustainable Land 
Relations Policy (2012) 212. 
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government) from 1980 until his appointment as Attorney-General in 1982.  He was 
appointed to be the Chief Justice directly from the High Court over the heads of other 
more experienced and independent minded Supreme Court judges, including Gillespie J 
(who later resigned and went into exile after Gubbay‘s resignation) and Chatikobo J.37 
Madhuku notes that the appointment of Chidyausiku CJ was highly politicised, although 
the appointment was made in line with the provisions of the Constitution.38 Madhuku 
further states that: 
‗The political angle rose from the following features: the new Chief Justice came from the 
High Court and was chosen over four serving judges of the Supreme Court. This was 
contrary to a precedent that the same government had set in 1990 when it appointed 
Chief Justice Gubbay, who was the most Senior Supreme Court judge. Further, just a 
year before his appointment, the new Chief Justice had chaired the highly controversial 
government appointed Constitutional Review Commission whose Draft Constitution for 
Zimbabwe had been rejected in a national referendum. In addition, his publicised views 
on land reform mirrored those of the government.‘
39
 
The appointment of Chidyausiku CJ by the President further strengthened the view that 
the appointment of judges in Zimbabwe was subject to political interference. It should be 
noted that since 2000, the President has appointed to the bench judges with close 
connections to the government and known sympathesisers of ZANU-PF.40 In order to 
ensure the loyalty of judges, including the Chief Justice, the government allocated land 
to them seized under its controversial land reform.41 Seductive donations were also 
made to members of the judiciary, most notably through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 
which has donated a fleet of new vehicles, generators, sets of plasma screen 
televisions, and full sets of satellite dishes to current judges.42 Such actions raised 
serious doubt regarding the independence and impartiality of the judges that benefitted 
                                                          
37
Linington G Constitutional Law in Zimbabwe (2001) 170. 
38
Madhuku L ‗The Appointment Process of Judges in Zimbabwe and Its Implications for the 
Administration of Justice‘ (2006) 21 SAPR/PL 345 360. 
39
Madhuku L (2006) 361. 
40
Human Rights Watch Our Hands are Tied. The Erosion of the Rule of Law in Zimbabwe (2008) 15.  
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/11/08/our-hands-are-tied-0 (Accessed 30 May 2011). 
41
Gubbay A The Progressive Erosion of the Rule of Law in Independent Zimbabwe Third International 
Rule of Law Lecture Bar of England and Wales (2009) 2.  
http://www.swradioafrica.com/pages/gubbay160210.htm (Accessed 30 May 2011). 
42
Human Rights Watch (2008) 13-18.  
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from the Land Reform Program and the seductive gifts, as it was viewed as a case of 
―one not biting the hand that feeds him‖. 
The lack of transparency in the appointment process had a great effect on the 
independence of the judiciary as the judiciary was purged and packed with ZANU-PF 
supporters who were bribed and given land by the executive so as to ensure their 
loyalty to government.43 The loss of independence of the current bench is strongly 
manifested in its failure to tackle fundamental human rights issues raised in several 
court applications.44 De Bourbon goes on to state that ―[t]he current composition of the 
Supreme Court of Zimbabwe bodes ill for human rights in Zimbabwe.‖45 Therefore, until 
and unless changes are made within the judiciary, human rights protection in the 
country will always remain a thing of the past.  
The current state of the judiciary is one of the reasons why the human rights situation 
has worsened.46 As a result of the human rights situation in the country, efforts have 
been made under the new Constitution to address the issue of judicial independence 
which consequentially would lead to the improved judicial promotion and protection of 
human rights.47 Thus, the Constitution of Zimbabwe has been adopted with a new 
Declaration of Rights, and with provisions relating to the independence of the judiciary. 
It is therefore imperative that the Constitution must address the issue of judicial 
                                                          
43
International Bar Association (Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI) and Open Society Initiative for Southern 
Africa (OSISA) (2011) 25.  
44
A host of judgments exist where the current judiciary has failed to address fundamental human rights 
issues. See amongst others the case of The Diaspora Action Group v Minister of Justice and 
Parliamentary Affairs Supreme Court Case No.22/05 (Unreported) where a case relating to the right to 
vote for Zimbabweans in the Diaspora was dismissed without any reasons being provided by the court. 
See also the cases of Dareremusha Cooperative v The Minister of Local Government, Public Works and 
Urban Development Harare High Court Case No.2467/05 (unreported); Batsirai Children‟s Care v The 
Minister of Local Government and Urban Development Harare High Court Case No. 2566/05 (unreported) 
where the courts sanctioned government‘s unlawful eviction programme of 2005 despite the fact that 
evictions were conducted in a violent manner, with deaths being reported and the evicted families were 
not provided with any alternative accommodation. A number of other cases exist where the current 
judiciary has failed to address fundamental human rights issues in the country. These cases will be dealt 
with in detail in the body of the thesis. 
45
De Bourbon A (2003) 217. 
46
The human rights situation has also worsened due to government‘s disregard of judicial decisions which 
it perceives to be contrary to its policies. 
47
Amnesty International Zimbabwe „Constitutional Reform: An Opportunity to Strengthen Human Rights 
Protection.‘ 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR46/001/2000/en/d3bd173f-dfcc-11dd-8e17-
69926d493233/afr460012000en.pdf. (Accessed 20 August 2011). 
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independence, in order to address the ills of the past and improve human rights 
protection in Zimbabwe. The issue of the extent to which the Constitution of Zimbabwe 
can significantly address the issue of judicial independence and consequently the 
improvement of the judicial protection of human rights, will be dealt with in this study. 
1.1 Research Problem 
The continued abuse of human rights has resulted in Zimbabwe becoming a pariah 
state.48 In response to questions concerning the ability of the Lancaster House 
Constitution to carry through a new democratic process, it may be argued that judicial 
independence in the country is a ―compelling interest‖ which must be adequately 
addressed in the Constitution of Zimbabwe. This is so because it enhances greater 
emphasis on the significance of the role of judicial independence in promoting justice in 
the country. In a climate where judicial independence is under increased scrutiny, it is 
important that the Constitution of Zimbabwe must effectively address this crucial issue.49 
1.2 Hypothesis 
This study emanates from the hypothesis that judicial independence is crucial to the 
promotion and protection of human rights in any democratic society. The issue of the 
judicial protection of human rights in Zimbabwe has been problematic as the judiciary 
has been viewed not being independent and hence this has greatly affected its ability to 
protect human rights. A new Constitution has been adopted with a view to addressing 
the challenges to the independence of the judiciary and human rights protection. Human 
rights in Zimbabwe have been violated and continue to be violated, and individuals have 
failed to obtain any justice from the judiciary since the judiciary is not independent and 
has been corrupted. It is therefore crucial that the newly enacted Constitution, in order 
to safeguard the independence of the judiciary, must prohibit administrative interference 
with the judiciary and also possibly ensure that judicial services are carried out with the 
objective of promoting an actual fortification of human rights in Zimbabwe. Although this 
                                                          
48
Linington G ‗Developing a New Bill of Rights for Zimbabwe: Some Issues to Consider‘ in Kersting N 
(eds) Constitution in Transition: Academic Input for a New Constitution in Zimbabwe (2009) 46. 
49
Kersting N ‗Constitution in Transition‘ in Kersting N (eds) Constitution in Transition: Academic Input for a 
New Constitution in Zimbabwe (2009) 19. 
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research advocates for an independent judiciary to protect human rights in Zimbabwe, it 
does recognise that other domestic measures need to be adopted to complement the 
role of the judiciary in human rights promotion and protection. 
1.3 Significance of Research  
The Lancaster House Constitution provided for individual human rights. The mandate of 
protecting such rights was placed on the judiciary.50 The role of the judiciary in 
protecting human rights and upholding the law cannot be underestimated.51  The 
judiciary is one of the greatest pillars in ensuring that the Constitution and all its 
obligations are fulfilled and, as such, it plays a unique role in the protection and 
promotion of human rights.52 
The judiciary has a vital role in ensuring that all the other organs of state fulfil and 
uphold their constitutional obligations.53 It is therefore important that the judiciary 
should, in so far as it is within its power, ensure that the obligations imposed by the 
Constitution are faithfully observed by other organs of government in order to ensure 
that the rule of law prevails.54 The role of the judiciary in upholding the rule of law can 
never be underestimated since the rule of law is essential to the effective functioning of 
the system of government in a democratic society.55 It is therefore imperative that the 
judiciary should be free from any external control so that it can be able to deliver and 
uphold the law. The doctrine of separation of powers is of great importance in ensuring 
the effective functioning of the judiciary.56 An independent judiciary is one of the 
                                                          
50
Apple J (1997) 197. 
51
Keith LC ‗Judicial Independence and Human Right Protection Around the World‘ (2002) 85:4 Judicature 
195 195. 
52
Prefontaine DC and Lee J The Rule of Law and the Independence of the Judiciary (1998) 164. Paper 
prepared for the World Conference on the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Montreal December 
7- 9 1998. 
http://rs.sqdi.org/volumes/11.2_-_prefontaine-lee.pdf (Accessed 24 April 2011). 
53
Motala Z ‗Toward an Appropriate Understanding of the Separation of Powers and Accountability of the 
Executive and Public Service under the new South African order‘ (1995) 112 SALJ 503 518. 
54
Meyerson D ‗The Rule of Law and Separation of Powers‘ 2004 Macquarie Law Journal 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MqLJ/2004/1.html (Accessed 15 August 2011). 
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Smith v Mutasa NO 1989 (3) ZLR 189 (SC). 
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essential pillars of a democratic state as it enables citizens of a state to obtain a legal 
remedy for their claims.57 
This research seeks to show that for the judiciary to be able to preserve and promote 
the purport, spirit and objects of the Constitution, the Constitution of Zimbabwe must be 
enforced in such a manner as to prevent any interference with the functions of the 
judiciary in order to ensure that its independence is upheld, thus improving the human 
rights situation in the country.  
1.4 Research Aims and Objectives 
1.4.1 Aims 
This research seeks to show how the completed constitutional reforms that culminated 
in the adoption of the Constitution of Zimbabwe can be used as a foundation for the 
improved protection and promotion of human rights values by the judiciary in Zimbabwe. 
As a result of its loss of independence, the judiciary has been unable to deliver on its 
constitutional mandate. In order to ensure that there is an improvement in the judicial 
protection of human rights, the Constitution of Zimbabwe has been adopted to address 
this issue. This research will analyse the role of the Constitution of Zimbabwe and the 
significance, if any, of the reforms in the Constitution on the protection of the 
independence of the judiciary and the effects that such independence will have on the 
future of human rights protection in the country. 
1.4.2 Objectives 
 To examine the state of the judiciary before the Constitution of Zimbabwe was 
drafted and the factors that necessitated the drafting of the new Constitution. 
 To critically review the legal significance of the Constitution of Zimbabwe with 
regards to the independence of the judiciary. 
 To examine what must be done in the light of the Constitution of Zimbabwe to 
more effectively protect judicial independence. 
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 To make recommendations on how the Constitution of Zimbabwe may contribute 
to an improved protection of human rights by the judiciary.  
 To examine if other measures, besides the judicial reforms, need to be taken in 
order to improve the human rights situation in the country. 
 
1.5 Research Questions 
 What is the importance and significance of judicial independence in the 
protection of human rights? 
 What are the most practical and effective measures to ensure judicial 
independence in Zimbabwe? 
 Do the new Zimbabwean constitutional provisions on judicial independence 
suffice? 
 What can be done to further strengthen weaknesses (if any) with regards to 
constitutional provisions on the independence of the judiciary? 
 Are there any other measures that need to be taken to improve human rights 
protection in the country? 
 
1.6 Literature Review 
An array of literature has been written about the human rights abuses and the conduct 
of the judiciary in Zimbabwe. A great volume of this literature will be referred to in the 
body of the thesis. The literature explores the extent of the human rights abuses in the 
country as well as analysing the various reasons that have contributed to such abuses. 
An array of literature has also been written with regard to the independence of the 
judiciary and how such independence is vital to the effective functioning of the judiciary. 
Wade and Bradley58  make an in-depth analysis of the importance of the doctrine of 
judicial independence. The authors analyse how it is vital that the separation of powers 
doctrine should be maintained in any jurisdiction so as to ensure that the judiciary 
closely guards its independence and also to ensure that other organs of the state 
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remain accountable for their actions. The same subject is also addressed by McQuoid 
et al59, who attach much significance to the importance of the doctrine of separation of 
powers and judicial independence in the protection of human rights.  
English and Stapleton60  look at the importance of the courts as they play a central role 
in maintaining the rule of law which is essential for the protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. The authors also emphasise the importance of an independent 
judiciary in the protection of human rights and state that an independent judiciary is one 
of the cornerstones of a democracy.61 An independent judiciary is therefore an essential 
component in the proper administration of the rule of law. 
Simmons discusses how the doctrines of rule of law and separation of powers are an 
integral part in the maintenance of judicial independence in any jurisdiction.62  Despite 
the varying interpretations given to the rule of law, there are basic underlying tenets 
associated with the rule of law doctrine63, and Feltoe states that the rule of law includes 
the following concepts discussed below: 
‗The rule of law is an essential foundation of any democratic system. It is a complex 
concept but its core aspects are straightforward. The rule of law requires that power be 
exercised in accordance with the law and disallows the arbitrary use of extra legal power. 
Everyone should therefore be equally subject to the law and no other law should be 
above the law. Law enforcement agencies and the courts should enforce and apply the 
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McQuoid-Mason D, O‘Brien EL and Green E (eds) Human Rights for All: Education Towards a Rights 
Culture (1993) 33. 
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English K and Stapleton A The Human Rights Handbook: A Practical Guide to Monitoring Human Rights 
(1997) 80. 
61
English K and Stapleton A (1997) 80. 
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Commonwealth Magistrates‟ and Judges Association 8-11. 
63
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law impartially and the law should protect everyone equally against illegal action causing 
harm.‘
64 
The academic input by the mentioned authors on the above subject will therefore add 
great value to this research. 
The importance of an independent judiciary in the protection of human rights is a 
fundamental element of democracy and the protection of human rights since the 
judiciary exercises checks and balances on other organs of state to ensure that there is 
no abuse of power.65 Rautenbach and Malherbe discuss the importance of issues, such 
as, separation of powers and judicial independence.66 The authors discuss the 
importance of separation of powers and why the judiciary should be free from executive 
control to ensure the effective functioning of the judiciary. Authors, such as, Eso67, 
Savage and Chimhini68 and Currie69, also discuss the importance of the separation of 
powers and judicial independence.70 
Saller conducted a detailed study of the judicial institution in Zimbabwe.71 The author 
dealt with the doctrine of separation of powers and discussed the issue of whether the 
judiciary is indeed independent from other organs of state. The book also deals with the 
importance and role of the judiciary in the protection of human rights.72 Authors, such 
as, Hatchard et al73 and Madhuku74, have conducted a detailed study of the 
independence of the judiciary in Zimbabwe and other jurisdictions in Africa. Such 
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studies have established the best practices in the protection of the independence of the 
judiciary. 
Bond and Manyanya clearly depict the economic history of Zimbabwe and how the 
negative economic situation in Zimbabwe has resulted in severe economic difficulties75, 
which have subsequently forced judges to be at the mercy of the executive. The 
negative economic situation has forced members of the judiciary to become reliant on 
government donations and has resulted in the impartiality of judges being questioned.76  
A number of scholarly articles have been written on the state of the human rights 
situation in Zimbabwe and on the failure of the current judiciary to effectively protect 
human rights due to the loss of its independence. A report by the International Bar 
Association (IBA) on the justice system in Zimbabwe, published in 2004, examines how 
the justice system had collapsed in Zimbabwe.77 The report shows how the judiciary 
and the justice system have been compromised. The report depicts the non- existence 
of transparency in judicial appointments and how the appointment of judges is clearly 
influenced by political considerations.78 The report shows the partisan nature of the 
Zimbabwean judiciary and how several members of the judiciary have chosen to protect 
the interest of the ruling party and how other judges and lawyers, perceived to be 
unsympathetic to government policy, have been victimised and forced to flee the 
country.79 The report clearly depicts the collapse of the judicial institution and how such 
collapse has contributed to the increased culture of human rights abuses in the country. 
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Another report published by the International Bar Association‘s Human Rights Institute 
(IBAHRI) and the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA) in 2011 focuses 
on the human rights situation in Zimbabwe.80  The report looks at the current state of the 
judiciary in the country and how the executive and the police have consistently 
interfered with the functioning of the courts.81 The report reveals how such interference 
has made it difficult for the courts to function independently since many orders of the 
courts have been ignored by the police force, which has developed a tendency of 
conducting its duties along political lines.82 This has resulted in increased human rights 
violations since perpetrators of human rights violations are seen to be beyond the reach 
of the law. 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) has also published several articles on the abuse of human 
rights in Zimbabwe. HRW in several of its reports depicts how human rights violations 
have been a consistent practice in Zimbabwe.83 Its reports also depict the state of the 
judiciary and how it has been compromised through the persistent interference with its 
duties by the executive.84 Other reports give a detailed analysis of the human rights 
situation in the country and how the formation of the Government of National Unity 
(GNU) failed to end human rights violations in the country.85 These reports provide 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
15 September 2011). Justice Benjamin Paradza was arrested in his chambers on 17 February 2003 for 
allegedly obstructing the course of justice. Justice Paradza had a long history of passing judgments 
perceived to be unfavourable to the ruling authorities. The arrest led to the judge fleeing Zimbabwe and 
sought asylum in New Zealand. 
http://www.queensu.ca/samp/migrationnews/article.php?Mig_News_ID=2833&Mig_News_Issue=15&Mig
_News_Cat=11 (Accessed 15 September 2011). 
80
International Bar Association Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI) and Open Society Initiative for Southern 
Africa (OSISA) (2011).  
81
International Bar Association Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI) and Open Society Initiative for Southern 
Africa (OSISA) (2011) 25. 
82
International Bar Association Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI) and Open Society Initiative for Southern 
Africa (OSISA) (2011) 25. See also International Bar Association Partisan Policing: An Obstacle to 
Human Rights and Democracy in Zimbabwe (2007) 8. 
www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx%3FDocumentUid%3De4d35d9f-0fd2-4ee0-81af-
05bd80e2277e+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=za (Accessed 13 April 2012). 
83
Human Rights Watch Diamonds in the Rough Human Rights Abuses in the Marange Diamond Fields of 
Zimbabwe (2009) 3-6. 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2009/06/26/diamonds-rough-0 (Accessed 23 April 2012). 
84
Human Rights Watch (2008) 2. 
85
Human Rights Watch World Report 2011: Zimbabwe (2011) 1-4.  
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/zimbabwe_1.pdf (Accessed 30 November 2011). 
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useful information on the human rights abuses in the country and the present state of 
the judiciary 
Although the literature discussed above is important in the discussion of judicial 
independence and judicial protection of human rights, it however does not cover any 
issues relating to the independence of the judiciary under the new constitutional 
dispensation in Zimbabwe. Although this thesis relies on the above scholarly writings, 
this study goes beyond these scholarly writings and endeavours to analyse the 
significance of the new constitutional dispensation in Zimbabwe. This is done in order to 
highlight whether the new constitutional dispensation will bode well for the 
independence of the judiciary and thus lead to an improvement of the judicial protection 
of human rights in Zimbabwe. 
1.7 Research Methodology 
This research was desk based. As a desk based research, it was conducted through 
library search, and the use of various internet sources. The author analysed the law and 
jurisprudence on the independence of the judiciary in relation to human rights 
protection. Given that this research seeks to emphasise the importance of an 
independent judiciary in human rights protection, a substantial part of this thesis 
analyses a number of scholarly writings on this aspect. Case law and International 
instruments are also used to highlight the importance of this aspect in human rights 
protection. This research also makes a historical analysis of the protection of human 
rights by the judiciary in Zimbabwe. This is done in order to highlight the performance of 
the judiciary over the years with regards to human rights protection. The historical 
analysis brings out the marked differences in the protection of human rights and how 
the present judiciary has lagged behind in the protection of human rights. The research 
also makes use of a comparative study of the protection of judicial independence in 
countries, such as, Uganda, South Africa, and Canada. The comparative analysis is 
made to establish the best practices in the protection of judicial independence and how 
these countries have incorporated international instruments relating to judicial 
independence, thus enhancing the protection of judicial independence at the national 
level. 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
1.8 Outline of Chapters 
This research is divided into seven chapters 
Chapter One deals with the general outline of the research. It outlines the aims, 
objectives, problem statement, assumptions underlying the research, rationale, 
limitations of the research, and the methodology. 
Chapter Two will look at the importance and significance of the doctrine of judicial 
independence in the protection of human rights. This chapter will focus on the 
international and African regional instruments that seek to give effect to the protection 
and importance of the independence of the judiciary in human rights protection. 
Chapter Three will deal with the historical analysis of the state of the judiciary in 
Zimbabwe from the independence era up to the present. The historical analysis will 
highlight the performance of the judiciary over the years with regards to human rights 
protection. The historical analysis will bring out the marked differences in the protection 
of human rights and how the present judiciary has lagged behind in the protection of 
human rights. 
Chapter Four will provide a comparative analysis of the protection of judicial 
independence in countries, such as, Uganda, South Africa, and Canada. The 
comparative analysis will be made to establish the best practices in the protection of 
judicial independence and how these countries have incorporated international 
instruments, thus enhancing the protection of judicial independence at the national 
level. 
Chapter Five will look at the Constitution of Zimbabwe and the factors that have 
necessitated the drafting of the new Constitution. The chapter will review the legal 
significance of the new constitutional dispensation on the independence of the judiciary 
and the impact of the new constitutional dispensation on the independence of the 
judiciary and human rights protection in the country. 
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Chapter Six will look at whether there is a need to put in place other measures, which 
can be used to complement the role of the judiciary in the protection and promotion of 
human rights. 
Chapter Seven provides the conclusions of the research concerning the protection of 
human rights and the functioning of the judiciary in Zimbabwe. The chapter will also 
provide adequate recommendations which will aid in the strengthening of judicial 
independence and human rights protection in Zimbabwe. 
1.9 Limitations 
A key limitation of this research is the availability of substantial primary and secondary 
sources concerning this delicate subject in a country that is eager to gag or limit any 
discussions concerning judicial independence and human rights protection. The lack of 
availability of such information (after the Fast Track Land Reform) has been a hindrance 
in getting vital information relating to the study. This problem can mainly be seen in the 
lack of case law relating to human rights issues. Although a few of these cases are 
reported on databases, a substantial number of vital human rights cases remain 
unreported.  
This research notes that there is an array of jurisprudence on human rights issues in 
Zimbabwe since independence. This will therefore present a challenge with regards to 
the methodology for the selection of cases and thus the study may not be exhaustive of 
all the human rights jurisprudence. Thus, the research will highlight landmark human 
rights cases since independence in Zimbabwe. The same will also be done in the 
comparative analysis chapter. A discussion of all human rights judgments in Zimbabwe 
and in the comparative analysis chapter is beyond the scope of this research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE IMPORTANCE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN HUMAN RIGHTS 
PROTECTION BY THE JUDICIARY: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE  
2 Introduction 
The judicial system in a country is central to the protection of human rights and 
freedoms.86 This is so because courts play a major role in ensuring that victims or 
potential victims of human rights violations obtain effective remedies and protection.87 
The existence of an independent judiciary has become a mantra for international 
institutions and governments around the world.88 It is widely believed that an 
independent judiciary is one of the strongest guarantees for upholding the rule of law 
and the protection of human rights in any society. It is also argued that a strong judiciary 
is one of the elements of the rule of law.89 As a result of the pivotal role which the 
judiciary plays in the governance of states and in the lives of individuals, many efforts 
have been made internationally to formulate and enact rules that are designed to 
protect the judiciary and ensure that it performs its mandate and secure it from undue 
influence. This chapter, therefore, seeks to emphasise the importance of judicial 
independence in the protection of human rights and identify various international 
instruments that have been put into place to protect and promote the independence of 
the judiciary. These international law principles provide guidelines that can be used by 
states around the world to effectively promote and protect the independence of the 
judiciary 
 
 
 
                                                          
86
It should be noted that this research recognises that in any democracy, the judiciary is not the only body 
tasked with human rights protection. This is so because there are other national bodies of organs such as 
the police, NGOs and national human rights institutions that are also tasked with human rights protection. 
Since the focus on this thesis is on the judiciary, specific reference will be made on the role of the 
judiciary as the other bodies fall outside the scope of discussion of this thesis. 
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2.1 Judicial Independence and Human Rights Protection 
The importance of an independent judiciary in human rights protection has been noted 
as the indispensable cog in the machinery for securing individual protection against 
states‘ human rights abuses.90 Keith notes that in order to ensure that it act as a check 
on the potential excesses of both the executive and legislative branches, only an 
independent and impartial judiciary may effectively guarantee the protection of human 
rights.91 Meron notes that judicial independence is critical for the rule of law and thus 
ensures that judges who are independent of political or other pressures are able to 
adjudicate disputes brought before them with an eye to the guiding legal principles and 
without any undue influence by external sources.92 Abul-Ethem also notes that one of 
the vital ways to keep human rights safe is by preserving the prevailing role of the 
judiciary.93 
Meron also notes that judicial independence plays a key role in the protection of human 
rights, as it allows judges to act within the confines of the law, thus ensuring 
predictability of their decisions. This would be so because these decisions would be 
based on existing law, judicial precedent, and the unbiased application of the law to the 
facts in issue.94 Abul-Ethem supports this view and states that in cases where the 
judiciary makes equitable decisions, such decisions set a valuable precedent for the 
future resolution of disputes between individuals or between the State and individuals.95 
Thus the judicial process provides for the effective implementation of the law, the 
protection of the rights of individuals and groups, and sets standards for the subsequent 
equitable enforcement of the law.96 This will result in human rights receiving effective 
protection from the courts.97  
                                                          
90
Nsereko DD ‗The Police, Human Rights, and the Constitution‘ (1993) 15 Hum. Rts. Q. 465-468. 
91
Keith LC (2002) 195. 
92
Meron T ‗Judicial Independence and Impartiality in International Criminal Tribunals‘ (2005) 99:2 The 
American Journal of International Law 359 359. 
93
Abul-Ethem F ‗The Role of the Judiciary in the Protection of Human Rights and Development: A Middle 
Eastern Perspective‘ (2002) 26:3 Fordham International Law Journal 761 761. 
94
Meron T (2005) 359. See also Abul-Ethem F (2002) 762. 
95
Abul-Ethem F (2002) 762. 
96
Abul-Ethem F (2002) 762. 
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Abul-Ethem F (2002) 762. 
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Abul-Ethem further notes that in a system where human rights receive effective 
protection from the courts, parties to a dispute are able to present evidence in an 
endeavor to make the court correctly understand the facts of the dispute, and 
consequently rule in a just manner, reinstating their rights.98 As a result of the common 
opinion that an independent judiciary is the strongest guarantee for upholding the rule of 
law and the protection of human rights, a number of international instruments recognise 
the link between the independence of the judiciary and human rights. These 
international instruments, which are discussed in detail in this chapter, place great 
emphasis on the importance of an independent judiciary as one of the most essential 
elements for safeguarding human rights. International standards for securing judicial 
independence have also been put into place in order to emphasise the importance of an 
independent judiciary in human rights protection. These standards are also discussed in 
detail in this chapter.  
2.2 Defining the Concept of Judicial Independence 
Madhuku notes that the independence of the judiciary is a logical collarry of the principle 
of separation of powers in that the vesting of the judicial functions in a body of persons 
separate from the executive and the legislature can only have real meaning if the body 
of persons is truly independent.99 Judicial independence has over the years been 
frequently touted as the lynchpin of a democratic society and the rule of law.100 
However, despite the significant emphasis on the importance of judicial independence, 
a concrete or consistent definition of the term has proven to be elusive. Tiede  notes 
that part of the problem of attempting to define judicial independence is that the use of 
the term is amoebic, changing shape to fit the particular context in which it is used and 
with the question of who or what the judiciary should be ―independent‖ from.101 Although 
judicial independence is understood to be a dynamic concept that may be defined in 
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Abul-Ethem F (2002) 762. 
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Madhuku L ‗Constitutional Protection of the Independence of the Judiciary: A Survey of the Position in 
Southern Africa‘ (2002) 46:2 Journal of African Law 232 232. 
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Simmons D (2001) 8-11. 
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different ways, it is generally referred to as shorthand for the judiciary‘s independence 
from the executive and legislative branches of government.102  
 Eso in providing the definition of the independence of the judiciary mainly inclined to 
the institutional independence of the judiciary, with the executive and legislature playing 
a key role in ensuring that the judiciary remains independent. He stated that: 
‗The concept of an independent judiciary implies, first that the powers exercised by the 
court in the adjudication of disputes is independent of legislative and executive power, so 
as to make it usurpation to attempt to exercise it either directly by legislation, as by a bill 
of attainder, or by vesting any part of it in a body which is not a court; secondly, that the 
personnel of the court are independent of the legislature and the executive as regards 
their appointment, removal and other conditions of service.‘
103
 
On the other hand, Green provides a comprehensive definition of the concept of judicial 
independence and defines it as the capacity of the courts to perform their constitutional 
function free from interference by and apparent dependence upon, any persons or 
institutions, including, in particular, the executive arm of government, over which they do 
not exercise direct control.104 
The above definition emphasises the fact that when exercising judicial functions, judges 
should be free from any direct or indirect interference by the executive, any institution or 
any private individuals. Despite the several definitions provided for the concept of 
judicial independence and the complexity of the whole concept, scholars have generally 
agreed that the concept generally has to do with the independence of the judiciary from 
the executive and legislative arms of government. It should be noted that the main 
emphasis on judicial independence serves to ensure that there is a curtailment of any 
abuse by the government and hence in order to ensure that there are no violations of 
human rights or freedoms, the judiciary should therefore be afforded the opportunity to 
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exercise its authority as the guardian of the constitution and protector of human 
rights.105 
As can be seen from the discussion above the notion of judicial independence derives 
from the doctrine of separation of powers106, as advocated by Montesquieu. 
Montesquieu opined that if the judiciary were not independent of the legislature and the 
executive, the law could not be employed as a means of ensuring liberty and advancing 
human rights. Hence in such circumstances the law could not empower an affected 
citizen to challenge the lawfulness or otherwise of any legislation or executive actions 
that would impede a citizen‘s rights. Hence, in order to fully guarantee the protection of 
human rights, it is important that a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal has to 
be established in accordance with the law to guarantee the protection of human rights. 
This guarantee ensures that individual human and constitutional rights of a party to a 
dispute are decided by a neutral body, be it judicial or quasi-judicial. In this instance it is 
important to note that it is not enough for the judiciary, as an institution, to be 
independent as individual judges must be seen to be objective and impartial. Thus, the 
next paragraph makes a distinction between judicial independence and judicial 
impartiality.  
2.2.1 Distinction between Judicial Independence and Judicial Impartiality 
A number of jurists have opined that the concepts of judicial independence and 
impartiality overlap and thus can hardly be clearly distinguished.107 However, there are 
scholars who have also opined that judicial independence and impartiality are two 
distinct concepts and therefore must be distinguished.108 As has been already stated 
above, scholars have generally agreed that the concept of judicial independence 
generally has to do with the independence of the judiciary from the executive and 
legislative arms of government, the press, media, public debate, and political parties. As 
such judges should be free from any ‗inappropriate‘ influence in their decisions.  
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Impartiality, on the other hand, relates to a specific case at hand. The guarantee of 
impartiality plays a pivotal role in the protection of an individual‘s rights. The concept of 
impartiality entails that a judge must not be biased in favour of any party to a dispute. 
Treschel notes that ‗a judge must be free to float hither and thither between the 
positions of the parties and finally reach a decision at the place which, in correct 
application of the law and rules of jurisprudence, marks the just solution.‘109 
The distinction between judicial independence and impartiality has been dealt with by a 
number of courts. In the case of Valente v The Queen, the Supreme Court of Canada 
held that: 
‗Although recognising the ‗close relationship between the two, they are nevertheless 
separate and distinct requirements. Specifically, impartiality refers to a state of mind or 
attitude of the tribunal in relation to the issues and the parties in a particular case. The 
word ―independent‖, however, connotes not only the state of mind or attitude in the actual 
exercise of the judicial functions, but a status or relationship with others particularly to the 
executive branch of government.‘
110
 
In the case of R v Lippe, in making a distinction between judicial independence and 
judicial impartiality it was stated that: 
‗..Judicial independence is critical to the public‘s perception of impartiality; judicial 
independence is the cornerstone, a necessary prerequisite, for judicial impartiality.‘
111
 
The distinction between judicial independence and judicial impartiality has also been 
emphasised in the case of Prosecutor v Kanyabashi where the International Criminal 
Tribunal stated that:  
‗Judicial independence connotes the freedom from external pressures and interference. 
Impartiality is characterised by objectivity in balancing the legal interests at play.‘
112
 
However, it is crucial to note that despite the existence of jurisprudence that seeks to 
differentiate between judicial independence and impartiality, the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has noted that at times the distinction 
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between the two terms is complicated and not always transparent. In the case of Holm v 
Sweden113, the Court found it difficult to examine the issues of independence and 
impartiality separately.114 Similarly in the case of Debled v Belgium115, the ECHR found 
that it was unnecessary to examine issues of independence and impartiality separately. 
Another case that illustrates that the ECHR does not attach much importance to the 
distinction between judicial independence and impartiality is that of Findlay v United 
Kingdom. In the case of Findlay v United Kingdom, the Court held that: 
‗The concept of independence and objective impartiality are closely linked and the court 
will consider them together as they relate to the present case.‘
116
 
It should be noted that despite the differences between judicial independence and 
impartiality, as noted above, this research recognises that judicial independence plays a 
key role in the protection of human rights and forms a prerequisite for judicial 
impartiality.  The concept of judicial independence has two important elements: the 
individual independence of the judges and the institutional independence of judges. The 
significance and importance of these elements will be discussed below. 
2.3 Individual Independence of the Judiciary 
The individual independence of the judiciary entails a number of factors that help to 
ensure that judges can act free from the influence of any outside sources.117 Individual 
independence of judges means that judges should be free to exercise judicial functions 
without any fear or anticipation of retaliation or reward.118 It therefore means that in 
making their decisions judges should decide cases impartially based on the facts of the 
case and their understanding of the law and without any direct or indirect influence on 
their decisions.119 In performing their functions it is of paramount importance that judges 
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should arrive at decisions in a regular as opposed to an arbitrary manner, thus ensuring 
that justice is dispensed and also ensuring and gaining the confidence of the general 
public in the whole judicial system.120 According to Singh, the individual independence 
of judges consists of three elements: personal, substantive and internal 
independence.121 
2.3.1 Personal Independence 
The characteristics of personal independence of the judiciary entail that judges must 
have security of tenure either in the form of life-long appointments, set terms of office or 
a mandatory retirement age, adequate remuneration and pensions and a well-defined 
process for their removal.122 The safeguarding of the personal independence of the 
judiciary is important in ensuring that judges can be able to decide cases without fear or 
favour. This would therefore make it difficult for the executive or the legislature to 
dismiss judges in retaliation for unfavourable judgments.123   
2.3.1.1 Appointments 
The appointment process of judges is crucial in safeguarding the individual 
independence of judges. It is mandatory that judicial appointments should be made on 
the basis of clearly defined criteria and by a publicly declared process. The appointment 
process should also ensure that individuals appointed to the judicial bench are of 
integrity and have ability and the necessary training and qualifications.124  
In terms of international law there are no binding procedures and standards for 
appointing judges. Although each state is left to design its own procedures and 
standards, such procedures should be transparent, clear and impartial. It is also crucial 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
improper  influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter 
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that appointments should be made by an independent body as is the case in most 
African countries, where the JSC is tasked with judicial appointments. The 
establishment of an independent body for judicial appointment finds support in the 
African Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance 
(African Principles)125 and the Commonwealth Principles on the Accountability of and 
Relationship on the Three Branches of Government (Latimer House Principles).126 An 
independent body, such as the JSC, is tasked with identifying and selecting individuals 
who will uphold the independence of the judiciary. International law also recognises that 
the other arms of government may make judicial appointments but favours 
appointments by an independent body so as to avoid partisan appointments to the 
judiciary.127 Although there are no binding procedures and standards for appointing 
judges, it is crucial that in order to safeguard the independence of the judiciary, any 
method of judicial selection must safeguard against judicial appointments for improper 
motives.128 
2.3.1.2 Tenure and Removal 
In order to secure the independence of the judiciary, appointments should ensure that 
the tenure of judicial officers is protected. The securing of the security of tenure of 
judges helps to ensure that judges discharge their duties impartially without any threat 
over the non-renewal of their contracts. Thus, international law prefers that non-
renewable or long term security of tenure129 are ideal for securing the independence of 
the judiciary and that such security of tenure should be guaranteed under domestic 
legislation.130 
The personal independence of the judiciary is also protected through the provision of 
removal procedures that are clear, and that reasons for removal must be provided.131 
International law recognises that judges should be removed from office only in cases 
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where there is ‗serious misconduct‘, a disciplinary or criminal offence, or incapacity to 
discharge judicial functions.132 The process for the removal of a judge should be 
transparent and investigations for the removal of a judge should be conducted by an 
independent body so as to ensure impartiality. To ensure impartiality and transparency, 
a judge should be notified of the reasons for removal and should be afforded a fair 
hearing by an independent and impartial body.133 The protection of the removal 
conditions of judges goes a long way in securing the independence of the judiciary. 
2.3.1.3 Financial Security 
Financial security of the judiciary is also crucial in maintaining individual judicial 
independence as it would prevent other branches of government from using threats of 
salary deductions to influence judges. Financial security therefore ensures that the 
judicial system is able to operate effectively without any undue constraints which may 
hamper the independence of the judiciary.134 A number of international instruments 
have been put into place and these recognise the need for the judiciary to be given 
sufficient resources. The instruments, amongst others, include the United Nations Basic 
Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (hereinafter UN Basic Principles)135, the 
Latimer House Guidelines136 and the Guidelines on a Right to a Fair Trial in Africa.137 
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2.3.2 Substantive Independence  
Substantive independence of the judiciary refers to the freedom of judges to perform 
their judicial functions independently.138 Substantive independence requires that the 
judge in his or her decision-making process is only bound by law and not by any 
determination or other means of influence by other parties. This applies not only vis-à-
vis the litigants but also vis-à-vis the entire government.139 The substantive 
independence of judges therefore requires that in the process of performing their 
functions judges should be free from direct or indirect influence or improper influence or 
pressures. Judges should therefore be in a position to make decisions based on the 
facts at hand, and through the proper application of the law, and hence as a result 
judgments are made without fear or favour.140 
In accordance with the substantive independence of the judiciary judges therefore have 
a right and duty to decide cases before them in accordance with the law, and free from 
any external interference. This is mainly enforced by Principle 2 of the UN Basic 
Principles which states that: 
‗The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in 
accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, 
pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any 
reason.‘
141
 
The above quotation highlights the importance of the impartiality of judges in upholding 
the right to a fair trial. Although the concepts of independence and impartiality are 
separate, they both form an integral part of the way in which courts must exercise their 
judicial functions. This therefore means that the court cannot be perceived to be 
impartial if it is not perceived as independent.142 In order to give effect to the right to a 
fair trial, judges have a duty to ensure that they remain impartial and the State and other 
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institutions and private parties have an obligation to refrain from putting pressure on or 
inducing judges to rule in a certain manner, and judges have a correlative duty to 
conduct themselves impartially.143 Principle 8 of the UN Basic Principles further states 
that ‗Judges shall always conduct themselves in such a manner to preserve the dignity 
of their office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.‘144 
2.3.3 Internal Independence  
Internal independence of the judiciary means that the independence of a judge from his 
or her fellow judges. This is so because the independence of individual judges may be 
undermined not only by outside sources but also by fellow judges, particularly by senior 
judges using their administrative power and control.145 It is important that judges should 
have unfettered freedom to decide cases impartially, in accordance with their 
conscience and their interpretation of the facts, and in pursuance of the prevailing rules 
of law. However, it is important to note that not all influences from senior judges should 
be regarded as a violation of the individual independence of judges. This is so because 
under common law, the decisions of superior courts must be followed by lower courts 
and hence the influence of superior judges‘ judicial decisions is therefore not 
objectionable. It should be noted that the internal independence of the judiciary is also 
protected under the Beijing Statement of the Principles of the Independence of the 
Judiciary in the LAWASIA region146, and the Montreal Universal Declaration on the 
Independence of Justice.147 
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2.4 Institutional Independence 
The institutional independence of the judiciary requires that the judiciary should be able 
to function without interference from other organs of state. The notion of institutional 
independence requires that the judicial institution ―ought not to be tied to the apron 
strings of the executive.‖148 The main idea behind securing the institutional 
independence of the judiciary is to ensure that the judiciary is not dependent on the 
executive or the legislature in its operations.149 Any such dependence would therefore 
affect the performance of judicial duties by individual judges.  Institutional independence 
is necessary to ensure and secure the individual independence of judges and creates 
an environment in which judges are able to exercise their judicial functions without fear 
or favour.150 
The notion of institutional independence of the judiciary is set out in Principle 1 of the 
UN Basic Principles151 which places a duty on all institutions to respect and observe and 
ensure that the institutional independence of the judiciary is guaranteed. The UN Basic 
Principles stipulate that the judiciary has to be independent of the other branches of 
government, namely, the executive and legislature, which like all other State institutions 
have a duty to respect and abide by judgments and decisions of the judiciary. The 
independence of the judiciary with regards to decision making is therefore essential for 
the upholding of the rule of law and human rights. 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in emphasising the importance of 
institutional independence and how it is related to other issues has stated that: 
‗The requirement of the independence necessitates that courts be autonomous from the 
other branches of government, free from influence, threats or interference from any 
source and for any reason, and benefit from other characteristics necessary for ensuring 
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the correct and independent performance of judicial functions, including tenure and 
appropriate professional training‘
152
 
The Human Rights Committee has laid down a number of requirements as being 
essential in securing the institutional independence of the judiciary. It has pointed out 
that delays in the payment of salaries and the lack of adequate security of tenure for 
judges have an adverse effect on the independence of the judiciary.153 It has also 
considered the lack of any independent mechanism responsible for the recruitment and 
discipline of judges as limiting the independence of the judiciary.154  
International law contains a number of provisions that are related to securing the 
institutional independence of the judiciary. The UN Basic Principles provide that the 
assignment of cases to judges within the courts to which they belong is an internal 
matter of judicial administration.155 It is important to note that the fact that allocation of 
cases should be an internal matter of judicial administration is to ensure that judges 
hear cases impartially. This seeks to avoid the control of the outcome of particular 
cases which could be assigned to specific judges who could potentially rule in favour of 
particular interests. In respect of other aspects of court administration the Montreal 
Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice 1983 provides that: 
‗It shall be a priority of the highest order, for the state to provide adequate resources to 
allow for the due administration of justice, including physical facilities appropriate for the 
maintenance of judicial independence, dignity and efficiency, judicial and administrative 
personnel, and operating budgets.‘
156
 
The Beijing Statement on the Independence of the Judiciary in LAWASIA Region 
provides that the appointment, supervision and disciplinary control of administrative 
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personnel and support staff must vest in the judiciary or in a body in which the judiciary 
is represented and has an effective role.157 
The above discussion highlights how the independence of the judiciary is crucial in 
ensuring that judges are free from any external control in the exercise of their duties. 
Such independence therefore bodes well for the protection of human rights in any 
jurisdiction. However, it should be noted that there are fundamental prerequisites for the 
establishment of a fairly independent judiciary which include the observance of the 
principle of separation of powers between the three organs of government, and the rule 
of law. The importance of these shall be discussed below: 
2.5 Separation of Powers 
The principle of the independence of the judiciary has its origin in the doctrine of 
separation of powers, which states that the three arms of government, that is, the 
executive, the legislature and the judiciary, must be independent of each other so as to 
avoid the concentration of power in one organ of the state.158 The principle therefore 
entails that at a minimum no branch of government should encroach on the powers of 
another branch of government and neither should a branch deprive another branch of 
government of the powers and resources necessary for performing its core functions 
and duties.159 
2.5.1 Origins of Separation of Powers 
The doctrine of separation of powers finds its origins in the ancient world, where 
theories of government and government functions were first developed.  This theory has 
over the years developed. In dealing with the doctrine of separation of powers, Aristotle 
in his ‗Politics‘ identified three elements or powers in a government. He noted that there 
was a deliberative element which dealt with, amongst other things, affairs concerning 
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war and peace, the enactment of laws and the appointment of officials.160 The second 
element focussed on the issue of public offices and dealt with the number of offices and 
the subjects that these offices could deal with and the tenure of the offices. The last 
element as noted by Aristotle dealt with the judicial system, mainly dealing with 
classification of the courts and the manner in which judges were appointed.161 
The doctrine of separation of powers is also expounded on by John Locke, who was an 
English political theorist. In his ‗The Second Treatise of Government‘ (1689), he 
envisaged a threefold classification of powers. Locke was able to draw a distinction 
between three types of power which mainly dealt with legislative, executive and 
federative powers. According to Locke, the legislative powers were supreme, and 
although the executive and federative powers were distinct, the former concerned with 
the execution of domestic law within the state and the latter with a state‘s security and 
external relations, he nevertheless took the view that ―they are always united‖ in the 
hands of the same persons. It should be noted that in his classification of the separation 
of powers, Locke never made any mention of a separate judicial power. He stated that 
the proper exercise of these powers was not done through separation but on the basis 
of trust.162 
2.5.2 Montesquieu and Separation of Powers 
 The doctrine of separation of powers was further developed in the 18th century by 
Montesquieu, a French jurist who further contributed new ideas to the theory and is 
recognised as the founder of the modern theory of judicial independence.163 
Montesquieu‘s formulation of the doctrine of judicial independence was mainly based on 
the British constitution of the early 18th century as he understood it.164 His contribution to 
political theory, ―The Spirit of Laws‖, was the product of his observations during his 
travels in Europe between 1728 and 173. He spent most of his time attending the court 
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of George II and it is widely believed that his exposure to English political life had a 
great influence on his writing.165  
Montesquieu in his theory on separation of powers stated that there should be 
separation of powers between the three organs of state to ensure that one organ 
checks on the others so as to prevent abuse of power.166 He stated that if this is not 
observed, it will be the end of everything as laws that are oppressive will be approved 
and this would therefore lead to tyranny and arbitrary rule.167 In his exposition on the 
separation of powers he stated that: 
‗Political liberty is to be found only when there is no abuse of power. But constant 
experience shows us that every man invested with power is liable to abuse it, and to 
carry his authority as far as it will go... To prevent this abuse, it is necessary from the 
nature of things that one power should be a check on another…When the executive and 
legislative powers are united in the same person or body... There can be no liberty if the 
judicial power is not separated from the legislature and the executive... There would be 
an end of everything, if the same person or body, whether of the nobles or of the people, 
were to exercise all three powers.‘
168
 
It is evident that according to Montesquieu the rationale underlying the separation of 
powers was to prevent the abuse of power and to avoid power being concentrated in an 
individual or group of persons.169 The separation of powers ensures that those 
entrusted with the drafting of laws are different from those who interpret, apply and put 
the law into effect.170  
In accordance with the separation of powers doctrine it is imperative that there must be 
a division of the government into three organs, namely the legislature, the executive and 
the judiciary. These organs should be kept distinct from each other and a clear 
distinction has to be made as to the exact functions or powers of each organ. However, 
it should be noted that as a result of the complexity of the doctrine of separation of 
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powers and the demands of the modern world, complete separation of powers is 
impossible in theory and in practice as it has been established that there is some 
overlapping of functions or powers amongst the three organs.171 However, it should be 
noted that the overlapping of powers should be in such a way that no organ of the state 
usurps the powers of the other organs.172 As a result the system of checks and 
balances plays a key role in the doctrine of separation of powers. Checks and balances 
seek to ensure that the organs of state perform the functions required of them.173 
Through the application of law, courts are therefore supposed to ensure that the other 
branches of government respect the rights of the people and do not act illegally. This is 
done in cases where the courts are often tasked with the duty to review the validity of 
legislation and the conduct of members of the executive branch of government. In order 
to ensure that courts carry out their duty and to fairly determine the legality of 
government action, courts must therefore be free from actual or perceived interference 
by other branches of the government.  
2.5.3 Separation of Powers and International Law 
The importance of the protection of the doctrine of separation of powers has received 
widespread recognition at the international level. The principle of separation of powers 
has been deemed to be the cornerstone of an independent and impartial justice system. 
The Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers has stated that, 
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‗the separation of powers and the executive respect for such independence is a sine 
quo non for an independent and impartial judiciary to function effectively.‘174 
The Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers has also further 
emphasised the importance of separation of powers and has stated that: 
‗The principle of separation of powers is the bedrock upon which the requirements of 
judicial independence and impartiality are founded. Understanding of, and respect for, the 
principle of the separation of powers is a sine quo non for a democratic State.‘
175
 
Further, the Inter- American Court of Human Rights has also expressed the importance 
of the maintenance of the separation of powers principle in any democratic society. The 
Court has stated that: ‗One of the principle purposes of the separation of public powers 
is to guarantee the independence of judges and therefore under the rule of law, the 
independence of judges must be guaranteed...‘176 On the other hand, the Human Rights 
Committee has also made several recommendations for States to adopt legislative and 
other measures to ensure that there is a clear distinction between the executive and 
judicial branches of government so as to avoid interference in matters for which the 
judiciary  is responsible.177 
2.6 Rule of Law 
The rule of law is a set of principles that has been promoted in many democracies in 
building democracy. The rule of law is closely linked to the concept of the modern state 
that seeks to address the interests of the community and the general population of its 
territory.178 Thus, the aim is to create stable, favourable conditions for all people in the 
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state territory to develop. The concept of the rule of law underpins these government 
functions and thus seeks to prevent abuse of the state‘s monopoly of force.179 
It should be noted that although there is no uniform international definition of the rule of 
law, the content and priorities of the concept are largely shaped by historical change, 
national differences and the influence of different social interests.180 However, it is 
agreed that the importance of the independence of the judiciary in the administration of 
the rule of law thus contemplates a form of government where the law is superior to, 
and thus binds, the government and all its officials.181 It is therefore necessary that the 
law must respect and preserve the dignity, equality and human rights of all persons.182 
It is also important that the law must establish and safeguard constitutional structures 
that are necessary in building a free society in which citizens have a say in shaping and 
enforcing the rules that govern them. The American Bar Association (ABA) notes that 
the law must devise and maintain systems to advise all persons of their rights, and also 
empower persons to fulfil just expectations and seek redress of grievances without 
penalty or retaliation.183 The ABA has developed a working definition of the rule of law 
which is based on the following principles: a system of self-government in which all 
persons, including the government, are accountable under the law184; a system based 
on fair, publicised, broadly understood stable law185; a fair, robust and accessible legal 
process in which rights and responsibilities based in law are enforced; and diverse 
competent and independent lawyers and judges.186 
                                                          
179
O‘Connor SD ‗Vindicating the Rule of Law; The Role of the Judiciary‘ (2003) 2 Chinese J. INT‟L 1 4. 
180
Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation ‗The Rule of Law-Concept: Significance in Development 
Cooperation‘  
file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/resource_en_23596.pdf (Accessed 7 April 2014). 
181
American Bar Association ‗The Rule of Law and an Independent Judiciary‘  
http://apps.americanbar.org/intlaw/committees/division_chair/section/Independent_Judiciary_White_Pape
r.pdf (Accessed 7 April 2013). 
182
American Bar Association ‗The Rule of Law and an Independent Judiciary‘  
http://apps.americanbar.org/intlaw/committees/division_chair/section/Independent_Judiciary_White_Pape
r.pdf (Accessed 7 April 2013). 
183
American Bar Association ‗The Rule of Law and an Independent Judiciary‘  
http://apps.americanbar.org/intlaw/committees/division_chair/section/Independent_Judiciary_White_Pape
r.pdf (Accessed 7 April 2013). 
184
 See also Stein R ‗Rule of Law: What Does it Mean?‘ (2009) 18:2 Minn J. Int‟L 293 302. 
185
Stein R (2009) 302. 
186
 American Bar Association ‗The Rule of Law and an Independent Judiciary‘  
 
 
 
 
41 
 
It should be noted that the rule of law concept is of universal validity and application and 
a society in which the rule of law is prevalent is marked by respect for law and an 
effective and independent judiciary in that society.187 The rule of law is therefore 
essential for any democratic system and should ensure that everyone is equal before 
the law.188 The connection between the rule of law and human rights is brought out in 
the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which emphasises 
the importance of human rights to be protected by the rule of law.  
2.7 International Perspective on the Independence of the Judiciary and 
Impartiality 
The judiciary plays a pivotal role in any democratic society, especially with regards to 
the protection of human rights. Its independence is therefore essential in the protection 
of human rights.189 It is therefore not surprising that many efforts have been made in 
various domestic jurisdictions and internationally to formulate and enact rules that are 
designed to protect the judiciary and ensure that it performs its mandate under optimum 
conditions. Many of these rules have therefore become part of the constitutional law of 
various jurisdictions around the world as they seek to secure the judiciary from undue 
influence and to make it as autonomous as possible within its own area.  
2.7.1 International Instruments 
2.7.1.1 United Nations Standards 
At the international level the milestone for the protection of the independence of the 
judiciary was reached in 1985 when the United Nations General Assembly adopted the 
Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary.190 These Principles, as the name 
suggests, list several basic principles aimed at securing the independence of the 
judiciary. The Principles deal with the importance of the independence of the judiciary. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://apps.americanbar.org/intlaw/committees/division_chair/section/Independent_Judiciary_White_Pape
r.pdf (Accessed 7 April 2013). See also Stein R (2009) 302. 
187
Gubbay A (2009) 2. 
188
Feltoe G (2001)131. 
189
Apple J (1997) 197. 
190
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 40/32 of 29 November 1985 and 40/146 of 13 December 
1985. 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
Amongst the most important of the Principles is that the independence of the judiciary 
shall be guaranteed by states and enshrined in the Constitution of the member state. It 
is the duty of all governments and other institutions to respect and observe the 
independence of the judiciary.191 The Principles further stipulate that all governments 
have the duty to respect and observe the independence of the judiciary and to ensure 
that the judiciary decides matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in 
accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influence, inducements, 
pressures, threats or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any 
reason.192 In accordance with the Principles, the judiciary is accorded jurisdiction over 
all issues of a judicial nature.  The judiciary has exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether 
an issue submitted for its decision is within its competence as defined by the law.193 
In seeking to protect the judiciary from any unwarranted interference, the UN Basic 
Principles guarantee that there shall not be any inappropriate or unwarranted 
interference with the judicial process, nor shall judicial decisions by the courts be 
subject to revision. It should be noted that this principle is without prejudice to judicial 
review or to mitigation or commutation by competent authorities of sentences imposed 
by the judiciary, in accordance with the law.194 The Principles also guarantee individuals 
the right to be tried by ordinary courts using established legal procedures. Tribunals that 
do not use duly established procedures of the legal process shall not be created to 
displace the jurisdiction belonging to the ordinary courts or judicial tribunals.195 The 
Principle of the independence of the judiciary entitles and requires the judiciary to 
ensure that judicial proceedings are conducted fairly and that the rights of parties are 
respected.196 Each Member State to the United Nations is required to provide adequate 
resources to enable the judiciary to perform its functions. 197 
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It should be noted that the above UN Basic Principles were not formulated as binding 
rules but as guides to Member States of the United Nations. These Principles seek to 
secure and promote the respect for and recognition of the independence of the judiciary 
in national legislation and practice and to advertise them to members of the executive, 
legislature and the general public. It is as a result thereof that many nations have 
incorporated most of these rules in their constitutions as advocated by the UN Basic 
Principles. 
The United Nations in seeking to encourage Member States to promote the 
independence of the judiciary has also adopted Procedures for the Effective 
Implementation of the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary198, and 
various other international instruments.199 The Procedures for the Effective 
Implementation of the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary seek to 
encourage all Member States to adopt and implement in their justice systems the Basic 
Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary in accordance with their constitutional 
processes and domestic practices.200 The instrument also requires States to ensure that 
the Basic Principles are widely publicised in at least the main or official language or 
languages of the respective country. Judges, lawyers, members of the executive, the 
legislature, and the public in general, shall be informed in the most appropriate manner 
of the content and importance of the Basic Principles so that they may promote their 
application within the framework of the justice system.201 
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The United Nations has also taken various steps in seeking to protect and promote the 
independence of the judiciary around the world. In 1994, the United Nations appointed a 
Special Rapporteur (Mr. Param Cumaraswamy)202 on the Independence of Judges and 
Lawyers as a result of the increase in the frequency of attacks on the independence of 
judges, lawyers and court officials and the gravity and frequency of human rights 
violations around the world.203 The mandate of the Special Rapporteur was to ensure 
and maintain the independence and impartiality of the judiciaries around the world. The 
Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers noted that ‗an 
independent judicial system is the constitutional guarantee of all human rights. 
Therefore the right to such a system is the right that protects all other human rights. 
Realisation of this right is a sine qua non for the realisation of all other rights.‘204 Over 
the years subsequent Special Rapporteurs on the Independence of Judges and 
Lawyers have reaffirmed on numerous occasions that the independence of the judiciary 
is a core component of democracy, the rule of law and good governance.205  
Since the establishment of the office, Special Rapporteurs have consistently adopted 
the position that the requirement of judicial independence is an obligation incumbent 
upon States as a matter of international law. They have described it as both an 
obligation imposed by conventions, including the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention against Torture (CAT), and also as a 
general principle of law recognised by the international community.206 Special 
Rapporteurs have also emphasised the particular importance of judicial independence 
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for the investigation, prosecution and, where appropriate, punishment of grave human 
rights violations.207 
The United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC) (formerly the Commission on Human 
Rights) has affirmed the principle of judicial independence and its importance for the 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The HRC has affirmed that ―an 
independent and impartial judiciary is a prerequisite for the protection of human rights 
and the application of the rule of law‖208 and that ―an independent judiciary in full 
conformity with applicable standards contained in international human rights 
instruments, is essential to the full and non-discriminatory realisation of human rights 
and indispensable to the democratic process.‖209 
2.7.1.2 Treaty Provisions 
The United Nations has adopted various treaty norms that seek to give effect to the 
importance of the independence of the judiciary. The International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR)210 (Zimbabwe is a state party to the covenant)211 states 
that: 
‗All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunal. In the determination of any 
criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone 
shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law.‘
212
 
The United Nations Human Rights Committee, the body charged with supervising the 
implementation of the ICCPR, in General Comment 32213 has provided guidance as to 
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the scope of the rights and obligations contained in Article 14 of the Covenant. The 
Committee has stated that: 
‗The notion of a tribunal in article 14, paragraph 1 designates a body that is independent 
of the executive and legislative branches of government and enjoys, in specific cases, 
judicial independence in deciding legal matters in proceedings that are judicial in 
nature.‘
214
 
Further the Human Rights Committee in General Comment 32 states that the 
requirement of competence, independence and impartiality of a tribunal in the sense of 
Article 14, paragraph 1, is absolute and not subject to any exception.215 The Human 
Rights Committee has over the years dealt with the requirement of judicial 
independence and has expressed concern at the failure of States to respect the 
obligation of judicial independence216 and has noted instances thereof, including 
political interference in the judicial process by State officials.217 
The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families218 (Zimbabwe is not a signatory to this treaty)219 also seeks 
to emphasise the importance of an independent judiciary in the dispensing of justice. 
The Convention states that: 
‗Migrant workers and members of their families shall have the right to equality with 
nationals of the Sate concerned before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of 
any criminal charge against them or of their rights and obligations in a suit of law, they 
shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law.‘
220
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The Committee against Torture has described judicial independence as an ‗essential 
quality for ensuring the application of the principal of legality.‘221 The Committee against 
Torture has over the years raised concerns about the compatibility of domestic 
arrangements with the obligation of judicial independence under the Convention against 
Torture in respect of several State parties, such as, Ethiopia222, Honduras223, Syria224 
and Yemen.225 In the light of these concerns the Committee against Torture has 
established the practice of recommending that domestic arrangements be reformed in 
accordance with relevant international standards.226 
The importance of an independent judiciary is further emphasised by the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC).227 It should be noted that Zimbabwe has signed and 
ratified this treaty.228 The Convention states that: 
‗Every child deprived of his or her liberty shall have the right to prompt access to legal 
and other appropriate assistance, as well as the right to challenge the legality of the 
deprivation of his or her liberty before a court or other competent, independent and 
impartial authority, and to a prompt decision on any such action.‘
229
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The discussion on the above treaty provisions seeks to emphasise the importance of 
the independence of the judiciary on the international plane and how treaties have been 
adopted to ensure that States around the world incorporate and implement the specific 
provisions on the importance of the protection of judicial independence and how it 
bodes well for the protection and promotion of human rights. It should also be noted that 
besides the treaty provisions, other declaratory norms which are non-binding have also 
been adopted by the United Nations to highlight the importance of an independent 
judiciary in any democratic society.230 
2.7.2 Other Global Standards 
Various global standards have been adopted to give effect to the protection of judicial 
independence in various jurisdictions around the world. Included amongst these is The 
Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct.231 The Bangalore Principles recognise as 
fundamental the principle that everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public 
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal in the determination of rights and 
obligations and of any criminal charge. The importance of an independent and impartial 
judiciary in the protection of human rights is also emphasised as the courts play an 
essential role in upholding constitutionalism and the rule of law.232 The Principles also 
emphasise the fact that judges should individually and collectively respect and honour 
the judicial office as a public trust and strive to enhance and maintain confidence in the 
judicial system.233 The importance of judges to function independently is also 
highlighted as judges must be independent and should decide cases based on their 
understanding of the law, free of any extraneous influences, inducements, pressure, 
threats or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.234 
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The Bangalore Principles also focus on the importance of impartiality of judges in 
discharging their duties.  Impartiality is deemed to be essential for the proper discharge 
of the judicial office and applies in the decision making process and the final decision of 
a judgment.235 It is therefore imperative that a judge should be able to perform his or her 
duties without fear or favour, bias or prejudice. The manner in which judges conduct 
themselves, both in and out of court, is important in maintaining and enhancing the 
confidence of the public, and therefore judges should conduct themselves in a 
professional manner and avoid occasions when the impartiality of a judge might be 
called in question.236 The values of integrity, propriety, equality and competence and 
diligence are identified as essential in ensuring that the judiciary remains independent, 
and as a result effective measures should be adopted to provide mechanisms to 
implement and protect the independence of the judiciary.237 
In seeking to emphasise the importance of an independent judiciary, judges from 
various jurisdictions have adopted The Universal Charter of the Judge.238 The Charter 
seeks to promote the maintenance and respect for judicial independence in various 
jurisdictions around the world. The Charter emphasises the importance of the 
independence of the judiciary in the promotion of human rights and stipulates how an 
independent judiciary is indispensable for impartial justice, and that as a result all 
institutions and authorities must respect, protect and defend this independence.239 The 
Charter also seeks to protect judges from any external interference in the course of 
conducting their duties and stipulates that judges should be free from any social, 
economic and political pressures, and independent of other judges and the 
administration of the judiciary.240 The Charter also lays down various provisions that 
seek to protect the tenure of judges and also seeks to ensure that the selection and 
appointment of judges are carried out according to objective and transparent criteria 
based on proper professional qualifications.241 In a nutshell, the sole aim of the Charter 
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is to enforce the importance of an independent judiciary in dispensing justice and how 
such independence should be closely guarded and protected. 
2.7.3 Commonwealth Instruments 
Although Zimbabwe has pulled out of the Commonwealth242, there are a number of 
Commonwealth instruments which recognise the importance of an independent judiciary 
within the justice system. Zimbabwe, before it pulled out of the Commonwealth, was a 
signatory to the Harare Declaration243 (Harare Commonwealth Declaration) signed on 
20 October 1991 by the Heads of Government of the member states of the 
Commonwealth. The Declaration seeks to reaffirm the commitment of member states to 
certain fundamental principles of good governance, including the primacy of equal rights 
under law and the establishment of national systems based on the rule of law and the 
independence of the judiciary.  
In addition to the Harare Declaration, the Commonwealth also adopted the Latimer 
House Guidelines on Parliamentary Supremacy and Judicial Independence on 19 June 
1998.244 The Latimer House principles articulate minimum standards for relations 
between parliament, the executive and the judiciary in Commonwealth countries. The 
Latimer House principles also deal with a wide range of issues relating to the 
independence of the judiciary. These issues include the importance of having 
appropriate independent processes for judicial appointments, providing sufficient and 
sustainable funding to the judiciary so that it performs its functions to the highest 
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standards, and the need to constantly provide training for judicial officers to enhance 
judges‘ understanding of the law and the development of judicial skills.245 
2.7.4 African Regional System 
There are a number of instruments in the African Regional system that promote the 
independence of the judiciary.  Various treaty norms exist in the African Regional 
system. Zimbabwe, having ratified the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights‘ 
(ACHRP)246, has an obligation according to Article 26 to guarantee the independence of 
the courts and to allow for the establishment and improvement of appropriate national 
institutions entrusted with the promotion and protection of rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the Charter.247 Article 17 of the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child248 seeks to ensure that State parties to the treaty in the course of 
administration of juvenile justice should ensure that every child accused of infringing the 
penal law should have the matter determined as speedily as possible by an 
independent tribunal.  
The African region also has in place specific standards on the independence of judges, 
lawyers and prosecutors. The Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and 
Legal Assistance in Africa249 seeks to ensure that African states guarantee the 
independence of judicial bodies and judicial officers and that such independence is 
respected by the government, its agencies and authorities. The Principles also mandate 
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Member States to ensure that judicial officials have appropriate education and training 
and should be made aware of the ideals and ethical duties of their office, of the 
constitutional and statutory protections for the rights of accused persons, victims and 
other litigants, and of human rights and fundamental freedoms recognised by national 
and international law.250 The Principles also seek to ensure that prosecutors and 
lawyers are well trained and have the appropriate education, and should be able to 
perform their professional functions without intimidation, hindrance, harassment, 
improper interference or unjustified exposure to civil, penal or other liability.251 
The African Commission in seeking to strengthen the independence of the judiciary in 
African countries has also passed the Resolution on the Respect and the Strengthening 
on the Independence of the Judiciary.252 The Resolution recognises the importance and 
role of the judiciary in any democratic state and emphasises the need for African 
countries to have a strong and independent judiciary. The Resolution, amongst other 
issues, calls upon African countries to repeal all legislation that is inconsistent with the 
principle of respect for the independence of the judiciary and to refrain from taking any 
action which may threaten, directly or indirectly, the independence and security of 
judges and magistrates. 
The importance and the fragility of judicial independence has been recognised in the 
African system in a number of reports and fact finding missions that the African 
Commission has published about the human rights situation in Zimbabwe. The African 
Commission in its mission report of 2002 expressed serious concerns about human 
rights abuses and the state of the judiciary in Zimbabwe. In its report the Commission 
noted how the judiciary had been subjected to great interference and pressure from the 
executive and how their conditions of service were unable to protect judges from 
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political pressure.253 In its report on the fact finding mission the Commission made 
recommendations for Zimbabwe to adopt measures that would ensure that the 
appointment of judges should be done in a manner that insulates judges from the 
stigma of political patronage, and for the government to protect and comply with the 
independence of the judiciary by giving serious consideration to the application of the 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa.254 
In 2005, after the alarming human rights violations perpetrated by the state and its 
agencies during Operation Murambatsvina (Clear out filth), the African Commission 
released a Resolution on the state of human rights255 and the judiciary in Zimbabwe.256 
The Resolution expressed great concern at the massive human rights violations in the 
country and the continued undermining of the independence of the judiciary through the 
defiance of court orders, harassment and intimidation of independent judges, and the 
executive ouster of the jurisdiction of the courts. The Resolution sought to condemn all 
these actions by the Zimbabwean government and called upon the government of 
Zimbabwe to implement the recommendations contained in the African Commission 
Report of 2002, to respect and protect human rights, and to uphold the principle of 
separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary. 
The African Commission in its jurisprudence has identified the independence of the 
judiciary as indispensable for the protection of human rights. Its jurisprudence on the 
independence of the judiciary has been extensive and clearly highlights the importance 
of an independent judiciary in any democratic society. In a series of its 
Communications, the African Commission has found that a number of countries have 
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contravened Articles 7257 and 26258 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples‘ 
Rights.259 In its Communication in Civil Liberties Organisation v Nigeria260, the 
Commission found that Nigeria had violated these provisions after the military 
government in Nigeria had enacted a number of decrees which suspended the 
Constitution and ousted the jurisdiction of the courts to examine any decree 
promulgated after December 1983261, and also a decree which dissolved all political 
parties and ousted the jurisdiction of the courts and nullified any domestic application of 
the African Charter.262 In its Communication the Commission observed that:  
‗The ousting of the jurisdiction of the courts of Nigeria over any decree enacted in the 
past ten years and those to be subsequently enacted constitutes an attack of incalculable 
proportions on Article 7. The complainant refers to a few examples of decrees which 
violate human rights but which are now beyond review by the courts. An attack of this 
sort on the jurisdiction of the courts is especially invidious, because while it is a violation 
of human rights itself, it permits other violations of human rights to go unaddressed.‘
263
 
In Constitutional Rights Project and Civil Liberties Organisations v Nigeria264 the 
Commission also expressed the importance of upholding the independence of the 
judiciary and the importance of obeying court orders after the Nigerian military 
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government had refused to release a detainee who had been granted bail by the Court 
of Appeal.265 In its ruling the Commission noted that:  
‗The fact that the government refused to release Chief Abiola despite the order for his 
release on bail made by the Court of Appeal is a violation of Article 26 which obliges 
State parties to ensure the independence of the judiciary. Failing to recognise a grant of 
bail by the Court of Appeal militates against the independence of the judiciary.‘
266
 
The African Commission has also had the opportunity to further advance its 
jurisprudence on the importance of the independence of the judiciary in its 
Communication in Centre for Free Speech v Nigeria.267 The complainants were 
journalists who had been unlawfully arrested, detained and convicted by a Military 
Tribunal for reporting stories on the alleged 1995 coup attempt in Nigeria. The 
journalists were convicted and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment and could 
not appeal against their sentences because of the various decrees promulgated by the 
military regime that ousted the jurisdiction of the courts from hearing appeals in cases 
decided by a Military Tribunal. The complainants therefore asserted that Articles 6268 
and 7 and Principle 5 of the United Nations Basic Principles269 had been violated. In its 
findings the Commission declared the complaints‘ trial before the Military Tribunal a 
violation of Articles 7 and 26 of the African Charter and Principle 5 of the United Nations 
Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary. The Commission stated that: 
‗The issue of the arraignment and trial of the journalists must be addressed here. The 
complainant alleges that the journalists were arraigned, tried and convicted by a special 
Military Tribunal, presided over by a serving military officer and whose membership also 
included some serving military officers. This is in violation of the provisions of article 7 of 
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the Charter and Principle 5 of the UN Basic Principles. it could not be said that the trial 
and conviction of the four journalists by a special Military Tribunal presided over by a 
serving military officer who is a member of the Provisional Ruling Council, [t]he body 
empowered to confirm the sentence, took place under conditions which genuinely 
afforded the full guarantees of fair hearing as provided for in article 7 of the Charter. The 
above is also in contravention of article 26 of the Charter.‘
270
 
The importance of the independence of the judiciary has also been further emphasised 
by the Commission in Lawyers for Human Rights v Swaziland.271 In this case the 
complainants challenged the King‘s Proclamation to the Nation No.12 of 1973   which 
declared that King Sobhuza I had assumed supreme power in the Kingdom of 
Swaziland and that all legislative, executive and judicial power were vested in him. The 
Proclamation also repealed the Constitution of Swaziland of 1968 which enshrined 
several fundamental principles of democratic governance, such as, the supremacy of 
the Constitution and separation of powers. The complainants argued that the 
Proclamation which vested all powers of the State in the King, including judicial powers 
and the authority to appoint and remove judges, violated Articles 7 and 26 of the Africa 
Charter. In ruling in favour of the complainants and emphasising the importance of 
separation of powers, the Commission stated that: 
‗By entrusting all judicial powers to the Head of State with powers to remove judges, the 
Proclamation of 1973 seriously undermines the independence of the judiciary in 
Swaziland. The main raison d‟etre of the principle of separation of powers is to ensure 
that no organ of government becomes too powerful and abuses its power. The separation 
of power amongst the three organs of government-executive, legislature and judiciary- 
ensure checks and balances against excesses from any of them. By concentrating the 
powers of all three government structures into one person, the doctrine of separation of 
power is subject to abuse.‘
272
 
In the end the Commission ruled that the vesting of judicial powers in the King was a 
violation of Article 26 of the African Charter and urged the government of Swaziland to 
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repeal the decree as it was inconsistent with the principles of respect for the 
independence of the judiciary.273 
The increased human rights violations in Zimbabwe have over the years seen a steady 
rise in the number of Communications that have been brought before the African 
Commission.274 On a number of occasions the African Commission has ruled 
Communications submitted against the state party of Zimbabwe to be admissible, 
implying that in those cases there were no effective domestic remedies for the human 
rights violations alleged.275 It is submitted that the admissibility of these complaints is an 
indictment of the judiciary and an indicator of how the judiciary in the country has failed 
to guarantee the enjoyment of human rights for the people of Zimbabwe.  
Although some of the Communications are yet to be finalised, the Commission has 
managed to deal with a number of the complaints and has in respect of some of the 
complaints found the government of Zimbabwe to be in violation of Articles 7 and 26 of 
the African Charter. An example is highlighted in Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights 
and Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (on behalf of Andrew Barclay 
Meldrum v Zimbabwe).276 The complainant in this case was an American citizen 
(Andrew Barclay Meldrum) who had been permanently resident in Zimbabwe from 1980 
to 2003 and was deported after he had published an article in the Daily News (an 
independent paper that had been closed down by the government of Zimbabwe) on the 
internet version of the Mail and Guardian. As a result the complainant was charged with 
publishing falsehood under section 80 (1) (b) of the Access to Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA)277 and was found not guilty. After his acquittal, the 
complainant was requested to report to the Immigrations Department Investigative Unit 
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and was served with a deportation order in terms of section 14(1)(g) of the Immigration 
Act.278 The deportation order was successfully challenged in the High Court which 
ordered that the complainant be allowed to stay in the country until the Supreme Court 
had dealt with all constitutional matters raised in the complainant‘s application. 
However, despite several court orders staying the deportation of the complainant, the 
complainant was defiantly deported by the government of Zimbabwe. In condemning 
the actions of the government and its complete disregard for the independence of the 
judiciary, the Commission stated that: 
‗It is a vital requirement in a state governed by the law that court decisions be respected 
by the State, as well as individuals. The courts need the trust of the people in order to 
maintain their authority and legitimacy. The credibility of the courts must not be 
weakened by the perception that courts can be influenced by external pressure. Thus, by 
refusing to comply with the High Court orders, staying the deportation of Mr. Meldrum 
and requiring the Respondent State to produce him before the Court, the Respondent 
State undermined the independence of the Courts. This was a violation of article 26 of 
the Charter.‘
279
 
As a result the Commission called on the government of Zimbabwe to promote and 
protect the independence of the judiciary through obedience to court orders, and to 
rescind the deportation orders against the complainant.280 Meldrum was deported from 
Zimbabwe despite the existence of a High Court order interdicting his deportation. 281 
Similarly in Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe282, the Commission 
ruled that the government of Zimbabwe was in violation of Articles 1 and 7 of the Africa 
Charter for various human rights abuses during the 2000 elections and how individuals 
that testified against such violence before the courts were subjected to intimidation and 
further violence for testifying against the ruling party. Furthermore, a general amnesty 
was granted against the perpetrators of such violence except for those who had 
                                                          
278
Chapter 4:02. 
279
Communication No. 294/04 paras.119-120.  
280
Communication No. 294/04 para. 121. 
281
The Standard ‗Zimbabwe: Journalist, Andrew Meldrum, Deported‘ 
http://www.afrika.no/Detailed/3560.html (Accessed 10 November 2013). 
282
Communication No. 245/02. 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
committed specific crimes excluded under the amnesty, thus putting such individuals 
beyond the reach of the judiciary.   
Although the African Commission has ruled in some of its Communications on the 
infringement of the independence of the judiciary in the country, it has also dismissed 
on the merits some Communications that have alleged infringement of the 
independence of the judiciary by the government of Zimbabwe.283 However, it is 
important to note that the jurisprudence of the African Commission clearly emphasises 
the importance of an independent judiciary in the administration of justice and how 
Member States should strive to protect and promote the independence of the judiciary 
in line with the provisions laid down in the African Charter. It is important to note that 
there are a number of decisions not discussed in this research where the Commission 
has reiterated the importance for Member States to protect and promote the 
independence of the judiciary.284 
2.7.5 Other Regional Systems 
2.7.5.1 Inter-American System 
The importance of an independent judiciary in the administration of justice is protected 
and emphasised in a number of other regional human rights instruments across the 
world. Although these do not have a binding effect on Zimbabwe, it is important to 
highlight how these regions view an independent judiciary to be an important 
component in delivering justice. The Inter-American system contains treaty norms that 
seek to promote the importance of an independent judiciary. Included amongst these 
treaties is the American Convention on Human Rights285 which guarantees individuals 
the right to a fair trial by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal.286 The Inter- 
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American system also has declaratory norms which seek to give effect to the 
importance of an independent judicial system. These include the American Declaration 
of the Rights and Duties of Man287 and The Inter-America Democratic Charter.288 
In emphasising the importance of the protection of judicial independence, the Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights (I-ACHR) established that: 
‗The guarantees necessary to ensure the correct and independent operation of the 
judicial branch include the mechanism whereby judges are appointed, the stability they 
enjoy in their appointments, and their proper professional training. In addition, the courts 
must also be independent of the other branches of government- and that is free from 
influence, threats, interference, irrespective of their origin.‘
289
 
In its report entitled Democracy and Human Rights, the I-ACHR has also expressed its 
views on the importance of an independent judiciary in the enforcement of fundamental 
human rights and freedoms and how an independent judiciary is essential in ensuring 
that the rule of law is upheld in any democracy. The I-ACHR has stated that: 
‗[T]he observance of rights and freedoms in a democracy requires a legal and institutional 
order in which law prevails over the will of rulers, and in which there is judicial review of 
the constitutionality and legality of the acts of public power, it presupposes respect for the 
rule of law.‘
290
 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (I-ACtHR) has provided enriching 
jurisprudence on the importance of preserving the independence of the judiciary in Inter-
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American states. In the case of Reveron Trujillo v Venezuela,291 the I-ACtHR 
emphasised the importance of the independence of the judiciary in the administration of 
justice and stated that: 
‗The principle of judicial independence constitutes one of the basic pillars of the 
guarantees of the due process, reason for which it shall be respected in all areas of the 
proceeding and before all the procedural instances in which decisions are made with 
regard to the person‘s rights. The Court has considered that the principle of judicial 
independence results necessary for the protection of fundamental rights, reason for 
which its scope shall be guaranteed even in special situations, such as the state of 
emergency.‘
292
 
The I-ACtHR in Apitz-Barbera v Venezuela293 also elaborated on the importance of 
preserving the independence of the judiciary. The case dealt with the removal of a 
number of persons from judicial office on the grounds of their purportedly having 
committed an ―inexcusable judicial error‖. The I-ACtHR held in the case that the 
principle of judicial independence ―must be guaranteed by the State both in its 
institutional aspect that is, regarding the judiciary as a system as well as in connection 
with the specific judge.‖294 In its judgment the Court further noted that: 
‗The purpose of such protection lies in preventing the judicial system in general and its 
members in particular, from finding themselves subjected to possible undue limitations in 
the exercise of their functions, by bodies alien to the judiciary or even by those judges 
with review or appellate functions.‘
295
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In its decision the I-ACtHR found that Venezuela had infringed the provisions of Article 
8(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights in removing the judges from office.  
The I-ACtHR in Constitutional Court v Peru296 case has also noted the importance of the 
separation of powers doctrine and how it is imperative that organs of state should be 
separate in order to protect and maintain the independence of the judiciary. The Court 
stated that,  
‗One of the principal purposes of the separation of public powers is to guarantee the 
independence of judges and, to this end the different political systems have conceived 
strict procedures for both their appointment and removal.‘
297
 
The Court in this case noted the need for States to guarantee the independence of the 
judiciary, and also placed emphasis on the importance of the government and other 
public bodies to respect and observe the independence of the judiciary. 298 
2.7.5.2 European Union 
The European Union also has a number of instruments that seek to promote the 
independence of the judiciary for its member states. Article 47 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union299 grants individuals the right to a fair trial 
and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
previously established by the law. Article 6 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms300 seeks to ensure that in the 
determination of civil rights and obligations or any criminal charge, an individual should 
be entitled to a fair trial and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent 
and impartial tribunal established by law.  
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The European Union also has a number of specific standards on the independence of 
judges, lawyers and prosecutors. A number of Recommendations have been adopted to 
ensure that necessary measures are taken by member states to respect, protect and 
promote the independence of judges. These include Recommendation No.R (94) 12 of 
the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Independence, Efficiency and Role 
of Judges301 which encourages member states to promote and protect the 
independence of the judiciary by inserting specific provisions in their Constitutions or 
other legislation.302 Other recommendations include Recommendation No. R (2000) 21 
of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the freedom to exercise the 
profession of lawyer303 which provides for necessary measures to be taken to respect, 
protect and promote the freedom to exercise the profession of lawyer without 
discrimination and without improper interference from the authorities or the public.304 
The European Union also has other standards that seek to promote and protect the 
independence of the judiciary. These include Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers 
of the Council of Europe on Human Rights and Fight against Terrorism305 which entitles 
any person accused of terrorist activities to the right to a fair hearing, within a 
reasonable time, by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.  
The ECHR has also emphasised the importance for the maintenance and protection of 
the independence of the judiciary in its jurisprudence on this subject.306 However, it 
should be noted that it is beyond the scope of this study to discuss in detail the issue of 
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the independence of the judiciary in the European Human Rights System. This issue 
has been dealt with extensively by European authors, such as, Andenas307 and 
Malleson308.  
2.7.5.3 Asia-Pacific 
The Asia-Pacific region has the Beijing Statement of Principles on the Independence of 
the Judiciary in LAWASIA Region.309 The Beijing Statement emphasises the importance 
of the judiciary in any democratic society and states that the judiciary is an institution of 
the highest value in every society.310 The Beijing Statement seeks to put emphasis on 
the importance of an independent judiciary in ensuring that individuals are guaranteed a 
fair and public hearing. Emphasis is also put on the importance of the judiciary to decide 
matters in accordance with its impartial assessment of the facts and its understanding of 
the law without improper influences, direct or indirect, from any source.311 It is 
imperative that for the judiciary to remain independent and in order to ensure that it 
functions effectively, proper appointment procedures should be put into place and the 
tenure of judges should be guaranteed in order to safeguard the independence of 
judges.312 
2.7.5.4 Arab States 
The importance of the protection and promotion of the independence of the judiciary is a 
fundamental value recognised amongst Arab states. The Arab Charter on Human 
Rights313 protects and emphasises the importance of preserving the independence of 
the judiciary in Member States. In this regard the Arab Charter guarantees that all 
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individuals are equal before the courts and any tribunal. The Charter further places a 
duty on all Member States to guarantee the independence of the judiciary and to protect 
magistrates against any interference, pressure or threats.314 Article 13 of the Charter 
also guarantees individuals the right to a fair trial before a competent, independent and 
impartial court that has been constituted by law to hear any criminal matter. 
In an effort to strengthen judicial independence in Arab states, the Arab Convention on 
Judicial Cooperation was negotiated in 1983. In 1999 the Beirut conference organised 
by the Arab Centre for the Independence of the Judiciary and the Legal Profession 
(ACIJLP), in collaboration with the Centre for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers 
(CIJL), was held and resulted in the adoption of the Beirut Declaration providing for a 
comprehensive set of goals and standards for Arab judiciaries.315 The Beirut Declaration 
covers, amongst other issues, safeguards for the judiciary, urging a series of structural 
and procedural guarantees of judicial independence, and measures to be adopted to 
ensure adequate training is provided for judiciaries in the Arab states.  
2.8 International Humanitarian Law 
The need to protect and promote the independence of the judiciary is also established 
under international humanitarian law. Common Article 3 to the four Geneva 
Conventions316 states that: 
‗In case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one 
of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a 
minimum the following provisions: (1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, 
including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors 
de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances 
be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or 
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faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end, the following acts are 
and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the 
above mentioned persons (a) violence of life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, 
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon personal 
dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) the passing of sentences 
and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly 
constituted court, affording all judicial guarantees which are recognised as indispensable 
by civilised peoples…‘
317
 
It should be noted that State practice has established the rule of fair trial guarantees as 
a norm of customary international law applicable in both international and non-
international armed conflicts.318 Thus the rule seeks to ensure that no individual may be 
convicted or sentenced, except pursuant to a fair trial affording all essential judicial 
guarantees.  The right to fair trial is set forth in numerous military manuals319 and the 
denial of a fair trial is a criminal offence under the legislation of a number of States 
(including Zimbabwe, South Africa and Uganda), most being applicable in both 
international and non-international armed conflicts.320 
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The importance of an independent judiciary in the administration of justice is further 
emphasised in the Third Geneva Convention which requires that courts judging 
prisoners of war offer essential guarantees of independence and impartiality.321 This 
requirement is also emphasised in Additional Protocol II322 and Article 75 (4) of the 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions which states that: 
‗No sentence may be passed and no penalty may be executed on a person found guilty 
of a penal offence related to the armed conflict except pursuant to a conviction 
pronounced by an impartial and regularly constituted court respecting the general 
recognised principles of regular judicial procedure.‘
323
 
The requirements that courts be independent, impartial and regularly constituted are set 
forth in a number of military manuals of several countries around the world324 and are 
also contained in national legislation.325 
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In a nutshell, the discussion in this chapter has centred on the importance of judicial 
independence in human rights protection. Many national legal systems around the world 
recognise the importance of judicial independence in human rights protection.  Thus, 
the principle of judicial independence and impartiality of the judiciary enjoys universal 
allegiance at the level of national and international legal instruments. These instruments 
recognise the guarantee of independent and impartial courts as a human right to a fair 
trial. As result, it can therefore be said that the general protection of judicial 
independence has attained customary international law status. Thus, this chapter has 
highlighted the importance of the independence of the judiciary and impartiality and how 
international measures have been taken in order to ensure that the independence of the 
judiciary is promoted and respected around the world. The emphasis on the adoption of 
such instruments symbolises the importance of an independent judiciary in the 
administration of justice. It is therefore as a result that nations around the world have 
adopted these principles into their constitutions and have enacted legislative and other 
measures in order to ensure that the independence of the judiciary is promoted and 
protected. 
2.9 Conclusion 
The judiciary has a crucial role to play in the protection and promotion of human rights 
in any democratic society. However, it should be noted that for this to be achieved, the 
judiciary should be independent of other organs of the state. Such independence will 
ensure that the judiciary is able to conduct its duties without any fear, favour or 
prejudice and also ensure the impartiality of judges in discharging their duties. In order 
to enforce, promote and respect the independence of the judiciary, the international 
community has established a number of instruments that seek to give force to the 
importance of an independent judiciary and impartiality in the administration of justice. 
Many countries around the world have incorporated these principles into their 
constitutions and other domestic legislation. Such incorporation has seen these 
countries maintain an independent judiciary which is fundamental for the protection of 
human rights. With this chapter having placed great emphasis on the importance of the 
independence of the judiciary in human rights protection, the next chapter makes a 
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detailed analysis of the independence of the judiciary in Zimbabwe under the Lancaster 
House Constitution. The chapter makes such analysis to highlight the weaknesses in 
the constitutional guarantees on the independence of the judiciary and how the 
executive has taken advantage of such weaknesses to undermine the independence of 
the judiciary. These challenges to the independence of the judiciary have over the years 
adversely affected the protection of human rights by the courts.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS BY 
THE JUDICIARY IN ZIMBABWE 
3 Introduction 
Judicial independence is described as a yardstick of a functional judiciary.326 The 
concept of the independence of the judiciary not only entails independence from the 
executive and the legislature but also from political organs, the public or itself.327 
Historically Zimbabwe had one of the most independent and well respected judiciaries 
across Africa.328 After the attainment of independence, the judiciary was well-known for 
its impartiality and independence and this was mainly reflected in its enriching 
jurisprudence on human rights.329 However, since the beginning of the Fast Track Land 
Reform Program (FTLRP) the judiciary has lost its status of being labelled as one of the 
most independent judiciaries in Africa. This is so because the executive has consistently 
interfered with the functioning and running of the courts.330 This constant interference 
has greatly contributed to the manner in which the present judiciary has failed to protect 
and promote human rights. This chapter seeks to give a historical background to the 
state of the judiciary in Zimbabwe and to look at the factors that have contributed to the 
loss of judicial independence (on the part of the current judiciary), hence leading to the 
judiciary‘s questionable jurisprudence on human rights. The chapter begins by 
analysing constitutional provisions relating to independence of the judiciary. 
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3.1 Constitutional Framework for Judicial Independence under the Lancaster 
House Constitution  
The previous chapter has noted that independence of the judiciary is a logical corollary 
of the principle of the separation of powers in that the vesting of judicial functions in a 
body of persons separate from the executive and the legislature can only have real 
meaning if that body of persons is truly independent.331 In order to protect the 
independence of the judiciary, the Lancaster House Constitution protected the principle 
of separation of powers, with each organ of state having distinct powers.332 However, it 
should be noted that the Lancaster House Constitution provided for the partial 
separation of powers and as a result permitted the overlapping of powers and 
functions.333 Madhuku notes that although Zimbabwe adopted the basic framework of 
creating three state organs in terms of the principle of separation of powers, it did not 
fully embrace the strict separation of powers.334 
Madhuku notes that since a number of countries pay some regard to the separation of 
powers, the extent to which a constitution guarantees the independence of the judiciary 
is usually a good measure of the seriousness with which the principle of separation of 
powers is regarded.335  As highlighted in there are a number of features which 
determine the extent of the independence of the judiciary. Madhuku notes that these 
features include the method of appointment of judges, the removal of judges from office, 
whether or not the judiciary has exclusive jurisdiction over ―judicial‖ matters, and the 
question of salaries payable to judges.336 As highlighted in the previous chapter, 
international law identifies the above features as key components of preserving the 
independence of the judiciary.337 Thus, the following discussion makes an analysis of 
the protection of these features under the Lancaster House Constitution. 
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3.1.1 Vesting of Judicial Functions Exclusively in the Judiciary 
Madhuku notes that the vesting of judicial functions would be rendered meaningless if it 
were possible to vest judicial functions in other bodies. 338Thus, the executive and the 
legislature would simply avoid the judiciary by entrusting crucial matters to sympathetic 
or manipulable bodies.339 Thus, the Lancaster House Constitution stipulated that the 
judicial authority in the country was vested in the courts.340  However, it should be noted 
that in Zimbabwe the vesting of the judicial authority in the courts was undermined by a 
provision allowing Parliament to vest ‗adjudicating functions in a person or authority 
other the court.‘ 341Madhuku noted that the inclusion of such a provision posed a serious 
threat to the independence of the judiciary as it allowed the legislature to avoid the 
judiciary in controversial matters by vesting judicial functions in bodies which may be 
less independent than the courts.342 
3.1.2 Clear Provision Guaranteeing the Independence of the Judiciary 
The Lancaster House Constitution, like most constitutions around the world343 expressly 
guaranteed the independence of the judiciary in order to maintain an independent and 
impartial bench. Section 79B of the Constitution stated that: 
‗In the exercise of his judicial authority, a member of the judiciary shall not be subject to 
the direction or control of any other person or authority, except to the extent that a written 
law may place him under the direction or control of another member of the judiciary.‘
344
 
Despite such guarantees, Madhuku argues that the wording of section 79B had some 
weaknesses in that it allowed a member of the judiciary to be placed under the control 
or direction of another, which in principle is not acceptable as a judge must be 
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independent from his or her colleagues on the bench.345 Despite the criticism of the 
wording of section 79B, it should be noted that there are certain instances where the 
law can direct a judge to be under the control of another, especially in cases of judicial 
supervision.  Another weakness of this section was that it did not go further to provide 
for a positive duty on other organs of the state to promote the independence of the 
judiciary, similar to other constitutions in Africa.346 However, it should be noted that 
despite the weaknesses of the section, the inclusion of this clause expressly recognised 
the importance of an independent judiciary in any democracy and sought to give effect 
to an internationally recognised standard of judicial independence. It is widely 
recognised that an independent and impartial judiciary bodes well for the protection of 
human rights in any jurisdiction.347 Apart from section 79B, the Lancaster House 
Constitution contained various other constitutional provisions that sought to give effect 
to the principle of judicial independence. These provisions related to the appointment, 
removal, remuneration and terms of conditions of judges. These will be discussed 
below. 
3.1.3 Appointment of Judges  
As highlighted in the previous chapter, the process for the appointment of judges is a 
key factor in guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary. Thus, where the 
appointment process is left entirely in the hands of politicians, there is more likelihood 
that judges can be appointed on the basis of political allegiance, thus creating a 
judiciary which is unlikely to be independent of the executive.348 As has been previously 
highlighted, although there are no set standards for judicial appointments, it is important 
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that checks and balances must be put into place to guarantee sufficient constraints on 
purely political appointments.349 
The provisions relating to the appointment of judges were dealt with under section 84 of 
the Lancaster Constitution. The section read: 
‗(1) The Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice, Judge President and other judges of the 
Supreme Court and other judges of the High Court shall be appointed by the President 
after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission. (2) If the appointment of a Chief 
Justice or Judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court is not consistent with any 
recommendation made by the Judicial Service Commission in terms of subsection (1) the 
President shall cause Parliament to be informed as soon as practicable.‘ 
In order to ensure impartiality in the appointment process the Lancaster House 
Constitution therefore made it mandatory that before any appointments were made, the 
President had to consult with the JSC. The composition of the JSC is discussed below: 
3.1.3.1 Composition of the JSC 
Madhuku notes that the extent to which the appointment of judges is free from political 
manipulation is dependent on the independence of the Judicial Service Commission.350 
He further notes that if the JSC is merely the President‘s alter ego, there is little 
difference, in practice, between where the President is required to act ―on the advice of 
the Commission‖ and where he or she acts ―after consultations with‖ the Commission.351 
The composition of the JSC was dealt with under section 90 of the Lancaster House 
Constitution. It provided that the JSC be comprised of the Chief Justice or Acting Chief 
Justice or the most senior Judge of the Supreme Court352, the Chairman of the Public 
Service Commission353, the Attorney-General354, and not less than two or more than 
three other members appointed by the President355, of which one had to be a person 
who was or had been a Supreme Court or High Court Judge, a person who has been 
                                                          
349
Madhuku L (2002) 234 
350
Madhuku L (2002) 238. 
351
Madhuku L (2002) 238. 
352
Section 90(1)(a) of the Lancaster House Constitution. 
353
Section 90(1)(b) of the Lancaster House Constitution. 
354
Section 90(1)(c) of the Lancaster House Constitution. 
355
Section 90(1)(d) of the Lancaster House Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
75 
 
qualified as a legal practitioner in Zimbabwe for not less than five years or is a person 
possessed of such legal qualifications or experience as the President considers suitable 
and adequate for his appointment to the JSC. The remaining Presidential appointees 
had to be chosen for their ability and experience in administration or their personal 
qualifications or their suitability otherwise for appointment.  
It should be noted that over the years the composition of the JSC had been called into 
question as the lack of independent representation in the Commission fuelled the view 
that the appointment of judges in the country was mainly premised on political 
considerations rather than on the integrity and performance of an individual.356 Virtually 
all the members appointed to sit on the Commission were presidential appointees. Of 
the six (6) members of the JSC, three (3) members were directly appointed by the 
President to the Commission357, two (2) members of the JSC were appointed to the 
Commission by virtue of being holders of offices to which they were appointed by the 
President and one (1) was directly appointed by the President to the JSC by virtue of 
being a member of the Public Service Commission.358 From the above information it is 
clear that all the appointments to the JSC were virtually made by the President and at 
face value it is also evident that the lack of independent representation in the JSC made 
it impossible over the years to ensure that impartiality was observed in the appointment 
of members of the judiciary.359  
As noted above, in the appointment of judges under the Lancaster House Constitution, 
the President was not bound by the advice of the JSC. The issue of fairness and 
impartiality in the appointment of judges was compounded by the fact that in the 
appointment process the President was able to act against the advice of the JSC, and 
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once such a decision was made, the Lancaster House Constitution stated that the 
President had to inform Parliament.360 The Lancaster House Constitution in this case, 
however, did not provide the circumstances that would allow the President to act 
against the advice of the JSC and neither did it provide or prescribe the action that 
Parliament had to take in cases where the President acted against the advice of the 
JSC. It is submitted that the non-existence of any provision empowering Parliament to 
question the decision of the President in cases where the President acted against the 
JSC, granted the President a great leeway in the appointment of judges.361 Such use of 
powers by the President therefore reinforced the argument that the appointment of 
judges was largely exposed to significant political interference.362 
A number of judicial appointments, especially of judges appointed after the Fast Track 
Land Reform Program (FTLRP), were called into question as it was believed that some 
of the appointments were made solely on political grounds so as to give the ruling party, 
ZANU-PF, political leverage on the political scene.363 The issue of the controversial 
appointment of judges in Zimbabwe after the FTLRP is discussed later in this chapter.  
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3.1.3.2 Appointment of Acting Judges 
The provisions on the appointment of acting judges under the Lancaster House 
Constitution posed a great threat to the independence of the judiciary, as such 
appointments left it open for the executive to possibly exert influence on individual 
judges. Section 84(3) of the Lancaster House Constitution provided for the appointment 
of a judge for a fixed period but there was no provision prohibiting the renewal of fixed-
term appointments. Madhuku notes that the renewal of fixed-term contracts provides an 
incentive for some judges to toe the line with the executive and hence it is important that 
in order to preserve the independence of the judiciary, there is need for a constitution to 
prohibit the renewal of fixed-term contracts.364 
Section 85(2) of the Lancaster House Constitution empowered the President to appoint 
an acting judge, inter alia, ‗if the services of an additional judge of the High Court were 
required for a limited period.‘ The Lancaster House Constitution however did not define 
the scope of the limited period nor did it provide the circumstances that would warrant 
the appointment of an additional judge. Madhuku notes that it was also unclear whether 
it was the President who determined when the services of an additional judge were 
warranted or if it was also the President who determined the length of the ―limited 
period‖.365 Such provision left it open for the President to abuse the institution of the 
‗acting judge‘ to make purely political appointments for limited political objectives.366 
3.1.4 Tenure and Removal 
3.1.4.1 Tenure 
Madhuku is of the view that the fact that judges cannot be removed from office makes it 
mandatory that there must a provision for a compulsory retirement age, so as to ensure 
that judges can be replaced.367 Section 86 of the Lancaster House Constitution 
contained the provisions relating to tenure and remuneration of judges. Section 86(1) 
stated that: 
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‗Subject to the provisions of section 87, a judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court 
shall retire when he attains the age of sixty-five unless before he attains that age, he has 
elected to retire on attaining the age of seventy years: provided that (a) an election under 
this subsection shall be subject to the submission to, and acceptance by, the President, 
after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission, of a medical report as to the 
mental and physical fitness of the judge so to continue in office; (b) the provisions of this 
subsection shall not apply to an acting judge or a judge who has been appointed for a 
fixed period of office.‘ 
Section 86(2) also stated that a judge of the Supreme Court or High Court may at any 
time resign from his office by notice in writing to the President. From the above 
discussion it is clear that the Lancaster House Constitution imposed a retirement age of 
seventy (70). A judge who reached the age of seventy (70) had to retire and the 
executive had no discretion to extend the term of office of a judge who had reached that 
age. However, the Lancaster House Constitution subject to a medical report being 
accepted by the President gave the President power to extend the retirement age of a 
judge who had reached the age of sixty five (65). This provision thus provided the 
President with an avenue to influence judicial behaviour. It left it open for the President 
to  further terminate or extend the retirement age and could have resulted in only ―good‖ 
or ―loyal‖ judges having their terms of office extended. Such a scenario would in the 
long term undermine the independence of the judiciary. Madhuku supports this view and 
states that: 
‗The power of the President lies in either accepting or rejecting the medical report, but 
this is a limited from of power as it is unlikely that the President may reject an otherwise 
sound report merely to terminate the judge‘s tenure of office. However, this earlier 
observation by the author must be qualified in the light of recent developments in 
Zimbabwe. It would appear that the executive could be tempted to abuse this power, to 
do the unthinkable and reject a sound medical report with the sole motive of terminating a 
judge‘s tenure of office.‘
368
 
The Lancaster House Constitution also went on to state that the office of a judge of the 
Supreme Court or the High Court could not, without his consent, be abolished during his 
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tenure of office.369  It is submitted that the granting of tenure strengthened the 
independence of the judiciary in the sense that this provision sought to ensure and 
promote the freedom of judges in deciding cases and making of rulings that were in 
accordance with the rule of law and judicial discretion, even if these decisions were 
politically unpopular or opposed by powerful interests. Hence, the protection of tenure 
under the Lancaster House Constitution sought to ensure that judges would remain 
impartial in carrying out their judicial duties. 
3.1.4.2 Removal 
Madhuku notes that if a judge can be easily removed from office, it matters very little 
that the appointment process was rigorous and free from political manipulation. 
Therefore, where judges enjoy adequate security of tenure, it can offset the effects of 
a defective appointment system, in that once appointed, a judge is confident that it is 
difficult to remove him or her from office, and is free to develop an independent 
stance regardless of the original motivations for his appointment.370 As has been 
highlighted in the previous chapter, international standards applicable to the 
preservation of the independence of the judiciary place considerable emphasis on the 
improper removal of judges from office. Hence a judge who faces removal must be 
examined by an independent and impartial tribunal, and the ground for removal must 
either for the inability to perform judicial duties, or serious misconduct. 
The removal of judges was dealt with under section 87 of the Lancaster House 
Constitution. The section provided that: 
 ‗A judge of the Supreme Court or High Court may be removed from office only for 
inability to discharge the function of his office, whether arising from infirmity of body or 
mind or any other cause, or for misbehavior and shall not be so removed except in 
accordance with the provisions of this section.‘ 
The Lancaster House Constitution only allowed for the removal of judges in cases 
where a judge became unable to discharge the functions of his office or for 
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misbehaviour.371 The Constitution stated that if the President considered that the 
question of removal from office of the Chief Justice ought to be investigated, the 
President had the power to appoint a tribunal to inquire into the matter.372 In the case of 
a judge of the Supreme Court or a judge of the High Court other than the Chief Justice, 
the Chief Justice had to advise the President that the question of removal from office of 
the judge concerned ought to be investigated, and the President had to appoint a 
tribunal to inquire into the matter.373 The President could therefore not without the 
approval of the Chief Justice initiate the process for the removal of a judge from office. 
Madhuku notes that this allowed the judiciary to oversee the removal process.374 
Any tribunal appointed to inquire in any matter relating to the removal of the Chief 
Justice or any judge of the Supreme Court or High Court had to inquire into the matter 
and report on the facts thereof to the President and recommend to the President 
whether or not the judge had to be removed from office. The President was mandated 
to act in accordance with the recommendation.375 If the question of the removal of any 
judge from office was referred to any tribunal, the judge in question was suspended 
from performing the functions of his office until the President revoked the suspension or 
the judge was removed from office.376 If the question of the removal of a judge was 
referred to the JSC and the Commission advised that the judge had to be removed from 
office, the President was mandated by order under the public seal, to remove the judge 
from office.377 
The issue of the removal of judges had been a controversial issue in Zimbabwe since 
the beginning of the FTLRP. The executive consistently undermined the independence 
of the judiciary by purging and forcing independently-minded judges to resign from the 
bench. Such forced removals were all done in contravention of the removal provisions 
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under the Lancaster House Constitution.378 The executive consistently undermined the 
independence of the judiciary in the wake of the ruling in the case of Commercial 
Farmers Union v Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Resettlement in Zimbabwe379, which 
ruled that the 2000 land invasions were unconstitutional. As a result of this decision and 
a series of anti-government rulings, the government began to use an array of tactics to 
infringe upon the independence of the  judiciary. Due to political interference and 
intimidation several judges were forced out of office as they had been perceived to be 
traitors for delivering a series of anti-government decisions.380 These independently-
minded judges were replaced by judges labelled as ―party loyalists‖ who over the years 
have sought to maintain and protect the interests of the ruling party.381 The controversy 
surrounding the removal and forced resignation of judges will also be discussed in detail 
in the latter parts of this chapter. 
3.1.4.3 Remuneration 
Section 88 of the Lancaster House Constitution contained the provisions relating to the 
remuneration of judges. The section stated that: 
‗(1) There shall be charged upon and paid out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund
382
 to a 
person who holds the office of or is acting as Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice, a judge 
of the Supreme Court, Judge President of the High Court or a judge of the High Court 
such salary and allowances as may from time to time be prescribed by or under an Act of 
Parliament. (2) The salaries and allowances payable to a person under subsection (1) 
shall not be reduced during the period he holds the office concerned or acts as holder 
thereof.‘ 
Thus, the salaries of judges were charged against the Consolidated Revenue Fund, a 
neutral and legitimate source funded by taxpayers. The use of this source therefore 
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sought to ensure that judges were not beholden to any individual but to the state as a 
whole.383 
The issue of the remuneration of judges was previously regulated by the Judges, 
Salaries, Allowances and Pensions Act384, which is now known as the Judicial Service 
Act.385 The purpose of the Judges, Salaries, Allowances and Pension Act was to 
prescribe the salaries of judges of the Supreme and High Court. The Judges, Salaries, 
Allowances and Pension Act gave the President the responsibility of setting and 
determining the remuneration of judges in the country.386 The Act was silent on whether 
the President had an obligation to consult any other body (such as the JSC or 
Parliament) when it came to prescribing the salaries of judges. This therefore meant 
that the whole process was left in the hands of the President alone. In order to secure 
the independence of the judiciary, it would have been proper that the Act put into place 
consultative measures (with the JSC or Parliament) to act as checks on the powers of 
the President in setting and determining the salaries of judges.387 The Judicial Services 
Act now stipulates that funds for the judicial service would consist of moneys 
appropriated by an Act of Parliament for salaries and allowances payable to and in 
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finance and the Chief Justice or a person designated by the Chief Justice…‘ 
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respect of members of the judicial service and recurrent administrative expenses of the 
judicial service.388 
The fact that the judiciary was financially dependent on the executive and legislative 
arms of government clearly undermined its independence as the executive had the 
power, as delegated by parliament, to set the salaries of judges. The lack of financial 
independence on the part of the judiciary and the current crippling economic situation 
severely compromised the independence of the judiciary, and the executive thus took 
advantage of the situation to further compromise the independence of the judiciary.389 
Seductive gifts were made to members of the judiciary (current judiciary) with the 
executive and the Reserve Bank splashing out on lavish gifts ranging from computers 
and plasma televisions to satellite dishes in order to ensure that judges remained loyal 
to the ruling party.390 In order to ensure the loyalty of the judiciary, judges were also 
beneficiaries from the controversial FTLRP, with the executive handing out farms to 
individual judges across the country.391 
The lack of financial independence on the part of the judiciary had severely 
compromised the independence of the judiciary. It is submitted that in order to ensure 
the independence of the judiciary, the financial security of judges must be 
constitutionally guaranteed with the political branches‘ financial influence reduced. 
Dakolias and Thachuk suggest that the financial influence of the political branches of 
the state over the judiciary could be reduced by making judicial budgets some fixed 
percentage of the national budget.392 Such an arrangement would be a positive step in 
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ensuring that the political branches of the state do not exert a lot of influence over the 
judiciary.393  
The use of seductive gifts sadly portrays how the executive has over the years since the 
commencement of the FTLRP consistently eroded the independence of the judiciary. 
This has immensely contributed to the escalation of human rights abuses and the lack 
of judicial protection of human rights in the country.394 It is imperative that the new 
constitutional dispensation in Zimbabwe must secure the financial independence of the 
judiciary in order to improve the quality of judicial protection of human rights in the 
country. This chapter will clearly show how the loss of judicial independence on the 
current judiciary has severely impacted on the judicial protection of human rights.  
The above discussion depicts the protection of the independence of the judiciary under 
the Lancaster House Constitution. It is as a result of its weak guarantees for the 
independence of the judiciary and the constant interference with the judiciary by the 
executive that the independence of the judiciary has been affected. Such lack of 
independence impacted on the manner in which the current judiciary has therefore 
protected human rights.  Taking into consideration the discussion above on the 
independence of the judiciary under the Lancaster House Constitution, the discussion 
below seeks to make a detailed historical analysis of the independence of the judiciary 
under the different chief justices (identified below) and how such independence has 
impacted on the promotion and protection of human rights.  
3.2 History of Human Rights Litigation in Zimbabwe 
3.2.1 Introduction 
The constant interference with the judiciary has greatly contributed to the manner in 
which the present judiciary has failed to protect and promote human rights. This chapter 
                                                          
393
Rosenn KS ‗The Protection of Judicial Independence in Latin America‘ (1987) 19:1 University of Miami 
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seeks to give the historical background to the state of the judiciary since independence 
and to look at the factors that have contributed to the loss of judicial independence (of 
the current judiciary), hence leading to the judiciary‘s questionable jurisprudence on 
human rights. 
This part of the research seeks to address the history of human rights litigation since the 
attainment of independence and to give a detailed account of how the executive has 
constantly interfered with the judiciary, leading to the current state of affairs in the 
country. The research will look at the state of the judiciary from 1980-1984 (under the 
leadership of Fieldsend CJ). The state of the judiciary from February 1984 - 2001 under 
the leadership of Dumbutshena CJ and Gubbay CJ will also be looked at. Finally the 
research will address the state of the judiciary under the current leadership of 
Chidyausiku CJ. It also should be noted that due to the existence of huge volumes of 
case law on human rights since independence, it would therefore be impossible for this 
chapter to discuss all these cases. Specific attention will be given to a selected number 
of judgments from the various eras in order to show how the judiciary has fared in 
promoting and protecting human rights. 
3.3. Early Beginnings-Period Immediately after the Attainment of 
Independence (1980-1984)  
3.3.1 Contextual Background 
Zimbabwe attained its independence from colonial rule in 1980. Soon after the 
attainment of independence the judiciary was under the leadership of Fieldsend CJ. 
According to De Bourbon the first five years after the attainment of independence in 
Zimbabwe provided very limited opportunities to apply the Declaration of Rights in 
Zimbabwe.395 This period was mainly characterised by applications dealing with 
detentions without trial and the state of emergency396 that had been declared by the 
Smith government on its Unilateral Declaration of Independence in November 1965. 
The Unilateral Declaration of Independence was extended repeatedly every six months 
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and was kept in force by the new government for ten years. It permitted the deprivation 
of liberty, subject to certain conditions, under the law of Zimbabwe and hence the many 
applications dealing with detentions without trial during this period. As a result most of 
the judgments that were delivered by the courts during this period brought the judiciary 
in conflict with the executive. However, despite this the judiciary was able to set the 
foundation for human rights protection and played a crucial role in advancing the cause 
of human rights in the country. 
3.3.2 Human Rights Jurisprudence 
One of the first cases to be heard during this period dealing with human rights was the 
case of Minister of Home Affairs and Others v Dabengwa and Another.397 This case 
dealt with an application challenging the Emergency Powers Regulations (Maintenance 
of Law and Order)398 that still existed in Zimbabwe, in particular the right of persons 
detained without trial to have access to their lawyers. In this case prominent members 
of the Zimbabwe‘s ZAPU, namely, Dumiso Dabengwa and Lookout Masuku, had been 
arrested and tried for treason. The members of ZAPU were acquitted of the charge of 
treason, but were immediately arrested in terms of the emergency regulations. They 
were denied access to their lawyers as the regulations issued under the state of 
emergency prohibited detainees from communicating with or receiving any 
communication from their lawyers.399 As a result of this infringement, the detainees 
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Section 43 of the Emergency Powers Regulations which read ‗[s]ubject to the provisions of this section, 
a protecting authority may by order prohibit, either absolutely or subject to such conditions as he may fix- 
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communication. (4) Where the protecting authority has prohibited a restricted person or detained person 
from communicating with or receiving any communication from his legal representative the protecting 
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representative.(5) Any person who is aggrieved by the provisions of an order made under subsection (1) 
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Minister.   (6) On receipt of any representations in terms of subsection (5) the Minister may, having regard 
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sought an order from the High Court to be allowed to consult with their legal 
representative, which was granted by McNally J. The applicants in the court a quo had 
contended that, because the provisions of section 43 of the Emergency Powers 
Regulations were in identical terms to the regulations that were in force at the date of 
the coming into force of the Lancaster House Constitution on 18 April 1980, they were 
therefore saved by section 26(3)400 of the Lancaster House Constitution which formed 
part of the Declaration of Rights. The applicants therefore lodged an appeal to the 
Supreme Court, arguing that the regulations prohibiting detainees from communicating 
with or receiving any communication from their lawyers was pre-existing and therefore 
was saved by section 26(3) of the Lancaster House Constitution. In dismissing the 
appeal Fieldsend CJ held that Schedule 2 to the Constitution401, which set out the 
powers of the executive to deal with an emergency, did not form part of the Declaration 
of Rights, and therefore afforded separate rights that were enforceable outside the 
provisions of section 26 of the Lancaster House Constitution.402 The Dabengwa case 
was a landmark decision by the Supreme Court as it was made at the time when 
repression in Matebeleland was at its peak and therefore was a hallmark decision by 
which other human rights decisions in Zimbabwe would be tested.403  
In another landmark ruling dealing with detention under the Emergency Powers 
Regulation, the Supreme Court was also able to set its mark on the issue of detention 
without trial, thus advancing human rights protection in the country.404 The case of 
Minister of Home Affairs v York405 dealt with two farmers (York brothers) who were 
arrested and charged with the illegal possession of arms of war. The evidence 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
to the provisions of subsection (3) and (4), confirm the order made by the protecting authority or direct the 
protecting authority to amend the order in such manner as the Minister may specify.‘ 
400
Section 26(3) which was repealed specifically provided that laws that were in existence at the date of 
independence on 18 April 1980, could not be challenged under the Declaration of Rights for a period of 
five years. All repressive legislation introduced during the Rhodesian era was immune from challenge 
until 1985. 
401
Paragraph 2(1)(a)  of Schedule 2 read ‗(1) Where a person is detained under any law providing for 
preventive detention- (a) he shall be informed as soon as reasonably practicable after the 
commencement of the detention, an in any case not later than seven days thereafter, in a language that 
he understands of the reasons for his detention and shall be permitted at his own expense to obtain and 
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submitted to the High Court for conviction of the brothers was ruled to be inadmissible 
as the statement that had been made by one of the accused to the police, admitting the 
crime, had been made as a result of police threats.406 As a result the brothers were 
acquitted. However, the government ordered their immediate detention. A series of 
applications were made to the High Court to secure the release of the brothers. 
Fieldsend CJ held that the executive had not acted in terms of the law, and therefore 
the detentions were illegal. In his judgment Fieldsend CJ, stated that: 
‗It is important to draw lessons from what has occurred in this case. It is vitally important 
that the greatest care be taken in the exercise of powers of detention in times of 
emergency. It has been stressed in every jurisdiction that has similar provisions how 
much power they give to the executive; that is why they are carefully hedged about to 
ensure that the freedom of the individual  is preserved so far as is consistent with 
national good. The other reason why great care is required is that a failure to observe the 
requirements of the law may result in the courts having to order the release of persons 
who may be a danger to the state‘ 
407
 
It should be noted that the decision of the Court in the above case resulted in clashes 
between the executive and the judiciary. The then Minister of Home Affairs attacked the 
judiciary and accused it of dispensing ‗injustice by handing down perverted pieces of 
judgment which smack of subverting the people‘s government.‘408 In attacking the whole 
legal profession in the country, the Minister stated that: 
‗We are aware that certain legal practitioners are in receipt of moneys as paid hirelings, 
from governments hostile to our own order, in the process of seeking to destabilise, to 
create a state of anarchy through the inherited legal apparatus. We promise to handle 
such lawyers using the appropriate technology that exists in our law and order section. 
This should succeed in breaking up the unholy alliance between the negative bench, the 
reactionary legal practitioners and governments hostile to us, some of whose 
representatives are in this country.‘
409
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The decision of the Court also drew the attention of the then Prime Minister and now 
President, Robert Mugabe, who launched a scathing attack on the judiciary in 
Parliament on the 29th of July 1982. He stated that: 
‗I must say that, much as I appreciate the difficult task that our judges are faced with, and 
the difficult task should invoke more sympathy from this House than condemnation, the 
Government cannot allow the technicalities of the law to fetter its hands in what is a very 
difficult task before it, to preserve law and order in the country, maintain peace in the 
country and forge ahead to build a non-racial society. We shall therefore proceed as 
Government in a manner we feel is fitting, in a manner which will enable us to be in 
control of the situation, and some of the measures we shall take are measures which will 
be extra-legal.‘
410
 
It should be noted that the threats by the executive to use any legal or extra-legal 
measures to advance its policies were alarming and clearly represented a serious threat 
to both the independence of the judiciary and the functioning of the country‘s legal 
system.411 Fieldsend CJ together with the Law Society issued various statements 
condemning the attacks on the legal profession. The matter was later resolved through 
the intervention of the then Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe, who through the Minister of 
Justice, issued a press release reaffirming the government‘s commitment to the 
independence of the judiciary.412 
Controversy between the executive and the judiciary was soon to follow in the case of S 
v Slatter and Others.413 In this case nine aircraft were destroyed in an attack on the 
Zimbabwe Air Force Base in Gweru. Six white Air Force officers were arrested and 
charged with the attack. Upon their arrest the officers were subjected to torture and 
were refused access to their lawyers. In the Magistrate‘s Court, the officers were 
convicted of the attack solely on the basis of the signed confessions which were 
obtained as a result of torture. An appeal was successfully made to the High Court by 
the accused for their acquittal on the grounds that the confessions had been obtained 
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411
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illegally and that the accused had been denied access to their legal representatives.414 
The Attorney-General appealed the decision of the High Court to the Supreme Court415 
on the basis that Dumbutshena JA, who had heard the matter in the High Court, had 
erred in his application of the law.416 Beck JA in his judgment held that the Attorney-
General had failed to convince the Court that Dumbutshena JA had erred in his 
application of the law and as a result dismissed the appeal, thus upholding the judgment 
of the High Court.417 In response to the Supreme Court dismissing the appeal, the 
Minister of Home Affairs accused judges of ―class bias and racism‖ thus further bringing 
the judiciary and the executive into conflict and undermining the independence of the 
judiciary which the executive had previously stated that the government respected.418 
It should be noted that during this period the courts did not only find in favour of the 
ordinary litigant but in favour of the state as well.419 In the case of Mandirwhe v Minister 
of State420, a case which dealt with a man (Mandirwhe) who had been arrested by state 
security officers and surrendered to officials in Mozambique without any formal 
extradition proceedings. A writ of habeas corpus was sought, and the trial judge referred 
the matter to the Supreme Court so that it could determine the necessary measures to 
be adopted to protect Mr. Mandirwhe‘s rights. In this case the Supreme Court declined 
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to exercise its jurisdiction on the grounds that the High Court still had the power to make 
an effective order without having any constitutional issue determined.  
Overall it should be noted that during the era of Fieldsend CJ, little constitutional 
litigation came before the courts as a result of the impact of the then repealed section 
26(3) of the Lancaster House Constitution.  It is submitted that despite the threats by the 
executive against the judiciary, this did not stop the latter from asserting individual rights 
and freedoms and as a result the judiciary enhanced its reputation in the early years 
after the attainment of independence as a protector of human rights. This view is 
supported by De Bourbon who notes that the courts, especially the Supreme Court, 
emerged with great credit in the five years when its hands were tied by section 26(3) of 
the Lancaster House Constitution as it used its limited powers to enforce human 
rights.421 Gubbay notes that despite the interference with the rule of law and statements 
that caused a threat to the independence of the judiciary, such threats were however 
insignificant as compared to the current events in the country that have resulted in the 
judiciary abrogating its role of protecting and promoting human rights.422 
3.4 The Golden Period of Human Rights Litigation in Zimbabwe (1984-2001) 
3.4.1 Judiciary under Chief Justice Dumbutshena  
3.4.2 Contextual Background 
Dumbutshena CJ was appointed at the height of the state of emergency and the 
Matebeleland civil war (Gukurahundi)423 when thousands of individuals were killed, 
raped and tortured by the Fifth Brigade for dissident activities.424 Despite the atrocities 
committed during the Matebeleland civil war, perpetrators of such inhumane acts were 
never held accountable for the human rights violations as amnesty was granted, placing 
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them beyond the reach of the courts.425 A commission of enquiry (Chihambakwe 
Commission of Enquiry) was appointed to look at the events surrounding the massacres 
but as of now the findings of the Commission have not been made public.426 Despite 
presiding over the judiciary during this dark period in Zimbabwean history, the judiciary 
under the guardianship of Dumbutshena CJ made great strides in recognising the 
importance of human rights protection in the country. During this period, until the 
commencement of the land reform, the Zimbabwean judiciary was regarded as having a 
strong reputation for independence and thus made a great contribution in protecting 
human rights.427 De Bourbon labels this period as the golden era of human rights 
litigation as the judiciary had a strong reputation for human rights protection. He states 
that: 
‗The golden period of human rights litigation in Zimbabwe where the court did not always 
find for the ordinary litigant, but one knew that whatever point was being raised was 
carefully considered, and one knew even when the court found for the state that the 
judgment represented the honest view of the judges who heard the matter.‘
428
 
3.4.3 Human Rights Jurisprudence 
One of the most groundbreaking cases of the Dumbutshena CJ era dealt with the issue 
of torture and gave the courts the opportunity to invoke international human rights 
norms.429 The right not to be subjected to torture, one of the most important substantive 
rights in the Lancaster House Constitution, was protected under section 15(1). The 
section read; ‗[N]o person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
punishment or other such treatment.‘430 The case of S v Ncube and Others431 dealt with 
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the constitutionality of adult whipping, after three adult males had been sentenced to 
whipping.432 It was argued in the case that the punishment of adult whipping violated the 
right to protection from inhuman or degrading punishment.433 Finding support in 
international law434 in the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights case of 
Tyrer v United Kingdom435 and various other cases which added a persuasive value436 
towards the reasoning of the Court, Gubbay JA held that whipping of an adult 
offender437 violated the Declaration of Rights as such punishment was inhuman and 
degrading and therefore in conflict with section 15(1) of the Lancaster House 
Constitution.438 He stated that: 
                                                          
432
It should be noted that corporal punishment had been a feature of the sentencing system. It was 
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‗The manner in which it is administered is somewhat reminiscent of flogging at the 
whipping post, a barbaric occurrence particularly prevalent a century or so past. It is a 
punishment, not only inherently brutal and cruel, for its infliction is attended by acute pain 
and much physical suffering, but one which strips the recipient of all dignity and self-
respect. It is relentless in its severity and is contrary to the traditional humanity practiced 
by almost the whole of the civilised world, being incompatible with the evolving standards 
of decency…it is degrading to both the punished and the punisher alike and by its very 
nature treats members of the human race as non-humans.‘
439
 
The Supreme Court under Dumbutshena CJ also played a crucial role in abolishing 
whipping of boys under the age of eighteen (18). The case of S v Juvenile440 dealt with 
the constitutionality of sentences of corporal punishment imposed upon juveniles in 
terms of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act.441 Dumbutshena CJ in his ruling, 
and quoting extensively from the S v Ncube and Others442 case, held that the practice of 
juvenile whipping was unconstitutional and was in conflict with section 15(1) of the 
Lancaster House Constitution. In passing judgment and emphasising the importance of 
international law in interpreting issues of human rights and how authorities from other 
jurisdiction influenced the court‘s decision, Dumbutshena CJ stated that: 
‗Zimbabwe has a Constitution with a justiciable Bill of Rights. One of its provisions 
prohibits torture, or inhuman or degrading punishment or other such treatment. It is now 
possible for an accused person sentenced to a whipping to challenge the constitutionality 
of the punishment in terms of section 15(1) of the Constitution. An added advantage is 
that the courts of this country are free to import into the interpretation of section 15(1) 
interpretations of similar provisions in international and regional human rights 
instruments such as, among others, the International Bill of Human Rights, the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the 
Inter-American Convention on Human Rights. In the end international human rights 
norms will become part of our domestic human rights law. In this way our domestic 
human rights jurisdiction is enriched.‘
443
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The above statement shows how the courts mostly relied on international law in the 
interpretation of the Declaration of Rights despite the fact that the Lancaster House 
Constitution had no provision expressly permitting courts to do so. This shows how the 
courts before the start of the FTLRP, used to consistently give a broad and benevolent 
interpretation to the provisions in the Constitution on human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. It is in this regard that Dumbutshena CJ, thus, ruled juvenile whipping to be 
unconstitutional and inconsistent with section 15(1) of the Lancaster House 
Constitution.444 
The decision of the Supreme Court in S v Juvenile445 triggered a response from the 
government as it showed signs of unhappiness with the decision.446 In a reflection of the 
previous clashes between the judiciary and the executive under the reign of Fieldsend 
CJ, Parliament proceeded to amend the Constitution and added a derogation that 
expressly allowed for juvenile whipping to be administered to boys under the age of 
eighteen. Amendment number 11447 resulted in the inclusion of section 15(3) which 
read: 
‗No moderate corporal punishment inflicted (a) in appropriate circumstances upon a 
person under the age of eighteen years by his parent or guardian or by someone in loco 
parentis or in whom are vested any of the powers of his parent or guardian; or (b) in the 
execution of the judgment or order of a court, upon a male person under the age of 
eighteen years as a penalty for breach of any law; shall be held to be in contravention of 
section15(1) on the ground that it is inhuman or degrading.‘ 
 
It is submitted that the amendment of the Constitution to expressly allow for whipping of 
boys under the age of eighteen, showed the intolerance that the government had 
towards the judiciary. The decision clearly showed how far the executive had gone over 
the years to undermine the courts which had endeavoured to set standards for 
constitutional conduct by the state.448 It is submitted that the amendment should 
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therefore have been attacked before its inclusion in the Constitution and should have 
been read as not being part of the Constitution as it sought to legalise conduct that the 
courts had expressly stated was inconsistent with section 15(1) of the Lancaster House 
Constitution.  Although Parliament in Zimbabwe has not incorporated the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC)449 as part of national law, it can be argued that the 
inclusion of section 15(3) into the Lancaster House Constitution was in violation of the 
CRC450 read together with CRC General Comment number 8 which seeks to abolish 
corporal punishment. It is submitted that due to the fact that the Zimbabwean 
government has signed and ratified the CRC without any reservations451 it should have 
been held accountable for violation of its international law obligations.  
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Despite the setback of Parliament reversing the judgment of the Supreme Court, with 
the inclusion of section 15(3), the Supreme Court under Dumbutshena CJ also made a 
great contribution to advancing human rights in the country by outlawing other forms of 
punishment and sought reliance on international law in deciding most human rights 
cases in the country. Dumbutshena CJ set a benchmark for the exact role that the 
judiciary had to play in protecting human rights irrespective of the fact that he presided 
over a judiciary characterised by political upheavals in Matebeleland452 and efforts by 
Parliament to counter judicial decisions by amending the Constitution. Dumbutshena CJ 
retired, before he reached the age of retirement, in April 1990.453 
 
3.4.4 Judiciary under the Leadership of Chief Justice Gubbay (1990-2001) 
Gubbay CJ was appointed as Chief Justice after the retirement of Dumbutshena CJ. 
The judiciary at this time was also known for its strong reputation of independence and 
its strong reliance on principles of international law in interpreting and applying human 
rights principles. As a result Gubbay described this era as a fulfilling one, as the 
increased awareness by legal practitioners of the scope and impact of the Declaration 
of Rights enabled the courts to create sound human rights jurisprudence in the 
country.454 
 
One of the first major cases to come to the courts under the reign of Gubbay CJ era 
dealt with a challenge to the conditions in the condemned prisoners‘ section of a 
maximum security prison.455 In this case the applicant and two other accused persons 
had been convicted in the High Court of murder and sentenced to death.456 The 
applicant was incarcerated in the condemned prisoners‘ section of the maximum 
security prison and in terms of section 110 of the Prisons Act457 was confined in a cell. 
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Initially the applicant was allowed virtually unrestricted access to the exercise yard 
during daylight hours until 16:00. However, this situation was altered as attempts had 
been made to forcibly effect the release from lawful custody of the applicant and his co-
accused and to remove them from Zimbabwe. Stricter measures which were deemed 
essential were implemented by the Director of Prisons which reduced the period of the 
applicant‘s access to the exercise yard to half an hour on weekdays only and during 
weekends and public holidays the applicant was confined throughout in a tiny, 
windowless cell.458 
 
The applicant applied directly to the Supreme Court under section 24(1) of the 
Lancaster House Constitution alleging that the periods during which he was confined to 
his cell, both on weekdays and weekends, were so excessive as to amount to a 
violation of his right not to be subjected to inhuman treatment, protected under section 
15(1) of the Lancaster House Constitution.459 Gubbay CJ in delivering his judgment 
noted that despite the fact that the Court had to exercise judicial restraint in its handling 
of this case as prison officials had to be accorded latitude and understanding in the 
administration of prison affairs, the Court had a duty to take cognisance of a valid claim 
that a prison regulation offended a fundamental constitutional protection, and it was 
therefore the responsibility of the Court to enforce the constitutional rights of all 
persons.460 As had been the norm in the Gubbay CJ era, careful consideration was 
given to how other jurisdictions around the world dealt with cases involving prisoners‘ 
rights and such judgments added a persuasive value to the decision of the Court.461 
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Gubbay CJ in holding that the incarceration of the applicant with limited exercise 
periods violated his constitutional rights, stated that: 
‗In my opinion, to deprive the applicant of access to fresh air, sunlight and the ability to 
exercise properly for a period of twenty three and a half hours per day, by holding him in 
a confined space, is virtually to treat him as a non-human. I think it is repugnant to the 
attitude of contemporary society. The emphasis must always be on man‘s basic dignity, 
on civilised precepts and on flexibility and improvement in standards of decency as 
society progresses and matures.‘
462
 
Gubbay CJ ordered that the applicant be allowed to exercise in the open air, every 
weekday, for one hour in the morning and one hour in the afternoon, and that the 
applicant be allowed to exercise in the open air every Saturday, Sunday and public 
holiday for a minimum of one hour.463 Despite the ruling of the Court, the Director of 
Prisons initially declined to enforce the judgment until the intervention of the Minister of 
Justice who directed that the judgment had to be enforced.464 It is submitted that the 
actions of the Director were also another clear attempt to frustrate and undermine the 
authority of the courts in the country and should have been prosecuted for violating a 
court order. 
 
The protection of the rights of prisoners was also greatly advanced under the leadership 
of Gubbay CJ, when the Supreme Court in the case of S v Masitere465 decided that 
solitary confinement and reduced diet as punishments imposed by the courts were no 
longer permissible. In this case the applicant was convicted of house-breaking with 
intent to steal and theft by the Provincial Magistrate in Masvingo. As a result of a 
catalogue of previous convictions the applicant was sentenced to serve a term of three 
years‘ imprisonment with labour, and a suspended sentence of three years‘ 
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imprisonment with labour imposed by the High Court upon his last conviction was 
brought into effect by the Provisional Magistrate. Further, the Provincial Magistrate 
ordered that the first and last fortnights of the applicant‘s term of imprisonment be spent 
in solitary confinement and on a spare diet.466 
 
The case was brought before the Supreme Court after leave to prosecute a criminal 
appeal in person both against conviction and sentence in terms of section 10467 of the 
Supreme Court Act.468 The appeal was dismissed, with Korsah JA ruling that the appeal 
lacked merit. However, Korsah JA proceeded to look at the constitutionality of the issue 
of the imposition of additional punishments of solitary confinement and spare diet. The 
learned judge stated that although the imposition of solitary confinement and reduced 
diet had not specifically been declared unconstitutional as being forms of torture or 
inhuman and degrading punishment, and as such struck by section 15 of the Lancaster 
House Constitution, such punishments by virtue of their inhuman and degrading nature 
and the element of torture entailed, were patently unconstitutional.469 In his ruling 
Korsah JA, in agreement with the Attorney-General to whom the matter had been 
referred, stated that these forms of punishment were reminiscent of the Dark Ages and 
were therefore in contravention of section 15 of the Lancaster House Constitution and 
therefore unconstitutional.470 The Supreme Court should be commended for advancing 
the rights of incarcerated persons, thus ensuring that the dignity of prisoners was 
upheld.  
 
The Supreme Court also enhanced its status as a guardian of rights by delivering one of 
its landmark judgments dealing also with prisoner‘s rights. The case of Catholic 
Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe v Attorney-General Zimbabwe and 
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Others471 concerned a challenge to the constitutionality of delays in carrying out 
sentences of the death penalty. The applicant in this case sought an order preventing 
the execution of four prisoners who had been sentenced to death in February 1987 and 
November 1988, on the grounds that, by March 1993 when it was proposed that the 
four be executed, their executions had been rendered unconstitutional in that the 
dehumanising factor of prolonged delay between the dates of their being sentenced and 
the date of their proposed execution, viewed in conjunction with the harsh and 
degrading conditions under which they had been confined, contravened section 15(1) of 
the Lancaster House Constitution.472  
 
Gubbay CJ in his judgment, after seeking guidance from international courts,  
international jurisprudence and various other foreign jurisdictions, such as India473, ruled 
that prolonged delays in the execution of a death sentence were unconstitutional as it 
was in violation of section 15(1) of the Lancaster House Constitution. In his judgment he 
emphasised the importance of preserving the dignity of prisoners. Quoting extensively 
from previous cases dealt with by the courts in Zimbabwe in relation to prisoners‘ rights, 
the learned judge emphasised how humanness and the dignity of the individual are the 
hallmarks of civilised laws and that justice had to be done in accordance with 
constitutional mandates.474 The decision of the Supreme Court has greatly advanced 
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and enriched human rights jurisprudence with regards to delays in executions and has 
received recognition in the Privy Council for its advancement of human rights.475 
 
Once again the judgment brought the judiciary and the executive into conflict as clashes 
witnessed during the era of Fieldsend CJ resurfaced, with the President and the 
Attorney-General publicly criticising the judgment of the Court. They stated that it was 
illogical to mark prolonged delay in carrying out a sentence of death as inhuman or 
degrading, as by its very nature it lengthened the life of the condemned prisoner, an 
occurrence that he would desire, and did not shorten it.476 In a clear disregard of the 
judgment and in manner undermining the authority of the courts, the Zimbabwe 
legislature enacted Amendment number 13477 which reversed the effect of the judgment 
of the Supreme Court and sought to legalise such conduct. It is submitted that the 
constant rebuke of the judiciary and the use of constant amendments to subvert the will 
of the courts, showed the manner in which the executive has over the years been 
prepared to frustrate the judiciary in its quest to promote and protect human rights.478 
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In criticising the amendment to the Lancaster House Constitution as a result of the 
above judgment, Saller notes that the conduct of the state in this instance totally 
extinguished the fundamental right that existed before the amendment together with the 
remedy that individuals had been afforded by the court.479 Gubbay also argues that the 
essence of a Constitution is that it should, among other things, lay down the rules of 
conduct for organs of state. Parliament, which is established and exists in terms of the 
Constitution, should be subordinate to it. It should not be able to change the constitution 
whenever it suits it to do so and diminish or dilute the scope of a fundamental right or 
protection after it had been defined by the judiciary.480  
 
The attacks on the judiciary by the executive and its branches did not, however, deter 
the courts in the country from protecting human rights. Further clashes were also 
witnessed between the executive and the judiciary, in the case of Elliot v Commissioner 
of Police481 where the Supreme Court struck down section 10(1)(c) of the National 
Registration Act482 which authorised a police officer to demand the production of an 
identity document483, and to arrest any individual, registered in terms of the Act, found in 
a public place without such a document on his or her person. In this case the applicant, 
a lawyer had departed from his office to attend a lunch-time keep fit class and was 
accosted by police officers who demanded that he produce his identity document. The 
applicant was arrested and later discharged without charge after providing reasons for 
not having his identity document on his person. Despite this, the applicant brought an 
application in terms of section 24(1) of the Lancaster House Constitution which 
advanced that section 10(1)(c) of the Act constituted a restriction upon the constitutional 
right to freedom of movement of all persons.484 
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In his judgment Gubbay CJ stated that the provision was unconstitutional as it allowed 
for the random stoppage of movement of a  person for the purpose of a spot check and 
therefore such stoppage interfered with the guaranteed right to freedom of 
movement.485 Gubbay CJ stated that ‗there was respectable authority supportive of the 
proposition that a random stoppage of a person authorised by law, however brief it may 
be and for whatever purpose, is a detention and interferes with the right of freedom of 
movement.‘486 In response to the judgment and in comments greatly undermining the 
authority of the judiciary, the police publicly condemned the judgment on the basis that 
the Supreme Court had made their work impossible as the inability to seek the 
production of the identity document prevented the police from identifying unlawful 
immigrants and criminals who were evading the law to the detriment of the country‘s 
well-being.487 
The constant stand-off between the judiciary and the executive which dated back to the 
time of Fieldsend CJ escalated to new heights in the late 1990s with the executive 
showing a clear disregard for the judicial institution, thus undermining its authority as the 
guardian of the law in the country. This period also saw the emergence of the MDC, 
which emerged as a serious political threat to the ruling party ZANU-PF.488 Since 
independence in 1980 Zimbabwe had been ruled by ZANU-PF and there were no real 
challenges from a viable opposition in the country. This situation changed, with 
profound consequences, in February 2000, when the government‘s proposed new 
Constitution for the country was rejected in a nationwide referendum. Thus, the rejection 
of the proposed Constitution and the  emergence of the MDC in the late 1990s and its 
newly imposed political threat saw new levels of violence across the country and with 
the executive consistently rebuking members of the judiciary for a series of judgments 
that the executive perceived to be anti-government.489  
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The period of the late 1990s and early 2000s saw an unprecedented assault on the rule 
of law by the executive. The clear disregard of the law and most importantly the 
authority of the judiciary is brought to the fore in the case of Chavunduka v Minister of 
Home Affairs.490 This case dealt with the arrest, detention, interrogation and torture of 
two journalists by the military police over an article published about an alleged coup plot 
by certain army officers. The journalists were brutally tortured and held for over a week 
by army officers before being placed in the custody of the police. No public statements 
were made by the President, nor the Commissioner of Police, condemning the action of 
the army in violating the law.491 The President, however, issued a public statement that 
the journalists had forfeited their right to legal protection by having acted in a blatantly 
dishonest manner. The Commissioner of Police also stated that they had not intervened 
because the nature of the enquiry involved highly sensitive matters of national security. 
Criminal charges were laid by the journalists against the perpetrators of their illegal 
detention and torture.492  
As a result of the lack of co-operation from the police and the Attorney-General in 
investigating the allegation of torture, an order was sought and granted by the Supreme 
Court for the police and the Attorney-General to institute a comprehensive and diligent 
investigation of the offences committed with a view to the prosecution of all persons 
against whom there was a reasonable suspicion of complicity.493 In granting the order 
Gubbay CJ in his judgment stated that: 
‗The entitlement of every person to the protection of the law, which is proclaimed in 
section 18 (1) of the Constitution, embraces the right to require the police to perform their 
public duty in respect of law enforcement. This includes the investigation of an alleged 
crime, the arrest of the perpetrator (provided the investigation so warrants) and the 
bringing of him or her to trial before a court of competent jurisdiction.. [M]embers of the 
Police Force may not refuse to perform a duty imposed upon them by the law of the 
land.‘
494
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Gubbay notes that despite the existence of the court order, the police still continued to 
ignore the order and bring the offenders to justice, thus compromising justice and 
promoting the culture of impunity in the country.495 It should be noted that to date no 
investigations have been conducted on the alleged torture of the two journalists, one of 
whom passed away allegedly partly due to the torture inflicted by the state officials.496 
It should also be noted that since the emergence of the MDC on the political scene and 
the commencement of the FTLRP entrenched the culture of impunity. Gross human 
rights violations have been committed in the country with impunity thus exacerbating the 
human rights situation in the country.497 Most of the human rights violations have been 
committed against supporters of the opposition party (MDC) who over the years have 
been kidnapped, tortured, assaulted and killed as a result of their support for the 
opposition party.498 These human rights violations have been done with impunity, with 
even the President granting such perpetrators immunity from prosecution. Just like the 
clemency order issued to grant immunity to those implicated in the Gukurahundi 
atrocities, the President has over the years granted perpetrators of human rights 
violations immunity from prosecution. An example is that of the Presidential Clemency 
Order No. 1 of 2000 issued under the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act499 
which granted amnesty to those who had kidnapped, tortured and assaulted and burnt 
people‘s houses and other possessions as a way of politically intimidating them in the 
run-up to the 2000 elections.500 The amnesty was targeted at those who had been 
arrested and were facing trial for serious offences, and most of whom were supporters 
of the ruling party who had committed the offences against members of the opposition 
party. Gubbay CJ notes how the levels of impunity rose in the country as a result of the 
amnesty and states that the amnesty created an impression that political violence could 
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be condoned with those responsible going unpunished.501 It is submitted that the 
granting of the amnesty also represented a lost chance of justice in the country and the 
possibility of breaking the cycle of impunity which even to this day is still the order of the 
day in Zimbabwe. 
3.4.4.1 Land Cases 
The conflict between the executive and the judiciary under the leadership of Gubbay CJ 
escalated at the start of the FTLRP and the various court rulings concerning the farm 
invasions of February 2000. Land reform has been a major volatile issue in Zimbabwe 
since the attainment of independence.502 Historically, land reform in Zimbabwe started 
after the Lancaster House Agreement in 1979 and was done in an effort to equitably 
distribute land between the disenfranchised black population in Zimbabwe and the white 
minority.503 However, no meaningful land redistribution could take place under the 
Lancaster House Agreement and the government was obligated under the Constitution 
to acquire land on a willing seller-willing buyer basis during the first ten years of 
independence, after which a two-thirds majority vote in parliament could overturn it.504  
As a result of the slow nature of the land reform process, the government enacted a 
number of statutes and amended the Constitution in order to speed up the process of 
land acquisition and resettlement. Constitutional Amendment Number 11 was enacted 
to allow for the acquisition of land for resettlement, including utilised land, buildings, and 
improvements to land, whereas previously only utilised land could be acquired for 
resettlement. In 1990, the Land Acquisition Act (LAA)505 was enacted to allow for the 
purchase of land at government set prices without right of appeal. The effect of the LAA 
was to enable government to acquire any land for resettlement purposes and to require 
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―fair‖ compensation to be paid within a reasonable time, thus removing the ‗willing-
seller, willing buyer‖ clause of the Lancaster House Agreement.506  
Efforts to speed up the land reform process in the country still remained futile, as the 
process was slow, cumbersome and expensive largely because of the commercial 
farmers‘ resistance to make land available for land reform.507 The slow nature of the 
land reform process resulted in land occupations by the impatient landless people. The 
political threat imposed by the emergence of the MDC508, and the absence of 
international support for land reform (after the Tony Blair British Government had 
refused to advance the process of land reform, in effect revoking Britain‘s obligations as 
per the Lancaster House Agreement in which the British government had agreed to 
finance land reform), led to the launching of the FTLRP in 2000.509 The FTLRP is 
discussed below. 
3.4.4.2 Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP) 
The FTLRP program, launched in July 2000, was designed to be undertaken in an 
accelerated manner with reliance on domestic financing. Thomas notes that he main 
objectives of the program were: to speed up the identification of land for compulsory 
acquisition; accelerating the planning and demarcation of acquired land and settler 
emplacement of this land; provision of limited basic infrastructure (such as, boreholes, 
dip tanks and access roads) and farmer support services (such as, tillage and 
agriculture inputs); and the provision of secondary infrastructure such as, schools, 
clinics and rural service centres, as soon as resources became available.510 
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In order to facilitate the FTLRP, Amendment Number 16511 was introduced and it 
empowered the government to acquire commercial farms and to pay compensation for 
any improvements carried out on the farms. The amendment also shifted the obligation 
of paying compensation for agricultural land compulsorily acquired, to the former 
colonial master, Britain, thus absolving the Zimbabwean government from paying 
compensation for any acquired land.512 It should be noted that the inclusion of this 
provision resulted in the loss by Zimbabweans of the constitutional right to claim any 
compensation for agricultural land forcibly acquired for resettlement.513 The launch of 
the FTLRP resulted in the expropriation of a number of farms across the country, with 
several families being resettled on these acquired farms. Several court applications 
were made challenging the invasions, thus bringing the judiciary further into conflict with 
the executive. 
3.4.4.3 Legal Challenges to the FTLRP 
The constitutionality of the FTLRP was challenged in the case of Commercial Farmers 
Union (CFU) v Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Resettlement.514 The case sought to 
challenge the manner and approach with which the FTLRP was launched. An interdict 
was granted by the Supreme Court, barring further land acquisitions by the government 
on the grounds that the FTLRP was unconstitutional as it was carried out in a violent 
and haphazard manner. In his judgment Gubbay CJ stated that: 
‗Wicked things have been done, and continue to be done. They must be stopped. 
Common law crimes have been, and are being committed with impunity. Laws made by 
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Parliament have been flouted by the government. The activities of the last nine months 
must be condemned.‘
515
 
The court also went further to state that: 
‗The settling of people on the farms had been entirely haphazard and unlawful. A 
network of organisations, operating with the complete disregard of the law, has been 
allowed to take over from the government. War Veterans, villagers and unemployed town 
people have simply moved onto farms. They have been supported, encouraged, 
transported and financed by party officials, public servants, the Central Intelligence 
Organisation (CIO) and the Army. The rule of law has been overthrown in the 
commercial farming areas and farmers and farm workers on occupied farms have been 
denied the protection of the law.‘
516
 
In his judgment Gubbay CJ noted that there was no actual dispute regarding the land 
reform program since it was necessary and essential for the future peace and prosperity 
of Zimbabwe, and hence resettlement had to be carried out in conformity with the law 
that governed land resettlement in the country.517  It was therefore important for 
government to put into place a program of land reform that complied with the 
Constitution so as to ensure that resettlement was carried out lawfully.518 The 
Commissioner of Police, Augustine Chihuri, was instructed by the Court to enforce the 
court order and to disregard any instruction from any person holding executive power 
that countered the evection order. However, the court order was ignored and the 
Commissioner later appealed against the judgment of the Court, arguing that the police 
were not in possession of sufficient resources that would enable them to implement the 
court order.519 Gubbay notes that the non-compliance with the court order showed how 
the executive viewed the land issue as a political issue rather than a legal issue and 
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hence the non-compliance with the ruling thus vitiating the principle of equality before 
the law.520 
The Supreme Court judgment prompted the government to enact new legislation, the 
Rural Land Occupiers (Protection from Eviction) Act, which was ―fast tracked‖ through 
parliament in order to counter the court judgment.521 The main purpose of the Act was 
to protect from eviction for a period of twelve months (originally it was a period of six 
months) individuals who had occupied land up to February 2001 without following 
proper procedures.522 The promulgation of the Act also resulted in the suspension of 
applications by the land owners for court orders for the eviction of settlers from all 
farms. The Act also protected all settlers (invaders) against criminal and civil liability for 
occupation of properties and any damage caused to the properties.523  
3.4.4.4 Public Attacks and Forced Resignations 
The judgment of the Supreme Court in the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) v Minister 
of Lands, Agriculture and Resettlement524 heightened tensions that existed between the 
executive and the judiciary and had been evident since the attainment of independence. 
Public attacks and rebukes of members of the judiciary reached their peak during this 
period with members of the executive and war veterans attacking the judiciary for its 
attitude towards the FTLRP. 
The judgment in the CFU case drew the ire of the ruling party and party supporters 
against the judges who had handed down judgment in the case. The Court ruling was 
deemed to be an embarrassment and undermined government‘s ability to rule and 
address the land imbalances that existed since the attainment of independence.525 A 
campaign was therefore launched to get rid of judges ―under the guise that these judges 
were remnants of the racist governmental institutions of the former colonial regime and 
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were therefore against the land reform process in Zimbabwe.‖526 At the forefront of the 
attacks on the judges were government officials, ruling party parliamentarians and 
ministers, party youth, the current Chief Justice527, and members of the Zimbabwe 
National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA).528 The war veterans invaded 
the Supreme Court and threatened violence against certain individual judges and 
pressured them to resign; with some success, as Gubbay CJ was forced to retire 
prematurely in March 2001 after the ruling in the CFU case.529 Gubbay CJ was accused 
of being in favour of white landowners and was asked by the Minister of Justice, Patrick 
Chinamasa, to step down since the government could no longer guarantee his 
security.530 It should be noted that no condemnation of such attacks was made by the 
government showing clearly that they did not support the decision of the Court.  
A number of other independently-minded judges have also been forced to resign and 
flee the country after being subjected to threats of violence and intimidation. Paradza J, 
a serving High Court Judge, was arrested in his chambers and charged with obstructing 
the course of justice in that he had tried to influence another judge of the High Court, 
Cheda J,  to release the passport of a business associate  who had been remanded on 
bail.531 Paradza J was charged in the alternative with contravening section 360(2) of the 
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Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act532, in that he had incited two other judges to 
contravene section 4(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.533 In its ruling, the Supreme 
Court held that the actions of the government were unconstitutional and held that the 
arrest of Paradza J in his chambers was in violation of the right to protection of personal 
liberty and equal protection before the law.534 The charges against Paradza J were later 
dropped in February 2004 after it had been announced that a tribunal consisting of 
Supreme Court judges from Malawi, Zambia and Tanzania had been appointed to 
inquire into the conduct of Paradza J. The Tribunal stood down in April 2004 after 
Paradza J had challenged the appointment of the Tribunal justices in the Supreme 
Court.535 Paradza J was later in 2006 convicted for corruption and sentenced to three 
(3) years in jail. However, he did not serve the sentence as he escaped from the country 
before the sentence was imposed.536 
Other cases of judges who have been forced to retire prematurely also include 
Chatikobo J, who retired after he had made a ruling in favour of the registration of a 
radio station537 and was labelled by the then Minister of Information and Publicity,  
Jonathan Moyo, as a ―night judge dispensing justice in the middle of the night.‖538 The 
judgment in this case was later deemed invalid after the President issued a presidential 
decree that sought to ban the radio station.539  Ibrahim J, Devittie J and McNally J were 
all forced into resignation after threats of violence had been made against them.540 
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Mujuru J, the former Judge President of the Administrative Court, was also forced to 
quit the bench after the government had made threats to investigate him following a 
decision in the case of Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe Private Limited v The 
Minister for Information and Publicity in the President‟s Office and Others541 where he 
had ruled in favour of the registration of an independent daily newspaper that the 
government had banned through the use of draconian legislation.542 
It should be noted that that the public attacks on the judiciary and the forced removal of 
independently-minded judges clearly showed a blatant and contemptuous disrespect for 
the process of the Constitution which guaranteed judicial independence.543 The 
personal attacks and intimidation aimed at the judges also showed how the personal 
safety of judges was put at risk. Although, the author appreciates the fact that the 
judicial institution is not beyond criticism544, it is however important to note that judges 
should not be subjected to government intimidation in the hope that they become more 
compliant and rule in favour of the executive.545 Any criticism of judges should therefore 
be legitimate and should arise from what is done in the discharge of the judicial duty.546 
It should be noted that lack of official condemnation of the actions of the war veterans 
and the unjustified and unreasonable attacks on the judiciary undermined the crucial 
role that the judiciary plays in enforcing the law and upholding the Constitution.547 The 
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executive has systematically eroded the independence of the judiciary in Zimbabwe 
through intimidation, harassment and physical assault of judicial personnel. 
Despite attempts by the executive to undermine the judiciary during the era of Gubbay 
CJ, the judiciary under his guardianship stood steadfastly strong against any executive 
interference. This can be mainly seen in its rich jurisprudence that advanced human 
rights protection and promotion in the country.548 De Bourbon notes that the nation 
should be proud of the reputation that the judiciary, in particular the Supreme Court, 
achieved in this period as most of the judgments of the Court are constantly and 
regularly referred to in South Africa and other countries, including by the Privy Council. 
The judiciary under the leadership of Gubbay CJ should be greatly commended for 
advancing human rights in Zimbabwe and also for leaving an indelible mark on the 
exact role that the judiciary should play with regards to human rights protection.  
3.4.4.5 Chidyausiku CJ Upholds Fast Track Land Reform Programme 
Following the forced resignation of a number of judges, a number of judges were 
appointed to the Supreme Court.549 One of the first cases to be heard by the Supreme 
Court under the leadership of Chidyausiku CJ was that of the Minister of Lands, 
Agriculture and Rural Resettlement v Commercial Farmers Union (CFU).550 In this case 
the Minister of Lands sought to overturn an interdict that had been previously issued in 
the case of Commercial Farmers Union v Minister of Lands, Agriculture and 
Resettlement551 (by the Gubbay bench) in which the Court had ordered a stop to farm 
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invasions as they were unlawful and in violation of the owners‘ constitutional rights.552 
Prior to this case, an application had been made, and dismissed, for the recusal of 
Chidyausiku CJ as the CFU questioned the impartiality of the Chief Justice because of 
his close association with the ruling party and also because of his previous statements 
endorsing the government‘s land policy.553 The newly reconstituted Supreme Court 
overturned the interdict that had been initially granted by Gubbay CJ outlawing farm 
invasions in the country 
In his ruling Chidyausiku CJ (in whose judgment the three other newly appointed judges 
of the Supreme Court concurred) was of the view that the government had complied 
with the Supreme Court order that had required it to put in place a proper program of 
land reform that complied with the Constitution.554 The new Chidyausiku bench was of 
the view that government had taken sufficient steps to restore the rule of law as regards 
commercial farms and that the rule of law did not require a totally crime free 
environment but a determination of whether the government had taken adequate 
measures to enforce law and order.555 This view was stated despite the fact that the 
CFU had presented detailed evidence of the turmoil on the farms and that the rule of 
law had not been restored with farmers being evicted and prevented unlawfully from 
conducting their operations.556 
In a dissenting judgment in the same case Ebrahim J (the only judge from the previous 
Gubbay bench to hear the matter as other senior judges from the Gubbay era, such as, 
Sandura J, Muchechetere J and McNally J were excluded from the hearing)557 was of 
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the view that the rule of law had not been restored in the occupied farms and that the 
government had not come up with a lawful programme of land reform.558 Ebrahim J 
added that the most important aspect that had to be considered was whether the 
program was being implemented lawfully and in accordance with the legally stipulated 
processes.  
Madhuku notes that the fact that this case was heard by different members of the 
Supreme Court made the outcome of the case predictable.559 Madhuku further states 
that the deliberately calculated appointment process ensured that government was able 
to achieve a composition of the Supreme Court which not only shared its political beliefs 
but was prepared to give an interpretation of the law which implemented those 
beliefs.560 Critics of this judgment state that the ruling by Chidyausiku CJ was heavily 
predicated upon political expediency rather than on the law as evidence existed that 
violence on commercial farms was on the increase and little or nothing had been done 
to stem that violence.561 Mapfumo notes that in his judgment Chidyausiku CJ confined 
his role only to seeing if the procedures were followed but not to marry that to the 
factual circumstances on the ground.562 Thus, there was a clear divergence from the 
approach earlier adopted by Gubbay CJ, and thus the approach adopted by 
Chidyausiku CJ evoked the perception that the judiciary was rubber-stamping executive 
lawlessness.563  
3.4.4.6 Ouster of Jurisdiction of the Courts Over Land Issues 
In an effort to ensure that no court challenges could be made with regards to the 
FTLRP, the government enacted Constitutional Amendment Number 17564 which ousted 
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entirely the jurisdiction of the courts over cases of acquisition of land by the state. This 
was stated in section 16B(3)(a) of the Lancaster House Constitution which stated that: 
‗the provisions of any law referred to in section 16(1) regulating the compulsory 
acquisition of land that is in force on the appointed day, and the provisions of section 
18(1) and (9), shall not apply in relation to land referred to in subsection (2) (a) except for 
the purpose of determining any question related to the payment of compensation 
referred to in subsection (2) (b), that is to say, a person having any right or interest in the 
land- (a) shall not apply to court to challenge the acquisition of the land by the State, and 
no court shall entertain any such challenge.‘
565
 
This amendment was enacted despite the Constitution stipulating the requirements to 
be met by a law which provided for compulsory acquisition of property. These 
requirements include the fact that any compulsory acquisition had to be effected for 
public purposes specified in section 16(1) of the Lancaster House Constitution; the law 
under which the property acquired must afford the owner reasonable notice of the 
acquisition; the law must provide for fair compensation; and the law must afford the 
owner an opportunity to have disputes over the acquisition settled by a court.566 
The inclusion of section 16B into the Lancaster House Constitution nullified all rights 
that land owners possessed before the enactment of the amendment. The amendment 
also infringed on the enjoyment of the rights mentioned above as it removed the right to 
notice to be given to landowners, the right to compensation except for improvements to 
their land, and the right to approach a court. It should be noted that the provision was 
contrary to the national and international law in relation to the right to property567 and 
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Section 18(1) of the Lancaster House Constitution stated ‗that everyone is entitled to the protection of 
the law and section 18(9) further guarantees everyone the right to have disputes over civil rights decided, 
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Article 14 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples‘ Rights, to which Zimbabwe is a state party, 
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appropriate laws.‘ The new property clause in the Lancaster House Constitution arbitrarily deprived 
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also rendered impotent national and international protection of the fundamental rights to 
protection of the law and a fair hearing.568  
Furthermore, the amendment infringed international instruments, such as, the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples‘ Rights (ACHPR), and the ICCPR, which grant all 
individuals the right to have their dispute heard by a competent court. The amendment 
also violated the principles of maintaining and promoting an independent judicial system 
as well as the doctrine of separation of powers as it prevented the judiciary from acting 
as a necessary check on the actions of the executive and parliament and directly 
undermined the rule of law doctrine in Zimbabwe.569   
The issue dealing with the ousting of the jurisdiction of the courts has been dealt with on 
several occasions by the African Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights. The 
Commission has pronounced that such action taken by members of the executive is in 
direct violation of Article 7 of the Charter which provides for  the rights of all individuals 
to have their cause heard and to have the right to appeal to competent national organs 
against acts violating fundamental rights.570  
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Section 18(1) of the Lancaster House Constitution stated that ‗everyone is entitled to the protection of 
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jurisdiction of the courts. 
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See Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe Communication No.245. (2002) where a 
clemency order exonerating perpetrators of politically motivated crimes prevented the complainant from 
having recourse for crimes. The Commission held that such a state of affairs resulted in a situation where 
the judiciary could no longer provide a check on the executive branch of government and that in order for 
the rule of law to be upheld, individuals whose rights had been infringed had to have an effective remedy. 
See also Constitutional Rights Project, Civil Liberties Organisation and Media Agenda v Nigeria 
Communication No. 140/94, 141/94, 145/95 (1999), a case which dealt with ouster clauses preventing 
Nigerian courts from hearing cases brought by publishers contesting the search and seizure of their 
premises. In this case the Commission held that such a state of affairs would result in a legal situation 
where the judiciary could no longer provide a check on the executive, which was an important component 
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3.4.4.6.1 Legal Challenge to the Ousting of the Jurisdiction of the Courts on Land 
Issues 
Chidyausiku CJ and other members of the current bench have also made several other 
questionable rulings upholding the legality of the land reform programme and the 
amendments to the Constitution removing the jurisdiction of the courts from hearing any 
cases dealing with the challenges to the land reform. A prime example is the case of 
Mike Campell (Pty) Ltd and Another v Minister of National Security Responsible for 
Land Reform and Resettlement.571 In this case the applicants were owners of a farm 
which had been compulsorily acquired as being necessary for implementation of the 
land reform program. In challenging the acquisition of the farm, the applicant contended 
that the enactment of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment 17, which introduced 
section 16B into the Constitution, and the acquisition of agricultural land belonging to 
the applicant, violated the Declaration of Rights in relation to the rights protected under 
sections 11 (contained in the Preamble of the Declaration), 16(1) (the right not have 
private property compulsorily acquired without the authority of law), 18(1) (the right to 
protection of the law), 18(9) ( the right to a fair hearing and determination of civil rights 
or obligations by an impartial  court of law, and 23(1) (the right not to be treated in a 
discriminatory manner on the grounds of race and colour).572 The applicants contended 
that the amendment was null and void as it was inconsistent with the essential features 
of the Lancaster House Constitution with regards to the right to due process and 
protection afforded to every citizen in Zimbabwe.573 
The newly constituted Supreme Court bench, led by Chidyausiku CJ, delivered its 
judgment on January 22, 2008, and dismissed Campbell‘s challenge to the 
constitutional validity of Amendment 17 and the compulsory acquisition of land for 
resettlement in Zimbabwe.574 The Court was of the view that race was not an issue in 
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the compulsory acquisition of farms because neither the relevant provisions of section 
16B575 of the Constitution nor the gazetted provisions relating to land acquisition made 
any specific reference to race or colour.576 In his reasoning in dismissing the application, 
Malaba JA, also stated that the Government of Zimbabwe had an inherent right to 
compulsorily acquire property and that Parliament had the power to change the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe in accordance with section 52 of the Lancaster House 
Constitution.577 Malaba JA further noted that in clear and unambiguous language the 
Legislature in the proper exercise of its powers had ousted the jurisdiction of the courts 
of law from any of the cases in which a challenge to the acquisition of agricultural land 
secured in terms of section 16B(2)(a) of the Constitution could have been sought.578 In 
support of the intention of the legislature, Malaba JA reasoned that the legislature had 
unquestionably stated that in the enactment of a fundamental law any acquisitions of 
farms could not be challenged in any court of law and hence this view had to be 
respected. The Court thus viewed the application by Mike Campell as an abuse of the 
right to protection of law as it sought to challenge the lawful acquisition of farms.579  
It should be noted that the ouster of the jurisdiction of the courts to hear land cases 
clearly undermined the rights of the applicants as stated above.580 The implications for 
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Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights in 2005 filed a complaint with the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples Rights on the constitutional validity of Amendment No. 17. See Zimbabwe Lawyers for 
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human rights brought about by the Amendment are quite clear in that the Amendment 
broadened the range of limitations on the right to property. The failure of the Court to 
critically analyse the implications of the Amendment for human rights indicates the 
manner in which the current judiciary has sought to rubber-stamp executive decisions in 
order to legitimise arbitrary actions of the executive.581  
3.5 The of Decline of the Rule of Law and Judicial Protection of Human Rights 
3.5.1 Judiciary under the Leadership of Chief Justice Chidyausiku (2001) 
3.5.1.1 Contextual Background 
The Chidyausiku bench, which now consists entirely of new judges, has existed in a 
highly charged political setting in the country, where the emergence of the MDC and the 
launch of the FTLRP have resulted in an increase in human rights violations and the 
decline of the rule of law.582 As a result of the highly charged political setting the 
judiciary has lost its status of being regarded as one of the independent judiciaries in 
Africa. The executive has consistently eroded the independence of the judiciary in the 
manner in which it has purged independently-minded judges and appointing to the 
bench judges that are loyal to the ruling party, and in the manner it has controlled the 
economic activities of the judiciary, thus ensuring that judges will always remain loyal to 
it. 583 Such interference has greatly impacted on the manner in which the current 
judiciary has abrogated its role in protecting and promoting human rights.584 
Since the launch of the FTLRP, where independently-minded judges have been purged 
as a result of a series of anti-government judgments, efforts have been made by the 
executive to mould a pliant judiciary that would protect the interests of the state.585 
Because the appointment process of judges has been subjected to significant political 
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interference586, judges deemed to be, ―party loyalists‖ such as, Garwe J, Malaba J, 
Cheda J and Gowora J, have been appointed onto the bench.587  
One of the most controversial appointments after the launch of the FTLRP was the 
appointment of Chidyausiku CJ at the height of land invasions, after the forced 
resignation of Gubbay CJ.588 Chidyausiku CJ has always been widely perceived as a 
government supporter. Before his appointment Chidyausiku CJ had previously chaired 
the 1999-2000 Constitutional Commission and had also served as a Deputy Minister for 
Justice (Under the ZANU-PF government) from 1980 until his appointment as Attorney 
General in 1982.589 He was appointed to be the Chief Justice directly from the High 
Court over the heads of other more experienced Supreme Court judges, including 
Gillespie J (who later resigned and went into exile after Gubbay‘s resignation) and 
Chatikobo J (who came under pressure for ruling in favour of a private radio station).590 
His appointment as Chief Justice came as a surprise to many in the legal fraternity. His 
appointment to the bench strengthened the view that the appointment of judges is 
subject to political interference, with judges not being appointed on merit but merely on 
political grounds.  
As mentioned earlier, in order to ensure the loyalty of judges, including that of the Chief 
Justice, the government has allocated to these judges land seized under its 
controversial FTLRP.591 The Chief Justice and several judges have benefitted from the 
land reform program.592 The prevailing economic climate in the country has also 
resulted in the executive making serious inroads on the independence of the judiciary. 
In order to ensure the loyalty of judges, the executive has taken advantage of the 
economic situation in the country by splashing seductive gifts on members of the 
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judiciary. The Governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) has (in violation of the 
constitutional provisions on the remuneration of judges)593 donated a fleet of vehicles, 
generators, plasma screen televisions sets and full satellite dishes594 to current judges 
under the guise of improving their conditions of service and salaries that have over the 
years been rendered insignificant as a result of the economic crisis in the country.  
The economic crisis in the country has had a serious impact on the administration of 
justice in the country, with the judiciary being under-resourced, thus promoting 
corruption amongst members of the judiciary.595 The use of seductive gifts has resulted 
in the executive gaining full support of the judiciary. This is so because members of the 
judiciary now owe their loyalty to the executive and have been moulded into a pliant 
judiciary that has endorsed executive lawlessness. This has greatly impacted on the 
independence of the judiciary, and the actions of the RBZ and the executive have been 
calculated to subject members of the judiciary to the mercy of the other branches of the 
state especially the executive branch. It is submitted that judges in the country have 
been turned into instruments of tyranny as they have abrogated their role of acting as a 
tool for social justice.  
The economic situation has severely compromised the independence of the judiciary, a 
situation that was admitted by Chidyausiku CJ, in that it has resulted in courts being 
under-resourced, thus promoting corruption in the judicial system.596 The lack of 
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resources on the part of the judiciary has been further exacerbated by the fact that the 
judiciary does not have an independent budgetary allocation from the Treasury as the 
judiciary‘s financial and administrative needs are financed through the Ministry of 
Justice budget allocations. The lack of financial autonomy and independence has 
negatively impacted on the independence of the judiciary. It should be noted that 
positive legislative steps had been taken to secure the financial independence of the 
judiciary with the enactment of the Judicial Services Act.597 The Act seeks to guarantee 
financial and administrative independence of the judiciary from the executive in order to 
ensure that the judiciary is no longer reliant on the executive for financing.598 The 
enactment of the Act is a positive development in seeking to protect the independence 
of the judiciary.599 
The control by the executive of the financial autonomy of the courts (before the 
enactment of the Judicial Services Act) resulted in the loss of judicial independence. 
The reliance by judges on executive funding has over the years seen judges owing their 
loyalty to the executive, thus also protecting executive interests over the interest of the 
ordinary citizens. This has severely impacted on the ability to protect and promote 
human rights by the current members of the judiciary. This is mainly seen in a number 
of cases discussed below. 
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3.5.2 Human Rights Jurisprudence  
The fact that post-2000 judicial appointments were made in circumstances where 
political considerations were the primary motivation for the executive‘s choice of a 
judicial appointee, and as such these judges have been conscious of the reasons for 
their appointment and have had a tendency to toe the line of the government in 
politically sensitive cases.600 Such approach has thus seen a departure from the 
approach of the judicial appointments before 2000. Although these judicial 
appointments were made by the President, judges did not assume office on the 
conditional basis of some ‗understanding‘ about a political mission.601 As discussed 
above, they clearly pursued an independent line of decision-making, even in matter 
where they risked being labelled anti-government. 602Thus, the Chidyausiku bench in its 
jurisprudence has tended to toe the line of the government as seen with the land reform 
cases and other cases that are discussed below: 
3.5.2.1 Election Cases 
Madhuku note that with the launch of the FTLRP, it became a norm for the newly 
appointed judges to take a majority position in support of government‘s preferences, 
whilst the remnants of the old bench would reach a different conclusion.603 It should be 
noted that the period of the FTLRP also saw the rise of the MDC and as such the party 
was viewed as trying to reverse the gains of independence.604 Thus, the emergence of 
the MDC posed a great threat to ZANU-PF remaining in power, and therefore the 
government on the eve of the 2002 elections enacted legislation that tilted the elections 
in its favour. 
The Citizenship of Zimbabwe Amendment Act605, which was enacted before the 2002 
presidential elections, had the effect of taking away Zimbabwean citizenship from a 
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substantial number of white Zimbabweans.606 Madhuku notes that although at face 
value the amendment had the laudable intention of effectively implementing the long-
standing constitutional intention to abolish dual citizenship under the Lancaster House 
Constitution, the real intention of the framers was to disenfranchise mostly the white 
section of the Zimbabwean population whose block support for the opposition (MDC) 
presidential candidate was undisputable.607 
Madhuku notes that considering the difficulties of renouncing foreign citizenship, a 
number of white Zimbabweans automatically chose not to be Zimbabwean citizens.608 
As a result their names were removed from the voter‘s roll by the Registrar-General, 
thus removing their right to vote. However, it should be noted that Schedule 3 of the 
Lancaster House Constitution did not restrict the right to vote to citizens only, but also 
accorded that right to any Zimbabwean who since the 31st of December 1985 had been 
regarded by virtue of a written law as permanently resident in Zimbabwe. Thus the MDC 
launched a legal challenge to argue that the white Zimbabweans affected by the 
amendment were still entitled to vote as permanent residents. In the case of Registrar 
General of Elections v Morgan Tsvangirai609, Chidyausiku CJ, with the concurrence of 
the three other newly appointed judges, made a ruling to the effect that a person who 
ceased to be a citizen of Zimbabwe also ceased to be a voter by operation of the law 
and thus could not acquire the status of being a ‗permanent resident‘ within the 
contemplation of Schedule 3. However, Sandura JA disagreed with the majority and 
held that such a person could become a permanent resident and remain entitled to vote. 
Madhuku notes that the pattern of reasoning in this electoral case cannot be divorced 
from the manner in which the judges were appointed.610 He further notes that the newly 
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appointed judges saw themselves as being in place to defend a certain set of political 
values and beliefs and thus this greatly hampered the administration of justice in 
Zimbabwe.611 Thus, there is need for judges to be impartial as impartiality is an 
essential component of the delivery of justice. 
3.5.2.1.1 Other Electoral Cases 
The attitude of the post-2000 judicial bench towards sensitive political cases has been 
characterised by delays to such cases, thus resulting in the denial of justice. Such 
approach has been different to that adopted under the leadership of Gubbay CJ, which 
recognised the need for the speedy resolution of human rights cases.  
However, in a number of highly important electoral cases, the current bench has not 
given recognition to the principle of the speedy resolution of human rights cases, and 
such delays have been used to avoid deciding human rights cases deemed to be 
politically sensitive. One such example is the case of Tsvangirai v Registrar General of 
Elections and Others612, where the litigant contended that the Electoral Act 
(Modification) Notice613, published three days before the 2002 Presidential election by 
the President, violated his rights to protection of law and freedom of expression as 
envisaged by the Lancaster House Constitution.  The matter was heard a day before 
the 2002 elections (8th of March 20012). The Court reserved judgment and only handed 
it down on the 4th of April 2002 and dismissed the case on the basis that Tsvangirai 
lacked locus standi. 
Delays in the administration of justice by the current bench can also seen in a number 
of electoral petition cases launched by the MDC in the aftermath of the 2000 
Parliamentary elections. After these elections, the MDC filed 37 electoral petitions 
averring widespread violence and intimidation, amongst several other electoral 
irregularities.614 At the time of the next Parliamentary elections in 2005, nineteen 
petitions had been heard but not completed whilst those on appeal to the Supreme 
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Court had not been heard.615 Chidyausiku CJ blamed the delays in these cases on the 
litigants, whom he labelled as non-cooperative and constantly postponed cases; and as 
such the interest of the parties in the cases had waned.616 Mapfumo notes that the 
assertion by Chidyausiku CJ is at complete variance with the role of the court in 
ensuring the speedy resolution of cases whether or not the interest of the parties had 
waned.617 He further states that the court thus has discretion to grant or refuse a 
postponement and had the powers to compel litigants to meet certain deadlines and 
ensure the speedy resolution of cases.618 As such these election cases show the failure 
of the current bench to achieve human rights for litigants using delaying tactics to 
circumvent decisions on the merits.619 
3.5.2.2 The Denial of the Right to Vote to Zimbabweans in the Diaspora 
The right to vote is one of the fundamental rights in a democratic society that empowers 
citizens to influence governmental decision-making and to safeguard their human rights 
and is described as a badge of ―dignity and personhood‖. 620 As a result a number of 
international instruments have been put into place in order to assert and attach 
importance to this right. These instruments include the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR)621, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)622, 
and regional human instruments, such as, the African Charter on Human and Peoples‘ 
                                                          
615
Mapfumo T (2005) 25. 
616
Daily Mirror ‗Judiciary Blames MDC for Delays in Poll Cases‘ January 11 2005. 
http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/jan12_2005.html#link15 (Accessed 7 April 2014). 
617
Mapfumo T (2005) 25. 
618
Mapfumo T (2005) 25. 
619
Mapfumo T (2005) 25. 
620
August and Another v Electoral Commission and Others 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC); 1999 (4) BCLR 363 (CC) 
para.17. 
621
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Article 21 states that ‗(1) Everyone has the right to take 
part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. (2) Everyone has 
the right to equal access to public service in his country. (3) The will of the people shall be on the basis of 
the authority of government; this shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by 
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.‘ 
622
Article 25 of the ICCPR codifies the right to vote. It states that  ‗Every citizen shall have the right and 
the opportunity, without any of the distinction mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions 
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) To 
vote and be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall 
be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the elections; (c) To have access, 
on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.‘ 
 
 
 
 
130 
 
Rights (ACHPR)623, the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR)624, and 
Protocol One of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).625 
The right to vote was constitutionally protected under the Lancaster House Constitution. 
Section 23A of the Lancaster House Constitution provided that every adult citizen shall 
have the right to vote in referendums and elections for any legislative body established 
under the Constitution.626  However, the Constitution was silent on whether the right to 
vote extended to citizens of Zimbabwe who resided outside the country. The casting of 
external votes is however regulated in Part XIV of the Electoral Act.627 The Act makes 
reference to postal voting but does not make any provision for voting at any of the 
Zimbabwean diplomatic missions around the world. The Act provides for the provision of 
external voting to a limited category of individuals. Thus, section 71(1) of the Electoral 
Act states that: 
‗When an election is to take place in a constituency, a voter ordinarily resident in 
Zimbabwe who is resident in that constituency, or was, within twelve months preceding 
the polling day or first polling day, as the case may be, fixed in relation to that 
constituency resident therein and has good reason to believe that he or she will be 
absent from the constituency or unable to attend at the polling station for reason being 
(a) on duty as a member of a disciplined force or as an electoral officer or monitor; or (b) 
absent from Zimbabwe in the service of Government of Zimbabwe; or (c) a spouse of a 
person referred to in paragraph (a) or (b) may apply to the Chief Elections Officer for  a 
postal ballot paper: Provided that applications for postal ballot papers by members of a 
                                                          
623
The African Charter does not explicitly recognise the right to vote as a means of political participation. 
However, Article 13 of the African Charter states ‗Every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in 
the government of his country, either directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance with 
the provisions of the law. (2) Every citizen shall have the right equal access to the public service of his 
country.‘ 
624
Article 23 of the ACHR states that (1) ‗Every citizen shall enjoy the following rights and opportunities: 
(a) to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) to 
vote and to be elected in genuine periodic elections, which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and 
by secret ballot that guarantees the free expression of the will of the voters; and (c) to have access, under 
general conditions of equality, to the public service of his country. (2) The laws may regulate the exercise 
of the rights and opportunities referred to in the preceding paragraph only on the basis of age, nationality, 
residence, language, education, civil and mental capacity, or sentencing by a competent court in criminal 
proceedings.‘ 
625
Article 3 of Protocol One of ECHR states that ‗The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free 
elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression 
of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.‘ 
626
Section 23A(2) of the Lancaster House Constitution. 
627
Act No. 25 of 2004/Chapter 2:13. 
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disciplined force may be made to the Chief Elections Officer through their commanding 
officers‘ 
628
 
 The economic and political problems that Zimbabwe has experienced since the launch 
of the FTLRP have seen millions of Zimbabweans emigrating to various countries 
around the world in search of better opportunities. With the increasing number of 
individuals emigrating to other countries around the world there have been increasing 
calls and demands by Zimbabweans in the diaspora for external voting arrangements to 
be extended to them so that they could also exercise their constitutionally protected 
right. As a result an application was made in the Supreme Court to grant Zimbabweans 
living outside the country the right to vote.  
The case of the Diaspora Action Group (DVAG) v The Minister of Justice and 
Parliamentary Affairs629 concerns the legal challenge to extend voting rights to 
Zimbabweans living outside the country. The applicants in this case were Zimbabwean 
citizens legally resident in the United Kingdom, but not employed by the government 
who argued that their exclusion from voting was unconstitutional as the Electoral Act 
was discriminatory to the extent that it permitted certain citizens to vote externally whilst 
excluding others. The applicants also argued that the denial of the right to vote was a 
curtailment of their right to freedom of expression and as a result the government of 
Zimbabwe was committed to full participation of its citizens in the political and electoral 
processes by virtue of being party to the ACHPR and that as a member of the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC), it was bound by the SADC Principles and 
Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections.630 In opposing the application, the Minister 
of Justice argued that the political and economic situation currently prevailing in the 
country could not allow for external voting to be extended to citizens residing outside the 
country as a result of practical and logistical problems. The Minister also further 
contended that the opposition parties would also have an unfair political playing field as 
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Section 71(1) of the Electoral Act. 
629
Supreme Court Case No SC 22/05. (Unreported). 
630
The SADC Principles in section 2 state that ‗SADC Member States shall adhere to the following 
principles in the conduct of democratic elections: 2.1.1 Full participation of citizens in the Electoral 
Process.‘ However, it should be noted that the SADC Principles are silent on the issue of whether the full 
participation of citizens includes those living abroad. 
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members of the ruling party were banned from most of the countries that most 
Zimbabweans were resident in.631 
Chidyausiku CJ in his judgment ruled that the case that had been brought by the DVAG 
had no merit and dismissed the case without providing any reasons. The failure to 
provide reasons for the judgment is an indicator of the attitude that the judiciary has 
adopted towards human rights litigation in the country especially in matters relating to 
the accountability of government. It is submitted that the failure to provide reasons in 
this case enforces the view that since the launch of the FTLRP, the judiciary has 
premised its reasoning and decisions mainly on political rather than on legal 
considerations and it has failed to remain independent of the national politics of the day. 
As a result public confidence in the judiciary has diminished over the years as it has 
been corrupted and therefore has over the years sought to shield arbitrary executive 
actions.632 Persuasive authority on the importance of judges to provide reasons for their 
decisions is found in the South African case of Moleka v The State633 where Bosielo JA, 
in quoting the Retired Australian Chief Justice Henry Gibbs states that: 
‗The citizens of a modern democracy are not prepared to accept a decision simply 
because it has been pronounced, but rather are inclined to question and criticise any 
exercise of authority, judicial or otherwise. In such a society it is of particular importance 
that the parties to litigation-and the public- should be convinced that justice has been 
done, or at least that an honest, careful and conscientious effort has been made to do 
justice, in any particular case, and that the delivery of reasons is part of the process 
which has that end in view..‘ 
Bosielo JA also notes that giving reasons for decisions is critical in engendering and 
maintaining the confidence of the public in the judicial system. People need to know that 
courts do not act arbitrarily but base their decisions on rational grounds.634 It is therefore 
imperative that judges should provide reasons for their decisions in order to ensure that 
                                                          
631
Diaspora Action Group v Minister of Justice and Parliamentary Affairs Supreme Court Case No SC 
22/05. (Unreported). 
632
Mapfumo T (2005) 40. 
633
2012 (1) SACR 431 para.13. 
634
Moleka v The State 2012 (1) SACR 431 para. 12. See also Strategic Liquor Services v Mvumbi NO and 
Others 2010 (2) 92 (CC) para. 15 where the Constitutional Court whilst dealing with a failure by a judicial 
officer to give reasons for a judicial decision stated that: ‗Failure to supply them will usually be a grave 
lapse of duty, a breach of litigants‘ rights, and an impediment to the appeal process.‘ 
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the reasoning provided is sound and free from any external interference or 
considerations. 
It is also important to note that the legal approach adopted by the Supreme Court of 
Zimbabwe on the issue of external voting stands in stark contrast to the approach taken 
by the South African judiciary. In a decision in the Pretoria High Court and later 
confirmed unanimously by the Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court ruled that 
South Africans living abroad had the right to vote if they were registered, thus ruling 
section 33 of the South African Electoral Act635 as unconstitutional as it unfairly 
restricted the right to cast special votes while abroad to a very narrow class of 
citizens.636 O‘Regan J stated that the right to vote has a symbolic and democratic value 
and those that were registered could not be limited by unconstitutional and invalid 
limitations. This indicates clearly a judiciary that seeks to protect and make advances in 
the field of human rights. Many democratic states around the world allow their non-
resident citizens to participate in the election process, which shows the symbolic value 
and importance of the right to vote.637 The indifference of the current judiciary towards 
political cases is also shown in a number of cases that have been brought before the 
courts.638 
3.5.2.3 Operation Murambatsvina and Eviction Cases  
It is without doubt and unquestionable that every human being irrespective of colour, 
ethnicity, social status, religion, or political affiliation, among others, has inherent human 
rights, which rights have been acknowledged as universal, inalienable, interdependent 
                                                          
635
Act 73 of 1998. 
636
Ritcher v The Minister for Home Affairs and Others (with the Democratic Alliance and Others 
Intervening, and with Afriforum and Another as Amici Curiae) 2009 (3) SA 615 (CC). See also The A 
Party, Andrew Pepperell v The Minister for Home Affairs, Electoral Commission and the Director General, 
Department of Home Affairs 2009 (3) SA 649 (CC); 2009 (6) BCLR 611 (CC). 
637
Electoral reforms of 1997 in Botswana allow non-resident citizens to participate in regular elections. 
The same also applies for Namibia which has since 1989 made it possible for non- resident citizens to 
vote in parliamentary and presidential elections. In America under the Overseas Absentee Voting Rights 
Act of 1975 allows its citizens living outside the country to actively participate in all its elections. 
638
See Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and Another v Chairperson of the Zimbabwean Electoral 
Commission (ZEC) E/P 24/08) [2008] ZWHHC 1 (14 April 2008) where the Court ruled that delays of up to 
17 days in releasing Presidential election results were justifiable, despite that the results of the 
Parliamentary election held at the same time with the Presidential election were released only 2 days 
after the election. Available at http://www.zimlii.org/zw/judgment/supreme-court (Accessed 26 June 2012). 
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and indivisible. These rights are essential to mankind and as such human rights have 
become for every individual person an entitlement.639 The launch of Operation 
Murambatsvina (clear or remove the filth) in 2005 resulted in the massive violation of 
citizens‘ legally protected rights, particularly socio-economic rights. It should be noted 
that socio-economic rights were not protected under the Lancaster House 
Constitution.640 It is submitted that the absence of justiciable socio-economic rights in 
the Constitution can be said to have compounded the inability of the judiciary to protect 
such rights in Zimbabwe. However, it is the attitude of the judiciary towards cases 
dealing with socio-economic rights that clearly depicts the unwillingness of the courts to 
overturn arbitrary executive actions. This is mainly shown in a number of cases that 
sought to challenge the legality of Operation Murambatsvina in 2005. 
Operation Murambatsvina was launched in 2005. The operation was mainly targetted at 
the removal of informal settlements in all major urban and peri-urban areas in the 
country.641 The aim of the government in launching this operation was to arrest 
disorderly urbanisation and to clamp down on illegal economic activities that had 
become a major characteristic of all urban areas in Zimbabwe.642 The operation was 
conducted with brutality, torture, beatings, killings, and the demolition of all informal 
                                                          
639
English K and Stapleton A, Human Rights Handbook (1999) 1. 
640
It should be noted that although socio-economic rights were not constitutionally protected in Zimbabwe 
(under the Lancaster House Constitution), a legal framework was put into place by parliament to give 
effect to the protection of socio-economic rights. Examples of legislation amongst others which seek to 
give effect to the protection of socio-economic rights included, The Public Service Pensions Scheme 
governed by the State Services (Pensions) Act Chapter 16:06 which is a contributory pension scheme 
which provides for the payment of pensions, gratuities and other benefits to or in respect of persons 
employed by the State on retirement, discharge, resignation, death or termination of service.  The 
National Social Security Authority Act of 1989 Chapter 17:04 established National Social Security 
Association (NSSA), a parastatal tasked with implementing and administering social security services to 
the nation.  The Social Welfare Assistance Act Chapter 17:06 where limited public assistance is provided 
by the Department of Social Welfare to destitute persons incapable of work and to persons aged 65 or 
older or with a disability. The Social Welfare Assistance Act also makes provision for the placement of the 
needy and vulnerable elder persons in homes where they receive social assistance through government 
grants as well as other assistance from Non-Governmental Organisations. 
641
Tibaijuka AM Report on the Fact Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to Assess the Scope and Impact of 
Operation Murambatsvina by the U.N Special Envoy on Human Settlement Issues in Zimbabwe (2005) 
12. 
642
Tibaijuka AM (2005) 12. On the other hand it is believed that the operation was launched as a political 
tactic to get rid of urban voters who supported the opposition MDC party as the party had established its 
political stronghold in urban areas across the country.  
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structures.643 No prior consultations were held with the affected communities as the 
state haphazardly dispatched members of the army and police that oversaw the 
bulldozing, smashing and burning of structures that housed thousands of poor urban 
dwellers. Thousands of citizens, including women and children, were left stranded 
without protection, alternative accommodation, access to adequate water, sanitation 
and health care, and food.644 The manner in which the operation was conducted 
violated international law on forced evictions.645 No adequate notice was also given to 
affected individuals on the launch of the operation and neither were individuals given 
the time to regularise such legal structures as required under national law.646 
The legality of the operation was challenged without success as the courts sought to 
maintain and protect executive lawlessness. The case of Dareremusha Cooperative v 
The Minister of Local Government, Public Works and Urban Development and Others647 
dealt with an urgent application seeking a provisional order that the residents of Hatcliffe 
Extension be allowed to return to their stands, and that they not be forcibly evicted from 
there, and a final order declaring that their forced eviction was unlawful. The basis of the 
application was that the Zimbabwean government had violated the Regional, Town and 
Country Planning Act by giving zero to three days notice to its citizens before the 
                                                          
643
Centre for Housing Rights and Evictions Operation Murambatsvina: Unlawful Forced Evictions; Crimes 
against Humanity; and Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of the Poorest of the Poor: Submission to 
the African Commission on Human and People‟s Rights 41
st
 Session by Centre on Housing Rights and 
Evictions (COHRE) (2007) 3. 
644
Tibaijuka AM (2005) 31-45. 
645
For guidelines to be followed in terms of forced evictions see Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights General Comment 7 Forced Evictions, and the Right to Adequate Housing (Sixteenth 
session, 1997), U.N. Doc. E/1998/22, annex IV at 113 (1997). See also decisions of the African 
Commission in the case of Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and Centre for Economic and 
Social Rights (SERAC) –Nigeria v Nigeria African Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights Decision 
155/96, The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights – 
Nigeria (27 May 2002), Fifteenth Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples‘ Rights, 2001-2002, Done at the 31st Ordinary Session of the African Commission held from 2nd 
to 16th May 2002 in Pretoria, South Africa. 
646
See the Regional Town and Country Planning Act Chapter 29:12 in particular sections 27 and section 
35(2). Section 27 gives owners of properties that have not been regularised the time to effect the 
regularisation of such properties or to find an alternative place to reside in or operate from. The Act 
affords individuals to make applications to local authorities to have such informal properties regularised. 
Section 35 gives local authorities the power to remove, demolish or alter any existing building or stop any 
operations with or without payment of compensation. Before such removals or demolitions can be 
conducted, the local authority is required to serve written notice upon the owner of the development or 
any person to be affected by the proposed action. 
647
Harare High Court Case 2467/05 (Unreported). 
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demolition of their homes and businesses.648 The short to non-existent time span 
between notice and demolition further deprived citizens of their right to petition the 
courts against the decision or to apply for a permit.649 The denial of due process, thus, 
violated the Lancaster House Constitution.650 
Karwi J in his judgment ruled that the evictions were lawful and stated that a reasonable 
notice period had been given to the residents and that the residents were in breach of 
their lease agreements that they had entered into with the Ministry of Local Government 
by erecting unapproved structures. Karwi J reasoned that the public policy 
considerations for the destruction of the illegal structures far outweighed the interests of 
individuals who were in contravention of the law.651 It is clear from this decision that the 
ruling left the human rights of individuals exposed to violation as the lack of 
consideration of human rights issues in this case rubber-stamped the actions of the 
executive. It is submitted that it would have been appropriate in this case for the judge 
to enforce the obligation of the Zimbabwean government under its own domestic 
legislation, to give owners of property that have not been regularised the time to effect 
the regularisation of such properties and the time to find an alternative place to reside or 
operate from. Sadly, no alternative accommodation was provided and neither were the 
individuals afforded time to find alternative accommodation, and they were thus forcibly 
evicted. It is submitted that since Zimbabwe has signed and ratified the International 
Covenant on Economic and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the forced evictions were also in 
violation of its obligations under international law which obliges States to use ―all 
appropriate means‖ to promote the right to adequate housing and to refrain from forced 
evictions without the provision of adequate protection.652 
                                                          
648
See section 32(3) of the Regional, Town and Country Planning Act which states that local authorities 
must wait at least thirty days after giving notice to demolish unregulated structures. 
649
Section 38(1) of the Regional, Town and Country Planning Act guarantees all citizens the right to 
appeal the local planning authority‘s decision and apply for a permit within one month of receiving notice. 
650
See section 16 of the Lancaster House Constitution which protected citizens from deprivation of 
property without due process of law. 
651
Dareremusha Cooperative v The Minister of Local Government, Public Works and Urban Development 
and Others Harare High Court Case 2467/05 (Unreported). 
652
Article 11 of the ICESCR states that, ‗The State parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of 
everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing 
and housing, and the continuous improvement of living conditions. The State Parties will take appropriate 
steps to ensure the realisation of this right, recognising, to this effect the essential importance of 
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Ironically, whilst ruling that the evictions were lawful the learned judge in his judgment 
went on to state that: 
‗It would be naïve for me to conclude my judgment without mentioning the fact that the 
action taken by the respondents, however, has caused untold suffering to a number of 
people. I am told by the applicants that a lot of people have obviously been displaced 
and appear to have nowhere to go. Many have been sleeping in the open and in the cold 
weather. Many school children are not going to school. It is my considered view that, 
notwithstanding the fact that the action taken and the manner in which it was taken was 
lawful, hardships which have befallen the affected people would have been avoided by 
giving adequate notice to the affected people to relocate and re-establish themselves. A 
few days notice was not adequate in my view.‘
653
 
The above statement by the judge in acknowledging that the forced evictions resulted in 
the violation of rights and his failure to use the law to protect such rights is also 
indicative of the attitude that the judiciary has adopted in human rights litigation in terms 
of rubber-stamping executive actions. It is mind boggling as to why the judge in this 
case would note that human rights violations occurred and not protect such rights. The 
clear disregard of the judge to notice that Operation Murambatsvina was clearly carried 
out in a manner that violated national law and international law governing evictions 
clearly indicates a lack of impartiality. It is submitted that the lack of human rights 
protection has contributed to the loss of trust and confidence by the public as human 
rights have continued to be violated with impunity with the judiciary rubber-stamping 
executive lawlessness.    
Another case that sought to challenge the legality of Operation Murambatsvina was that 
of the Batsirai Children‟s Care (BCC) v The Minister of Local Government, Public Works 
and Urban Development and Others.654 In this case the BCC was an orphanage that 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
international co-operation based on free consent.‘ Although not binding, General Comment 7 also lays 
down guidelines to be followed in cases of evictions. See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights General Comment 7 Forced Evictions, and the Right to Adequate Housing (Sixteenth session, 
1997), U.N. Doc. E/1998/22, annex IV at 113 (1997). See also Article 17 (1) of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (Zimbabwe has signed and ratified the treaty) which compliments the right not 
to be forcibly evicted without adequate protection. 
653
Dareremusha Cooperative v The Minister of Local Government, Public Works and Urban Development 
and Others Harare High Court Case 2467/05 (Unreported). 
654
Harare High Court Case No. 2566/05 (Unreported). The case was a similar application to that of the 
Dareremusha Cooperative v The Minister of Local Government, Public Works and Urban Development 
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looked after children, including those that had been orphaned by the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic.  The orphanage was closed down after the infrastructure was demolished by 
members of the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP). Children and staff were left 
homeless. As a result an urgent application was filed for a spoliation order seeking that 
BCC be allowed to return to its property and carry on its business. Hlatshwayo J 
continuously postponed the case and thus failed to grant the applicants a provisional 
spoliation order that would allow BCC to continue providing the services it rendered to 
the orphaned children. The continuous postponing of the case was done irrespective of 
the fact that the applicants had filed an urgent application averring that their rights had 
been violated. Thus, the use of delay tactics in this case clearly reveals the lack of 
independence of the judicial system and the lack of impartiality of the judge to deliver a 
judgment that would be deemed to be against the ideologies of the government.   
The judiciary has adopted a passive attitude towards human rights, thus failing to 
protect citizens from arbitrary decisions of the executive.655 This aspect is emphasised 
by the former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka, 
who visited Zimbabwe to assess the impact of Operation Murambatsvina on human 
rights. She states that: 
‗There is a general concern that the High Court‘s failure to safeguard the right of the 
victims of the Operation reaffirms the argument that the Zimbabwean judiciary has 
generally failed to act and be seen to act as custodians of human rights in Zimbabwe and 
that there has been a regrettable failure by members of the bench to remain independent 
from the national and local politics of the day. The general view among many 
stakeholders is that this has had a severe impact on the rule of law and the 
administration of justice, and has caused the ordinary person on the street to lose faith in 
achievement justice through legal channels.‘
656
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and Others Harare High Court Case 2467/05 (Unreported) which sought to aver the violation of rights 
stipulated under that case.  
655
See also other cases relating to Operation Murambatsvina that were dismissed by the courts Antony 
Shumba v Officer in Charge, Norton Police Station, Commissioner of Police, Minister of Home Affairs, 
City of Harare and Minister of Local Government, Public Works and Urban Development Norton 
Magistrate Court Case No 376/05 (Unreported); Felistus Chinyuku and other Residents of Porta Farm v 
The Minister of Local Government and Urban Development HC No 3225/05 (Unreported). 
656
Tibaijuka AM (2005) 62. 
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The failure of the judiciary to hold the executive accountable for violating international 
law principles on evictions also indicates that the current bench has failed to apply 
principles of international law in trying to arrive at reasonable and sound judgments in 
both cases discussed above.657 The failure of the courts to seek guidance from 
international law clearly shows a clear departure from the judiciary under Gubbay CJ 
which relied greatly on international law in advancing the cause of human rights in the 
country. The fact that the judiciary allowed such evictions to be carried out without the 
provision of any alternative accommodation, is deemed to be a foreign concept in South 
Africa as the judiciary there has over the years outlawed evictions without the provision 
of any alternative shelter.658         
3.5.2.4 Torture and Enforced Disappearance 
The indifference of the current judiciary in handling human rights cases has also been 
brought to the fore in several cases that have been brought before the courts relating to 
torture and the enforced disappearance of supporters of the opposition party and 
human rights defenders. It should be noted that historically Zimbabwe has had a 
troubled history of torture as the current government has been intolerant of individuals 
with different political ideologies.659 This is so despite the fact that the use of torture was 
outlawed under the Lancaster House Constitution660 and various other international law 
instruments.661 Several cases of torture have been brought before the courts and most 
of the allegations of the use of torture have been mainly levelled against the police 
                                                          
657
As stated earlier that although no constitutional provision exists giving the courts the opportunity to 
refer to international law in the interpretation of the Declaration of Rights, it would have been ideal in this 
case to make use of international law in interpreting the Declaration of Rights, thus holding the State 
accountable to its international obligation since it has signed and ratified the ICESCR and the ICCPR.  
658
See Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC); City of 
Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 (1) SA 78 (W); 2006 (6) BCLR 728 (W); Residents of Joe 
Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others Case CCT 22/08 [2009] ZACC 16; 
Minister of Public Works v Kyalami Ridge Association 2001 (3) SA 1151 (CC). 
659
African Human Rights Commission (2007) 27. 
660
Section 15(1) of the Lancaster House Constitution stated that ‗no person shall be subjected to torture 
or to inhuman or degrading punishment or other such treatment.‘ 
661
Article 5 of UDHR which states that ‗No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment‖; Article 7 of the ICCPR which reads‖ No one shall be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected 
without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.‘; Article 5 of the ACHPR which states 
‗Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and to the 
recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave 
trade, torture, cruel or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited.‘ 
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force, which has been used to suppress opposition supporters, lawyers662, as well as 
human rights defenders who have been arrested and tortured for speaking out against 
human rights abuses in the country.663 However, judicial indifference towards human 
rights cases and the attitude of the Attorney-General (AG) in handling cases alleging 
torture have severely compromised access to justice in the country.664 
One of the groundbreaking cases of torture that has been handled by the current 
judiciary is that of Jestina Mukoko v The Commissioner- General of Police and 
Others.665 In this case Jestina Mukoko, a human rights activist, was abducted from her 
home in the early hours of the morning on the 3rd of December 2008. For days she was 
assaulted on the soles of her feet and beaten with rubber truncheons. Her whereabouts 
remained unknown until her appearance in court on the 24th of December 2008. During 
the period of her disappearance the police had publicly professed ignorance of her 
whereabouts. She was charged with contravening section 24(a) of the Criminal Law 
(Codification and Reform) Act666 for allegedly recruiting or attempting to recruit 
individuals for training in banditry, insurgency, sabotage or terrorism. 
The legal representatives of Jestina Mukoko made a number of concerted efforts for her 
to be released on bail, but on several occasions such requests were denied by the 
courts.667 She continued to mount a protracted legal battle to secure her freedom 
                                                          
662
The continued abuse of lawyers handling human rights cases in the country has been done in violation 
of United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers and the Legal Practitioners Act of Zimbabwe 
1981 which states that ‗legal practitioners are entitled to represent their clients without fear of being 
harassed and intimidated by the authorities.‘ 
663
Amnesty International USA Torture, ill-Treatment and the Denial of Medical Care Zimbabwe July 2007 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?lang=e&id=ENGAFR460192007 (Accessed 19 March 2010). 
664
The impartiality of the AG has been called into question because he has publicly declared his support 
for ZANU-PF. This has raised several questions on the capability of the AG to independently prosecute 
human rights violators and bringing them to justice. See The Zimbabwe Times ‗New AG Openly Declares 
Support for ZANU-PF‘  
http://www.thezimbabwetimes.com/?p=9859 (Accessed 30 March 2012). 
665
Supreme Court Case No. 293/09 [2009] ZWSC 1 (14 January 2009). 
Available at http://www.saflii.org.za/zw/cases/ZWSC/2009/1.html (Accessed 26 June 2012). 
666
Act 23 of 2004. 
667
See S v Mukoko Case No. HC B88/09 at http://www.zimlii.org/zw/judgment/harare-high-court/2009/24 
(Accessed 26 June 2012) where Chitakunye J denied Jestina Mukoko bail as he was of the view that she 
had to go through the initial remand hearing so that the Magistrate before whom she had initially 
appeared could determine whether there was a legal justification to place her on remand.  Efforts were 
also made in vain in the Supreme Court for the release of Jestina Mukoko .See also Mukoko v 
Commissioner General of Police and Others Supreme Court Case No. 293/08 [2009] ZWSC 1 (14 
January 2009) where an application was made on her behalf seeking an order to depart from the 
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through several applications in the Magistrates Courts, High Court and Supreme Court 
until she was granted bail in May 2009 and finally her acquittal by the Supreme Court on 
28 September 2009.668 Jestina Mukoko was acquitted by the Supreme Court on the 
basis that several of her constitutional rights, the right to personal liberty, freedom from 
inhuman and degrading treatment at the hands of state agents , and the right to 
protection of the law, had been violated.669  
Although the Supreme Court should be commended in this case for finally protecting 
her rights, it is surprising that it took the court a lengthy period of time to find that her 
rights had been violated. To make matters worse, the violations were done with 
impunity with the court failing to condemn the actions of the perpetrators and to 
recommend that such perpetrators be taken to task and prosecuted for the human rights 
violations.670 In criticising the delays of the court in upholding Mukoko‘s rights, Magaisa 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Supreme Court Rules in regard to set down of a Constitutional Court application made in terms of section 
24(1) of the Lancaster House so that the court could hear the case on an urgent basis. The application 
was dismissed by Chidyausiku CJ as he stated that the application was fatally defective as it did not 
comply with section 24 of the Lancaster House Constitution. Chidyausiku CJ in his reasoning stated that 
section 24 of the Lancaster House Constitution was peremptory and therefore the court did not have 
discretion to condone departure from compliance with it. A document released by the Zimbabwe Lawyers 
for Human Rights clearly depicts the number of cases that were filed with the courts and the attitude of 
the courts and the state towards the handling of the Jestina Mukoko case and that of other human rights 
defenders. In the Jestina Mukoko v The Commissioner General of the Police and another HC Case 
No.7169/08 (Unreported) an application was filed with the Harare High Court requesting the court to grant 
her the right to seek medical treatment. The court granted the order but State officials refused to comply 
with the court order. As a result a further urgent High Court case was filed in an effort to make sure that 
medical treatment was granted to Jestina Mukoko and several other human rights activists arrested on 
similar charges. (HC Case No. 03/09). The High Court in this case dismissed the application and refused 
to hear the matter on the basis that the medical affidavits filed together with the application were ones 
used in criminal cases, and not civil, and so the papers were not in order. The Judge ordered that fresh 
medical affidavits be filed, an issue which, according to ZHLR lawyers, was sorted out within an hour only 
to find later that the judge was unreachable. 
www.zimbabwewatch.org/.../ZLHR%20Abductions%2009-01-06%20timeline1.doc ( Accessed 10 January 
2009) 
668
International Federation for Human Rights ‗Stay of prosecution in favour of Ms Mukoko‘ 2 October 2009 
http://www.fidh.org/Stay-of-prosecution-in-favour-of-Ms-Jestina (Accessed 10 January 2012). 
669
International Federation for Human Rights ‗Stay of prosecution in favour of Ms Mukoko‘ 2 October 2009 
http://www.fidh.org/Stay-of-prosecution-in-favour-of-Ms-Jestina (Accessed 10 January 2012). 
670
For example see the South African case of Mthembu v S 2008 (2) SACR 407 (SCA) para.39 where 
Cachalia JA (Supreme Court) recommended that  members of the police be prosecuted after they had 
used torture to extract evidence from the chief State  witness to implicate the applicant  in a number of 
serious crimes that he had committed. Cachalia JA in his judgment stated that ‗What has happened in 
this case is most regrettable. The appellant, who ought to have been convicted and appropriately 
punished for having committed serious crimes, will escape the full consequences of his criminal acts. The 
police officers who carried the responsibility of investigating these crimes have not only failed to 
investigate the case properly by not following elementary procedures relating to the conduct of the 
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states that ―if the court was certain that there was a violation of rights, then those rights 
should have been protected from the first day the accused was brought before the 
court.‖671 The failure of the court to condemn the state and its agents and to hold them 
liable for such human rights violations indicates how the culture of impunity has become 
deeply entrenched in the country and has contributed greatly to the continued violation 
of human rights. The indifference of the courts towards cases dealing with torture is also 
shown in a number of cases where individuals have sought justice without success from 
the courts.672 Thus, the failure of the courts to protect such rights has sent out a 
message that the state is above the law and therefore cannot be held accountable for 
any human rights violations in the country. 
3.6 Non-Enforcement of Court Orders 
Zimbabwe has over the years had an endemic problem with regards to the enforcement 
of judicial orders with the executive and its agents constantly flouting court orders.673 
Since the formation of the Government of National Unity in 2009, positive developments 
have been noted in the manner in which the current judiciary has handled human rights 
cases. However, despite several judicial pronouncements, the police and the executive 
have continuously violated court orders. Perhaps what is more worrying is that the 
judiciary has been silent on such actions by the executive and its agents. Such silence 
has again compromised the rule of law in the country as no one has been held 
accountable for any violation of court orders.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
identification parade, but have also by torturing Ramseroop and probably also Zamani Mhlongo and 
Sithembiso Ngcobo, themselves committed serious crimes of a most egregious kind. They have treated 
the law with contempt and must be held accountable for their actions.‘ 
671
Magaisa A ‗Mukoko Case and the Rule of Law in Zimbabwe‘ The Zimbabwe Standard, 3 October 
2009.http://www.thestandard.co.zw/opinion/21625-mukoko-case-and-the-rule-of-law-in-zimbabwe.html 
(Accessed 10 March 2012). 
672
See Kenneth Simon Marimba v the Commissioner General of Police High Court Case No.6903/08 
(Unreported) where an urgent application seeking the release of a human rights defender was subjected 
to lengthy delays with the file being shuffled amongst several judges as most of the judges refused to 
hear the matter. See further Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights A Plea to SADC Leaders: Do Not 
Tolerate or Fuel the Impunity of those who seek to violate the SADC Treaty and the Zimbabwe Global 
Political Agreement for Political Ends http://www.sokwanele.com/thisiszimbabwe/archives/3120 
(Accessed 10 March 2012). 
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Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum Revisiting The Commonwealth and Zimbabwe: What is to be 
done? An Assessment of Zimbabwe‟s Performance since its Withdrawal from the Commonwealth (2007) 
14. 
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A number of cases exist where the defiance of court orders has resulted in the further 
violation of citizens‘ rights. In the case of Fidelis Charamba and Others v The Minister of 
Home Affairs and Others674 an order declaring the release of the applicants in this case 
was ignored by the police. In the following cases Killiana Takawira and Tsitsi Gonzo v 
The Commissioner General of Police and Others; Adrison Shadreck Manyere v The 
Minister of Home Affairs and Others675; Enita Zinyemba v The Minister of Home Affairs 
and Another676, the police were ordered by the courts to do everything possible to 
determine the whereabouts of the abducted people and to investigate their abductions. 
According to ZLHR there was no action by the police and the victims remained 
incarcerated with their abductors roaming free.677 The defiance of court orders is also 
observed in the cases relating to the abduction of Jestina Mukoko. Court orders to 
release Mukoko for medical treatment were continuously violated by the police.678 The 
continued defiance of court orders mainly by the police has seen the country descend 
into a state of lawlessness with the police being a law unto themselves.679 
The lack of judicial protection of human rights by the current judiciary has been a major 
cause of concern. This is so because judicial indifference towards human rights cases 
has resulted in increased impunity in the country. The current judiciary has been 
corrupted and its failure to protect human rights has been evident in the way it has 
handled human rights cases. De Bourbon notes that the present composition of the 
judiciary bodes ill for human rights in the country680 as human rights violations are still 
the order of the day in the country.681 It is therefore imperative that a new approach 
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High Court Case No.6420/08 (Unreported). 
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High Court Case No.7127/08 (Unreported). 
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High Court Case No.7128/08 (Unreported). 
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Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights ‗Abductions Timeline‘ 
www.zimbabwewatch.org/.../ZLHR%20Abductions%2009-01-06%20timeline1.doc ( Accessed 10 March 
20012) 
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See Jestina Mukoko v The Commissioner-General of Police (HC 7169/08) (Unreported); Jestina 
Mukoko and 31 Others v The Commissioner General of Police and Another High Court Case No.7166/08 
(Unreported). 
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See a report by the International Bar Association that depicts how the police have continuously defied 
court orders in the country thus exacerbating the human rights situation in the country. International Bar 
Association Partisan Policing: An Obstacle to Human Rights and Democracy in Zimbabwe (2007) 7-57.   
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De Bourbon A (2003) 217. 
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should be adopted in order to address the human rights situation in the country and to 
ensure that all judges abide by their judicial oath to protect the Constitution and the rule 
of law. 
3.7 Conclusion  
The discussion in this chapter has revealed a historical picture of the judicial protection 
of human rights in Zimbabwe since the attainment of independence. From the early 
beginnings, up to before the commencement of the FTLRP, the judiciary served with 
great distinction despite certain instances where clashes were witnessed between the 
executive and the judiciary and such actions of the executive sought to undermine the 
independence and authority of the courts in the country. However, despite constant 
clashes with the executive, this did not deter the courts from upholding the Constitution 
and the rule of law, thus ensuring that human rights were protected. However, the case 
has not been the same since the launch of the FTLRP, where independently-minded 
judges have been purged after a series of judgments perceived to be against 
government policies. The courts have been packed with pliant judges who have in 
various decisions endorsed executive lawlessness, thus abrogating their role to promote 
and protect human rights. In order to maintain the loyalty of judges, seductive gifts have 
been used by the executive to ensure that judges champion the cause of the executive. 
This has resulted in the loss of independence on the part of the judiciary and has 
contributed to the continued escalation of human rights violations.  
Thus, the next chapter undertakes a comparative analysis of the judicial systems of 
Uganda, South Africa and Canada. The purpose of the comparative analysis is to 
establish how these jurisdictions have adopted international law principles in protecting 
the independence of the judiciary and how such independence has contributed to the 
domestic promotion and protection of human rights by the respective judiciaries. The 
comparative study will recommend that Zimbabwe could also adopt the same measures 
to improve the respect for judicial independence which will subsequently lead to an 
improvement in the promotion and protection of human rights.    
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Chapter 4 
ENLARGING THE SCOPE OF HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVANCE BY THE 
JUDICIARY: A CONTEMPORARY COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE 
ZIMBABWEAN, UGANDAN, SOUTH AFRICAN AND CANADIAN JUDICIAL 
SYSTEMS 
 
4 Introduction  
The previous chapter has highlighted the importance of the independence of the 
judiciary and how international law strives to ensure that States around the world adopt 
domestic measures to promote and protect the independence of the judiciary. As has 
been noted in this research, there is no doubt that the independence of the judiciary is 
fundamental to the effective protection of human rights. Thus, countries, such as, 
Uganda, South Africa and Canada, have adopted these international practices and have 
incorporated them into their domestic law. The realisation of the importance of human 
rights protection has thus necessitated the adoption of these principles that seek to 
promote and protect the independence of the judiciary. This chapter therefore seeks to 
make a survey of how three countries have implemented these international principles 
into their domestic law and how this has impacted on their promotion and protection of 
human rights. Such information is of great value to inform the situation in Zimbabwe on 
how it can improve its human rights protection.    
Over the years the Zimbabwean judiciary has adopted an approach of disregarding the 
observance of human rights largely due to political pressure and has lowered its 
compliance with international human rights obligations. Such lowered compliance has 
thus had a severe impact on the human rights situation in the country. An analysis of 
the cost-effect of the lack of protection of human rights from Uganda‘s experience 
establishes that the disregard of human rights, especially by developing countries, may 
not be a plausible agenda. The benefits of human rights observance are illustrated by 
Uganda‘s efforts to reform amidst prevailing challenges. Also it should be noted that 
there exist better examples of human rights observance, such as in the case of South 
Africa, and further best practices can be obtained from Canada. Therefore, as a result 
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the author believes that in order to improve the human rights situation and the judicial 
protection of human rights in Zimbabwe, the country could follow the examples of 
Uganda, South Africa and Canada on how best to establish a strong judiciary so as to 
improve human rights protection. The reason why these three countries were chosen is 
because in South Africa, despite it being a developing country, the post-apartheid 
judiciary has set a tremendous example on the exact role that the judiciary ought to play 
in the protection of human rights. Its independence has thus greatly enhanced its ability 
to promote and protect human rights. Uganda, as a developing country, provides a 
great example of the consequences of the lack of promotion and protection of human 
rights and how the lack of an independent judiciary greatly impacts on efforts to promote 
and protect human rights. The Ugandan situation therefore enforces the belief that an 
independent judiciary is vital for human rights protection.  Canada can thus be used as 
a best practices example for the protection of the independence of the judiciary and the 
judicial protection of human rights. 
4.1 Uganda 
4.1.1 Introduction 
It should be noted that Uganda is a prime example in Africa that could greatly inform the 
situation in Zimbabwe on the consequences of the lack of promotion and protection of 
human rights, and how the lack of an independent judiciary greatly impacts on efforts to 
promote and protect human rights. According to the International Bar Association, 
Uganda has a post-colonial history that has been marred by civil war, economic decline, 
social disintegration and human rights violations.682 Mapfumo notes that the political 
landscape in Uganda has influenced the judiciary‘s character, its independence and the 
ability to protect human rights.683 Onyango notes that during the colonial era, the 
judiciary was an extension of the British Crown and as such the judiciary was not 
independent, which greatly affected the protection of human rights in Uganda.684 Under 
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683
Mapfumo T (2005) 43. 
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the leadership of Milton Obote who assumed power in 1966 after ousting Sir Edward 
Muteesa II, the independence of the judiciary was not assured.685 In order to 
consolidate his rule Obote suspended the 1962 Constitution, abolished kingdoms and 
consolidated his control over the military by eliminating several rivals.686 As a result of 
consolidating his rule, Obote openly undermined the judiciary and hence also 
undermined the protection of human rights.687  
The first regime of Milton Obote was brought to an end in 1971 when General Idi Amin 
took over power in a coup.688 The Idi Amin era was a total dictatorship characterised by 
widespread human rights violations.689 The judiciary was not independent and some 
members of the judiciary were victims of human rights violations.690 Idi Amin lasted in 
power for eight years and he was overthrown in 1979.691 Elections were held in 1980 
and ushered in the second rule of Milton Obote.692 Milton Obote‘s government was 
overthrown in 1985, with Tito Okello Lutwa assuming power. He was later overthrown in 
a coup in 1986 with Yoweri Museveni taking over.693 Okoth notes that during all the 
regimes in Uganda, the rule of law was suspended with a series of crimes being 
committed against civilians by both the state and non-state actors. Thus, the various 
governments subjected Ugandans to systematic violations of human rights which 
included arbitrary arrest and detention, extrajudicial killings and torture.694 
After many years of lack of independence, attempts were made prior to 1995 to improve 
the state of the judiciary and secure its independence.  In 1994 the Ugandan judiciary 
was praised for its independence after the acquittal of a former Minister in the Obote 
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Mutibwa PM Uganda since Independence: A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes (1992) 42-64. 
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administration on the capital charge of treason.695 Such decision was viewed as a sign 
that the Ugandan judiciary enjoyed a reasonably unfettered degree of independence 
from the executive. Because of the bad state of the judiciary after years of conflict and 
instability, attempts were made to build up the judicial system so as to attract foreign 
investment.696 Although efforts pre-1995 were made to interfere with the judiciary, the 
courts still managed to uphold human rights issues697 despite some instances where the 
Museveni government refused to comply with court judgments. Mapfumo notes that 
since 1995 the Ugandan judiciary has changed its approach towards human rights and 
has become more robust as a result of constitutional provisions that have given the 
judiciary space for activism.698 However, such activism has not advanced far enough to 
ensure that the judiciary is the surest guarantor of human rights as at times the judiciary 
has been intimidated and influenced to make decisions that support the ideology of the 
executive. 699Unfortunately the same fate has also befallen the judiciary in Zimbabwe 
and the rubber-stamping of executive decisions has been made at the expense of 
human rights. 
4.2 Courts and Human Rights Protection in Uganda 
After many years of conflict, the realisation of the importance of human rights protection 
resulted in the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda700 putting into place the 
institutional framework for human rights protection that recognises the need for 
establishing a socio-economic and political order based on the principles of unity, 
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Ellett RL Emerging Judicial Power in Transitional Democracies: Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda (2008) 
226. 
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See the case of Ssempebwa v Attorney General Constitutional 1 of 1987 where Ssempebwa obtained 
judgment against the National Resistance Movement (NRM) based on a claim against the former Obote 
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equality, democracy, freedom, social justice and progress.701 The National Objectives 
and Directive Principles of State Policy emphasise the protection of human rights by the 
State and the need for the State to respect institutions charged with the promotion and 
protection of human rights.702 Chapter four of the Constitution of Uganda contains a Bill 
of Rights that encompasses civil and political rights, economic703, social and cultural 
rights and environmental rights.  
Furthermore, Article 50 of the Constitution deals with the enforcement of the rights 
protected under the Constitution and most significantly provides for public interest 
litigation so as to increase access to justice in Uganda.704 
In order to ensure that the judiciary is responsible for the protection of human rights, the 
Constitution of the Republic of Uganda established a court structure headed by the 
Supreme Court of Uganda.705 The judiciary is headed by the Chief Justice who is 
responsible for the administration and supervision of all courts in Uganda. Judicial 
power in Uganda is derived from the people and the Constitution states that such power 
shall be exercised by the courts established under the Constitution in the name of the 
people and in conformity with the laws and with the values, norms and aspirations of the 
people.706 
4.2.1 Independence of the Judiciary 
In order to ensure that courts discharge their duties without any fear or favour, the 
independence of the judiciary is protected under the Constitution of Uganda. Thus, 
article 128 of the Constitution states that: 
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Preamble of the Constitution of Uganda. 
702
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‗(1) In the exercise of judicial power, the courts shall be independent and shall not be 
subject to the control or direction of any person or authority. (2) No person or authority 
shall interfere with the courts or judicial officers in the exercise of their judicial functions. 
(3) All organs and agencies of the State shall accord the courts such assistance as may 
be required to ensure the effectiveness of the courts. (4) A person exercising judicial 
powers shall not be liable to any action or suit for any act or omission by that person in 
the exercise of judicial power.‘ 
The Constitution of Uganda emphasises the need for members of the judiciary to be 
independent of the other branches of the state. The independence and impartiality of 
the judiciary is thus seen as crucial in the protection and promotion of human rights. For 
the courts to remain impartial and exercise their functions without any fear or favour it is 
crucial that their independence should be secured. As has been discussed previously, 
key to securing the independence of the judiciary are the appointment processes, the 
provision of fixed security of tenure and adequate remuneration. These are discussed 
below. 
4.2.2 Appointment of Judges 
In order to ensure that impartiality is observed in the appointment of judges, the 
Ugandan Constitution puts into place appointment mechanisms that seek to maintain 
impartiality in judicial appointments. Article 142 of the Constitution of Uganda states 
that: 
‗(1) The Chief Justice, the Deputy Chief Justice, the Principal Judge, a justice of the 
Supreme Court, a justice of Appeal and a judge of the High Court shall be appointed by 
the President acting on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission and with the 
approval of Parliament.‘ 
The important role played by the JSC707 in the appointment process is once again 
highlighted in the Constitution.708 In order to ensure that appointments are carried out 
                                                          
707
Article 146 of the Constitution of Uganda states that ‗(1) There shall be a Judicial Service Commission. 
(2) The Judicial Service Commission shall, subject to clause (3) of this article, consist of the following 
persons who shall be appointed by the President with the approval of Parliament- (a) a chairperson and a 
deputy chairperson who shall be persons qualified to be appointed as justices of the Supreme Court, 
other than the Chief Justice, the Deputy Chief Justice and the Principal Judge; (b) one person nominated 
by the Public Service Commission; (c) two advocates of not less than fifteen years‘ standing nominated 
by the Uganda Law Society; (d) one judge of the Supreme Court nominated by the President in 
 
 
 
 
151 
 
impartially, the President is bound by the advice of the JSC. The Ugandan JSC is most 
notable for the fact that the Chief Justice is not chair of the Commission.709 Ellett notes 
that the make-up of the JSC is far more extensive and more detailed in its layout.710 The 
Constitution of the Republic of Uganda also specifies that a person is not qualified to be 
appointed as a member of the JSC unless the person is of high moral character and 
proven integrity.711 However, Ellett notes that the composition of the JSC is dominated 
by Presidential appointments with the exception of the two advocates appointed by the 
Uganda Law Society.712 Despite concerns about its composition it is plausible that the 
President in Uganda appoints judges on the advice of the JSC. More importantly the 
Constitution also gives Parliament, as representative of the populace, a say in the 
appointment of judges. It is submitted that such role is important in that it ensures that 
checks are conducted on the President so as to ensure that there is no abuse of power 
and that appointments are not made in accordance with political considerations.  
However, it should be noted that as is the case with Zimbabwe, investigative reports in 
Uganda by the International Bar Association have raised concerns about the influence 
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of political considerations in the appointment process.713 The Uganda Judicial Officers 
Association (UJOA) has also raised concerns about the influence of political 
considerations in judicial appointments.714 More recently, the re-appointment of Odoki 
CJ as Chief Justice of Uganda has been challenged before the Constitutional Court 
after allegations have been levelled against the President for disregarding the advice of 
the JSC in re-appointing Odoki CJ as Chief Justice.715 Such actions by the President in 
disregarding the advice of the JSC do not augur well for the independence of the 
judiciary. Despite this, Freedom House notes that generally the higher courts in Uganda 
have a tradition of independence, whilst the magistrates often succumb to political and 
economic pressure.716 
4.2.3 Tenure of Office of Judicial Officers 
4.2.3.1 Security of Tenure 
In order to secure the independence of the judiciary, the Constitution of Uganda 
protects the tenure of office of judicial officers. Thus, Article 144 states that:  
‗(1) A judicial officer may retire at any time after attaining the age of sixty years, and shall 
vacate his or her office- (a) in the case of the of the Chief Justice, the Deputy Chief 
Justice, a justice of the Supreme Court and a justice of Appeal, on attaining the age of 
seventy years; and (b) in the case of the Principal judge and a judge of the High Court, 
on attaining the age of sixty-five years; or (c) in each case, subject to article  128(7) this 
Constitution, on attaining such other age as may be prescribed by Parliament by law; but 
a judicial officer may continue in office after attaining the age at which he or she is 
required by this clause to vacate office, for a period not exceeding three months 
necessary to enable him or her to complete any work pending before him or her.‘ 
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The re-appointment of Odoki CJ717  who had reached the age of retirement has opened 
a huge debate about the issue of tenure in Uganda. Sebatindira notes that lack of fixed 
tenure under the Constitution poses a great threat to the independence of the judiciary 
in Uganda.718 He also notes that the position of the Chief Justice as the head of the 
judiciary makes him responsible for the administration and supervision of all courts in 
Uganda and he thus issues orders and directions to the courts necessary for the proper 
an efficient administration of justice. Therefore, in cases where the Chief Justice serves, 
for example, under a two year contract or can be removed any time by the President, 
such measures are bound to interfere with the independence of the judiciary.719 Such a 
move therefore makes it possible for the Chief Justice to be susceptible to political 
pressure or intimidation, thus seriously compromising the independence of the judiciary. 
4.2.4 Removal of Judges 
In accordance with Article 144(2) a judicial officer may be removed from office only for 
inability to perform the functions of the judicial office, misbehaviour or misconduct, and 
incompetence.720 The JSC or the Cabinet have the responsibility of referring to the 
President if a question arises that a judge should be removed from office.721 If such a 
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The re-appointment of Odoki CJ was made in accordance with Article 142(2) of the Constitution of 
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scenario arises the President is mandated to appoint a tribunal to look into the matter.722 
Once the tribunal is formed to look at the question of the removal of a judge, such judge 
is placed on suspension.723 A judge is removed from office if the tribunal recommends 
to the President that such judge should be removed.724 However, the suspension is only 
lifted if the tribunal recommends that the judge should not be removed from office.725   
Recently there have been calls by the Ugandan Law Society for the removal of Choudry 
J as judge of the High Court of Uganda.726 Such calls have been premised on the fact 
that evidence has emerged that Choudry J was struck off the Roll of Solicitors in the 
United Kingdom.727 As such his fitness to hold the office of a judge of the High Court 
has been called into question. A petition has also been submitted to the Constitutional 
Court seeking orders for the appointment of a Tribunal to investigate the question of the 
appointment and removal of Choudry J. Although the JSC has noted that a prima facie 
case has been established against Choudry J, a tribunal is yet to be established.728 
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Article 144(4) states that ‗[t]he President shall then appoint a tribunal consisting of- (a) in the case of 
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4.2.5 Remuneration of Judges 
In accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, the administrative 
expenses of the judiciary, including salaries, allowances, gratuities and pensions, are 
charged to the Consolidated Fund.729 The Constitution also goes further to provide that 
the judiciary is self-accounting and may deal with the Ministry responsible for finance in 
relation to its finances.730 In order to secure the financial independence of judges, the 
Constitution also stipulates that the salaries, allowances, privileges and retirement 
benefits of a judicial officer or any person exercising judicial power shall not be varied to 
his or her disadvantage.731 Ellet notes that members of the Ugandan judiciary are some 
of the best paid civil servants, not only within Uganda, but also within the region.732 
However, despite this assertion by Ellet, there have been a number of reports of 
allegations of corruption amongst members of the judiciary which has threatened the 
independence of judges.733 In April 2013 proposals were made by the Ministry of Justice 
to increase the salaries of judges so as to ward off cases of corruption within the 
judiciary.734 
On the issue of funding of the courts in Uganda, the International Bar Association notes 
that the severe lack of funding has impacted on the administration of justice in 
Uganda.735 The International Bar Association (IBA) notes that severe cuts have been 
made in the judiciary‘s budget which has had negative consequences for the 
independence of the judiciary. The lack of financial independence has whittled down the 
independence of the judiciary as an institution. The International Bar Association also 
notes that the lack of financial independence has reduced the judiciary to a position akin 
to that of a ‗beggar going cup in hand‘ to the executive and legislator in order to be able 
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to perform its constitutional duty.736  The lack of adequate funding has left the 
independence of the judiciary exposed and has thus impacted on the administration of 
justice in Uganda.  
4.2.6 Human Rights Protection in Uganda 
It should be noted as discussed earlier that efforts have been made to secure the 
independence of the judiciary and also the promotion and protection of human rights. 
Such independence has resulted in courts being able to protect the fundamental rights 
and freedoms in the Constitution. However, as Kibalama notes, the judiciary has at 
times been intimidated and influenced to make decisions that rubber-stamp executive 
excesses at the expense of human rights.737 
The judiciary in Uganda has been commended for its approach to public interest 
litigation. This approach is in stark contrast to the approach that was adopted by the 
judiciary in Zimbabwe under the Lancaster House Constitution. Ellett notes that over the 
years Uganda has had several public interest litigation success stories and these are 
attributable to the Ugandan Constitution.738 In the case of Environmental Action Network 
Limited (TEAN) v Attorney-General739 the High Court allowed litigation by an NGO on 
behalf of non-smokers and such litigation was based on the fact that smoking in public 
places was a violation of the right to a clean and healthy environment. In the same case 
the Court, inter alia, declared that in public interest litigation there was no requirement 
for locus standi.  
With regards to public interest litigation in the case of Greenwatch v Attorney-General 
and Another740 the Court held that ‗any concerned person or organisation may bring a 
public interest action on behalf of groups or individual members of the country even if 
that group or individual was not aware that his fundamental rights or freedoms were 
being violated pursuant to article 50 of the Constitution.‘741 The case upheld the 
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justiciability of the right to a healthy environment.  However, despite the generous 
approach of the courts towards public interest litigation, there are some cases that have 
been rejected by the courts on the issue of standing.742 With its decision in Rwanyarare 
v Attorney-General, the Ugandan judiciary has been criticised for its frequent use of 
procedural issues and legal technicalities743 as an easy way to dismiss petitions, and as 
a result undermined efforts to enforce human rights in the courts. Gloppen also notes 
that: 
‗A particular approach to balancing judicial autonomy with self-restraint, and avoid 
crossing the boundaries of policy and politics, emerged in the Constitutional Court during 
this period. Whenever possible the court cautiously avoided a conflict with either the 
executive or the legislature, and for years, technicalities and controversies rather than 
meritorious issues marked its judgments. This is particularly noteworthy in light of the 
emphasis in the 1995 Constitution on the administration of substantive justice without 
undue regard to technicalities.‘ 
744
 
The Ugandan judiciary‘s approach towards the handling of election cases has been 
criticised as seeking to protect the interests of the ruling party and has thus endorsed 
electoral fraud at the expense of the rights of other political parties. These are the same 
allegations that the MDC in Zimbabwe has levelled against the judiciary for its persistent 
stance to endorse fraud in elections thus defeating the will of the people. For example, 
in Kizza Besigye v Yoweri Kaguta Museveni 745 the majority of the Court, despite finding 
a number of electoral flaws746, ruled that such flaws were not substantial enough to 
vitiate the election. However, in a dissenting judgment Tsekooko J and Oder J ruled that 
the electoral malpractices had substantially affected the outcome and that the election 
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had to be annulled.  In the Kizza Besigye v Yoweri Kaguta Museveni case, there were 
allegations that a number of the judges were intimidated to rule in favour of 
Museveni.747 Another case that highlights the attitude of the judiciary towards political 
cases is that of Kizza Besigye v Yoweri Museveni and Electoral Commission.748 In this 
case Besigye sought to challenge the results of the 2006 election. Just like the decision 
in 2001, the Supreme Court found that although there were serious irregularities in the 
election process, the results had not been substantially affected by such irregularities.  
However, despite the ―disappointing‖ judgments in the presidential election cases, the 
judiciary in Uganda has delivered some promising decisions with regards to election 
cases. In the case of Amama Mbabazi and Electoral Commission v Garuga James749, 
the Court found that a number of electoral malpractices had substantially affected the 
election. On appeal the Court of Appeal in upholding the decision of the High, held that 
there was overwhelming violence, intimidation and a sectarian campaign that had 
substantially affected the outcome of the elections and thus warranted nullification of the 
results.750 However, the handling of such election matters drew the ire of President 
Museveni, who directly attacked the judiciary and expressed a lack of confidence in the 
institution with regards to electoral cases.751 
Despite its mixed decisions in the electoral cases, the Ugandan judiciary has made a 
positive contribution to protecting human rights. It has delivered a number of judgments 
that have sought to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of the Ugandan 
people.752 With regards to human rights issues in the country, Human Rights Watch has 
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noted that there have been ongoing threats to freedom of expression, assembly and 
association.753 Human Rights Watch also notes that there have been recent cases were 
the violation of human rights by security forces has been done with impunity especially 
with regards to the killings and deaths during protests in 2009 and 2011754.   
4.3 Challenges to the Independence of the Judiciary in Uganda 
 There are still many challenges that the judiciary in Uganda is still facing. The biggest 
challenge, as is the case in Zimbabwe, has been assaults on the independence of the 
judiciary by the executive arm of government.755 The International Bar Association also 
notes that political interference in the work of the judiciary has been a major threat to 
judicial independence. The judiciary has been subjected to constant attacks from the 
executive especially with regards to decisions that are contrary to the ideologies of the 
executive.756 
The independence of the judiciary in Uganda has over the years been interfered with by 
the executive on a number of occasions. The lifting of the ban on parties in Uganda saw 
the arrest and incarceration of opposition leader Kizza Besigye and other members of 
the People‘s Redemption Army (PRA)757 on trumped up charges. The granting of bail to 
Kizza Besigye saw the military laying siege to the courts to re-arrest Kizza Besigye in 
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defiance of a court order that had granted him bail.758 As a result gun-wielding 
government security operatives invaded the High Court premises, assaulted legal 
practitioners and re-arrested treason suspects released on bail, and had them arraigned 
before military courts.759 The proceedings before the General Court Martial were ruled 
to be illegal by the Constitutional Court and subsequent court orders for the release of 
Kizza Besigye were ignored by the executive, thus contributing to the undermining of 
the independence of the judiciary in Uganda.760 Byaruhanga notes that the interference 
by the executive with the independence of the judiciary has undermined the rate of 
democracy in Uganda and that if that interference does not stop, democracy will remain 
a nightmare in the country.761 
4.4 Summary  
It should be noted that although the judiciary has over the years faced great challenges 
to its independence (most of which are similar to the challenges faced by the judiciary in 
Zimbabwe), it has shown marked improvement in its role in respect of human rights 
protection. Ellett notes that the courts have been provided with an arena for debate on 
important political issues and disputes, rights protection and on matters of substantial 
public interest.762 He adds that in the Ugandan judiciary there has emerged a culture, of 
radical judges who have chosen to exercise their leadership on the bench and others 
who have exercised their leadership on and off the bench.763 He notes that despite the 
existence of such judges, a number of judges have adopted a timid approach and a 
concern for personal survival rather than a selfless concern for the institutional well-
being of the judiciary as a whole.764 Mapfumo also states that there are times where the 
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judges have censored themselves rather than acting as a check against executive 
excesses in human rights issues765.  
However, there is general agreement that considering the difficult socio-economic 
conditions of Uganda, the judiciary has come a long way and has made some impact in 
the field of human rights. An example has thus been set for Zimbabwe, on how it is 
possible to promote and protect human rights despite the existence of threats to the 
independence of the judiciary. However, it should be noted that for the judiciary in 
Uganda to attain the best practices in human rights protection, it is crucial that it 
remains independent. Such independence is critical to human rights protection and 
enhancing democracy. As a result, the Ugandan judiciary may emulate the positive 
example that has been set by the South African judiciary in terms of human rights 
protection.766  
4.5 South Africa 
4.5.1 Introduction 
In a developing country, the post-apartheid judiciary in South Africa has set tremendous 
examples on the exact role that the judiciary ought to play in the protection of human 
rights. The adoption of a human rights based approach by the post-apartheid judiciary is 
in stark contrast to the lack of protection of human rights under the apartheid system. 
The adoption of the 1996 Constitution has resulted in the improvement of the judicial 
protection of human rights in South Africa. This has been premised on the fact that the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa has made efforts to provide safeguards to 
protect the independence of the judiciary. As a result the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa has gained fame across the world as a strong and liberal document due to 
its numerous safeguards that have been put into place to protect the independence of 
the judiciary. These safeguards offer best practices for the protection of judicial 
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independence and human rights and offer informative value to other nations that are 
undertaking constitutional reforms.  
4.5.2 Judicial Independence under Apartheid 
The judiciary under the apartheid regime was subject to great manipulation by the 
government despite assurances by the government that judicial independence was 
being maintained.767 Bruce and Gordon note that while formal structures existed 
guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary, and whilst the judiciary had a history of 
independence, close inspection of the judiciary, however, revealed that it was not truly 
independent.768 As a result the judiciary was unable to curb abuses of power by other 
branches of government. Instead of holding the government accountable for its human 
rights abuses, the judiciary under apartheid repeatedly upheld discriminatory and 
repressive legislation. As a result members of the judiciary were deemed to be obedient 
servants of the repressive legislature rather than impartial and objective arbiters and 
dispensers of justice, stepping in to protect the individual citizen from legislative and 
executive excesses.769 Therefore, the administration of oppressive laws by the judiciary 
contributed to the diminished esteem that ordinary people had for institutions set up to 
administer justice.770 
Under the apartheid regime political factors played a crucial role in the appointment of 
judges. Candidates for judicial appointments were mostly drawn from the ranks of 
senior counsel and such individuals were mostly white.771 With the commencement of 
the process for political change in 1990, the judiciary under the apartheid regime was 
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exclusively white with the only exception of Mohamed J who was appointed in 1991 and 
became the first black judge to be appointed.772 Kentridge also noted that the process 
for identifying potential candidates and their selection was always shrouded in 
controversy.773 As a result a number of judicial appointments to the Supreme Court and 
other courts were made solely on the basis of the political views and connection/s of the 
appointees.774 
Since the South African Constitution was modelled on the Westminster tradition of 
parliamentary sovereignty, there were no significant judicial constraints on Parliament 
as the courts were subservient to Parliament. As a result courts could only declare an 
Act invalid if it had not been passed in accordance with the procedures for passing 
legislation that had been laid down in the Constitution.775 The supremacy of Parliament 
during the apartheid era was also shown through the passing of the High Court of 
Parliament Act in 1952 which sought to entrench parliamentary sovereignty, thus giving 
Parliament the power to overrule decisions of the courts.776 The High Court of 
Parliament Act came to be after the Appeal Court had ruled that the passing of the 
Separate Representation of Voters Act of 1951 (which sought to strip the voting rights of 
coloured people in the Cape Province) was invalid because a two-thirds majority in a 
joint sitting of both houses of Parliament was needed in order to change the entrenched 
clauses of the Constitution.777  
The fact that apartheid judges were responsible for the implementation of repressive 
laws has raised debate as to the exact role that the judges had to play under the 
apartheid system. Dugard was of the view that judges under the apartheid era were 
simply obliged to apply the law on the statute book and were not to blame for their unfair 
nature.778 However, Dugard also noted that apartheid judges adopted an excessively 
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‗positivistic or literal approach‘ towards the interpretation of statutes.779 As a result 
judges regarded themselves as merely ‗declaring‘ the law rather than implementing a 
creative role in statutory interpretation. On the other hand, Van der Westhuizen opines 
that judges had to act as activists and as a result they had the chance of refusing to 
apply blatantly unfair laws and had to utilise spaces for discretion to rule in favour of 
human rights.780 Van der Westhuizen notes that: 
‗In the absence of a constitution as supreme law, the dilemma for apartheid judges was 
where to find any concrete or more or less objective higher law or guiding principle to 
override unfair laws- in natural justice, international law, the principles of common law, 
the principles of natural justice, or simply one‘s own subjective views of fairness and 
justice.‘
781
 
However, despite the controversy surrounding the exact role that judges had to fulfil 
under the apartheid regime, some judges did their best to ameliorate the harshness of 
legislation by enlightened judgments.782 These judges spoke out against the apartheid 
system and its repressive laws. They spoke out against the system extra-judicially and 
in court which contributed in effecting change in South Africa and the ending of the 
apartheid regime. Despite some of the judges speaking out against the system, the 
majority of judges chose to remain silent.783 
With the effects of deprivation under the apartheid regime, came the struggle to bring to 
an end the oppressive regime. The struggle for freedom resulted in negotiations for a 
new democratic South Africa. The democratic South Africa saw the adoption of the 
Interim Constitution of 1993784 and later the Final Constitution in 1996.785 The new legal 
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order in South Africa therefore seeks to innovate social, political and legal structures 
that would be radically different to those of the past history.786 Thus, the adoption of the 
1996 Constitution has ushered in a new legal order for South Africa with the 
Constitution becoming the supreme law.787 The Constitution as the supreme law 
empowers a court when deciding any constitutional matter within its powers to declare 
invalid any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution.788 The vision of the 
Constitution is clearly spelt out in the preamble and section 1 of the Constitution which 
contains the founding values.789 Thus, the founding values emphasise the importance of 
the advancement of human rights and freedoms in South Africa.790 
4.5.3 Judicial Independence in Post- Apartheid South Africa 
4.5.3.1 Judicial Authority 
Rautenbach and Malherbe note that the independence of the courts is a consequence 
of the separation of powers791 and as a result a number of constitutions around the 
world contain provisions that protect the independence of the courts. Section 165(1) 
thus provides that ‗the judicial authority of the Republic is vested in the courts.‘ Section 
165(2) of the Constitution provides for the independence of the courts. It reiterates that 
the courts ―are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, which they 
must apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice‖.  The Constitution also 
prohibits any interference with the functioning of the judiciary.792 It also mandates 
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organs of State to put into place legislative and any other measures that must assist 
and protect the independence of the judiciary.793 
The Constitution also puts into place a court structure with a hierarchy.794 At the apex is 
the Constitutional Court which is the highest court in all constitutional matters.795 The 
Constitution also established the Supreme Court of Appeal which is the highest court of 
appeal in all matters other than constitutional matters.796 High Courts797 and 
Magistrates‘ Courts 798 are also established by the Constitution. The Constitution also 
establishes other courts whose jurisdiction is determined in terms of an Act of 
parliament, including any court of a status similar either to the High Courts or the 
Magistrates‘ Courts.799 Apart from establishing the court structure, the Constitution also 
establishes specific guarantees that seek to protect the independence of the judiciary. 
These guarantees shall be discussed below.  
4.5.3.2 Appointment of Judicial Officers and the Issue of Transformation 
According to Gordon and Bruce, the Constitution contains various provisions that 
facilitate the appointment of diverse and well qualified individuals in an open and 
democratic process.800 Thus, section 174(1) of the Constitution stipulates that any 
person who is properly qualified and is fit and proper may be appointed as a judge in 
the country. However, consideration has to be given to ensure that any appointments 
reflect broadly the racial and gender composition of South Africa.801  Section 9(2) of the 
Constitution also contains a general affirmative action provision which seeks to promote 
the achievement of equality and protect and promote individuals disadvantaged by 
unfair discrimination. These provisions therefore seek to address the challenges of the 
past, and section 174(1) in particular seeks to change the face of the courts and 
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promote the appointment of more blacks and women (especially black women) in order 
to ensure that the judiciary reflects the racial demographics of South Africa.  
Wesson and Du Plessis note that the issue of transformation does not carry a single 
meaning as it incorporates issues, such as, the manner in which judges are appointed, 
the demographics of the judiciary, the underlying attitudes of the judiciary, accountability 
of the judiciary, and the embracement of efficiency and access to justice.802 However, it 
should be noted that the issue of transformation in the post-apartheid era has raised 
great concern in South Africa. Concerns have been voiced about the slow pace of 
transformation and accusations have also been made that white male candidates are 
being overlooked for judicial appointments in favour of black candidates.803 
Gordon and Bruce, who agree on the need for a representative judiciary, have 
expressed the fear that efforts that are being made in seeking to transform the judiciary 
could undermine the independence of the judiciary. Due to the apartheid legacy, the 
authors express great concern about the limited number of black, coloured and Indian 
legal practitioners who have the necessary skills and qualifications for appointment to 
the bench.804 Thus, they are critical of the JSC and believe that the JSC has not 
adequately met the challenge of transformation and has thus mainly focussed more on 
race and gender than on legal competence when making judicial appointments.805 Such 
accusations have also resulted in the resignation of Izak Smuts, a JSC member, who 
has launched a scathing attack on the JSC on the manner in which competent, well 
qualified independently-minded white male candidates have been overlooked for judicial 
appointments in favour of less qualified black or women candidates.806  
Although it is important that the issue of transformation needs to be addressed in South 
Africa, it is crucial that this is not done in a manner that will compromise the 
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independence of the judiciary. The current focus of appointments mainly based on race 
rather than competence can thus have long-term effects on the independence of the 
judiciary in South Africa. The exclusion of independently-minded judges from other 
racial groups might therefore result in the judiciary being packed with pliant judges that 
will seek to serve the interests of their masters. It is therefore crucial that this issue of 
transformation must be tackled in a manner that will enhance the independence of the 
judiciary rather than undermine it. As Budlender notes, great care has to be taken in the 
appointment of judges and not create a perception that white males are overlooked for 
judicial appointments.807 Budlender notes that if such a perception is created, the 
judiciary will be weakened.808 
4.5.3.2.1 Appointment Process 
According to section 174(3) of the Constitution, the President, after consulting the JSC 
and leaders of parties represented in the National Assembly, appoints the Chief Justice 
and the Deputy Chief Justice.809 The President after consulting the JSC also appoints 
the President and Deputy President of the Supreme Court of Appeal.810 In both 
instances the President is not bound by the decision of the JSC but does not need to 
consult leaders of parties in the National Assembly with regards to the Supreme Court 
of Appeal appointments. With regards to the appointment of other judges of the 
Constitutional Court, they are appointed by the President after consulting the Chief 
Justice and leaders of parties represented in the National Assembly.811 
However, with appointments of other judges of the Constitutional Court the JSC must 
prepare a list of nominees with three names more than the number of appointments to 
be made.812 The list has to be submitted to the President who may make appointments 
from the list and must with reasons advise the JSC if any of the nominees are 
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unacceptable for appointment and if any appointment remains to be made. 813 If such a 
scenario arises the JSC must supplement the list with further nominees and the 
President must make the remaining appointments from the supplemented list.814 All 
other judges are appointed by the President on the advice of the JSC.815  
In order to ensure that the judicial appointment process is transparent in South Africa, 
the Constitution establishes the JSC. The JSC consists of the Chief Justice, the 
President of the Supreme Court of Appeal, one Judge President, the Minister of Justice, 
two practising advocates, two practising attorneys, one law teacher, six members of the 
National Assembly (three of whom must be members of the opposition), four delegates 
to the National Council of Provinces, and four persons designated by the President after 
consultation with the leaders of all parties in the National Assembly.816  
Appointment procedures have also been put into place to ensure that there is 
transparency and accountability in the appointment process.817 The procedure to be 
followed for judicial appointments is outlined in the Government Gazette.818 In cases 
where a vacancy occurs on the Constitutional Court, the JSC has the role of 
announcing and soliciting written nominations in order to fill that vacancy.819 Letters of 
nomination with the candidates‘ written acceptances are given to the ―screening 
committee‖, an ad hoc sub-committee of the JSC, which prepares a shortlist of the 
candidates.820 A shortlist must be prepared and must include all candidates who qualify 
for appointment.821 Once the JSC approves the shortlist, the names of nominees are 
published.822 Interested parties are called to submit comments and then after that the 
JSC conducts public interviews of each nominee.823 After these interviews the 
Commission deliberates privately and, based on consensus or majority vote, selects 
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candidates for recommendation 824 The JSC also has a duty to inform the President of 
its recommendations, and explain the reasons for choosing each candidate. The list of 
recommendations is also publicly announced.825 From the above it can be noted that 
the South African appointment process provides transparency. The selection process in 
South Africa thus provides many lessons for other countries on the importance of 
transparency in the process of judicial appointment. 
From the discussion above it is clear that the JSC thus plays a crucial role in the 
appointment of judges by naming judges of the Constitutional Court, and also when 
appointing other judges of all courts, the President must do so ―on the advice‖ of the 
JSC. The JSC thus provides a broadly based selection panel for appointments to the 
judiciary. However, although there have been complaints about the large membership of 
the Commission , it has allowed for the representation of different interest groups 
making it imperative for candidates to ―win wide support from across the different 
groups‖ in order to be appointed to the bench.826 Great concern has also been 
expressed about the large number of political representatives and Presidential 
appointees on the Commission. It should be noted that the same complaints have been 
made in the case/s of Zimbabwe and Uganda. Calland notes that the large number of 
political representatives has given the ruling party a veto power.827 Fears have also 
been raised about the large number of political representatives on the JSC and that 
such could jeopardise its independence.828  
The Constitutional Court has dispelled the notion that the independence of the JSC 
might be jeopardised by the political control of the Commission. In Ex Parte Chairperson 
of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa829 the Constitutional Court stated that ‗in many countries in which there is 
an independent judiciary and a separation of powers, judicial appointments are either 
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made by the executive or Parliament or by both.‘ The key to the separation of powers 
and judicial independence according to the Court is that the judiciary should enforce the 
law impartially and should be independent of both the executive and the legislature.830 
The Constitutional Court was also of the view that the ‗JSC provides a broadly based 
selection panel for appointments to the judiciary and also provides a check and balance 
power of the executive to make such appointments.‘831 
Gordon and Bruce have highlighted that the lack of clear standards for assessing the 
suitability and competence of candidates has increased concerns about the JSC‘s 
motivations in appointing judges.832 This is so because the Constitution requires only 
that judges are ―appropriately qualified‖ and ―fit and proper persons‖833 and does not 
include more specific guidelines. Although Moerane notes that the JSC considers a 
variety of factors which include the candidate‘s ability to perform judicial functions, 
commitment to constitutional values and the symbolic value of appointment834, the way 
in which the JSC has assessed and weighed such factors has been deemed to be not 
entirely clear and has thus led to questions being asked about the quality of its 
nominations.835 Concerns about the JSC‘s standards and motivations for appointing 
judges have recently resulted in the Helen Suzman Foundation taking the JSC to court 
to seek clarity over the procedure and decision-making process regarding nominations 
for judicial office.836 
Calls have been made for possible reforms to the JSC as concerns have been raised 
about the JSC‘s standards and motivations for appointing judges and the presence of a 
large number of political representatives on the Commission. Gordon and Bruce note 
that although political influence on judicial appointments is not necessarily a threat to 
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judicial independence, concerns about the influence of the ruling party in the 
appointment process are legitimate and must inform the debate about judicial 
appointments.837 Budlender notes that: 
‗The Constitution requires that the government have the self-confidence and courage to 
appoint people who will read the law honestly and independently, within the framework of 
a commitment to the transformation goals of the Constitution. The result will, on occasion, 
be judgments which the government finds uncomfortable and annoying. That is part of 
the commitment to accountable democratic government.‘
838
 
In order to protect and maintain the independence of the judiciary, it is crucial that the 
government must demonstrate its dedication to building a democratic state that 
prioritises the protection of human rights. As such the government must be willing to 
appoint judges who will impartially and fairly handle cases brought before the courts.839 
Although concerns have been expressed over the JSC, it cannot be denied that the 
body has played a crucial role in the appointment of independent judges that have 
contributed to the cause of human rights in South Africa. Although the JSC has been 
facing major challenges in the appointment of judges, the body has largely remained 
independent and efforts have also been made to ensure that its appointment processes 
are transparent and free from any external influences.  
4.5.3.3 Security of Tenure  
Section 176 of the Constitution of South Africa provides for the security of tenure of 
judicial officers. According to section 176(1) a Constitutional Court judge holds office for 
a non-renewable term of 12 years or until they attain the age of 70. This is, however, 
dependent on whichever scenario occurs first. Section 4 of the Judges‘ Remuneration 
and Conditions of Employment Act840 provides that a Constitutional Court judge, whose 
12 year term of office expires or who reaches the age of 70 before completing 15 years 
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of active service, must continue in office until the completion of 15 years of active 
service or until that judge attains the age of 75, whichever is sooner.841 
Section 8 of the Judges‘ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act, which was 
ruled to be unconstitutional842, permitted the extension of the term of office of the Chief 
Justice. It allowed a Chief Justice, whose 12 year term was about to expire in the 
Constitutional Court and who would have completed 15 years of active service, to 
remain as Chief Justice at the request of and for a period determined by the President.  
According to section 176(2) other judges hold office until they are discharged from 
active service in terms of an Act of Parliament. Judicial officers from other courts retire 
at the age of 70 if they have completed 10 years of active service. If they attain the age 
of 70 having not completed 10 years of service, a judge may continue to perform their 
functions until they complete the 10 years of service.843 The Judges Remuneration and 
Conditions of Employment Act also stipulates that a judicial officer who has attained 65 
years and has completed 15 years of active service is given the discretion of writing to 
the Minister of Justice motivating why they should be discharged from active service.844 
In order to secure the security of tenure of judges, the Constitution stipulates that 
salaries, allowances and benefits of judges may not be reduced. 845 The remuneration 
of judges is determined by the President by proclamation in the Gazette.846 Such 
proclamation must be tabled in Parliament and lapses if Parliament rejects it during the 
same session of Parliament.847 In setting the remuneration of judges, the President is 
thus legally guided in terms of the Judges Remuneration and Conditions of Employment 
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Act by an independent commission set up under the Independent Commission for the 
Remuneration of Public Office Bearers Act.848 
4.5.3.4 Removal of Judges 
The Constitution of South Africa stipulates that a judicial officer may only be removed 
from office before their retirement on grounds of incapacity, gross incompetence or 
gross misconduct.849 A judge can be removed if the JSC finds he or she suffers from 
incapacity, is grossly incompetent or is guilty of gross misconduct. A judge can also be 
removed from office if the National Assembly calls for him or her to be removed and 
such resolution must be adopted with a supporting vote of at least two-thirds of its 
members.850 In accordance with section 177(2), the President must remove a judge 
from office upon the adoption of a resolution calling for a judge to be removed.  
It should be noted that recently in South Africa a tribunal was appointed to hear charges 
of misconduct that have been levelled against Hlophe J after several Constitutional 
Court judges alleged that Hlophe J had sought to unduly  influence them in a corruption 
case against President Jacob Zuma.851 However, the tribunal‘s legitimacy has been 
questioned following, inter alia, the request by Jafta J and Nkabinde J that they be given 
a chance to review the decision of the tribunal that had dismissed a preliminary issue 
they had raised stating that there was no valid complaint before the tribunal to be 
investigated.852 The conduct of the two Constitutional Court judges has as a result 
thrown their credibility and public trust into question and calls have been made for them 
to come clean on the Hlophe issue. 853 
 
                                                          
848
Act 92 of 1997. 
849
Section 177(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
850
Section 177(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
851
Mail and Guardian ‗Mogoeng: SA Shouldn‘t panic Over Hlophe Tribunal‘ 10 October 2013. 
http://mg.co.za/article/2013-10-10-mogoeng-south-africans-shouldnt-panic-over-hlophe-tribunal 
(Accessed 15 October 2013). 
852
Mail and Guardian ‗Mogoeng: SA Shouldn‘t panic Over Hlophe Tribunal‘ 10 October 2013. 
http://mg.co.za/article/2013-10-10-mogoeng-south-africans-shouldnt-panic-over-hlophe-tribunal 
(Accessed 15 October 2013). 
853
Zille H ‗Hlophe and the ConCourt; Our Judges Must Come Clean‘ 9 October 2013. 
http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71619?oid=415685&sn=Detail&pid=716
19 (Accessed 10 October 2013). 
 
 
 
 
175 
 
4.5.3.5 Importance of Judicial independence 
The importance of the independence of the judiciary in any democracy has been well 
articulated in a number of cases in South Africa.854 In the De Lange v Smuts case, the 
Constitutional Court articulated that ‗the independence of the judiciary is foundational to 
and indispensable for the discharge of the judicial function in a constitutional democracy 
based on the rule of law.‘855 The Constitutional Court in the same case also stated that 
the minimum criteria for judicial independence included security of tenure, financial 
security and institutional independence.856 
The Constitutional Court has also been called upon to decide whether the performance 
of non-judicial functions by a judge can impact on the independence of the judiciary. In 
the case of South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath857, the  
Constitutional Court was called on to consider whether the appointment of a judge to 
head the Special Investigation Unit (SIU), a unit designed to investigate serious 
malpractice in the administration of state institutions, state assets and public money, 
would undermine the separation of powers.858 Although the Court recognised that 
judges at times could carry out non-judicial functions that would not interfere with the 
separation of powers, it stated that certain functions were so far removed from the 
judicial function, that allowing judges to carry out such functions would compromise the 
separation that must exist between the judiciary and other branches of the state.859 The 
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Constitutional Court thus decided that appointing a judge as the head of the SIU would 
impact on the separation of powers as the functions of the head of the SIU were also 
ordinarily performed by the police, members of the National Prosecuting Authority or the 
state attorney. Such functions were, according to the Court, inconsistent with the judicial 
functions as ordinarily understood in South Africa.860 More importantly the Court noted 
that it was important in order to ascertain whether a particular function was incompatible 
with the judicial office, to assess facts on a case by case basis. The Court stated that a 
court had to look at: 
‗Whether or not the functions that the judge is expected to perform are incompatible with 
the judicial office, and if they are, whether there are countervailing factors that suggest 
that the performance of such functions by a judge will not be harmful to the institution of 
the judiciary, or materially breach the line that has to be kept between the judiciary and 
the other branches of government in order to maintain the independence of the 
judiciary.‘
861
 
Gordon and Bruce state that the Court in this instance emphasised the need to protect 
the separation of powers and judicial independence and as such these must always 
inform any functions that a judge performs.862 
4.5.3.6 Challenges to Judicial Independence in South Africa 
Since the advent of democracy in South Africa, the courts have remained largely 
independent and have been free to render judgments that conflict with the ideologies of 
the executive. However, despite this there have been reported instances that have 
raised a number of questions about the commitment of the current government to the 
protection and promotion of the independence of the judiciary.863 Thus, tensions 
between the executive and the judiciary have been brewing. One prime example is the 
statement issued by the African National Congress Executive Committee which was 
believed to undermine the independence of the judiciary. The statement read: 
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‗We face the continuing and important challenge to work for the transformation of the 
judiciary… We are also confronted by the similarly important challenge to transform the 
collective mindset of the judiciary to bring it into consonance with the vision and 
aspirations of the millions who engaged in the struggle to liberate our country from white 
minority domination. The reality can no longer be avoided that many within our judiciary 
do not see themselves as being part of these masses, accountable to them and inspired 
by their hopes, dreams and value systems. If this persists for too long, it will inevitably 
result in popular antagonism towards the judiciary and our courts, with serious negative 
consequences for our democratic system as a whole.‘
864
 
The statement by the ANC was broadly criticised as it is believed that it reflected the 
ANC‘s desire to have a compliant judiciary that would not interfere with government 
policies.865 Gordon and Bruce note that the tensions between the governing party and 
the judiciary are not unique to South Africa and as a result tension is bound to occur 
between the judiciary and other branches of government since the judiciary has the 
power to review and declare invalid government actions.866  
4.5.3.6.1 Non-Enforcement of Judicial Orders 
Despite the threats by government against the independence of the judiciary, it is 
generally agreed that government has continued to some extent to abide by judicial 
decisions that have conflicted with government policies. Although the South African 
government has upheld the independence of the judiciary, it has however been slow 
and inefficient in abiding by a number of court decisions. AfriMap notes that there is no 
evidence that the executive has over the years attempted to interfere with and influence 
the outcome of cases and neither is there evidence of deliberate non-compliance with 
judicial orders. Such non-compliance has been mainly attributed to bureaucratic and 
administrative inefficiencies.867 However, Roos, on the other hand, notes that situations 
have arisen where the executive branch of the state has often wilfully failed to comply 
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with court orders or has at times dragged its feet in implementing certain court orders.868 
With specific reference to the Eastern Cape869, Roos notes that the non-compliance 
with judicial orders has reached unacceptable levels and has described it as an 
imminent constitutional crisis.870 As a result of the non-enforcement of judicial orders 
successful litigants are often left without any recourse and thus questions about the 
effectiveness of the legal system have arisen. 871 
The executive in South Africa has also been guilty of the non-compliance and 
inadequate compliance with court orders in a number of high profile cases that have 
come before the Constitutional Court. Examples include The Government of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others872 case where the 
decision of the Court was partially fulfilled by the government.873 Another example 
includes the In re Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and 
Others874 case where the Treatment Action Campaign  repeatedly complained that the 
government had only partially complied with the Constitutional Court order to make the 
anti-retroviral drug Nevirapine available in public hospitals to reduce the risk of HIV 
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transmission from mother to child. The non-compliance by the executive with a number 
of court decisions can be seen as a threat to the independence of the judiciary as such 
non-enforcement undermines the authority of the courts. Although the extent of the non-
enforcement of court decisions cannot be equated to that in Zimbabwe, such actions 
pose a danger to the overall justice system and leave victims of abuses with no 
available avenues to address any violation of fundamental rights and freedoms.  
4.5.4 Human Rights Cases 
In spite of some attempts by the executive to undermine the independence of the 
judiciary, and the challenge of transformation, it is submitted that the South African 
judiciary has remained independent and has been able to assert its independence in 
cases where the executive has tried to make changes within the judicial system. Gordon 
and Bruce note that not only does the judiciary   enjoy formal guarantees of institutional 
independence, security of tenure and financial security, but the judiciary has also 
benefited from judges who are willing to defend and fight for judicial independence.875 
As a result of its protected status of being independent, it is not surprising that South 
African courts have set great examples to other African countries and around the world 
on how human rights protection can thrive if the judiciary is independent. However, it 
should be noted that it is not possible in this chapter to do justice to the human rights 
jurisprudence from the courts. There are many decisions in which courts, especially the 
Constitutional Court, have handed down decisions protecting human rights and most of 
these decisions have been implemented by government, especially those cases where 
the government has been ordered to amend laws.876 There also exist a number of 
human rights decisions that have advanced the protection of civil and political rights in 
South Africa.877 The same has also occurred with regard to socio-economic rights. 878 
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4.6 Summary 
The South African judiciary has set a great example on the continent on the best 
practices with regards to the protection of human rights. The protection of human rights 
by the judiciary in South Africa can thus be largely attributed to its independence and to 
the presence of independently-minded judges who have not shied away from protecting 
and guarding jealously their independence in the event of threats from the executive. 
The human rights jurisprudence from the South African judiciary is enriching and as a 
developing country South Africa has set a trend that other countries ought to aspire to 
achieve. Thus, the challenge remains for the judiciary in Zimbabwe to closely guard its 
independence and protect human rights. However, as has been highlighted at the 
beginning of this chapter, further best practices with regards to the independence of the 
judiciary can be obtained from Canada. Canada with one of the most effective best 
practices around the world, can crucially inform the situation in Zimbabwe on how best 
to protect the independence of the judiciary and improve human rights protection. 
4.7 Canada 
4.7.1 Introduction 
Canada as a developed nation stands as the epitome of judicial independence and the 
protection of human rights.879 As a developed country Canada provides the best 
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practices for the protection of the independence of the judiciary and has a 
comprehensive and well-established structure for guaranteeing the independence of the 
judiciary and the rule of law. Binnie notes that although in Canada judicial independence 
has been characterised as an unwritten constitutional principle, there are however 
constitutional sources that emphasise the importance of the independence of the 
judiciary.880 The independence and impartiality of the judiciary has also been noted to 
be important in a federal system.  Since Canada is a federation, with a constitutional 
division of powers between the federal and provincial governments, it has been noted 
that it is crucial that the courts must be independent arbiters of jurisdictional disputes 
between the two levels of government.881 This idea has been clearly emphasised by the 
former Canadian Chief Justice, Brian Dickson, who stated that: 
‗Canada is a federal country with a constitutional distribution of powers between federal 
and provincial governments. As in other federal countries, there is need for an impartial 
umpire to resolve disputes between two levels of government as well as between 
governments and private individuals who rely on the distribution of separation of 
powers.‘
882
 
It is therefore crucial that courts must be truly independent of the federal and provincial 
governments for them to be able to resolve any disputes that might arise between the 
two levels of government. The importance of the independence of the judiciary in 
Canada can also be attributed to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms883 
which gives the courts   the role of defending civil liberties and freedoms against 
government intrusion.884  
Binnie notes that while judicial independence in Canada benefits from a variety of 
institutional and legal safeguards, the strongest barrier to improper influences is a legal 
and political culture in which the public simply does not tolerate actual or perceived 
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transgressions. 885 It should be noted that this has been one of the key factors that has 
affected judicial independence in Zimbabwe as there has been no political will to ensure 
that the independence of the judiciary is protected. As a result of its independence the 
Canadian judiciary has over the years become one of the leading judiciaries well-
renowned for its independence and the protection of human rights. It has thus set a 
great example for other judiciaries around the world on how an independent judiciary is 
essential for the protection of human rights.  
The importance of the independence of the judiciary has also found emphasis in the 
jurisprudence of the Canadian courts. The concept of judicial independence in Canada 
has been defined in the Valente v The Queen case.886 In this case the Court noted that: 
‗Judicial independence involves both individual and institutional relationships: the 
individual independence of a judge, as reflected in such matters as security of tenure and 
the institutional independence of the court or tribunal over which he or she presides, as 
reflected in its institutional or administrative relationships to the executive and legislative 
branches of government.‘ 
The Court in The Queen v Valente887  also went further to identify security of tenure, 
financial security and administrative independence as key characteristics of the 
independence of the judiciary. The importance for the protection of the independence of 
the judiciary has also been emphasised in the case of The Queen v Beauregard888, 
where Dickson J stated that ―the role of courts as resolver of disputes, interpreter of the 
law and defender of the Constitution requires that they be completely separate in 
authority and function from all other participants in the justice system‖. Russell also 
shares the view that the adjudication of disputes by an impartial and independent 
judiciary must be regarded as an inherent requirement of political society.889  
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4.8 Canadian Court System 
According to the Canadian Judicial Council there are different levels and types of courts 
in Canada. These courts differ in their jurisdiction and such courts are grouped into 
provincial890 and federal courts891.  Binnie notes that the bedrock of the Canadian 
judicial system lies in the provincial superior courts whose jurisdiction covers both 
criminal and civil cases.892 The superior courts reflect Canada‘s federal structure and 
the various governments of the provinces in Canada have the responsibility for 
providing administrative support to these courts.893 However, the federal government is 
responsible for the appointment and remuneration of judges of the superior courts.894 
Hogg also notes that superior courts are responsible for the administration of all 
provincial, federal and constitutional laws and as a result constitutional litigation often 
begins in provincial superior courts.895 
At the top of the Canadian judicial system is the Supreme Court of Canada which is the 
final court of appeal in the Canadian justice system.  Its decisions are binding upon all 
lower courts in Canada and it hears appeals from within and throughout Canada. Its 
broad jurisdiction was granted in terms of section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867, 
which allowed Parliament to create a general court of appeal for Canada. 
4.9 Judicial Appointments in Canada 
4.9.1 Historical Background of Judicial Appointments in Canada 
Russell and Ziegel in their study of the federal appointment process in Canada from 
1984 to 1988 noted that a huge number of judges appointed had a partisan political 
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connection to the party in power.896  Hogg also notes that before 2004, no great detail 
was publicly known about the federal judicial appointments.897 As a result of the 
criticism of the political influence in the appointment process, reforms have been made 
to ensure that there is transparency in the appointment process. In order to investigate 
the issue of partisan appointment, the Canadian Bar Association established the 
Committee on the Appointment of Judges in Canada which found widespread 
dissatisfaction with the method of judicial selection and appointments.898 Investigations 
by the Committee found that political considerations played a great role in judicial 
appointments and as a result the system was not designed to select the best potential 
judges.899 Although the quality of the Canadian judiciary remained good, the  Canadian 
Bar Association  made a number of recommendations that sought to improve the 
appointment process and ensure that the best quality of individuals were appointed as 
federal judges and thus reduce the role of political patronage in the appointment 
process.900 
4.9.2 Methods of Appointment of Judges 
Section 96 of the Constitution Act901 provides that the Governor General has the 
responsibility of appointing judges of the Superior, District, and County Courts in each 
Province. The Governor in Council appoints judges of the Supreme Court and Federal 
Court by letters of patent under the Great Seal.902 Any person who has been a judge of 
a superior court of a province and has been a barrister or advocate for at least ten years 
standing at the bar of a province qualifies to be appointed as a Supreme Court judge.903 
The Supreme Court Act requires that at least three judges must come from the province 
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of Quebec (which is a civil law jurisdiction).904 Binnie notes that in addition to the 
statutory requirements for the appointment of Supreme Court judges, there has been a 
longstanding practice that seeks to ensure regional diversity in the Court.905 The 
Governor in Council (federal executive) is given the duty of appointing judges to the 
Supreme Court. The Prime Minister and Minister of Justice are involved in the selection 
of Supreme Court judges.906 A tradition has been established that before any 
appointments are made to the Supreme Court, the executive consults with Chief 
Justices and Attorney/s-General of the provinces as well as senior members of the legal 
profession.907 Any appointments of Supreme Court judges are not ratified by 
Parliament.  
Informal changes to the appointment process of Supreme Court judges were made in 
2005 in order to ensure that appointments became more transparent and 
consultative.908 Traditionally the Minister of Justice would assess the merit of potential 
candidates based on professional ability, personal characteristics and diversity.909 The 
Minister of Justice would then discuss the potential appointees with the Prime Minister 
who (after consultation with other members of the Federal Cabinet) would recommend 
one candidate to the Governor in Council.910 However, in 2005, federal policy led to the 
establishment of an advisory committee whose task was to consider candidates 
identified through the Minister of Justice‘s consultations with various stakeholders, and 
to provide names to the Minister of any potential appointees.911 The advisory committee 
was composed of representatives from the federal Parliament, the judiciary, provinces, 
legal organisations, and the general public.912 The Minister of Justice would then advise 
the Prime Minister who was then expected to recommend an individual for appointment. 
Binnie notes that this process was used in the appointment of Rothstein J, with the 
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whole process being televised.913 Although controversial appointments have made to 
the Supreme Court of Canada, there is a general satisfaction that individuals appointed 
to the Supreme Court are qualified.914 
With regards to the appointment of Federal Court judges, the Federal Court Act deals 
with the statutory qualifications of Federal Court judges.915 The Office of the 
Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs916 has the overall responsibility for the 
administration of the appointment process of judges on behalf of the Minister of Justice. 
In the selection of candidates for appointment as Federal judges, the Office of the 
Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs has a list of factors that are taken into 
consideration.917 
Prospective candidates who wish to be appointed as judges of the Federal Court apply 
in writing to the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs. Applicants are then 
requested to complete a ―personal history form‖ which provides data for subsequent 
assessment or comment. Members of the legal community and other interested 
individuals can make nominations for appointment to the Federal Court.918  
Marshall notes that with regards to the appointment of the Chief Justice, judges of the 
Supreme Court and the Chief Justice of the Federal Courts, no statutory requirements 
exist for consultation or public ratification.919 However, judges of the Federal Court, 
other than those who are judges of the superior courts of provinces or territories, are 
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assessed by an Advisory Committee on Judicial Appointments.920 Candidates from the 
superior courts of provinces and territories are considered for elevation to higher judicial 
office subject to consultations by the Minister of Justice.921 
The Advisory Committees on Judicial Appointments922 are established in all Canadian 
provinces and each committee consists of eight members (previously seven). 
Candidates who are lawyers are assessed by the Regional Advisory Committee on 
Judicial Appointments whilst candidates who are provincial court judges are not 
assessed by the Committees. The Committees have the responsibility of assessing 
lawyer candidates on the basis of two categories which are ―recommended‖ or ―unable 
to recommend‖ for appointment. With respect to lawyer appointments the Committee 
conducts extensive consultations within the legal and non-legal communities and 
Committee decisions are normally arrived at through a consensus. However, in cases 
where consensus cannot be reached a vote is always taken. After consultations have 
been conducted the Prime Minister is responsible for making recommendations to the 
Cabinet for the appointment of the Chief Justice of the Federal Court ( and also the 
Chief Justice and judges of the Supreme Court as discussed earlier) on the basis of 
investigations and consultations made by the Minister of Justice.923 With regards to 
other judges of the Federal Court, the Minister of Justice is responsible for making 
recommendations to Cabinet on the basis of assessments or comments by the advisory 
committee and consultations with senior members of the judiciary and the bar, and with 
the appropriate provincial or territorial Attorney-General or Minister of Justice.924  
Despite the previous controversies regarding the appointment process of judges in 
Canada, Friedland notes that the federal system of appointments has shown a marked 
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improvement over the past few decades with the setting up of an Advisory Committee 
on Judicial Appointments in all provinces and territories.925 Miller is of the belief that 
federally appointed judges are now being selected more for their legal merits than on 
political considerations.926 However, despite these changes Ul-Haq notes that what is 
more worrying about the judicial appointments is that the Canadian Constitution seems 
to leave the appointment process in the hands of the executive. Ul-Haq notes that the 
unwritten convention that allows the Prime Minister to confirm the appointment of judges 
unchallenged has doused the flame of judicial independence and has created tumult in 
the ideals of federalism.927 Binnie, however, believes that the courts in Canada, 
especially the Supreme Court, enjoy a high level of independence despite the federal 
government being ultimately responsible for the administration, financing and 
appointment of judges.928 
4.10 Tenure and Remuneration of Judges 
4.10.1 Tenure 
The security of tenure of federally appointed judges is protected in section 99 of the 
Constitution Act. 929Section 99(1) of the Constitution Act provides that ―judges of the 
Superior Courts shall hold office during good behaviour, but shall be removable by the 
Governor General on the address of the Senate and House of Commons‖. The tenure 
of judges is protected under section 99(2) of the Constitution Act which imposes a 
mandatory retirement age of seventy-five years.  
With regards to the removal of judges, the Judges Act930 established the Canadian 
Judicial Council (these judicial councils were created in most provinces to investigate 
and inquire into complaints against provincial court judges) which is made up of the 
Chief Justice of Canada, the Chief Justice and any senior associate chief justices and 
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associate chief justice of each superior court, and the Chief Justice of the Court Martial 
Appeal Court of Canada.931 The Judicial Council is mandated with receiving complaints 
and investigating such complaints, and may direct a committee to conduct an inquiry to 
determine whether a judge has become ―incapacitated or disabled from the due 
execution of the office of judge‖ by reason of age, infirmity, misconduct or failure in the 
due execution of the office.932 Following the inquiry into the removal of a judge, the 
Judicial Council is mandated with considering the report and recommendations of the 
Inquiry Committee. The Judicial Council has the role of recommending whether a judge 
should be removed from office for any of the reasons stated in the Judges Act. With 
regards to the removal of judges the Canadian Judicial Council in 2008 found Matlow J 
to be unfit for judicial office after a case of misconduct was reported against him.933 
Prefontaine also states that in 1996 a Canadian Federal Court judge in Quebec was 
removed from office after passing insensitive remarks about women and Jews. 934 
4.10.2 Remuneration 
Section 100 of the Constitution Act imposes the duty on Parliament of fixing the 
salaries, allowances and pensions of federally appointed judges. The remuneration of 
federally appointed judges is also established under the Judges Act.  Section 9 of the 
Judges Act fixes the salaries of the Chief Justice of Canada and other judges of the 
Supreme Court of Canada. Section 10 of the Judges Act also deals with salaries of 
judges of the Federal Courts. Pursuant to section 25 of the Judges Act, the salaries of 
judges are adjusted annually to reflect fluctuations in the economy. The Judges Act also 
mandates the Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission to submit reports every 
four years to the Minister of Justice regarding the adequacy of judicial remuneration.935 
The Commission‘s report is tabled in the House of Commons, but there is no 
requirement that Parliament adopts its recommendations.936 In addition to their annual 
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salaries, Supreme Court judges also receive an allowance for incidental and 
representational expenses, health and dental care, life insurance, accidental death 
benefits and a pension. 937 Thus, as a result judges in Canada are excellently paid and 
this has contributed to ensuring that the judiciary is not susceptible to any corrupt 
activities.   
 Binnie notes that the question of remuneration of judges in Canada has led to litigation, 
with specific reference to the provincial courts which are created by provincial statutes 
and have no constitutional status.938 Economic difficulties in the 1990s led to the 
reduction of salaries of provincial court judges in Canada. As a result fears of a threat to 
the independence of the judiciary were raised and the Supreme Court of Canada was 
as a result required to establish a framework for decision-making on the remuneration of 
provincial court judges consistent with preserving their financial security.939 In its ruling, 
the Supreme Court found that judicial salaries could be reduced or frozen but not 
without recourse to an independent effective and objective commission.940 Bennie notes 
that the effectiveness criterion prohibited governments from making decisions with 
respect to judicial salaries before receiving the commission‘s report.941 The Supreme 
Court also stipulated that the system that required judges to negotiate their salaries and 
benefits with the executive could lead to the perception of a lack of independence.942 In 
fixing the salaries of judges of the Provincial Courts, the Supreme Court noted that 
judicial salaries could not fall below a minimum level as there was risk that judges would 
adjudicate in a certain manner in order to secure higher salaries from the executive or 
the legislature.943 
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4.11 Extra-Judicial Activities and Immunity 
In order to ensure that the judiciary in Canada is not compromised, ethical principles 
have been put into place to protect the integrity of the judiciary when judges carry out 
extra-judicial activities.944 The Ethical Principles recommend that judges avoid any 
activities that may pose a threat to the independence of the judiciary and risks 
compromising the impartiality of the judiciary. 945 Judges in Canada can serve as 
directors of civil and charitable organisations, but are discouraged from involving 
themselves in fundraising activities for these organisations.946 More significantly judges 
are prohibited from engaging in any political activities so as to ensure their 
impartiality.947Judges in Canada also enjoy immunity from civil liability for actions taken 
in the performance of their judicial duties.948 
4.12 Courts and Human Rights 
As Binnie notes, the independence of the judiciary in Canada is a fundamental 
constitutional principle. The Canadian Constitution has put into place mechanisms to 
ensure that the independence of the judiciary is protected. Binnie also believes that the 
Supreme Court of Canada and judges in the country enjoy a high level of independence 
and such protection is in line with the demands of international law. Such independence 
has contributed to the judicial activism of the Canadian courts, especially the Supreme 
Court with regards to the human rights protected under the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.  
As in the case of South Africa, there is no space to do justice to the jurisprudence from 
the courts in Canada on human rights. As a result of its independence Canadian courts, 
in particular the Supreme Court, have made a significant impact in the promotion and 
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protection of human rights.949 Cases dealing with socio-economic rights, such as, the 
rights to housing950, health951 and the right to an adequate standard of living and social 
security952 have also been brought before the Canadian courts.  
Canadian courts have thus made a concerted effort in fostering the domestic protection 
of human rights. The courts have established the best practises on the protection of 
judicial independence and subsequently the promotion and protection of human rights. 
Its best practises are an example to many nations striving to secure the independence 
of the judiciary and human rights protection. Just like the South African judicial system 
in Africa, the Canadian system stands at the apex of judicial independence and human 
rights protection and has thus set great standards that countries like Zimbabwe that 
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have recently gone through constitutional reform could follow. The adoption of such 
standards will without doubt bode well for the improvement of the independence of the 
judiciary and future protection of human rights. 
4.13 Conclusion 
As been highlighted in this chapter an independent judiciary is mandatory for any 
effective protection of human rights. Countries, such as, Uganda albeit faced with 
challenges in securing judicial independence have realised the severe effects that are 
associated with the lack of human rights protection. Thus, it has made efforts to improve 
the state of the judiciary which has also subsequently led to the improvement of human 
rights in the country. Although in some cases the judiciary has exercised restraint, there 
is still room for improvement in the protection of human rights. South Africa and Canada 
have provided the best practises with regards to protecting judicial independence. It is 
no surprise therefore that these jurisdictions thrive with regards to human rights 
protection. As a result they offer best practises that can be adopted by Zimbabwe in 
order to improve the independence of the judiciary and its protection of human rights. In 
order to improve the human rights situation in the country the Constitution of Zimbabwe 
has made it a priority to introduce a number of reforms that seek to improve the state of 
the judiciary in the country. Such reforms seek to promote and protect the 
independence of the judiciary and the promotion and protection of human rights.As a 
result the next chapter seeks to make an analysis of the judicial reforms under the new 
constitutional dispensation in Zimbabwe and to show whether such reforms will suffice 
in improving the state of judicial independence. Where weaknesses or gaps are 
identified, this research, with the aid of the best practices discussed in this chapter, 
offers suggestions on how best to improve the protection of judicial independence in 
Zimbabwe, which will subsequently improve the judicial protection of human rights. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AS A LEGAL MECHANISM TO STRENGTHENING 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND CONTEMPORARY HUMAN RIGHTS 
PROTECTION IN ZIMBABWE 
 
5 Introduction  
The independence of the judiciary has been emphasised in this thesis, as being crucial 
in the protection and promotion of human rights in any democratic society.953 The 
judiciary therefore plays an important role in ensuring that the rights of individuals are 
protected. However, as discussed in previous chapters, this has not been the case in 
Zimbabwe. Due to the loss of its independence, the judiciary has over the years 
abrogated its role with regards to the protection and promotion of human rights.  A new 
Constitution has been adopted in Zimbabwe, to address amongst other issues the 
improvement of the independence of the judiciary which would resultantly bode well for 
the protection and promotion of human rights. The purpose of this chapter is therefore 
to look at the new constitutional dispensation and analyse whether it bodes well for the 
independence of the judiciary and human rights protection. The chapter will establish 
the importance of a constitution in democratic society and also deal with the history of 
constitution making in Zimbabwe and the factors that have necessitated the need for 
constitutional reform in the country. Lastly the chapter will review the legal significance 
of the new constitutional dispensation on the independence of the judiciary and its 
impact on the future of human rights protection, more significantly by the judiciary.  
5.1 Constitutions and Constitution Making 
The topics of the constitution and constitution making have raised a number of 
contentious views over the years. Contentious views have been expressed as to what 
exactly the main purpose of the constitution is or whether the constitution should solely 
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deal with government power or have various other purposes?954 Contentious views 
have also been expressed as to how constitutions should be made. A brief discussion of 
what the constitution is will be conducted and this chapter will provide an in-depth 
discussion on what the constitution making process entails and shall also focus on the 
constitution making process in Zimbabwe.   
 5.1.1 What should a Constitution do? 
A number of scholarly views have been expressed as to exactly what the constitution 
should do.  Mohamed CJ (Former Chief Justice of South Africa) has opined that: 
‗The Constitution of a nation is not simply a statute which mechanically defines the 
structures of government and the relations between government and the governed, it is a 
‗mirror of the national soul‘, the identification of the ideals and aspirations of the nation, 
the articulation of the values binding its people and disciplining its government‘.
955
  
On the other hand, other scholars believe that it is important that a constitution should 
reflect not only the history of the nation but should also mirror the interests and 
aspirations of its people with regards to how they wish to be governed.956 This view is 
also supported by Madhuku who states that: 
‗The content of a Constitution must be determined by the political experience of the 
people in the country. People must have a sense of the meaning of what they are putting 
in there. So you cannot just get a Constitution from the library. The Constitution must 
come from the spirit and the hearts of the people.‘
957
 
The view expressed by Madhuku lays down a transformative vision for a nation‘s future 
and marks a decisive break with the past, and is an important view that is reflected in 
various constitutions around the world. An example of such a constitution is that of 
South Africa, which brought to an end the institution of apartheid. The Constitution of 
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South Africa in its Preamble states that it ―recognises the injustices of the past and 
seeks to honour those who suffered for justice and freedom in our land and also to heal 
the divisions of the past.‖958 As a result the Constitution of South Africa has adopted 
multiple safeguards to guard against the repeat of the past.  
It is crucial that a constitution must not simply include a collection of rules and 
institutional arrangements regarding the use of state power, but should also place limits 
on the use of such power. Therefore, it is essential that the powers of government 
should be legally limited. The extent to which the Constitution of Zimbabwe seeks to 
limit government power shall be addressed later in this chapter. Besides dealing with 
the issue of regulating powers, it should be noted that the Constitution of Zimbabwe 
does identify the ideals and aspirations of the nation and also enunciates the values 
binding on its people and the government.959 
5.1.2 Constitution Making 
With regards to the issue of constitution making, constitutional law scholars generally 
agree that constitutional reform processes within a particular country are often in 
response to broad challenges of peace building, reconciliation, inclusion and socio-
economic development.960  This view is further supported by Elster, one of the leading 
scholars in constitution making, who states that: 
 ‗New constitutions almost always are written in the wake of a crisis or exceptional 
circumstances of some sort.  These range from socio-economic crisis, revolution, regime 
collapses (or fear of it), defeat in war (and resultant military occupation), the creation of a 
new state, and liberation from colonial rule.‘
961
 
It is important to note that in the drafting of a constitution, an appropriate procedure for 
constitution making should be put in place as superimposed constitutional formulae, or 
constitutional arrangements that do not address the real causes of discontent, are sure 
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to generate their own legitimacy crises.962 Great suspicion is also drawn to the 
constitution making process as significant individuals and groups can be created to 
capture the process in the service of their own interests. Elster notes that constitution 
making demands impartiality and far-sighted reasoning and that the drafting of a 
constitution should be made by a constitution making body that is motivated by 
conceptions of a broader longer-term public interest.963 Elster also notes that although it 
is difficult to constitute an assembly that will be partly motivated by reason and public 
interest rather than narrower conceptions of interest, it is possible to do so. He adds that 
some members of the assembly can be motivated by a broader interest at least some of 
the time.964 
 Elster is of the view that the main challenge to constitution making is to ensure that an 
assembly is constituted and also to ensure that it will not be duly influenced by narrow 
conceptions of self-interest.965 He recommends that the constitution should be drafted 
by a specialised assembly and not by the ordinary legislature as the legislature is more 
likely to be influenced by group and institutional self-interest.966 This view has received 
considerable support amongst many scholars. Miller notes that specialised assemblies 
offer a higher degree of popular legitimacy as compared to an ordinary legislature.967 
However, it should be noted that other scholars have challenged the view of 
constitutional assemblies being the appropriate bodies for drafting constitutions. Arato 
opines that parliamentary constitution making is more ideal and can ensure the 
legitimacy of the constitutional product.968 On the other hand, Partlett argues that 
constitutional assemblies can be inferior to ordinary legislatures as politicians can easily 
control a constitutional assembly and that this may lead to the drafting of constitutions 
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that are authoritarian or democratically weak.969 Although there is much debate on 
which method is best for constitution making, it is submitted that the process must be 
left in the hands of a constitutional assembly. This is so because constitutional 
assemblies are less likely to be partisan and thus give more authenticity to the drafting 
process.  
The constitution making process should be reflective of the broader society. In order to 
ensure that the constitution is thus reflective, all stakeholders involved in the constitution 
making (led by a constitutional assembly) process must be able to participate and have 
their views heard.970 Participatory constitution making is mainly based on the idea that 
democratic constitutions should be created and adopted through democratic 
processes.971 Participation is deemed to foster political dialogue, empowering the 
people and is said to improve the quality of the final constitution product.972 However 
Moehler expresses a significant view on the issue of participatory constitution making 
and states that: 
‗Participation is beneficial if citizens are well informed, involvement is meaningful, 
cleavages outcross one another, civil society is robust and pluralistic, and institutions are 
tailored to fit circumstances and parties and other representative institutions are well 
developed. If these fortuitous circumstances are absent, participation can be harmful for 
democracy.‘
973
 
Moehler also expressed the view that participatory a constitution making process might 
be a difficult process to implement especially in a situation of protracted, deep political 
conflict where the resolution of the conflict demands far more than a constitutional 
settlement through participation.974 Landau also expresses great concern about the idea 
of participatory constitution making and states that many mechanisms of popular 
participation may easily be manipulated by political forces. Referenda and similar 
                                                          
969
Partlett W ‗Making Constitutions Matter: The Dangers of Constitutional Politics in Current Post-
Authoritarian Constitution-Making‘ (2012) 38:1 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 193 200-203.  
970
Miller L.E (2010) 636.  
971
Banks M ‗Participatory Constitution Making in Post Conflict States‘ 2007 ASIL Proceedings 138.  
972
Banks AM ‗Expanding Participation in Constitution Making: Challenges and Opportunities‘ (2008) 49 
WM and Mary L. REV 1043 1050. 
973
Moehler D Distrusting Democrats: Outcomes of Participatory Constitution Making (2008) 22. 
974
Moehler D (2008) 22. 
 
 
 
 
199 
 
devices, for example may rarely be effective as external constraints on constitution 
makers because popular political leaders can easily gain support for their programs on 
a simple up or down vote.975 
Despite the concerns expressed on the issue of participatory constitution making, it 
should be noted that it has become an emerging norm of customary international law.976  
As such, a number of mechanisms have been put into place to act as guiding principles 
that need to be followed in the drafting of a new constitution in order to strengthen and 
give legitimacy to the drafting process. These guiding principles include issues, such as, 
the preparatory phase, awareness raising and consultative phase, content deliberation 
and drafting phase, and the adoption and implementation phase.977 These principles are 
important in the drafting of a constitution and since constitutional reform is an important 
vehicle on the road to democratic consolidation, the principles enable parties involved in 
the drafting process to be better prepared and to actively participate in the drafting 
process.978 
5.2 Background to Constitution Making in Zimbabwe 
5.2.1 Lancaster House Constitution  
The Lancaster House Constitution was adopted at independence in 1980.979 It came as 
a product of negotiations between the British government, the then Rhodesian 
government led by Ian Smith, (then Prime Minister) and nationalist politicians from the 
liberation movements at the Lancaster House negotiations in 1979 in London.980 The 
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Lancaster House Constitution was agreed as part of the ceasefire agreements and 
various pre-independence arrangements and as such lacked legitimacy in the eyes of 
many Zimbabweans as it lacked popular participation.981 The dissatisfaction with the 
Lancaster House Constitution was clearly portrayed by Ndulo who states that: 
‗The Lancaster House Constitution failed to serve as a framework for local political and 
economic actors to negotiate the transformation from a colonial state with great economic 
disparities to a more equitable Zimbabwe, largely because it contained entrenched 
provisions, which ensured certain policies could not be changed until a specified time. As 
a result, the basic structure of Zimbabwean society, especially as it related to land 
ownership, remained the same.‘
982
 
Ndulo also notes that with the increase in public protest regarding government 
corruption and its failure to improve the lives of ordinary Zimbabweans, the government 
as a result became undemocratic and authoritarian, increasing centralised power in its 
attempt to stay in office.983 This was mainly done through the constant amendment of 
the Constitution which was amended nineteen times (19) after independence. Most of 
the amendments were made in a largely piecemeal manner and without any 
comprehensive national constitutional reform strategy.984 A number of the amendments 
had the cumulative effect of increasing the powers of a powerful, executive 
presidency.985 Ncube notes that the amendments that entrenched presidential powers 
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made the country‘s judiciary and legislature unequal partners of the executive arm of 
government. This is so because the President over the years had the ability to 
significantly influence the legislative branch of the state through the power to make 
appointments to the senate; and to dissolve Parliament should it pass a vote of no 
confidence in the President.986 On the other hand, the judicial branch was subject to 
control by the executive as the President had control over the appointment and removal 
of judges, commissioners, chiefs of security services and other public figures.987 
Ndulo also opines that as a result of the constant amendments to the Lancaster House 
Constitution, Zimbabwe became a highly centralised system of governance with 
excessive state control of all aspects of human endeavour, coupled with limited capacity 
to govern.988 In a bid to stay in power, the government, through constitutional 
amendments and other laws, managed to excessively regulate civil society, and weaken 
institutions of state and civil society. This resulted in an unprecedented economic 
decline.989 As a result of the inadequacies of the Lancaster House Constitution, mostly 
brought about as a result of its undemocratic origins and constant amendment, there 
was general consensus for the adoption of a home-grown constitution for the people of 
Zimbabwe that would be democratic in its creation and content. The desire to adopt a 
democratic constitution and to limit the powers of the President resulted in the formation 
of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) in 1997 which publicly led the calls for 
the adoption of a new constitution that would reflect the democratic views of the people 
of Zimbabwe.990 However, the efforts of the NCA were frustrated by the government, 
which later established the Constitutional Commission in 1999 to lead the process of 
constitutional reform in the country.991 
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5.2.2 Constitutional Commission Draft Constitution 
The Constitutional Commission was set up on the 26th of April 1999, and was charged 
with the responsibility of initiating a process of constitutional review and to present a 
new constitution before 30 November 1999.992 The tight schedule afforded to the 
Constitutional Commission to submit the draft constitution raised fears that the 
President was intent on pushing his own constitutional and political agenda.993 The 
Constitutional Commission was made up of 400 members, with most of the members 
largely from the ruling party and others from a cross-section of society. The 
Constitutional Commission was chaired by the then High Court Judge Godfrey 
Chidyausiku (now the Chief Justice). The composition of the Commission was called 
into question, as it was mainly dominated by members of the ruling party, and as a 
result a number of individuals associated with the NCA refused to participate in what 
they perceived to be a fundamentally flawed process.994 
The mandate of the Constitutional Commission was to afford the people of Zimbabwe 
the opportunity to author and found their constitution enshrining freedom, democracy, 
transparency and good governance. Hatchard notes that in an effort to make the 
process participatory, the Constitutional Commission developed an outreach 
programme.995 Public meetings were held nationally, with commissioners sent to 
various provinces of the country in order to ascertain the views of the people with 
regards to the contents of the constitution. Extensive consultations were held with the 
people of Zimbabwe, with the participants expressing great unhappiness with the 
constitutional amendments which entrenched the powers of the executive presidency 
and thus linked the Constitution to the country‘s growing political and economic crisis.996 
Despite the short time-frame that had been given to the Constitutional Commission to 
submit the draft to the President, the Commission was able to submit the Draft 
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Constitution within the specified time.997 Hatchard notes that the draft that was 
submitted to the President was a progressive and impressive document that formed the 
basis for a new constitutional order in Zimbabwe. This was so because the draft 
contained a comprehensive Bill of Rights as compared to the Lancaster House 
Constitution, and limited a President to two terms in office, and placed strict limits on the 
number of government ministers.998 However, despite such recommendations the 
President was dissatisfied with the Constitutional Commission‘s draft and used his 
powers over the Commission to publish in the Government Gazette a ―Corrections and 
Clarifications‖ document that made significant changes to the Constitutional 
Commission‘s draft.  Key amongst the corrections to the draft was the provision for the 
compulsory acquisition of agricultural land for re-settlement without compensation. 
Hatchard notes that the Constitutional Commission was never consulted on the 
changes to the Draft Constitution and as a result the subsequent referendum was held 
on the basis of the Constitutional Commission‘s draft as amended by the ―Corrections 
and Clarifications.‖999 As a result of the many flaws associated with the draft, the 
Constitutional Commission Draft Constitution was rejected in a referendum held in 
February 2000.1000 
In criticising the actions of the President, Hatchard notes that it is imperative that 
constitution making should never be a matter for the President or government but 
should rather involve the people themselves who must be involved in the formulation 
and adoption of a constitution.1001 Hence Zimbabwe in drafting the new constitution 
learnt from the example of Uganda and its Guidelines on Constitutional Issues which 
stated that: 
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‗The people themselves must be involved in the formulation and adoption of their 
Constitution because…. A Constitution imposed on the people by force cannot be the 
basis of a stable and peaceful Government of the people‘
1002
 
All stakeholders in the constitution making process were given the opportunity to bring 
forward their views and ideas so as to avoid the imposition of a document that would not 
reflect the views of the people. Hence this explains the main reason why the 
Constitutional Commission‘s draft was rejected in 2000, as it was a document that the 
President wanted to impose on the people of Zimbabwe and did not reflect their views.  
The National Constitutional Assembly noted that the Constitutional Commission Draft 
Constitution failed to ensure the independence of the judiciary.1003 Similar to the Kariba 
Draft (discussed below) there were no improvements on the Lancaster House 
Constitution as the President still had the power to appoint judges and the JSC and the 
process for the removal of judges was mainly controlled by the President. As a result 
the draft Constitution was mainly a repetition of the provisions of the Lancaster House 
Constitution.  Further, the National Constitutional Assembly noted that the Draft 
Constitution provided for a narrow scope of rights and did not protect some fundamental 
rights and freedoms.1004 
5.2.3 Kariba Draft Constitution 
Following the rejection of the Constitutional Commission draft in 2000, the constitutional 
reform process was revived by government in September 2007 when members of 
ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations unilaterally negotiated and produced a 
document known as the ‗Kariba Draft Constitution‘. Once again the people of Zimbabwe 
were denied the opportunity to have their views heard as the draft was made solely by 
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members of the political parties stated above.1005 As the National Constitutional 
Assembly notes, the Kariba Draft was mainly a mirror image of the Constitutional 
Commission Draft Constitution. The Kariba Draft was essentially a replication of the 
shortcomings of the Constitutional Commission draft which sought to mainly entrench 
executive authority in the country.1006 It is important to note that the Kariba Draft was 
never adopted but was annexed to the Global Political Agreement (GPA) of September 
2008, raising fears that it would form the basis for future constitutional reform in the 
country.  
5.2.4 The Constitution Select Parliamentary Committee (COPAC) on the New 
Constitution of Zimbabwe 
5.2.4.1 Background to the COPAC Process 
In an effort to improve the political, economic, and human rights situation in Zimbabwe, 
in 2009 the country engaged in a constitution making process led by a Constitution 
Select Parliamentary Committee (COPAC) on the New Constitution.1007 The need for 
the adoption of a new constitution was clearly reflected in the GPA1008 where the 
political parties affirmed the urgent need to improve the political, economic and human 
rights situation in the country: 
‗We, the Parties to this Agreement; Concerned about the recent challenges that we have 
faced as a country and the multiple threats to the well-being of our people and, therefore, 
determined to resolve these permanently…; Committing ourselves to putting our people 
and our country first by arresting the fall in living standards and reversing the decline of 
our economy; Respecting the rights of all Zimbabweans regardless of political 
affiliation…‘
1009
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The adoption of a new democratic constitution is key to solving many of the problems 
that have blighted the country since the commencement of the Land Reform Program in 
2000. It should also be noted that the adoption of a new constitution was one of the key 
requirements of the GPA of 2008. The GPA spelt out the procedure for the drafting of a 
new constitution to replace the Lancaster House Constitution, which was viewed to be 
deficient in various aspects, most notable being the governmental imbalance that 
resulted from the frequent amendments to the Constitution.1010 
The GPA in article 6 provided that: 
‗Acknowledging that it is the fundamental right and duty of the Zimbabwean people to 
make a constitution by themselves and for themselves; Aware that the process of making 
this constitution must be owned and driven by the people and must be inclusive and 
democratic; Recognising that the current Constitution of Zimbabwe made at the 
Lancaster House Conference, London (1979) was primarily to transfer power from the 
colonial authority to the people of Zimbabwe; Acknowledging the draft Constitution that 
the Parties signed and agreed to in Kariba on the 30
th
 of September 2007; Determined to 
create conditions for our people to write a constitution for themselves; and Mindful of the 
need to ensure that the new Constitution deepens our democratic values and principles 
and the protection of the  equality of all citizens, particularly the enhancement of full 
citizenship and equality of women.‘
1011
 
Article 6.1 of the GPA also provided that: 
‗The Parties hereby agree: (a) that they shall set up a Select Committee of Parliament 
composed of representatives of the Parties whose terms of reference shall be as follows: 
(i) to set up such subcommittees chaired by a member of Parliament and composed of 
members of Parliament and representatives of Civil Society as may be necessary to 
assist the Select Committee in performing its mandate herein; (ii) to hold such public 
hearings and such consultations as it may deem necessary in the process of public 
consultation over the making of a new constitution for Zimbabwe; (iii) to convene an all 
Stakeholders Conference to consult stakeholders on their representation in sub-
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committees referred to above and such related matters as may assist the committee in its 
work; (iv) to table its draft Constitution to a 2
nd
 All Stakeholders Conference; and (v) to 
report to Parliament on its recommendations over the content of  a New Constitution for 
Zimbabwe; (b)  That the draft Constitution recommended by the Select Committee shall 
be submitted to a referendum…‘
1012
 
In accordance with the guidelines laid down in the GPA, COPAC convened the First All 
Stakeholders Conference in July 2009. The conference brought together 
representatives of civil society organisations, political parties and other groups for the 
purpose of identifying issues that should be covered in the new constitution.1013 As a 
result seventeen (17) thematic areas were identified during the conference and these 
had to be used in collecting the views of Zimbabweans on what should be reflected in 
the new constitution.1014 The government should be commended for advocating for 
broad participation in the constitution making process so as to ensure that the new 
Constitution would reflect the views and needs of the people of Zimbabwe. Following 
the conference, an Outreach Programme started in June 2010 and concluded in 
October 2010. According to the COPAC website a total of 4 821 meetings were held in 
all 1 950 wards in the country, and with people in the diaspora contributing to the 
process.1015 
Thematic Committees were established during the Outreach process and these 
committees were responsible for the collection of data nationwide. The Thematic 
committees were also responsible for the identification of common issues and 
classifying views submitted during the Outreach Programme. The data collected was 
used in the drafting of the new Constitution by the three (3) Principal Drafters1016, who 
were assisted by seventeen (17) technical experts under the instruction of the Select 
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Committee.1017 With the finalisation of the drafting process, the Second All Stakeholders 
Conference was held in October 2012, with the conference seeking to bring together 
representatives of different stakeholders to review and make recommendations on the 
Draft Constitution. The Draft Constitution was later presented and approved by 
Parliament in February 2013, passed by the people of Zimbabwe in a referendum held 
on the 16th of March 20131018 and assented to by the President in May 2013.1019 
Although the referendum on the new Constitution was held, various challenges 
throughout the whole constitution making process were experienced, thus raising doubt 
as to whether the whole process would come to fruition. Constant bickering between the 
political parties involved in the constitution making process was the order of the day. 
Disagreements with regards to the status of the Kariba Draft, and funding and 
allowances for COPAC members led to the whole process being delayed for over a 
year.1020 The public consultation process was characterised by chaos with frequent 
violence between supporters of the different political parties hindering effective 
participation in the constitution making process.1021 Constant bickering between the 
political parties was also seen in differences as to the exact contents of the new 
constitution and the frequent disruption of constitutional reform meetings held by the 
opposition parties.1022  
In addition the drafting process was also characterised by chaos, with ZANU-PF 
accusing the Principal Drafters of siding with the MDC by importing issues that had not 
been expressed during the Outreach Programme.1023 ZANU-PF wanted the COPAC 
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Draft Constitution to be amended to include more executive powers for the President, 
rejection of dual citizenship and devolution of power, and the retention of control of the 
voters roll in the office of the Registrar-General. As a result ZANU-PF unilaterally came 
up with a draft seeking to amend the Draft Constitution and demanded the inclusion of a 
number of provisions, such as, the restoration of presidential powers into the COPAC 
Draft Constitution.1024 The dispute between the parties was later referred to the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) and then resolved by the Cabinet 
Committee where a revised draft of the Constitution was adopted by COPAC.1025 It is 
submitted that ZANU-PF‘s objection to some of the provisions in the Draft Constitution 
compromised the role of COPAC in the drafting process and this led to some of their 
demands being resolved without the input of Zimbabweans. This in a way ensured that 
the views of Zimbabweans were not fully brought out in the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
It should be noted that the adoption of the new constitution marked a new beginning for 
the people of Zimbabwe, especially taking into consideration the political, economic and 
social problems that the nation had experienced for the past decade. Despite the fact 
that an overwhelming number of Zimbabweans voted for the adoption of the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe, key questions still arise as to whether the adoption of the 
Constitution will result in a change of fortune for a nation that has been bedevilled with 
serious problems for the past decade. Perhaps more important to this research, is the 
key question as to whether the judicial reforms that have taken place under the 
Constitution can lead to an improvement with regards to protection and promotion of the 
independence of the judiciary, which will subsequently bode well for the judicial 
protection of human rights in the country. This is the key question that this research 
seeks to address, and to look at the significance of these reforms and how they will 
better serve the nation in improving the judicial protection of human rights.  
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5.3 Constitution of Zimbabwe and Reforms  
 5.3.1 Introduction 
The importance of an independent judiciary in the protection of human rights has been 
consistently emphasised in this research. It is therefore without doubt that this research 
has advocated for an independent judiciary in Zimbabwe, so as to improve the 
protection and promotion of human rights. The lack of an independent judiciary in the 
country has significantly contributed to the continued violation of human rights with 
impunity. It was therefore important that the issues relating to the independence of the 
judiciary and the protection of human rights were adequately addressed in the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe in order to get rid of the past and start building a new 
Zimbabwe based on fundamental values, such as, upholding of the rule of law, 
separation of powers, judicial independence, and the protection and upholding of 
fundamental rights and freedoms. Although the main focus of this section will be on 
judicial reforms, an analysis of fundamental values, such as, the founding values and 
core values of the doctrine of constitutionalism, such as, the rule of law, protection of 
rights under the Bill of Rights, and the separation of powers, shall be made first as they 
are crucial to the establishment of an independent judiciary and the protection of human 
rights by an independent and impartial judiciary. The section will then proceed to 
analyse the judicial reforms which are crucial to the improvement of the judicial 
protection of human rights in the country. 
5.3.2 Preamble of the Constitution of Zimbabwe 
The Constitution of Zimbabwe, unlike the Lancaster House Constitution, contains a 
Preamble which acknowledges the diversity and common values of the people of 
Zimbabwe. The Preamble begins by acknowledging the ownership of the Constitution 
by the people of Zimbabwe, recognises the nation‘s history, and seeks to emphasise 
national cohesion. It seeks to distinguish from the past so as to build a democratic 
nation founded on the values of transparency, equality, freedom, fairness and the 
dignity of hard work. The Preamble states that: 
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‗We the people of Zimbabwe, United in our diversity by our common desire for freedom, 
justice and equality, and our heroic resistance to colonialism, racism and all forms of 
domination and oppression, Exalting and extolling the brave men and women who 
sacrificed their lives during the Chimurenga/Umvukela and national struggles, Honouring 
our forebears and compatriots who toiled for the progress of our country, Recognising the 
need to entrench democracy, good, transparent and accountable governance and the 
rule of law, Reaffirming our commitment to upholding and defending fundamental human 
rights and freedoms, Acknowledging the richness of our natural resources, Celebrating 
the vibrancy of our traditions and cultures, Determined to overcome all challenges and 
obstacles that impede our progress, Cherishing freedom, equality , peace, justice, 
tolerance, prosperity and patriotism in search of new frontiers under a common destiny, 
Acknowledging the supremacy of Almighty God, in whose hands our future lies, Resolve 
by the tenets of this Constitution to commit ourselves to build a united, just and 
prosperous nation, founded on values of transparency, equality, freedom, fairness, 
honesty and the dignity of hard work, And imploring the guidance and support of Almighty 
God, hereby make this Constitution and commit ourselves to it as the fundamental law of 
our beloved land.‘
1026
 
Perhaps more importantly for the purposes of this research, the Preamble expressly 
recognises the need to entrench democracy, the rule of law, good and open 
governance, and commitment to upholding and defending fundamental human rights 
and freedoms. This marks a significant departure from the Lancaster House 
Constitution, in that there was a realisation on the part of all the stakeholders involved in 
the drafting of the Constitution of the need to move away from the past which has 
mainly been characterised by lawlessness and human rights abuses, to a new 
beginning that will enshrine fundamental values, such as, the rule of law and the 
upholding and protection of fundamental values and freedoms. It should be noted that 
the Preamble of the Constitution was drafted along similar lines to the Preamble of the 
Constitution of South Africa. The Preamble of the South African Constitution attempts to 
heal the divisions of the past, seeks to address the injustices and divisions of apartheid, 
and lay the foundations of a democratic and open society.1027 Most importantly the 
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Preamble of the South African Constitution places democracy and a culture based on 
human rights as foundational to the South African political order. 
5.3.3 Founding Principles 
It is important to note that the founding principles of the Constitution were one of the 
seventeen thematic areas which were used to collect views from Zimbabweans on what 
should be included in the Constitution.1028 Many constitutions around the world contain 
underlying principles which are fundamental to the entire constitutional structure. It is 
important to note that since a constitution usually reflects the sins and misfortunes of 
the past, the founding principles should therefore be framed in a manner that seeks to 
overcome the past. Founding principles in a constitution are of great importance as they 
clearly express the core values on which a nation is founded. Further, founding 
principles are of importance as they act as a guide in the interpretation of the 
constitution1029 and reflect the aspirations of the nation and hope for the future. Thus, 
section 3 of the Constitution unlike the Lancaster House Constitution provides 
information and explains the founding principles that the Constitution is based on and 
emphasises the supremacy of the constitution and human rights protection as founding 
values of the Constitution.1030 
5.4 Doctrine of Constitutionalism 
Over the years constitutional scholars have struggled to produce a clear-cut definition of 
―constitutionalism‖ as many have confused it with the notion of a constitution. However, 
modern day scholars have stated that there is more to the definition than the mere 
attempt to limit government arbitrariness as the concept today encompasses the idea 
that a government should not only be sufficiently limited in a way that protects its 
citizens from arbitrary rule but also that such government should be able to operate 
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efficiently within its constitutional limits.1031  As such the main emphasis behind the 
doctrine of constitutionalism is to restrict what government can do and how they should 
go about what they are authorised to do.1032  
Constitutionalism thus elevates the constitution to the level of being the supreme law of 
the country and hence any conduct that would be inconsistent with it would be deemed 
to be invalid. Maranga notes that for the concept of constitutionalism to be effective, it 
requires compliance with legislative and executive statutes that specify performance, 
powers and limitations.1033 As a result of the limitation of powers, good governance 
emerges, thus putting constitutional limits to the power of the government.1034  As a 
result, constitutionalism contains certain core contents of values that are required to 
ensure the control of state power. These core contents of values include, amongst other 
issues, the supremacy of the constitution, observance of the rule of law, respect for 
human rights and freedoms, observance of separation of powers, independence of the 
judiciary, and judicial review. These core contents of the doctrine of constitutionalism 
shall be discussed below with specific reference to the Constitution of Zimbabwe, as 
they play a crucial role in ensuring that judicial protection of human rights is improved in 
Zimbabwe. However, it should be noted that that there will be a more specific focus on 
the judicial reforms that seek to improve the judicial protection of human rights in the 
country.  
5.4.1 Supremacy of the Constitution 
The Constitution of Zimbabwe in section 3 emphasises the supremacy of the 
Constitution.  Section 3 states that: 
‗(1) This Constitution is the supreme law of Zimbabwe and any law, practice, custom or 
conduct inconsistent with it is invalid to the extent of the inconsistency. (2) the obligations 
imposed by this Constitution are binding on every person, natural or juristic, including the 
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State and all executive, legislative and judicial institutions and agencies of government at 
every level, and must be fulfilled by them.‘
1035
 
Similarly section 3 of the Lancaster House Constitution provided that: 
‗This Constitution is the supreme law of Zimbabwe and if any other law is inconsistent 
with this Constitution that other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.‘
1036
 
The supremacy clause in the Constitution of Zimbabwe has been extended from that in 
the Lancaster House Constitution. The current supremacy clause has been drafted 
along similar lines to the supremacy clause in the South African Constitution and the 
Ugandan Constitution.1037 The Constitution of Zimbabwe also imposes an obligation on 
all persons and state institutions to respect and fulfil the constitutional obligations. The 
clause is therefore significant in that it places the Constitution as the supreme law and 
as a result binds all branches of the state; and any law that is not consistent with the 
Constitution has no force of law.1038  
Currie and De Waal note that the doctrine of constitutional supremacy will mean little if 
the provisions of the constitution are not justiciable.1039 Thus, for a supreme constitution 
to be effective the judiciary must have the power to enforce it.1040 Section 175(6)(a) of 
the Constitution of Zimbabwe provides that any court that has jurisdiction to hear any 
constitutional matter, ‗must declare any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the 
Constitution as invalid to the extent of the inconsistency.‘ However, it should be noted 
that such an order will have no force unless confirmed by the Constitutional Court.1041 
Another important factor in ensuring that the supremacy of the constitution is maintained 
is through the obeying of court orders.1042 Thus, section 164(3) of the Constitution of 
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Zimbabwe states that ‗an order or decision of a court binds the State and all persons 
and governmental institutions and agencies to which it applies, and must be obeyed by 
them.‘1043 The section therefore seeks to bind other arms of government and to ensure 
that the obligations imposed by the Constitution are fulfilled. 
The unique status of the Constitution as the supreme law in the country is further 
enforced by section 328 which guarantees the Constitution exceptional protection 
against random amendments by Parliament. Taking into account the fact that 
Parliament through directives from the executive had over the years constantly 
amended the Lancaster House Constitution, most of which were in direct violation of 
fundamental rights and freedoms, the inclusion of section 328 therefore seeks to protect 
the supremacy of the Constitution. Section 328 provides special procedures that must 
be followed when passing legislation to amend any provisions of the Constitution. It 
states that: 
‗(2) An Act of Parliament that amends this Constitution must do so in express terms. (3) A 
Constitutional Bill may not be presented in the Senate or national Assembly in terms of 
section 131 unless the Speaker has given at least ninety days‘ notice in the Gazette of 
the precise terms of the Bill. (4) Immediately after the Speaker has given notice of a 
Constitutional Bill in terms of subsection (3), Parliament must invite members of the 
public to express their views on the proposed Bill in public meetings and through written 
submissions, and must convene meetings and provide facilities to enable the public to do 
so.  (5) A Constitutional Bill must be passed, at its last reading in the National Assembly 
and the Senate, by the affirmative votes of two thirds of the membership of each House.  
(6) Where a Constitutional Bill seeks to amend any provision of Chapter 4 (Declaration of 
Rights) or Chapter 16 (Agricultural Land)- (a) within three months after it has been 
passed by the National Assembly and the Senate in accordance with subsection (5), it 
must be submitted to a national referendum; and (b) if it is approved by a majority of the 
voters at the referendum, the Speaker of the National Assembly must cause it to be 
submitted without delay to the President, who must assent and sign it forthwith…‘
1044
 
                                                          
1043
See also section 167(3) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe which also gives the courts the powers to test 
the constitutionality of any Act of Parliament.  Section 167 (3) states that ‗The Constitutional Court makes 
the final decision whether an Act of Parliament or conduct of the President or Parliament is constitutional , 
and must confirm any order of constitutional invalidity made by another court before that order has any 
force.‘ 
1044
Section 328 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe 
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Although this section was drafted along similar lines to section 52 of the Lancaster 
Constitution1045, its importance is to ensure that the supremacy of the Constitution is 
respected and also to ensure that proper procedures are followed in making any 
amendments to the Constitution especially taking into consideration that Parliament has 
made previous amendments to the Lancaster House Constitution in response to various 
unfavourable judicial decisions.1046  
The Constitution, unlike the Lancaster House Constitution, also includes special unique 
measures for amending the Bill of Rights and issues related to agricultural land. This 
perhaps could be attributed to the realisation of the importance of a Bill of Rights in any 
democratic society and also the importance of protecting such rights since the country 
has over the years had a bad track record with regards to the protection and promotion 
of human rights. The importance of agricultural land, bearing in mind the past history of 
the country with regards to land issues, is also noted and hence the special measures 
put into place to entrench the provisions relating to agricultural land in the country. The 
entrenchment of the Bill of Rights is a positive measure that has been introduced by the 
Constitution and as such ensures that the Bill of Rights is respected and that any 
amendments to it should therefore be approved by the people of Zimbabwe who over 
the years have borne the brunt of the abuse of their fundamental rights and 
freedoms.1047 
The supremacy of the Constitution is worth emphasising as a fundamental principle of 
the Constitution as it seeks to establish a constitutional state in which there is respect 
for the Constitution by all the branches of the State. As has been discussed earlier, the 
government of Zimbabwe, especially the executive and the legislature, have over the 
years shown little respect for the Constitution through its constant amendments thereof.  
                                                          
1045
Section 52 of the Lancaster House Constitution stated that ‗(1) Parliament may amend, add or repeal 
any of the provisions of this Constitution: provided that, except as provided in subsection (6), no law shall 
be deemed to amend, add to or repeal any provision of this Constitution..‘ 
1046
See for example the case of S v Juvenile 1989 (2) ZLR 61 (S).  
1047
Other jurisdictions also contain constitutional provisions that seek to entrench their constitution. For 
example section 74 of the Constitution of South Africa states that the Constitution is entrenched and 
prescribes multiple entrenchment methods that must be followed when passing legislation to amend its 
provisions. Different majority votes in the National Assembly and in the National Council of Provinces 
apply in the case of different provisions of the Constitution. These methods are therefore meant at 
protecting the contents of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. 
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As noted earlier most of these amendments resulted in the infringement of fundamental 
human rights and freedoms and also sought to extend and protect the interests of the 
ruling party. It is thus that as a result during the COPAC outreach process, a majority of 
Zimbabweans called for the inclusion of the supremacy clause so as to ensure that the 
obligations imposed by the Constitution are fulfilled. 1048  
It can also be argued that the drafters of the Constitution were guided by past events, 
where the executive and legislative arms of government constantly flouted constitutional 
provisions and hence placed themselves above the Constitution by not fulfilling 
constitutional obligations. The inclusion of this clause is imperative and will auger well 
for the protection of human rights in the country. It should be seen as a positive 
development in the Constitution as it seeks to ensure that the Constitution is respected 
by the government. 
5.4.2 Rule of Law 
The Constitution also places the rule of law as one of the founding principles in the 
Constitution. Currie and De Waal argue, with respect to the Constitution of South Africa, 
that the inclusion of the rule of law in the founding provisions bolsters the idea of 
constitutionalism.1049 As discussed earlier, the rule of law is essential for safeguarding 
civil liberties and for the maintenance of social order. The basic premise behind the rule 
of law is to ensure that the relationship that exists between the state and individuals is 
governed by a set of rules rather than an individual or group of individuals, and that 
such rules should be enforced by impartial courts in accordance with fair 
procedures.1050 It should also be noted that the rule of law is important in that it calls for 
both individuals and government to recognise the law‘s supremacy.1051 This therefore 
means that various organs of state must obey the law1052 and that there must always be 
                                                          
1048
COPAC ‗Statistical  Analysis with Narratives- Outreach Reports Version 1-Founding Principles‘ 
http://www.copac.org.zw/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=category&id=8:outreach-reports-
version-1&Itemid=280 (Accessed 09 April 2013). 
1049
Currie I and De Waal J (2005) 10. 
1050
Dicey AV An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 10ed (1959) xcvi-cli. See also 
Elster J (1995) 368-95.  
1051
Elster J (1995) 368-95, 
1052
See Commercial Farmers Union v Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Resettlement, Zimbabwe 2001 
(2) SA 925 (ZS) where the importance of obeying the rule of law is emphasised. In response to an 
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a law authorising all state actions.1053 Currie and De Waal also note that the rule of law 
has both procedural and substantive components so that both the executive and 
parliament cannot in the course of their duties act capriciously or arbitrarily1054 and that 
the government must respect the individual‘s basic rights.1055 
Zimbabwe‘s history in terms of the rule of law has been characterised by major 
setbacks ranging from the erosion of the Bill of Rights, to disregard of judicial decisions 
by the executive arm of the state, a violent and haphazard land reform program and the 
enactment of repressive laws that have resulted in the infringement of fundamental 
human rights and freedoms. The inclusion of the rule of law as a founding principle in 
the Constitution should therefore serve as an important reminder to government of its 
importance and how the rule of law is crucial in assuring success and stability in the 
country. It should also serve as a reminder of the past history of the country as to how 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
argument that the issues of land redistribution and the rule of law, ‗must be looked at from a political point 
of view‘, the Court stated that: ‗Of course, it is fundamentally true that the land issue is a political 
question. It is equally true that the political method of resolving that question is by enacting laws. The 
Government has done so. It has enacted, and amended, the Land Acquisition Act. It has then failed to 
obey its own law. That is the point at which, with respect, the Attorney-General and the Commissioner of 
Police have gone astray. The Courts are doing no more than to insist that the State complies with the law. 
The procedures under the Land Acquisition Act have been flouted. The Act was not made by the Courts. 
It was made by the State.‘ See also Minister of Public Works v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association 
2001 (3) SA 1151 (CC) para. 88 where the Court questioned but did not decide whether the common-law 
presumption of interpretation that the state is not bound by its own enactments, except by express words 
or by necessary implication and the correct approach to such an argument in the light of the provisions of 
the Constitution. 
1053
Currie I and De Waal J (2005) 11. 
1054
Currie I and De Waal J (2005) 13 give an example where a non-judicial officer is given the power to 
order someone to be detained. Lack of independence may therefore result in arbitrary decision-making. 
An example with regards to Zimbabwe is that of Roy Bennet (former MDC-T Member of Parliament) who 
allegedly in May 2004 pushed the Minister of Justice Patrick Chinamasa (ZANU-PF Member of 
Parliament), to the floor during a heated exchange in parliament. Under the Zimbabwe‘s Privileges, 
Immunities and Powers of  Parliament Chapter 2:08 which empowers parliament to sit as a court and to 
award and execute punishments for specific offences which also include assaulting a member of 
parliament, a five person parliamentary committee (consisting of 3 ZANU PF and 2 MDC members) was 
tasked with reviewing the conduct of Roy Bennet. The committee recommended a sentence of 15 
months‘ imprisonment with hard labour, with three months suspended for good behaviour and the 
recommendations were adopted by the committee and parliament although voting was split over party 
lines. From the above it can be deduced that there was lack of independence and impartiality on the part 
of the committee tasked with investigating Roy Bennet‘s conduct as the committee was weighted in 
favour of ZANU-PF and was also passed by a parliament which at that time was dominated by ZANU-PF, 
with the injured party Patrick Chinamasa voting in favour of the recommendations on sentence contrary to 
the principles of disinterested administration of justice. Such a decision by the Parliament of Zimbabwe 
can therefore be viewed to have been arbitrary as the procedure that was used to convict Roy Bennet did 
not conform to the standards of a fair trial.   
1055
Currie I and De Waal J (2005) 12-13.  
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the decline of the rule of law has significantly contributed to the political and economic 
problems that have plagued the country. It is therefore crucial that government should 
adhere to the rule of law in order to ensure that the law is applied indiscriminately 
irrespective of race, sex, religion or political persuasion. It is submitted that the 
adherence to the rule of law is therefore crucial to the improvement and advancement of 
the human rights situation in the country and also for the respect of the independence of 
the judiciary.  
5.4.3 Good Governance 
The Constitution also identifies good governance as one of the founding principles. 
Section 3(2) of the Constitution states that: 
‗The principles of good governance, which bind the State and all institutions and agencies 
of government at every level, include- (a) multi-party democratic political system; (b) an 
electoral system… (c) the orderly transfer of power following elections; (d) respect for the 
rights of all political parties; (e) observance of the principle of separation of powers; (f) 
respect for the people of Zimbabwe, from whom the authority to govern is derived; (g) 
transparency, justice, accountability and responsiveness; (h) the fostering of national 
unity, peace and stability, with due regard to diversity of languages, customary practices 
and traditions…‘ 
Although there is no precise definition of ―good governance‖, the term has over the 
years been deemed to include various aspects, which include issues, such as, the 
respect for human rights, the rule of law, effective participation, multi-actor partnerships, 
political pluralism, transparent and accountable processes and institutions, and an 
efficient and effective public sector.1056  Good governance requires that public 
institutions should conduct public affairs and manage public resources and also 
guarantee the realisation of human rights in a manner that is free from abuse and 
corruption and with due regard for the rule of law. The former Commission of the United 
Nations in 2000 identified the key attributes of good governance as transparency, 
responsibility, accountability, participation, and responsiveness to the needs of the 
                                                          
1056
Gisselquist RM Good Governance as a Concept and Why This Matters for Development Policy (2012) 
2-3. Working Paper NO.2012/30. 
 http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/2012/en_GB/wp2012-030/ (Accessed 27 
September 2013). 
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people.1057 The inclusion of good governance as a founding value under the 
Constitution seeks to establish a constitutional arrangement that will provide important 
safeguards in ensuring public accountability, responsiveness to the electorate and 
participation in governance.  
5.4.4 Bill of Rights  
5.4.4.1 Introduction 
A Bill of Rights is an essential pillar of constitutionalism as it contains provisions that 
guarantee the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.  A Bill of Rights 
provides the standard against which governmental conduct is judged with regards to 
safeguarding fundamental rights and freedoms.1058 Liebenberg notes that a Bill of 
Rights provides a powerful mechanism for civil society, communities and independent 
commissions to hold public, and in appropriate circumstances, private actors 
accountable for human rights violations or abuses.1059 Besides providing effective 
mechanisms of redress for human rights violations, a Bill of Rights should also function 
to deepen democracy, and to enhance social and economic development which is 
responsive to the needs and views of the populace. As a result it is important that a Bill 
of Rights should contain provisions that seek to respond to the past and to address its 
injustices, and also lay a foundation based on the commitments of the new society that 
is being constructed.1060 
5.4.4.2 Declaration of Rights under the Constitution  
The crisis of governance in Zimbabwe over the years has largely been about lack of 
respect for human rights. The human rights situation in Zimbabwe has over the past 
decade descended into a crisis largely due to government actions coupled with the 
failure of the Lancaster House Constitution to provide for a comprehensive Declaration 
                                                          
1057
Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2000/64 The Role of Good Governance in the Promotion of 
Human Rights, 27 April 2000, E/CN.4/RES/2000/64,   
http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=3b00f28414 (Accessed 16 April 2013). 
1058
Currie I and De Waal J (2005) 23. 
1059
Liebenberg S ‗Reflections on Drafting a Bill of Rights: A South African Perspective‘ in Kersting N (eds) 
Constitution in Transition: Academic Inputs for New Constitution in Zimbabwe (2009) 21. 
1060
Teitel R Transitional Justice (2000) 200.  
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of Rights with strong mechanisms to ensure the enforcement of the rights enshrined. 
The Declaration of Rights under the Lancaster House Constitution provided for a narrow 
set of rights. The Declaration of Rights, modelled, on the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR)1061, did not guarantee the protection of all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. The Declaration of Rights made reference to the protection and 
promotion of civil and political liberties but did not make any provision for the protection 
of socio-economic rights.1062 The constant amendments to the Declaration of Rights 
progressively watered down the enjoyment of rights.1063 The enactment of repressive 
legislation also weakened a number of rights protected under the Declaration of Rights 
and the state sought to use the vague and wide concept of ―public interest‖ in order to 
justify state actions.1064 As a result during the consultative process there were calls by a 
majority of Zimbabweans for a comprehensive justiciable Declaration of Rights with 
strong enforcement mechanisms in order to improve the protection of human rights.1065 
 Thus, Chapter 4 of the Constitution contains the Declaration of Rights. Unlike the 
Declaration of Rights under the Lancaster House Constitution, Chapter 4 of the 
Constitution contains a much broader protection of human rights which include/s first 
generation (civil and political)1066, second generation (socio-economic)1067 and third 
                                                          
1061
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950, 
signed at Rome 1950.  
1062
The Legal Monitor „A Newsletter published by Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights and Human 
Rights Defenders‘ (2009) 3.  
1063
Examples of such amendments include Amendment Number 7 (Act 23 of 1987) which abolished the 
offices of a Ceremonial President and a Prime Minister and introduced an Executive Presidency. This 
entrenched the Executive power in Zimbabwe. Amendment 11(Act 30 of 1990) ousted the jurisdiction of 
the Courts in deciding whether compensation for expropriated land was fair or not. Furthermore, 
Amendment Number 17 (Act 5 of 2005) was promulgated to oust entirely the jurisdiction of the Courts 
over cases of acquisition of land by the state. Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act 30 of 1990 was 
amended in response to the S v Juvenile 1989 (2) ZLR 61 (S) case which abolished sentences of 
corporal punishment imposed upon juveniles in terms of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. In 
response to the judgment Parliament proceeded to amend the Constitution and added a derogation that 
expressly allowed for such corporal punishment to be carried out. 
1064
See for example the Public Order and Security Act 5 of 2002 which violates the right to freedom of 
assembly and peaceful demonstration. 
1065
http://www.copac.org.zw/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=category&id=8&Itemid=280 
(Accessed 16 April 2013). 
1066
These include amongst many other rights, the right to personal liberty (section 49 of the Constitution of 
Zimbabwe; section 51 the right to human dignity; section 53 the freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment; section 52 the right to persona; security; and Section 67 which deals 
with political rights. 
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generation (environmental)1068 human rights. Section 47 of the Constitution also does 
not preclude the existence of other rights and freedoms that may be recognised or 
conferred by law, to the extent that they are consistent with the Constitution. The 
extension of the rights protected under the Constitution should be commended as the 
inclusion of such rights will assist the people of Zimbabwe in enforcing the different 
types of rights against the state and private persons. The inclusion of various types of 
rights is also in line with international law which recognises that all human rights are 
universal and inalienable; indivisible; and interdependent and interrelated.1069 Such 
rights therefore apply to all equally and as such give the citizens of Zimbabwe the right 
to participate in decisions that affect their lives.  
5.4.4.3 Duties and Application of the Declaration of Rights 
Section 44 of the Constitution places a duty on the State and every person, including 
juristic persons, to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights and freedoms in the 
Declaration of Rights. Section 45(1) of the Constitution has a direct vertical application 
as it regulates the relationship between the individual and the state. The section states 
that the State and all executive, legislative1070 and judicial institutions1071 and agencies 
of government at every level are bound by the Declaration of Rights.1072 On the other 
hand, section 45(2), similar to section 8(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1067
These include amongst many other rights, section 71 the right to Health Care; section 75 the Right to 
Education; and section 77 the right to Food and Water.  
1068
See Section 73 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
1069
Principle 5 of the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, Adopted by the World Conference on 
Human Rights in Vienna on 25 June 1993. 
1070
See De Lille v Speaker of the National Assembly 1998 (3) SA 430 (CC).  
1071
In the course of adjudicating legal disputes judges and magistrates are therefore required to conduct 
themselves in a way that complies with the Declaration of Rights provisions. Thus courts must promote 
the values and principles that underlie a society and recognised under the Constitution which are based 
on openness, justice, human dignity, equality and freedom. 
1072
Section 45 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe which states that ‗(1) This Chapter binds the State and all 
executive and judicial institutions and agencies of government at every level. (2) This Chapter binds 
natural and juristic persons to the extent that it is applicable to them, taking into account the nature of the 
right or freedom concerned and any duty imposed by it. (3) Juristic persons as well as natural persons are 
entitled to the rights and freedoms set out in this Chapter to the extent that those rights and freedoms can 
appropriately be extended to them.‖ On the other hand see also section 8(1) of the Constitution of South 
Africa which states that ―the Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the 
judiciary and all organs of state.‘ 
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Africa1073, recognises that the abuse of human rights may also be conducted by private 
bodies and seeks to protect individuals against the abuse of their rights by other 
individuals. The direct vertical application of the Bill of Rights therefore gives an 
individual the power to challenge the conduct of any of the organs of state for any 
breach of their duties under the Declaration of Rights.1074 
5.4.4.4 Interpretation of Rights 
Currie and De Waal note that the process of interpretation involves ascertaining the 
meaning of the right involved and also determining whether the challenged law or 
conduct conflicts with the right in question.1075 Thus, the Constitution establishes a 
Constitutional Court which is the final arbiter in all constitutional matters.1076 This 
provision therefore puts the judiciary at the fore of human rights protection as it 
mandates the judiciary to give meaning to the provisions in the Declaration of Rights in 
order to establish whether law or conduct is inconsistent with a provision in the 
Declaration of Rights.1077  
A major difference introduced by the Constitution, unlike the Lancaster House 
Constitution, is the inclusion of an interpretation clause. Section 46(1) of the 
Constitution, drafted along similar lines to section 39(1) of the Constitution of South 
Africa1078, stipulates how the Constitution should be interpreted.1079 The Constitution 
                                                          
1073
Section 8(2) of the Constitution of South Africa states that ‗A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a 
natural and juristic person if and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the 
right and the nature and duty  imposed by the right.‘  
1074
Currie I and De Waal J (2005) 44. 
1075
Currie I and De Waal J (2005) 145. 
1076
Section 167(1) (a) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe which states that ‗the Constitutional Court is the 
highest court in all constitutional matters, and its decisions on those matters bind all other courts.‘ 
1077
Motala Z and Ramaphosa C Constitutional Law: Analysis and Cases (2002) 13. See also Currie I and 
De Waal J (2005) 145.  
1078
Section 39(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa states ‗when interpreting the Bill of 
Rights, court, tribunal or forum- (a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom; (b) must consider international law; and may consider 
foreign law.‘ 
1079
Section 46 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe states that ‗When interpreting this Chapter, a court, 
tribunal, forum or body- (a) must give effect to the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Chapter; (b) must 
promote the values and principles that underlie a democratic society based on openness, justice, human 
dignity, equality and freedom, and in particular the values and principles set out in section 3; (c) must take 
into account international law and all treaties and conventions to which Zimbabwe is a state party; (d) 
must pay due regard to all the provisions of this Constitution, in particular the principles and objectives set 
out in Chapter 2; and (e) may consider relevant foreign law; in addition to considering all other relevant 
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requires that in the interpretation of the Declaration of Rights, values that underlie an 
open and democratic society based on inter alia, the supremacy of the Constitution, 
openness, the rule of law, human dignity, equality and freedom, must be taken into 
consideration. The Constitution also places an obligation on the courts to take into 
account international law and all treaties and conventions to which Zimbabwe is a State 
Party when interpreting the Constitution. The Constitution however, does not specify 
whether non- binding international instruments may be used as a tool of interpretation of 
the Declaration of Rights. However, persuasive authority in this regard can be drawn 
from the example of South Africa, where the Constitutional Court has noted that both 
binding and non-binding international law may be used as tools of interpretation of the 
Bill of Rights. The Court in S v Makwanyane stated that: 
‗International agreements and customary international law provide a framework within 
which  ... [the Bill of Rights] can be evaluated and understood, and for that purpose 
decisions of tribunals dealing with comparable instruments, such as United Nations 
Committee on Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and the 
European Court of Human Rights, and in appropriate cases, reports of specialised 
agencies such as the International Labour Organisation may provide guidance as to the 
correct interpretation of particular provisions.‘
1080
 
The Makwanyane case can prove to be a persuasive authority to courts in Zimbabwe. 
Following such an approach will ensure that courts in Zimbabwe do not limit themselves 
to the treaties that the country is party to, but can also rely on general international 
human rights law in the interpretation of the Declaration of Rights.  
Although section 46(1) obliges local courts to consider international law in the 
interpretation of the Declaration of Rights, the same cannot be said with regards to 
foreign law. In S v Makwanyane the Constitutional Court was of the opinion that 
although section 35(1) of the Interim Constitution1081 stipulated that the courts ―may‖ 
have regard to foreign law in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, foreign case law 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
factors that are to be taken into account in the interpretation of a Constitution. (2) When interpreting an 
enactment, and when developing the common law and customary law, every court, tribunal, forum or 
body must promote and be guided by the spirit and objectives of this Chapter.‘ 
1080
S V Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) paras.36-7. 
1081
 Presently section 39(1)(d) of the Constitution of South Africa. 
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would not necessarily provide a safe guide to the interpretation of the Bill of Rights.1082  
Caution is therefore raised against the mandatory use of foreign law in the interpretation 
of the Declaration of Rights because of the different contexts in which other 
constitutions around the world are drafted and also because of the different historical 
contexts within which different constitutions are written.1083 However, this is not to mean 
that decisions that have been made in South Africa do not reflect comparative 
constitutional law from other jurisdictions around the world.1084 Courts in Zimbabwe 
although not mandated to use foreign law will be able to seek guidance from other 
jurisdictions on the interpretation of key issues in relation to human rights law. However, 
such an approach should be accompanied by great caution as foreign law might not 
necessarily provide a safe guide to the interpretation of the Declaration of Rights. 
The inclusion of the interpretation clause in the Declaration of Rights is a welcome 
development in Zimbabwe as it will aid and guide the courts to give the correct meaning 
to provisions in the Declaration Rights, especially with the inclusion of the injunction on 
international law. This will further enrich the jurisprudence of the Zimbabwean courts, 
which have over the years delivered shocking decisions that are contrary to 
international human rights norms in a bid to rubber-stamp executive lawlessness.1085  
5.4.4.5 Limitation of Rights 
Many constitutional rights and freedoms are not absolute. Currie and De Waal note that 
constitutional rights and freedoms have boundaries set by the rights of others and by 
important social concerns, such as, public order, safety, health and democratic 
values.1086 The Constitution permits the limitation of rights and fundamental freedoms. 
However, it should be noted that such limitation should be justifiable and must serve a 
                                                          
1082
S V Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para.37. 
1083
See amongst other cases Park-Ross v Director, Office of Serious Economic Offences 1995 (2) SA 148 
(C) para 160H. 
1084
See Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC). 
1085
See for example Dareremusha Cooperative v The Minister of Local Government, Public Works and 
Urban Development Harare High Court Case 2467/05 (Unreported); Batsirai Children‟s Home v the 
Minister of Local Government and Urban Development and Others Harare High Court Case No. 2566/05 
(Unreported) where the Courts justified unlawful evections of individuals across the country yet such 
evictions were conducted in complete violation of national and international laws governing evictions. 
1086
Currie I and De Waal J (2005) 163.  
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purpose which is compellingly important.1087 Section 86 of the Constitution provides a 
limitation clause that sets out the criteria for restricting the rights in the Declaration of 
Rights.1088 The Constitution, thus, provides that a limitation of rights should be justifiable 
and that such limitation should achieve the purpose that it is designed to achieve, with 
no other realistic way being available by which the purpose can be achieved without the 
restriction of rights.1089  
Despite providing the criteria for justifying the limitation of rights the Constitution also 
prohibits the enactment of any law that limits a certain class of rights enshrined in the 
Declaration of Rights. Thus, section 86(3) states that: 
‗No law may limit the following rights enshrined in this Chapter, and no person may 
violate them- (a) the right to life, except to the extent specified in section 48; (b) the right 
to human dignity; (c) the right not to be tortured or subjected to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment; (d) the right not to be placed in slavery or servitude; 
(e) the right to fair trial; (f) the right to obtain an order of habeas corpus as provided in 
section 50 (7) (a).‘ 
The Constitution therefore forbids the enactment of any law that infringes on the above 
rights that form the central values upon which the Constitution is established especially 
with regards to human dignity and the right not to be tortured or subjected to cruel and 
degrading punishment. The inclusion of this provision seeks to remedy previous 
instances where the executive has on several occasions amended the Constitution in 
response to unfavourable judgments from the courts, thus undermining the 
                                                          
1087
Meyerson D Rights Limited (1997) 36-43.  
1088
Section 86 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe states that ‗(1) The fundamental rights and freedoms set 
out in this Chapter must be exercised reasonably and with due regard for the rights and freedoms of other 
persons. (2) The fundamental rights and freedoms set out in this Chapter may be limited only in terms of 
a law of general application and to the extent that the limitation is fair, reasonable, necessary and 
justifiable in a democratic society based on openness , justice, human dignity, equality and freedom, 
taking into account all relevant factors, including- (a) the nature of right or freedom concerned; (b) the 
purpose of the limitation in particular whether it is necessary in the interests of defence, public safety, 
public order, public morality, public health, regional or town planning or the general public interest; (c) the 
nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms by 
any person does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others; (e) the relationship between the 
limitation and its purpose, in particular whether it imposes greater restrictions on the right or freedom 
concerned than are necessary to achieve its purpose; and (f) whether there are any less restrictive 
means of achieving the purpose of the limitation.‘ 
1089
See S v Manamela 2000 (3) SA 2 (CC) para.32. 
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independence of the judiciary. An example is that of the case of S v Juvenile1090, where, 
as stated earlier, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe made a ruling to the effect that 
corporal punishment was unconstitutional as it amounted to inhumane and degrading 
treatment which was not reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. The judgment 
handed down by the Supreme Court was to enforce an earlier ruling by the Court in the 
case of S v Ncube and Others1091 in which it had held that the carrying out of corporal 
punishment on adults in terms of section 109 of the Prisons Regulations of 1956 was 
unconstitutional because it was barbaric, inherently brutal and cruel.1092 In response to 
the judgment of the Supreme Court, Parliament proceeded to amend the Constitution 
and added a derogation that expressly allowed for corporal punishment to be carried 
out.  Amendment number 111093 introduced section 15(3) of the Lancaster House 
Constitution which read: 
‗No moderate corporal punishment inflicted (a) in appropriate circumstances upon a 
person under the age of eighteen years by his parent or guardian or by someone in loco 
parentis or in whom are vested any of the powers of his parent or guardian; or (b) in the 
execution of the judgment or order of a court, upon a male person under the age of 
eighteen years as a penalty for breach of any law; shall be held to be in contravention of 
section15(1) on the ground that it is inhuman or degrading‘  
The prohibition on amending the Constitution in order to limit the rights under section 
86(3) of the Constitution is therefore a welcome development that seeks to ensure that 
individuals are able to enjoy the rights and freedoms protected in the Constitution and 
also to ensure that judgments of courts protecting such rights are respected irrespective 
of whether a decision is favourable or unfavourable to the government of the day.    
 
5.4.4.6 Enforcement of Rights 
In terms of the Lancaster House Constitution, there were two ways of bringing a matter 
to the Supreme Court that related to the violation of the Declaration of Rights. A person 
could approach the Supreme Court directly for redress if the person alleged that the 
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1989 (2) ZLR 61 (S). This case dealt with the constitutionality of sentences of corporal punishment 
imposed upon juveniles in terms of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act.  
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1987 (2) ZLR 246 (S); 1988 (2) SA 702 (ZS). 
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1987 ZLR (2) 246 (S). 
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Declaration of Rights had been, was being, or was likely to be contravened in relation to 
him or her.1094 Section 24(2) of the Lancaster House Constitution further provided that; 
‗If in any proceedings in the High Court or in any court subordinate to the High Court any 
question arises as to the contravention of the Declaration of the Rights, the person 
presiding in that court may, and if so requested by any party to the proceedings shall, 
refer the question to the Supreme Court unless, in his opinion, the raising of the question 
is merely frivolous or vexatious.‘ 
Any court in Zimbabwe had the power to refer matters involving any alleged breach of 
the Declaration of Rights to the Supreme Court.1095 In cases where a lower court 
refused to refer a matter in terms of section 24(2) such court would be held to be in 
breach of the Declaration of Rights.1096 The issue of locus standi and public interest 
litigation had been a contentious issue in Zimbabwe taking into account the fact that the 
Lancaster House Constitution did not make reference to the issue of public interest 
litigation. The locus standi rule under the Lancaster House Constitution was adopted 
from the common law approach in which one has to have a personal, direct or 
substantial interest in a particular matter. Thus, as a result of the narrow rule on 
standing, the judiciary used this rule in justifying the denial of the right to standing for a 
number of individuals and certain groups.1097 This therefore resulted in a number of 
individuals failing to have access to courts to have their disputes heard and resolved. 
The Constitution of Zimbabwe has brought about several changes to address the 
problems associated with the narrow rule on standing under the Lancaster House 
Constitution. The changes in the Constitution enhance the contemporary litigation of 
                                                          
1094
Section 24(1) of the Lancaster House Constitution. 
1095
De Bourbon A (2003) 197. 
1096
Martin v Attorney- General 1993 (1) ZLR 153 (SC) para.158. In delivering judgment in this case 
Gubbay CJ stated that ‗Suppose that a judicial officer, solely due to the animosity towards an accused, in 
bad faith and without any warrant, were to rule that the question raised him was frivolous or vexatious and 
so order his remand in custody pending trial. Could it be then said that the accused was only entitled to 
approach the Supreme Court for relief under section 24(3)? I think not. Such action by the judicial officer 
concerned would, as mentioned before, itself constitute an infringement of the accused‘s entitlement to 
the protection of the law. Moreover, and most importantly, since at the conclusion of any remand 
proceedings there is no right of appeal, no remedy under section 24(3) would be available to that 
accused.‘ 
1097
See Tsvangirai v Registrar General of Elections and Others SC-20/2002.  See also Capitol Radio v 
Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe SC-128-02. 
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human rights by providing for public interest litigation.1098 Thus, section 85 of the 
Constitution provides that: 
‗(1) Any of the following persons, namely- (a) any person acting in their own interests; (b) 
any person acting on behalf of another person who cannot act for themselves; (c) any 
person acting as a member, or in the interests, of a group or class of persons; (d) any 
person acting in the public interest; (e) any association acting in the interests of its 
members: is entitled to approach a court, alleging that a fundamental right or freedom 
enshrined in this Chapter has been, is being or is likely to be infringed, and the court may 
grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights and an award for compensation.‘ 
Further, section 69 of the Constitution gives every person in the country the right of 
access to the courts with regards to criminal cases. It states that: 
‗(1) Every person accused of an offence has the right to a fair trial and public trial within a 
reasonable time before an independent and impartial court. (2) In the determination of 
civil rights and obligations, every person has a right to a fair, speedy and public hearing 
within a reasonable time before an independent and impartial court, tribunal or other 
forum established by law. (3) Every person has the right of access to the courts, or to 
some other tribunal or forum established by law for the resolution of any dispute. (4) 
Every person has a right, at their own expense, to choose and be represented by a legal 
practitioner before any court, tribunal or forum.‘  
The Constitution thus extends the rules of standing in Zimbabwe to accommodate 
public interest litigation and also allows individuals the rights of access to courts or any 
tribunal to resolve any dispute. The extension of the rules on standing seeks to ensure 
that citizens are able to openly access the courts and as a result improves the judicial 
protection of human rights in the country. However, it is essential that the courts in the 
country must be independent and impartial in the handling of any cases brought before 
them. An independent and impartial judiciary will result in the improvement of the 
protection of human rights and will aid in lifting society‘s confidence in the judicial 
system that for long has been viewed as being compromised. 
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See Article 50(2) of the Constitution of Uganda and section 38 of the Constitution of South Africa 
which provides for public interest litigation.  
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5.4.5 Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances1099 
The separation of powers doctrine is crucial to good governance in that it is important in 
curbing the abuse of executive power, as it promotes greater governmental 
efficiency.1100 Although various scholars argue that a rigid division of powers reduces 
flexibility and efficiency, Ackerman J notes that it is important that a delicate balance is 
established to control government by separation of powers and enforcing checks and 
balances and avoiding the diffusing of power, making it impossible for government to 
take timely measures in the public interest.1101 Although there cannot be a complete 
separation of powers amongst the branches of government, adequate safeguards need 
to be put in place to ensure that checks and balances exist among governmental 
organs, thus securing the independence of the institutions from each other so that they 
can act as effective checks on each other.  
Currie and De Waal note that the doctrine of separation of powers underlies the 
principle of judicial independence as it is important in any jurisdiction for the judicial 
branch of government to discharge judicial functions free from any external 
interference.1102 It should be noted that one of the aims of constitutionalism is to prevent 
the concentration of powers in one arm of the state and hence the system of checks 
and balances which seeks to ensure that the different branches of government control 
each other in the exercise of powers.1103  The system of checks and balances is 
important in that the judiciary is tasked with reviewing executive conduct and laws for 
compliance with the Constitution, and also with the executive exercising an important 
check with regards to the appointment of judges.1104 
                                                          
1099
Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances were also identified by COPAC at the First All 
Stakeholders Meeting as one of the 17 (seventeen) Thematic Areas used to obtain information from 
Zimbabweans as to what issues should be addressed in the new Constitution. 
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Carpenter G ‗Strengths and Limitations of a New National Government‘ in Licht R and De Villiers B 
South Africa‟s Crisis of Constitutional Democracy: Can the US Constitution Help? (1994) 168-169. 
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Currie I and De Waal J (2005) 120. 
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Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: in re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996 (First Certification Judgment) 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) para. 112. 
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The Lancaster House Constitution had several loopholes that had over the years posed 
a threat to the principle of separation of powers and checks and balances. The ousting 
of the jurisdiction of the courts with regard to land issues through Amendment Number 
17 is one particular example where the independence of the judiciary was eroded and 
as a result the judiciary could not exercise its checks and balances in respect of 
Parliament, which had rubber-stamped the will of the executive to remove the court‘s 
jurisdiction with regards to land issues. Another loophole that was a threat to the 
separation of powers principle was the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) 
Act1105 which allowed the executive President to make temporary laws subject to 
parliamentary approval at a later stage.1106 Although the use of such powers could have 
been ideal in cases of emergency, however it was shown that the use of such powers 
was subject to abuse. Such powers were used at crucial times, such as election 
periods, to pardon offenders who had committed certain crimes during the elections, 
thus placing such individuals beyond the reach of the judiciary.1107  
5.4.5.1 Constitution of Zimbabwe and Separation of Powers 
The Constitution of Zimbabwe does not contain an express provision guaranteeing the 
separation of powers and checks and balances. However, it should be noted that both 
separation of powers and checks and balances have been built into the Constitution. 
Thus, the Constitution recognises separation of powers in section 88(2) which vests 
executive authority in the President, subject to the Constitution, through the Cabinet. 
Section 162 vests judicial power in the courts1108 and section 1171109 of the Constitution 
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Chapter 10:20. An Act which empowers the President to make regulations dealing with situations that 
have risen or are likely to arise and that require to be dealt with as a matter of urgency.  
1106
Section 4 of the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act states that ‗(1) Copies of all 
regulations made in terms of section two shall be laid before Parliament no later than the eighth day on 
which Parliament sits next after the regulations were mad. (2) If Parliament resolves that any regulations 
that have been laid before it in terms of subsection (1) should be amended or repealed, the President 
shall forthwith amend or repeal the regulations accordingly. (3) Where any regulations have been 
amended or repealed in terms of subsection (2) in accordance with a resolution of Parliament, the 
President shall not, within a period of six months thereafter, make any further regulations in terms of 
section two that are identical in substance to the regulations before they were amended or repealed, as 
the case maybe.‘‘ 
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The Associated Press ‗Zimbabwe Head Grants Crimes Amnesty‘ 
http://wc.arizona.edu/papers/94/37/01_98_m.html (Accessed 12 March 2013). 
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Section 162 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe states that the ‗Judicial authority derives from the people 
of Zimbabwe and is vested in the courts, which comprise- (a) the Constitutional Court; (b) the Supreme 
 
 
 
 
232 
 
vests the legislative authority in the legislature. It should also be noted that there is an 
overlap with regards to the separation of powers model in the Constitution with 
members of the executive, more specifically the Cabinet, being tasked with conducting 
government business in Parliament.1110  
A more striking provision in the Constitution which retains the provision under the 
Lancaster House Constitution1111 pertains to the legislative authority. Section 116 of the 
Constitution stipulates that the Legislature of Zimbabwe shall consist of Parliament and 
the President.1112 It is submitted that this provision in the Constitution which gives the 
President legislative powers is inconsistent with the doctrine of separation of powers as 
the President is given powers that should be mainly reserved for parliament. What is 
more alarming is that the Constitution recognises the importance of separation of 
powers in its founding values,  but proceeds to include provisions that clearly violate the 
protection of separation of powers. The rendering of legislative powers to the President 
also becomes alarming in that it also seeks to legitimise the Presidential Powers 
(Temporary Measures) Act1113, a piece of legislation which has over the years allowed 
the President to make regulations which  have more force than  laws of Parliament.  
The Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act has given the President a broad 
interpretation of the provisions in respect of which the President is allowed to make 
regulations on, with the only restriction being that the provisions may not be used to 
amend the Constitution or affect constitutional provisions pertaining to the handling of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Court; (c) the High Court; (d) the Labour Court; (d) the Administrative Court; (f) the Magistrates Courts; (g) 
the Customary Law Courts; and (h) other courts established by or under an Act of Parliament.‘ 
1109
Section 117(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe states that ‗the legislative authority of Zimbabwe is 
derived from the people and is vested in and exercised in accordance with this Constitution by the 
Legislature.‘ 
1110
Section 110(3)(b) of the Constitution. See also the Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional 
Assembly: in re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (First Certification 
Judgment) 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) para 111 where it was argued that the overlap in that members of the 
executive are also members of parliament resulted in a failure by the 1996 Constitution to conform to a 
separation of powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. In this case the 
Constitutional Court held that doctrine of separation of powers is not ‗a fixed or rigid constitutional 
doctrine‘ and that ‗it is given expression in many different forms and made subject to checks and 
balances of many kinds‘. The court held that the overlap made the executive more directly answerable to 
the elected legislature. 
1111
See section 32(1) of the Lancaster House Constitution which stated that ‗The legislative authority in 
Zimbabwe shall vest in the Legislature which shall consist of the President and Parliament.‘ 
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Section 116 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.  
1113
Chapter 10:20. 
 
 
 
 
233 
 
money held by the Treasury.1114 Although Parliament is tasked with approving the 
regulations made by the President, Parliament over the years has been compliant and 
dominated by ZANU-PF until the emergence of MDC. It has ensured that the President 
has become a legislature unto himself with the proper law-making procedure being 
pushed into the background. It is as a result of this lack of separation of powers and 
effective checks and balances between the executive and the legislature, that the 
President  has over the years used the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act 
to make regulations that have infringed the independence of the judiciary and have 
resulted in the violation of fundamental human rights and freedoms.1115 
The position and powers of the President under the Lancaster House Constitution was a 
matter of controversy since the introduction of an executive presidency in 1987. It is 
therefore surprising that, despite the constitutional reforms, the Constitution of 
Zimbabwe did little to limit the powers of the President as it has simply restated powers 
similar to those in the Lancaster House Constitution.  This begs the question of to whom 
exactly the President is accountable. The impression drawn from these powers is that 
the President is not accountable to anyone and it remains unclear how the checks and 
balances are going to be established under the Constitution. 
Under the Constitution, the President is given powers to assent to legislation passed by 
Parliament. In cases where the constitutionality of legislation is questioned, the 
President is obliged to refer legislation to the Constitutional Court for advice on its 
constitutionality.1116 The President after referring the Bill to the Constitutional Court is 
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Section 2(a) of the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures Act).  
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It should be noted that section 134 of the  Constitution of Zimbabwe which allows for  the delegation of 
power and states that ‗Parliament may, in an Act of parliament, delegate power to make statutory 
instruments within the scope of and for the purposes  laid out in that Act, but (a) Parliament‘s primary law-
making power must not be delegated…‘ See also Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature v 
President of the Republic of South Africa 1995 (4) SA 877 (CC) where the Constitutional Court stated that 
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only then obliged to assent and sign the Bill if the Constitutional Court upholds its 
constitutionality.1117 The inclusion for the Constitutional Court to decide on the 
constitutionality of Bills is a positive step in seeking to ensure that the President is 
accountable and therefore does not hold much veto powers over Parliament, as the lack 
of such a provision would have provided the President with absolute powers in deciding 
what legislation should be passed in the country.1118 This provision was drafted along 
similar lines to that of section 84(2) of the Constitution of South Africa1119, and is a 
positive step in seeking to create accountability amongst the branches of government. 
However, it is imperative that an independent and impartial judiciary should be in place 
in order to ensure that proper checks and balances are exercised in that regard. In the 
case where the judiciary is subject to executive control as is the case in Zimbabwe, it 
would be difficult for judges to rule against the executive in cases where the executive 
disagrees with the legislation passed by Parliament.  
With regards to the separation of powers between the President and the legislature, the 
Constitution provides that the approval of the President is required when an Act of 
Parliament sets the remuneration and benefits of civil servants, members of the security 
sectors and traditional leaders. In this case the President‘s approval is given on the 
recommendation of the Minister responsible for finance and after the President has 
consulted with the Minister responsible.1120 The President under the Constitution also 
holds greater powers over Parliament as the President has the power to dissolve 
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Section 131(9) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe which states that ‗if on a reference under subsection 
(8) the Constitutional Court advises that the Bill is constitutional, the President must assent to it and sign 
it immediately and caused to be published in the Gazette without delay.‘ 
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See for example section 51(3a) of the Lancaster House Constitution which gave the President veto 
powers over any legislation passed by Parliament. However, such veto power was overridden by the fact 
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choosing legislation that he deemed suitable for the people of Zimbabwe. 
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Parliament if it refuses to pass his or her government budget.1121  Such a clause can 
therefore lead to a scenario where Parliament, acting in good faith, can be held to 
ransom by the executive, and would therefore in a way pressurise Parliament to always 
pass such budgets even if there are credible objections. However, it should be noted 
that a decision to dissolve Parliament under this section can be challenged and set 
aside by the Constitutional Court.1122 This perhaps provides a system of checks and 
balances by the judiciary over the executive in order to ensure that the President 
exercises his powers within the limits of the Constitution. However, the judiciary has to 
be independent to be able to resolve such a dispute in line with the Constitution. 
The above discussion on the separation of powers in the Constitution depicts how the 
Constitution has sought to maintain a system of executive presidency as was the case 
under the Lancaster House Constitution. The Constitution thus further legitimises the 
concentration of powers in the hands of the President and therefore does not provide for 
a proper separation of powers and checks and balances.  
5.5 Judicial Reforms under the Constitution of Zimbabwe 
5.5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters have clearly elaborated on the importance of the independence 
of the judiciary when it comes to the protection of human rights. An independent 
judiciary has become a mantra for international institutions and governments around the 
world.1123 It is widely believed that an independent judiciary is one of the strongest 
guarantees to upholding the rule of law and the protection of human rights in any 
society and that a strong judiciary is one of the elements of the rule of law.1124 There are 
a number of features which determine the extent of the independence of the judiciary 
and these include the method of appointment of judges, the removal of judges from 
office, whether or not the judiciary has exclusive jurisdiction over judicial matters and 
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Section 143(3) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. See also section 109(4)(b) where the Constitution 
empowers the President to dissolve Parliament, if it passes a vote of no confidence in his or her 
government. Such action has a muzzling effect on Parliament.  
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the question of salaries payable to judges.1125 Brazier also notes what the concept of 
judicial independence entails: 
‗What does judicial independence, properly defined, entail? In general the public must 
feel confident in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary: judges must therefore be 
secure from undue influence and be autonomous in their own field. That possibility 
implies that neither the government nor Parliament should have any role in the 
appointment or removal of judges. More precisely, judicial independence may be said to 
require: (a) that appointments to the judicial office, renewal of part-time appointments, 
and promotions should not depend on uncontrolled ministerial patronage; (b) that judges 
should be free from improper attempts by Ministers, Members of Parliament, or peers to 
influence the result of cases still under adjudication; (c) that judicial salaries should not be 
reduced; and (d) that judges should not be removed from office unfairly or without 
reason.‘
1126
 
Considering the importance of the judiciary in the protection of human rights, Zimbabwe 
has identified judicial reform as a key component to improve the protection of the 
independence of the judiciary and the protection of human rights.  
5.5.2 Judicial Authority 
Section 79 of the Lancaster House Constitution vested the judicial authority in courts 
which consisted of the Supreme Court, High Court and such other courts subordinate to 
the Supreme Court and the High Court as established by or under an Act of Parliament. 
The Constitution of Zimbabwe derives the judicial authority from the people of 
Zimbabwe and also vests it in the courts. Thus section 162 states that: 
‗The judicial authority derives from the people of Zimbabwe and is vested in the courts, 
which comprise- (a) the Constitutional Court
1127
; (b) the Supreme Court
1128
; (c) the High 
                                                          
1125
Madhuku L (2002) 32. 
1126
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Section 166 states that ‗(1) The Constitutional Court is a superior court of record and consist of- (a) 
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Court
1129
; (d) the Labour Court
1130
; (e) the Administrative Court
1131
; (f) Magistrates 
Courts
1132
; (g) the customary law courts
1133
; and (h) other courts established by or under 
an Act of Parliament.‘ 
A more notable change brought about by the Constitution is the introduction of a 
Constitutional Court. Historically the idea of the establishment of a Constitutional Court 
can be traced back to the period after the Second World War, when many European 
countries introduced court structures that departed from the Anglo-American model 
which entrusted a court with specific jurisdiction.1134 The departure led to the 
establishment of a special constitutional court to adjudicate on constitutional disputes 
and to prevent tyranny.1135  
The judgments of the Constitutional Court in Zimbabwe will be based on the 
Constitution, which is the supreme law in Zimbabwe. Taking into consideration that the 
human rights situation in the country has been in turmoil over the past decade, the 
establishment of the Constitutional Court as the highest court in all constitutional 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
appoint a judge of the high Court, or a former judge to act as a judge of the Supreme Court for that 
period.‘ The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is stated in section 169 which reads ‗(1) The Supreme 
Court is the final court of appeal for Zimbabwe, except in matters over which the Constitutional Court has 
jurisdiction. (2) Subject to subsection (1), an Act of Parliament may confer additional jurisdiction and 
powers on the Supreme Court. (3) An Act of Parliament may provide for the exercise of jurisdiction by the 
Supreme Court and for that purpose may confer the power to make rules of court...‘ 
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matters may lead to the improvement of the human rights situation in the country as its 
judgments will mainly guarantee the basic rights and freedoms of all persons. Such 
judgments will therefore have a binding effect on all organs of state and its agencies. 
Although the Supreme Court and the High Court have jurisdiction in certain 
constitutional matters1136, the introduction of the Constitutional Court is a welcome 
development as the Court will act as the ultimate protector of the new constitutional 
order.  
The jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court is dealt with under section 167 of the 
Constitution. Section 167 states that: 
‗(1) The Constitutional Court- (a) is the highest Court in all constitutional matters, and its 
decisions on those matters bind all other courts; (b) decides only constitutional matters 
and issues connected with decisions on constitutional matters, in particular references 
and applications under section 131 (8) (b) and paragraph 9 (2) of the Fifth Schedule; and 
(c) makes the final decision whether a matter is a constitutional matter or whether an 
issue is connected with a decision on a constitutional matter. (2) Subject to this 
Constitution, only the Constitutional Court may- (a) advise on the constitutionality of any 
proposed legislation, but may do so only where the legislation concerned has been 
referred to in terms of this Constitution; (b) hear and determine disputes relating to 
election to the office of President; (c) hear and determine disputes relating to whether or 
not a person is qualified to hold the office of Vice-President; or (d) determine whether 
Parliament has failed to fulfil a constitutional obligation . (3) The Constitutional Court 
makes the final decision whether an Act of Parliament or conduct of the President or 
Parliament is constitutional and must confirm any order of constitutional invalidity made 
by another court before that order has any force. (4) An Act of Parliament may provide 
for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Constitutional Court and for that purpose may 
confer the power to make rules of court; (5) The rules of the Constitutional Court must 
allow a person, when it is in the interests of justice and with or without leave of the 
Constitutional Court- ( a) to bring a constitutional matter directly to the Constitutional 
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Section 175 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe states that the other courts have jurisdiction in certain 
constitutional matters but their decisions are not binding unless confirmed by the Constitutional Court. 
Section 175 of the Constitution states that ‗(1) Where a court makes an order concerning the 
constitutional invalidity of any law or any conduct of the President or Parliament, the order has no force 
unless it is confirmed by the Constitutional Court. (2) A court which makes an order of constitutional 
invalidity referred to in subsection (1) may grant a temporary interdict or other temporary relief to a party, 
or may adjourn the proceedings, pending a decision of the Constitutional Court on the validity of the law 
or conduct concerned.‘ 
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Court; (b) to appeal directly to the Constitutional Court from any other court; (c) to appear 
as a friend of the court.‘ 
The Constitution is now binding on all the organs of state and the Constitutional Court 
now has the exclusive jurisdiction to test the constitutionality of an Act of Parliament and 
also to control executive action. This is a welcome development in the new 
constitutional dispensation as the courts are now given the power to expressly conduct 
checks and balances in respect of Parliament and the executive branch of government. 
This marks a huge departure from the Lancaster House Constitution which did not 
include such a provision. If such powers are to be exercised by an independent and 
impartial judiciary, the checks and balances will bode well for human rights protection in 
the country and also prohibit the abuse of power by other branches of government. The 
powers to test the constitutionality of legislation will ensure that the legislation passed 
does not violate any fundamental human rights and freedoms protected in the 
Constitution as has been the case in the country. The powers given to the Constitutional 
Court will also ensure that checks and balances are also conducted on the executive 
branch of government which has over the years undermined the independence of the 
judiciary mainly through interfering with the administration of the courts and the constant 
defiance of court orders.1137 
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See The State v Toby Harden and Julian Simmonds CRB 256/3.05 where a Norton Magistrate 
ordered prison authorities to release two British journalists, Julian Simmonds and Toby Harnden, on bail 
of Z$1 million each. They had been arrested on 30 March 2005 whilst visiting a polling station during 
election proceedings in the Norton area. They were also charged with an immigration offence after it was 
found that their visas had expired. An immigration official aligned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
prevented prison authorities from complying with the order served on them. As a result, the two accused 
were held in detention until the case had been finalised and they had been acquitted of the charges 
against them. See also Roy Leslie Bennet v The Constituency Electoral Officer, Chimanimani 
Constituency EP1/05 where a court order nullifying the results of the nomination court was defied by the 
executive when Justice Tendai Uchena, sitting in his capacity as a judge of the newly established 
Electoral Court, nullified the results of the nomination court for the Chimanimani constituency in which the 
presiding officer had unlawfully and unprocedurally refused to accept the nomination papers of Roy 
Bennett. Bennett intended to contest the March 2005 parliamentary election as the candidate for the 
opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Justice Uchena postponed the election for the 
Chimanimani constituency pending a fresh nomination procedure in which Bennett was to be allowed to 
submit his papers for nomination. On the instructions of the President of Zimbabwe, the court order was 
defied after the President attacked the judgment and ordered that the elections were to proceed as if 
nothing happened. 
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5.5.3 Independence and Impartiality of Courts under the Constitution of 
Zimbabwe  
Rautenbach and Malherbe note that the independence of the courts is an incidence of 
the separation of powers1138 and as a result a number of constitutions1139 around the 
world contain provisions that protect the independence of the courts. These include, the 
terms of office of judges, their salaries and pensions, disciplinary actions and 
appointment and dismissal. Madhuku also notes that a constitution should have a clear 
statement providing that the judiciary is independent.1140 Madhuku notes that this is 
important as it allows redress to be sought in the courts in the event of any law 
undermining the independence of the judiciary and also enables members of the public 
to criticise any tendencies by the executive to interfere with the work of the judiciary.1141 
Although the independence of the judiciary was protected under section 79B of the 
Lancaster House Constitution, section 164 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe is wider 
than the Lancaster House provision. Section 164 of the Constitution states that: 
‗(1) [t]he courts are independent and are subject only to this Constitution and the law, 
which they must apply impartially, expeditiously and without fear, favour or prejudice. (2) 
[t]he independence, impartiality and effectiveness of the courts are central to the rule of 
law and democratic governance, and therefore- (a) neither the State nor any institution or 
agency of the government at any level, and no other person, may interfere with the 
functioning of the courts; (b) the State, through legislative and other measures, must 
assist and protect the courts to ensure their independence, impartiality, dignity, 
accessibility and effectiveness and to ensure that they comply with the principles set out 
in section 165. (3) An order or decision of a court binds the State and all persons and 
governmental institutions and agencies to which it applies, and must be obeyed by them. 
(4) Nothing in this section is to be construed as preventing an Act of Parliament from 
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Rautenbach IM and Malherbe EFJ Constitutional Law 6
th
 ed (2012) 165. See also De Lange v Smuts 
NO 1998 (7) BCLR 779 (CC), 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC) paras. 60 70-72; South Africa Association of 
Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath 2001 (1) BCLR 77 (CC), 2001 (1) SA 883 (CC) paras.25-26. 
1139
See section 165(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South which states that ‗the courts are 
independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, which they must apply impartially and 
without fear or favour.‘ See also Article 128(1) of the Constitution of Uganda which states that ‗(1) in the 
exercise of judicial power, the courts shall be independent and shall not be subject to the control or 
direction of any person or authority.‘ See also Article 128 of the Constitution of Uganda which deals with 
the protection of judicial independence. 
1140
Madhuku L (2002) 233. 
1141
Madhuku L (2002) 233. 
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vesting functions other than adjudicating functions in a member of the judiciary, provided 
that the exercise of those functions does not compromise the independence of the 
judicial officer concerned in the performance of his or her judicial functions and does not 
compromise the independence of the judiciary in general.‘ 
The above section provides the general constitutional guarantee with regards to the 
protection of the independence of the judiciary. The protection of the independence of 
the judiciary in this instance is drafted in accordance with international law principles 
which demand that the independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by States and 
enshrined in the constitution or laws of the country.1142 In order to strengthen the 
independence of the judiciary, the Constitution places a duty on the State to enact 
ordinary legislation that will further supplement this constitutional provision. As a result 
legislation will have to be put in place that seeks to protect and uphold the 
independence of the judiciary and which should be informed and guided by the 
provisions in the Constitution.  
In line with international norms the Constitution stipulates that no person or organ of 
state may interfere with the functioning of the courts. The Constitution of Zimbabwe 
mandates judges to thus decide cases brought before them expeditiously and without 
fear, favour or prejudice. The prohibition of any external interference with the judges 
seeks to preserve the independence of the judicial institution. As this research has 
identified earlier such independence is a perquisite in ensuring and protecting the 
impartiality of judges. It is in this regard that the Constitution recognises the importance 
of the independence of the judicial institution vis a vis the issue of impartiality. The 
Constitution thus demands that judges must be impartial and must decide cases based 
on the facts of the case and their understanding of the law and without any direct or 
indirect influence on their decisions.1143 Although the Constitution states that a member 
of the judiciary can be vested with functions other than adjudicating powers, it 
recognises that such functions should not interfere with the independence of the 
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See Principle 1 of the United Nations Basic Principles on Judicial Independence, General Assembly 
Resolution 40/32 of 1985. 
1143
Principle 2 of the United Nations Basic Principles  which states ‗that the judiciary shall decide matters 
before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, 
improper  influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter 
or for any reason.‘   
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judiciary. However, it should be noted that as the independence of the judiciary is an 
important aspect of the separation of powers, the granting of non-judicial functions to 
judicial officers should be closely guarded by the Constitutional Court in order to ensure 
that there is no excessive interference by other branches of government with the 
discharge of judicial duties by judicial officers1144 and the inappropriate assignment of 
such powers to judicial officers.1145 
5.5.3.1 Principles Guiding the Judiciary 
The Constitution of Zimbabwe unlike the Lancaster House Constitution makes provision 
for a number of principles that will guide members of the judiciary in exercising their 
judicial authority.1146 These principles have been included in the Constitution so as to 
further strengthen the independence of the judiciary in the country.  
5.5.3.1.1 Speedy Resolution of Cases 
Since the Constitution has extended the rule of standing in order to allow individuals the 
right of access to courts for the speedly resolution of their cases, the Constitution now 
obliges judges to ensure that in the exercise of their duties they should ensure that 
                                                          
1144
See Van Rooyen v The State 2002 (5) SA 246 (CC) where the South African Constitutional Court 
invalidated provisions of the Magistrates Act 90 of 1993, Magistrates‘ Courts Act of 1944 and regulations 
made under the Magistrates Act dealing with powers of the Minister to determine the salary of a 
suspended magistrate, vesting in Parliament the power to impeach a magistrate without investigation by 
the Magistrates Commission, allowing the appointment of a non-judicial officer to hear the complaints 
against a magistrate, vesting the power in the Minister to determine appropriate sanction in case of 
misconduct by magistrate, allowing the use of transfer and payment of fines as sanctions against 
magistrates and the initiation by the Minister of  investigations into a magistrate ill-health or incapacity, 
giving the Minister discretion not to refer a recommendation by the Magistrates Commission to remove a 
magistrate from office to Parliament, and authorising the Minister to assign powers to magistrates or 
prohibit magistrates from exercising powers. 
1145
See South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath and Others 2001 (1) SA 883 (CC) 
paras. 29-35 where Chaskalson P stated that ‗accepted that the exercise of some non-judicial functions 
may be in order and expressly left  open the possibility for judges to serve on commissions of enquiry, 
observing: ‗performance of such functions ordinarily calls for the qualities and skills required for the 
performance of judicial functions-independence, the weighing up of information, the forming of an opinion 
based on information, and the giving of a decision on the basis of consideration of relevant information.‘ 
In Van Rooyen v The State 2002 (5) SA 246 (CC) paras.231-233 it was stated that magistrates should 
not be required to perform administrative duties unrelated to their functions as judicial officers because to 
do so may make them answerable to the executive. However, Chaskalson CJ also noted that ‗there may 
be reasons why existing legislation that makes provision for administrative functions and duties to be 
performed by magistrates is necessary, and is not at present inconsistent with the evolving process of 
securing institutional independence at all levels of the court system.‘ 
1146
Section 165 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
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justice must be done to all, irrespective of status and that justice must not be delayed. 
Thus section 165(1) states that: 
‗[I]n exercising judicial authority, members of the judiciary must be guided by the following 
principles- (a) justice must be done to all, irrespective of status; (b) justice must not be 
delayed, and to that end members of the judiciary must perform their judicial duties 
efficiently and with reasonable promptness; (c) the role of the courts is paramount in 
safeguarding human rights and freedoms and the rule of law.‘ 
The key importance of the role of the courts in human rights protection is explicitly 
recognised by the Constitution. This is so because the courts play a crucial role in the 
protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms. As such, in the handling of cases 
courts should therefore ensure that justice should be provided timeously as the old 
adage says ―justice delayed is justice denied‖. This approach was also stipulated in the 
case of Mandirwhe v Minister of State and Security1147 where Baron J stated that: 
‗a favourable judgment obtained at the conclusion of a normal and lengthy judicial 
process is of little value to the litigant [and] there are obvious advantages to litigants and 
the public to have important constitutional issues decided… without protracted litigation.‘ 
It should be noted that the old adage of ―justice delayed is justice denied‖ has now 
become a principle of customary international law that seeks to ensure the realisation of 
fundamental rights and freedoms.1148 Since the commencement of the Land Reform 
Program, the current bench has shown an indifference towards the speedy resolution of 
human rights cases, especially those dealing with sensitive political issues. An example 
is that of Tsvangirai v Registrar General of Elections and Others1149 where, in an urgent 
application, the applicant sought to have his electoral rights protected in the election 
which was a day away, but the Court reserved judgment until more than a month after 
the election had been conducted.1150  
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1981 ZLR 61. 
1148
Francioni F ‗Access to Justice, Denial of Justice and International Investment Law‘ (2009) 3 The 
European Journal of International Law 729 729-730. 
1149
(76/02) [2002] ZWSC 20; SC-20/2002 (4 April 2002)  
http://www.saflii.org.za/zw/cases/ZWSC/2002/20.html (Accessed 23 June 2013). 
1150
Legal Resources Foundation Report on Justice in Zimbabwe (2002) 73. 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/defenders/hrd_zimbabwe/LRFreport30-09.pdf (Accessed 10 March 
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Another example of the delay in justice in Zimbabwe is provided in the manner in which 
the 2000 election petition cases were handled. After the 2000 Parliamentary elections, 
the MDC filed 37 electoral petitions that averred widespread violence, intimidation and 
other electoral irregularities. Only a number of these cases had been finalised at the 
time when the next Parliamentary elections were held in 2005.1151 The above cases 
indicate the indifferent attitude that the courts in Zimbabwe have had over the years with 
regards to human rights cases, and the delays have resulted in the courts abrogating 
their duty to protect and promote fundamental rights and freedoms.1152 Therefore, the 
Constitution, in a positive development seeks to address the indifferent attitude that the 
judiciary has manifested over the years with regards to sensitive political and human 
rights cases and seeks to ensure that justice is delivered timeously irrespective of 
status. The speedy resolution of cases will therefore result in the improvement of the 
judicial protection of human rights and thereby raise public confidence in the justice 
system.1153 
5.5.3.1.2 Respect for Judicial Office 
Section 165(2) of the Constitution stipulates that members of the judiciary must 
individually and collectively respect and honour their judicial office and must therefore 
enhance their independence in order to maintain public confidence in the judicial 
system.  Section 165(2) of the Constitution further enforces the preamble of the 
Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct of 2002 which  emphasises the importance of 
judges, individually and collectively, to honour and respect the judicial office as a public 
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The Standard ‗Lawyers Slam Delays in Electoral Petitions‘ January 14 2005. 
http://www.thestandard.co.zw/2005/01/14/lawyers-slam-delays-in-electoral-petitions/ (Accessed 10 March 
2013). 
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Although the Constitution empowers the courts to hear election disputes, it however does not provide 
a time limit for handling such cases. In contrast the Constitution of Uganda places great emphasis on the 
speedy resolution of cases. Article 140 states that ‗(1) Where any question is before the High Court for 
determination under Article 86(1), the High Court shall proceed to hear and determine the question 
expeditiously and may, for that purpose, suspend any other matter pending before it. (2) This article shall 
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See Baker v Carr (1962) 369 US 186 where Frankfurter J states that ‗The Court‘s authority… 
possessed of neither the purpose nor the sword…. ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its 
moral sanction. Such feeling must be nourished by the Court‘s complete detachment, in fact and in 
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trust and strive to enhance and maintain confidence in the judicial system.1154 It is 
therefore imperative that a judge must always bear in mind that it is his or her duty to 
observe high standards of conduct and should also participate in collectively 
establishing and maintaining the high standards of conduct.1155 Brennan CJ in 
emphasising the importance of maintaining high standards of conduct stated that: 
‗Your office requires you to serve, and that is a duty. No doubt there were a number of 
other reasons, personal and professional, for accepting appointment, but the judge will 
not succeed and will not find satisfaction in his or her duties unless there is continual 
realisation of the importance of the community service that is rendered.  Freedom, peace, 
order and good government- the essentials of the society we treasure- depend in the 
ultimate analysis on the faithful performance of judicial duty…Knowing this, you must 
have a high conceit of your office… What you say and what you do, in public and some 
extent, in private, will affect the public appreciation of your office and the respect which it 
commands…‘
1156
 
Since the judiciary plays a central role in preserving the principles of justice and the rule 
of law, the Constitution seeks to ensure therefore that judges individually and 
collectively respect and honour their judicial office. This will therefore ensure that the 
judiciary earns its rightful place in society and by so doing will also enhance public 
confidence in the justice system. It is therefore important that judges in Zimbabwe 
should uphold this provision and desist from any activity that will shame the profession. 
The responsibility for promoting and maintaining high standards of judicial conduct lies 
with the judiciary. In accordance with the principles of judicial independence and the 
separation of powers, it is important that a code of conduct formulated by the judiciary 
itself should be adopted in each jurisdiction.1157  Although a new code might need to be 
adopted to encapsulate the new principles in the Constitution, it should be noted that 
Zimbabwe currently has Judicial Service (Code of Ethics) Regulations1158 that also 
support the view that judges should individually and collectively uphold and maintain 
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certain values attached to the judicial office. The Judicial Service (Code of Ethics) 
Regulations state that: 
‗Every judicial officer shall, individually and collectively, uphold, maintain and promote the 
following values attaching to judicial office, as further elaborated in this Part- (a) personal 
and institutional independence; and (b) integrity; and (c) propriety, and the appearance of 
propriety; and (d) equality, that is, equal treatment of all before the courts; and (e) 
impartiality, not only in respect of particular decisions but in respect of the process by 
which any decision is made; and (f) competence and diligence.‘
1159
 
The Zimbabwe Judicial Service (Code of Ethics) Regulations seek to enforce the 
expectation of how judges are supposed to behave in and out of court as such 
standards of conduct are designed to maintain confidence in the justice system.1160  
5.5.3.1.3 Judicial Decisions Must be Made Freely 
Section 165(3) of the Constitution also demands that judges must make judicial 
decisions freely and without interference or undue influence. The Constitution makes a 
significant change, as compared to the Lancaster House Constitution, as it does not 
make provision for a member of the judiciary to be placed under the direction or control 
of another member of the judiciary as was the case under the Lancaster House 
Constitution.1161 As has been argued in Chapter 3, the placement of a member of the 
judiciary under the direction of another member is not acceptable as a judge must be 
independent of his or her colleagues on the bench except in cases of judicial 
supervision.1162 Section 165(3) of the Constitution is also in accordance with 
international norms with regards to the protection of the independence of the judiciary. 
International law demands that judges should be free to perform their judicial functions 
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Thomas JB Judicial Ethics in Australia (1988) 7. See also Principle 2.2 of the Bangalore Principles of 
Judicial Conduct 
1161
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independently.1163 This means that in performing their functions, judges should be free 
of direct or indirect influence or improper influence or pressures. Judges should 
therefore be in a position to make decisions based on the facts at hand and through the 
proper application of the law and render judgments without fear or favour.1164  
The inclusion of the above provision in the Constitution will augur well for the protection 
of human rights as since the FTLRP, the suspicion has been raised that judges have 
been subject to external influences and that this has influenced the lack of protection of 
human rights in the country especially in high profile cases dealing with political 
issues.1165 The confidence of the public in the current judiciary has been eroded as 
judicial decision making has been perceived to be subject to inappropriate outside 
influence. As a result of political interference with the functioning of the judiciary, the 
government has managed to control the judiciary by packing the bench with pliant 
judges who have in various decisions endorsed executive lawlessness, thus abrogating 
their role to promote and protect human rights.  
It is imperative that under the new constitutional order all three branches of government 
must recognise and respect the independence of the judiciary and judges must 
therefore be aware that they are not beholden to the government of the day.1166 
Therefore it is essential to judicial independence and to maintaining public confidence in 
the judicial system that the executive and the legislature and the judiciary do not create 
a perception that a judge‘s decision could be coloured by external influence. Judges 
have a duty to apply the law as they understand it, on the basis of their understanding of 
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Principle 2 of the United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary. See also 
Principle 8 of the United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary. 
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Geyh CG and Tassel EFV (1998) 34. 
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Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Resettlement v Commercial Farmers Union 2001 (2) ZLR 457 (S) 
where the judiciary under the leadership Chidyausiku CJ validated the land reform in the country 
overturning the decision delivered in the Commercial Farmers Union v Minister of Lands, Agriculture and 
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the facts, without fear or favour and without regard as to whether or not the final 
decision is likely to be popular. This point was articulated by the South African 
Constitutional Court in the S v Makwanyane case in the following terms: 
‗The question before us, however, is not what the majority of South Africans believe a 
proper sentence should be. It is whether the Constitution allows the sentence. Opinion 
may have some relevance to the inquiry, but itself, it is no substitute for the duty vested in 
the Courts to interpret the Constitution and to uphold its provisions without fear or favour. 
If public opinion were to be decisive, there would be no need for constitutional 
adjudication… The Court cannot allow itself to be diverted from its duty to act as the 
independent arbiter of the Constitution by making choices on the basis that they will find 
favour with the public.‘
1167
 
It is important that in the exercise of their duties judges must have no regard for whether 
the laws to be applied, or the litigants before the court, are popular or unpopular with the 
public, media, or government officials. In order to maintain and protect the 
independence of the judiciary, a judge should therefore not be swayed by partisan 
interests or fear of criticism. Adherence to this basic principle will contribute positively to 
the improvement of the judicial protection of human rights in Zimbabwe.  
In order to ensure that there is no external influence on the functioning of the courts, 
section 165(4) of the Constitution provides that: 
‗Members of the judiciary must not- (a) engage in political activities;
1168
 (b) hold office in 
or be members of any political organisation; (c) solicit funds for or contribute towards any 
political organisation;
1169
 or (d) attend political meetings.‘ 
This section seeks to ensure that judges remain non-partisan and to enhance the 
impartiality of individual judges.  
5.5.3.1.4 Judicial Impropriety 
Section 165(5) of the Constitution further provides that ―members of the judiciary must 
not solicit or accept any gift, bequest, loan or favour that may influence their judicial 
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conduct or give the appearance of judicial impropriety.‖ It should be noted that propriety 
and appearance of propriety, both professional and personal, are essential elements of 
a judge‘s life. The test for impropriety is therefore whether the conduct compromises the 
ability of the judge to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality, 
independence and competence, or whether it is likely to create, in the mind of a 
reasonable observer, a perception that the judge‘s ability to carry out judicial 
responsibilities in that manner is impaired. 1170  It is therefore essential that a judge 
should desist from any conduct that will cause his or her impartiality to be 
questioned.1171 
The barring of judges from participating in political activities is a positive step in securing 
the independence of the judiciary in Zimbabwe. This follows years of accusations that 
the judiciary in the country has been heavily politicised and partisan. In order to uphold 
the doctrine of separation of powers, judges should therefore not engage in any political 
activities and should stay out of reach of such activities that will lead to their impartiality 
being questioned. With regards to political activity, although members of a judge‘s 
family have every right to be politically active, a judge should be able to recognise that 
such activities of close family members may, even if erroneously, adversely affect public 
perception of a judge‘s impartiality.1172 Therefore, in cases before the court where such 
perception is raised, a judge should be able to recuse himself or herself from such a 
case.1173 
Such has been the misfortune that has befallen most of the members of the present 
judiciary who have meddled in the realm of politics, thus compromising their judicial 
duties. Due to the naivety shown by some members of the judiciary, the executive has 
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taken advantage of the situation to compromise the independence of the judiciary.1174 
As indicated earlier, for their loyalty to the ruling party, seductive gifts have been made 
to members of the judiciary, with the executive and the Reserve Bank splashing out on 
lavish gifts, ranging from computers to plasma television sets, and satellite dishes, in 
order to ensure that judges remain loyal to the ruling party.1175 In order to ensure the 
loyalty of the judiciary, judges have also been beneficiaries of the controversial FTLRP, 
with the executive handing out farms to individual judges across the country.1176 The 
Constitution therefore seeks to remedy these past events by clearly disallowing such 
conduct and seeks to ensure that there will be no repeat in the future of such events in 
Zimbabwe, and thus entrenches the protection of the independence of the judiciary as 
essential to the improvement of the protection and promotion of human rights.  
In conformity with Article 6.1 of the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct1177, section 
165(6) of the Constitution seeks to ensure that members of the judiciary must give their 
judicial duties precedence over all other activities, and must not engage in any activities 
which interfere with or compromise their judicial duties. This provision in the Constitution 
seeks to emphasise that the primary duty of a judge is to hear and determine cases 
requiring the interpretation and application of law, and other tasks relevant to the judicial 
office or the court‘s operation.1178 It is important that a member of the judiciary should 
not undertake any other duties unless they will not interfere with the separation of 
powers doctrine. The carrying out of extra-judicial duties should be done in a manner 
that will not reduce the capacity of a judge to discharge the judicial office.  
5.5.3.1.5 Judicial Training 
Section 165(7) of the Constitution seeks to urge members of the judiciary to keep 
themselves abreast of developments in domestic and international law. The section 
states that: 
                                                          
1174
International Bar Association (2011) 11. 
1175
Human Rights Watch (2008) 16. 
1176
Gubbay A (2009) 2. 
1177
Principle 6.1 states that ‗the judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all other activities.‘ 
1178
Other judicial duties include administrative and out of court activities. Judges have important 
responsibilities such as case management and pre-trial conferences and such duties should also be 
undertaken with diligence.  
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‗Members of the judiciary must take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their 
professional knowledge, skills and personal qualities, and in particular must keep 
themselves abreast of developments in domestic and international law‘
1179
 
This provision is drafted with great influence from the Bangalore Principles for Judicial 
Conduct which also demand that judges must take reasonable steps to maintain and 
enhance their knowledge.1180 This can be done through in-service training 
programmes.1181 It should be noted that the duty to provide constant training to the 
judges lies with the judiciary itself and it should assume responsibility for organising and 
supervising judicial training.1182 With the increased relevance of international law, it has 
become imperative that judges should now keep abreast of international norms and 
exercise their judicial powers not only in accordance with domestic law but also in 
accordance with international law to the extent permitted by the domestic law.1183  It is 
imperative that constant in-house sessions should always be provided for judges in 
order for them to keep up to date with international human rights norms and how such 
laws can be applied domestically to ensure the adequate protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. 
Adequate knowledge of international law will bring about the realisation of the 
importance of human rights protection. It is submitted that attendance at international 
conferences and seminars on human rights with other judges from around the world will 
also bode well for the judicial protection of human rights in the country. Such 
conferences would ensure that judges share vital information regarding the steps that 
members of the judiciary must take in protecting human rights. Liaising with members 
from different jurisdictions is also a step which should be taken by the Zimbabwean 
judiciary in its quest to protect human rights. The South African judiciary would be a 
good starting point for the establishment of close ties in which ideas and challenges in 
the protection of human rights can be shared.1184 Such exposure is indeed urgently 
                                                          
1179
Section 165(7) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
1180
Principles 6.3 and 6.4 of the Bangalore Principles for Judicial Conduct. 
1181
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2007)134.  
1182
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2007) 134. 
1183
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2007) 135. 
1184
This suggestion is made considering the close proximity of the two countries and the positive trend 
that has been set by the South African judiciary in human rights promotion and protection.  
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required in Zimbabwe and it would be a positive step in ensuring that the judiciary is 
aware of the importance of human rights protection. 
5.5.3.2 Features Determining Extent of Independence of the Judiciary of 
Zimbabwe 
Madhuku has noted that there are a number of features which determine the extent of 
the independence of the judiciary. He notes that these features include the method of 
appointment of judges, the removal of judges from office, and the question of salaries 
payable to judges.1185 Thus the following discussion analyses the extent to which such 
features are protected under the Constitution of Zimbabwe.   
5.5.3.2.1 Appointment of Judges under Constitution of Zimbabwe 
As has been discussed in Chapter 2 of this research, in order to guarantee the 
independence and impartiality of the judiciary, international law requires States to 
appoint judges through a strict selection process and in a transparent manner.1186  
Although international law does not provide a specific method with regards to the 
appointment of judges, it is important that judges should be appointed and promoted on 
the basis of their legal skills, professional qualifications and integrity.1187 Clear selection 
criteria based on merit should be stipulated in the constitution of the concerned State as 
this is essential to protecting the independence of the judiciary. Although international 
law does not indicate a specific procedure with regards to the appointment of judges, 
there exist other international instruments which contain certain requirements that 
should be taken into account with regards to the appointment of judges. The Principles 
                                                          
1185
Madhuku L (2002) 232. 
1186
See Principle 10 of United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary; See also 
Article 9 of the Universal Charter of the Judge; Principle A, paragraph 4 (i) and (k) of the Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa. 
1187
The Human Rights Committee has over the years repeatedly referred to the criteria under which 
judges are appointed and has established that judges should be appointed for their professional skills. 
See Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee on Bolivia, UN document 
CCPR/C/79/Add.74, para. 34. See also the Concluding Observations on Lebanon, UN document 
CCPR/C/79/Add.78, para. 15; See also Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee on 
Azerbaijan, UN document CCPR/CO/73/AZE, para. 14; See also Concluding Observations of the Human 
Rights Committee on Sudan, UN document CCPR/C/79/Add.85, para. 21; See also Concluding 
Observations of the Human Rights Committee on Slovakia, UN document CCPR/C/79/Add.79, para. 18. 
 
 
 
 
253 
 
and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa advocate an 
independent body to be entrusted with selecting judicial officers, but also allow for other 
bodies, including other branches of power, to perform the function of appointing judges 
as long as they safeguard the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. 1188 
5.5.3.2.1.1 Minimum Qualifications 
As in the Lancaster House Constitution1189, the Constitution of Zimbabwe contains a 
number of requirements regarding the qualifications that a judge should have in order to 
be appointed to any of the courts established under the Constitution.1190 Madhuku notes 
that the setting of minimum qualifications for appointment is done in order to restrict the 
degree of manoeuvre by individuals that are empowered to make judicial appointments, 
and thus contributes to the independence of the judiciary.1191 The inclusion of these 
minimum requirements reduces the risk of political appointments and is an important 
aspect of provisions guaranteeing an independent judiciary.1192  
The entrenchment of the minimum qualifications for judicial appointment also ensures 
that judicial appointments are made on merit as envisaged by the Latimer House 
Guidelines. The Latimer House Guidelines identify the appointment of judges on merit 
as one of the key ways of preserving judicial independence.1193 As a result a number of 
African countries have adopted the same measures in order to preserve the 
independence of the judiciary.1194  
                                                          
1188
Principle A, paragraph 4 (h) of the Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal 
Assistance in Africa. See also Principles 13-17 of the Beijing Principles and Principle II.1 of the Latimer 
House Guidelines. 
1189
See section 82 of the Lancaster House Constitution.  
1190
See section 177 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe for qualifications for judges of the Constitutional 
Court; section 178 of the Constitution for qualifications for judges of the Supreme Court; section 179 for 
qualifications for judges of the High Court, Labour Court and the Administrative Court  
1191
Madhuku L (2002) 241. 
1192
Madhuku L (2002) 241. 
1193
See Guideline 3 of Latimer House Guidelines on Judicial Conduct.  
1194
Article 143(1)(a) of the Constitution of Uganda states that a person can only be appointed Chief 
Justice if he or she has served as a judge of the Supreme Court of Uganda or a court having similar 
jurisdiction, or he or she has practiced law as an advocate for a minimum period of 20 years. Article 
143(1)(e) of the Constitution of Uganda provides that for one to qualify as a judge of the High Court in 
Uganda, one must have practiced for a minimum of 10 years as an advocate. Section 112(1) of the 
Constitution of Malawi provides that the minimum number of years of having practised as a lawyer in 
order to qualify for judicial appointment is ten years. Article 139(4) of the Constitution of Ghana also 
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The Constitution lays down the requirements that are needed for one to be appointed a 
judge in the various courts. These requirements are necessary in order to ensure that 
individuals that are appointed to the bench are best qualified for the job, have the 
necessary experience and qualifications and are fit and proper to hold judicial office. 
This is therefore in accordance with a number of international instruments1195 and the 
law of other foreign jurisdictions1196 that seek to ensure that fit and proper individuals 
are appointed as members of the judiciary. It should be noted that other imperatives 
stated in the Constitution, such as, gender and racial representativeness of members of 
the judiciary1197, can also be reflected in legislation that will act as a possible guide in 
the appointment of judges. 
5.5.3.2.1.2 Appointment Process of Judges 
The appointment of judges is one of the most important factors in guaranteeing the 
independence of the judiciary. In order to ensure that the independence of the judiciary 
is protected the appointment process should not be left entirely in the hands of 
politicians as this will result in judges being appointed on the basis of political 
allegiance. Since politicians are unavoidable in the appointment process, in order for the 
appointment process to be legitimate, it is important that the judicial authority must be 
derived from the people, and thus appointments should be made by an elected organ of 
state. As a result in a number of jurisdictions the head of the executive (President or 
Prime Minister) has a critical say in the appointment of judges. However, the only 
differences that might arise in a number of jurisdictions is the degree of involvement and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
provides that the minimum number of years of having practised as a lawyer in order to qualify for judicial 
appointment is ten. In South Africa and Namibia, there are no prescribed minimum requirements and 
such can be attributed to the focus in both countries on promoting the advancement of formerly 
disadvantaged groups. However, section 174(1) of the Constitution of South Africa does recognise that 
the need for the appointment of an appropriately qualified individuals. 
1195
See Principle 10 United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary which state 
that a person selected for judicial office should be appropriately trained, and have integrity and 
demonstrable ability.  
1196
See section 174(1) of the Constitution of South Africa which states that ‗Any appropriately qualified 
woman or man who is fit and proper person may be appointed as a judicial officer. Any person to be 
appointed to the Constitutional Court must also be a South African citizen.‘ See also Article 143 of the 
Constitution of Uganda.  
1197
Section 184 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
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the extent to which the decision of the Head of State is subject to confirmation by the 
legislature or another body.1198 
The appointment of members of the judiciary has been a topical issue in Zimbabwe over 
the years. Criticism has been levelled at the Lancaster House Constitution and its weak 
provisions on the composition of the JSC, and this has led to the perception that there 
was lack of independence and impartiality in the appointment process. This was further 
compounded by the fact that the President was entitled to proceed with the appointment 
of a member of the judiciary regardless of the advice received from the JSC.1199 Thus, 
in an effort to improve the appointment process of judges in the country, section 180 of 
the Constitution states that: 
‗(1) The Chief justice, the Deputy Chief Justice, the Judge President of the High Court 
and all other judges are appointed by the President in accordance with this section. (2) 
Whenever it is necessary to appoint a judge, the Judicial Service Commission must- (a) 
advertise the position; (b) invite the President and the public to make nominations; (c) 
conduct public interviews of prospective candidates; (d) prepare a list of three qualified 
persons as nominees for the office; and (e) submit the list to the President; whereupon, 
subject to subsection (3), the President must appoint one of the nominees to the office 
concerned. (3) If the President considers that none of the persons on the list submitted to 
him in terms of subsection (2) are suitable for appointment to the office, he or she must 
require the Judicial Service Commission to submit a further list of three qualified persons, 
whereupon the President must appoint one of the nominees to the office concerned. (4) 
The President must cause notice of every appointment under this section to be 
published.‘ 
The analysis of the appointment process under the Constitution shall be conducted after 
a brief analysis of the role and composition of the Judicial Service Commission 
established under the Constitution. The analysis of the Judicial Service Commission is 
dealt with below: 
 
 
                                                          
1198
Madhuku L (2002) 234. 
1199
See section 84(1) of the Lancaster House Constitution. 
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5.5.3.2.1.3 Judicial Service Commission (JSC) 
The extent to which the appointment of judges is free from political manipulation is 
dependent on the independence of the Judicial Service Commission.1200 It is therefore 
important that the Judicial Service Commission must be independent to ensure that 
there is fairness and transparency in the appointment process. Thus, in this regard the 
Constitution creates a Judicial  
Service Commission (JSC)1201 which also plays a role in the appointment of judges.1202 
The Composition of the JSC is as follows:  
‗(1) There is a Judicial Service Commission consisting of- (a) the Chief Justice; (b) the 
Deputy Chief Justice; (c) the Judge President of the High Court; (d) one judge nominated 
by the judges of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, the High Court, the Labour 
Court and the Administrative Court; (e) the Attorney-General; (f) the Chief Magistrate; (g) 
the chairperson of the Civil Service Commission; (h) three practising legal practitioners of 
at least seven years‘ experience designated by the association, constituted under an Act 
of Parliament, which represents legal practitioners in Zimbabwe; (i) one professor or 
senior lecturer of law designated by an association representing the majority of the 
teachers of law at Zimbabwean universities or, in the absence of such association, 
appointed by the President; (j) one person who for at least seven years has practiced in 
Zimbabwe as a public accountant or auditor, and who is designated by an association, 
constituted under an Act of Parliament, which represents such persons; and (k) one 
person with at least seven years‘ experience in human resources management, 
appointed by the President.‘ 
 
                                                          
1200
Madhuku L (2002) 238. 
1201
Section 190 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe deals with the functions of the JSC which are: ‗(1) The 
Judicial Service Commission may tender advice to the Government on any matter relating to the judiciary 
or the administration of justice, and the Government must pay due regard to any such advice. (2) The 
Judicial Service Commission must promote and facilitate the independence and accountability of the 
judiciary and the efficient and transparent administration of justice in Zimbabwe, and has all the powers 
needed for this purpose. (3) The Judicial Service Commission with the approval of the Minister 
responsible for justice, may make regulations for any purpose set out in this section. (4) An Act of 
Parliament may confer on the Judicial Service Commission functions in connection with the employment, 
discipline and conditions of service of persons employed in the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, 
the High Court, the Labour Court, the Administrative Court and other courts.‘ 
1202
Section 189 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
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The JSC under the Constitution consists of thirteen members, which is a significant 
improvement on the one under the Lancaster House Constitution. It is clear from the 
composition of the JSC that the President‘s influence over the appointment of the JSC 
has been reduced compared to the Lancaster House Constitution.  Although some 
members sit on the Commission by virtue of being appointed to office by the President, 
considerable efforts have been made to ensure that there is independent representation 
on the Commission. Such independent representation will therefore ensure that 
appointments to the judiciary are made impartially and without any political 
considerations. Perhaps to further strengthen the independent representation on the 
JSC, the inclusion of members of civil society and members of Parliament from the 
different political parties on the JSC would also have enhanced the independence of the 
Commission.1203 
Section 191 of the Constitution mandates the JSC to conduct its business in a just and 
transparent manner. This provision seeks to ensure that the JSC maintains fairness and 
transparency in its work so as to avoid any political manipulation. With the efforts made 
to secure the independence of the JSC, the body will thus act as a watchdog to conduct 
checks and balances in respect of the President and ensure that judicial appointments 
are made on merit without any undue political influence. The Constitution has made a 
significant contribution in realising the importance of an independent Commission in 
judicial appointments. The maintenance of an independent JSC will bode well in 
seeking to address past problems about the lack of impartiality in the appointment 
process.  
 
 
                                                          
1203
The South African example in this case could have been followed as provided in section 178(1)(h) of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa which states that ‗There is a Judicial Service Commission 
consisting of- six persons designated by the National Assembly from among its members, at least three of 
whom must be members of the opposition parties represented in the Assembly.‘ See also Article 153 of 
the Constitution of Ghana which provides for a Commission of 18 members which include amongst other 
members four non-lawyers appointed by the President, a Chief and the editor of the Ghana law Reports. 
The influence of the President is severely curtailed as the majority of the members of the Commission 
gain membership independent of his or her influence.  
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5.5.3.2.1.4 Analysis of the Appointment of Judges 
In accordance with section 180 of the Constitution, the President is mandated with the 
appointment of judges, but is, however, bound by the advice of the JSC.1204 This marks 
a clear departure from the Lancaster House Constitution where the President was not 
bound by the advice of the JSC in judicial appointments. In order to ensure impartiality 
and fairness in the appointment process, the Constitution of Zimbabwe, unlike the 
Lancaster House Constitution, lays down a number of guidelines that need to be 
followed before an individual can be appointed as a judge. The guidelines stipulated in 
the Constitution will be discussed below. 
5.5.3.2.1.5 Advertisement of Judicial Vacancies 
In seeking to improve judicial appointments, the Constitution stipulates that the JSC 
must advertise any vacancy within the judiciary and invite applications to the post and 
also invite the President and the public to make nominations.1205 The advertisement of 
vacancies is a commendable inclusion in the appointment process and seeks to ensure 
that suitable qualified individuals are appointed to the bench.1206 It is also a welcome 
change from the past, as previously there was never any advertisement of judicial 
vacancies.1207 Over the years judicial appointments were made without any such 
advertisements, resulting in questions being asked about the credibility of the 
appointment process. 1208 Advertisements will therefore aid in the appointment of well 
qualified and fit individuals to the judiciary and increase openness, transparency and 
scrutiny with respect to potential choices. It is submitted that such advertisements will 
therefore increase the professionalism of the judiciary.  
                                                          
1204
See section 180 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
1205
See section 180(2)(a) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
1206
Such advertisement is in line with international law. See the Commonwealth (Latimer House) 
Principles on the Three branches of Government which require judicial vacancies to be advertised. See 
also Principle 12.3 of the Measures for the Effective Implementation of the Bangalore Principles of 
Judicial Conduct, Adopted by the Judicial Integrity Group at its Meeting in Lusaka, Zambia 2010.    
http://www.summitofhighcourts.com/docs/standarts/UN2.pdf (Accessed 20 April 2013). 
1207
Zimbabwe Independent ‗Mugabe Judges Appointments Stink‘ 19 July 2013. 
http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2013/07/19/mugabe-judges-appointments-stink/ (Accessed 23 
September 2013). 
1208
Zimbabwe Independent ‗Mugabe Judges Appointments Stink‘ 19 July 2013. 
http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2013/07/19/mugabe-judges-appointments-stink/ (Accessed 23 
September 2013). 
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5.5.3.2.1.6 President and Public Nominations 
The Constitution gives the President and members of the public the opportunity to 
nominate potential candidates to be appointed as judges.1209 Such nominations are 
made after the advertisement of judicial vacancies. It is submitted that the public‘s 
involvement in the nomination process marks an improvement on the Lancaster House 
Constitution as it did not provide for the involvement of the public in the appointment 
process. The public‘s involvement in the judicial appointment process is therefore 
crucial for the legitimacy and professionalisation of the appointment process. However, 
despite such positive changes being introduced, the Constitution contains a more 
alarming provision that allows the President to make nominations for any judicial 
vacancy in the country.1210 Since the Constitution gives the President the final authority 
in the appointment of judges, it is alarming that the President should also be given the 
power to nominate any individual for judicial appointment.  
It is submitted that this provision grants the President enormous powers in the 
appointment process. The President as a result might refuse to make an appointment if 
any of his or her nominations to the bench are not presented to him for appointment by 
the JSC. Such a scenario where the President is allowed to nominate individuals could 
result in the JSC being forced to forward certain names that would have been 
nominated by the President. Such a provision is therefore dangerous for the 
independence of the judiciary and is subject to abuse by the President in the case 
where his preferred choices are not forwarded for appointment. It also defeats the whole 
purpose of calling for members of the public to make nominations as their views might 
not make any significant contribution to the appointment process.  It is therefore difficult 
to dispel the suspicion that this provision was included to give the President indirect 
supreme powers over the JSC.  
 
 
                                                          
1209
See section 180(2)(b) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
1210
Section 180(2)(b) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
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5.5.3.2.1.7 Public Interviews 
The Constitution also provides that the JSC should conduct public interviews1211 of 
prospective candidates from which a list of three qualified and recommended persons 
must be prepared and submitted to the President1212, and from which appointments 
have to be made.1213 However, the President is not obliged to appoint any of the three 
nominees on the initial list submitted by the JSC and in such cases the President must 
require the JSC to submit a further list of three qualified persons, whereupon the 
President must appoint one of the nominees.1214 However, this provision does not state 
the process through which the second list is to be obtained (in comparison to the first list 
where nominations are called for) and as to whether such individuals are also subject to 
any public interviews. This therefore raises great suspicion that the appointment 
process might be subjected to manipulation. This is so because names on the second 
list can be handpicked and thus result in the appointment of pliant judges to the bench. 
Thus, this provision also alarmingly gives the President considerable power in the 
appointment of judges and there is great danger that the selection of judges might be 
further politicised. There is need to review this provision to ensure that impartiality in the 
appointment process is observed.  
Despite some concerns with the appointment process, efforts to ensure that there is 
transparency in the appointment process must be commended. They mark a departure 
from the past and the cumbersome appointment process procedures seek to ensure 
that there is a series of quality control mechanisms which will review the proposed 
appointees‘ suitability, qualifications and skill to ensure progressive jurisprudence.1215 In 
order to further strengthen the impartiality of the appointment process, it is 
recommended that the JSC adopts clear standards for assessing the suitability and 
competence of candidates. Such standards must be published so that the public is 
aware of the standards used to assess judges. Public awareness will no doubt lead to 
                                                          
1211
Section 180(2)(c) of the Constitution. 
1212
See section 180(2)(d) of the Constitution. 
1213
See section 180(2)(d) of the Constitution. 
1214
See section 180(3) of the Constitution.  
1215
Zimbabwe Independent ‗Mugabe Judges Appointments Stink‘ 19 July 2013. 
http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2013/07/19/mugabe-judges-appointments-stink/  
(Accessed 23 September 2013). 
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confidence in the justice system as members of the public would be aware that fit, 
proper and well qualified individuals are appointed as judges.  
5.5.3.2.1.8 Appointment of Acting Judicial Officials under the Constitution  
The practice of appointing acting judges has over the years raised international 
controversy. This is so because such appointments have been deemed to be contrary 
to sound legal policy and the independence of the judiciary as a result of their insecure 
tenure.1216 Security of tenure is key to the independence of the judiciary and if judges 
are appointed for a fixed term, there is the danger that they will be seen as attempting to 
please the individuals that have appointed them in order to obtain re-appointment for 
another term. Another bone of contention about such appointments is the fact that their 
duration are matters within the gift of the executive.1217 In order to secure the 
independence of acting judges, the Mount Scopus Revised International Standards of 
Judicial Independence1218 stipulate that the institution of temporary judges should be 
avoided as far as possible except where there exists a long historical democratic 
tradition1219, and that acting judges should be appointed only with proper safeguards 
secured by law.1220  
The controversy associated with the appointment of acting judges has been well 
articulated in the case of Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: in re 
Certification of the Constitution of the republic of South Africa 1996 (First Certification 
Judgment)1221 where objections were raised with regards to the appointment of acting 
judges in the country.1222 The objections to the provision related to the fact that the 
                                                          
1216
General Council of the Bar of South Africa Appointment of Public Servants as Judges (2008) 12. 
http://www.sabar.co.za/law-journals/2010/august/2010-august-vol023-no2-pp11-12.pdf (Accessed 21 
March 2013). 
1217
General Council of the Bar of South Africa (2008) 12. 
1218
International Association of Judicial Independence and World peace International Project of Judicial 
Independence, Mount Scopus Approved Revised International Standards of Judicial Independence, 
Approved March 19, 2008. http://www.jiwp.org/#!mt-scopus-standards/c14de (Accessed 13 April 2013). 
1219
Principle 4.7 of the Mount Scopus Approved Revised International Standards of Judicial 
Independence.  
1220
Principle 4.8 of the Mount Scopus Approved Revised International Standards of Judicial 
Independence. 
1221
1996 (4) SA 744 (CC). 
1222
Section 175 of the Constitution of South Africa states that ‗(1) the President may appoint a woman or 
man to be an acting judge of the Constitutional Court if there is a vacancy or if a judge is absent. The 
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Minister of Justice effectively had a sole discretion to make the appointments of all 
acting judges save for the appointment of acting judges to the Constitutional Court. 
Such discretion therefore was said to compromise the principle of separation of powers. 
However, in its ruling the Constitutional Court acknowledged the merit of the objections 
but stated that there were sufficient safeguards to ensure that section 175(2) did not 
become the vehicle for an abuse of power. The Constitutional Court stated that the 
majority of the temporary positions needed to be filled ―urgently and unexpectedly‖ and 
as such it would not be practicable to convene the large body of the JSC.1223 The Court 
also noted that the Minister was precluded by section 165 of the Constitution from 
interfering in any way with the discharge by an acting judge of his or her duties.1224  In 
line with international law acting judicial appointments should be made only with proper 
safeguards secured by law so as not to compromise the independence of the 
judiciary.1225 
The Constitution in section 181 provides for acting judicial appointments. It states that: 
‗(1) if the office of the Chief Justice is vacant or if the office-holder is unable to perform 
the functions of the office, the Deputy Chief Justice acts in his or her place, but if both 
offices are vacant or both office-holders are unable to perform their functions, the next 
most senior judge of the Constitutional Court acts as Chief Justice. (2) (a) If the office of 
President of the High Court; (b) Judge President of the Labour Court; or (c) Judge 
President of the Administrative Court; is vacant or if the office-holder is unable to perform 
the functions of that office, the next most senior judge of the court concerned acts as 
Judge President. (3) If the services of an additional judge of the High Court, the Labour 
Court or the Administrative Court are required for a limited period the President, acting on 
the advice of the Judicial Service Commission, may appoint a former judge to act in that 
office for not more than twelve months, which period may be renewed for one further 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
appointment must be on the recommendation of the Cabinet member responsible for the administration of 
justice acting with the concurrence of the Chief Justice. (2) The Cabinet member responsible for the 
administration of justice must appoint acting judges to other courts after consulting the senior judge of the 
court on which the acting judge will serve.‘ 
1223
Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996 (First Certification Judgment) 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) para.129. 
1224
Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996 (First Certification Judgment) 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) para.130. 
1225
See Principle II.1 of the Latimer House Guidelines on the Three Branches of Government which states 
that ‗judicial appointments should normally be permanent; whilst in some jurisdictions, contract 
appointments may be inevitable, such appointments should be subject to appropriate security of tenure.‘ 
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period of twelve months. (4) Persons appointed to act under subsection (3) may continue 
to sit as judges after their appointments have expired, for the purpose of dealing with any 
proceedings commenced before them while they were so acting.‘ 
The above section clearly provides the procedure to be followed when acting judicial 
appointments are made. With regards to the appointment of acting judges in the High 
Court, Labour Court and the Administrative Court, the President is bound by the advice 
of the JSC in order to ensure that there are no unilateral appointments. This section 
also marks an improvement on the Lancaster House Constitution where the President 
was not bound by the advice of the JSC in the appointment of acting judges.1226 
With regards to the appointment of acting judges to the Constitutional Court1227 and the 
Supreme Court1228, the Constitution provides that such appointments should be made 
by the Chief Justice. The Constitution is however silent on whether the Chief Justice 
has to consult the JSC in appointing acting judges of the Constitutional Court and the 
Supreme Court. It should be noted that as head of the judiciary it is appropriate that the 
Chief Justice should make such appointments. However, the unilateral appointment of 
acting judges of the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court by the Chief Justice is of 
great concern and raises great questions about impartiality in such appointments. The 
Constitution in this instance therefore also provides for a weak constitutional protection 
                                                          
1226
See section 85 of the Lancaster House Constitution stated that ‗(1) if the offices of the Chief Justice 
and Deputy Chief Justice are vacant or the Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief Justice are for any reason 
unable to perform the functions of their offices, the President may after consulting the Judicial Service 
Commission, appoint some person holding the office of judge of the Supreme Court or Judge President of 
the High Court to act as Chief Justice. (2) If the office of a judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court 
other than the Chief Justice is vacant or such judge is appointed to act in some other judicial capacity or 
is for any reason unable to perform the functions of his office, or if the services of an additional judge of 
the High Court are required for a limited period, the President may, as the case requires and after 
consultation with the Judicial Services Commission, appoint some person qualified for appointment as a 
judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court to act in that office. (3)  A person appointed to act under 
subsection (2)- (a) shall, subject to the provisions of section 87, continue to act for that period of his 
appointment or, if no such period is specified, until his appointment is revoked by the President, after 
consultation with the Judicial Services Commission; and (b) may, notwithstanding that the period of his 
appointment has expired or that his appointment has been revoked, sit as a judge for the purpose of 
giving judgment or otherwise in relation to any proceedings commenced before or heard by him while he 
was so acting.‘ 
1227
Section 166(2) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe states that ‗If the services of an acting judge are 
required on the Constitutional Court for a limited period, the Chief Justice may appoint a judge or a former 
judge to act as a judge of the Constitutional Court for that period.‘ 
1228
Section 168(2) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe states that ‗If the services of an acting judge are 
required on the Supreme Court for a limited period, the Chief Justice may appoint a judge of the High 
Court, or a former judge to act as a judge of the Supreme Court for that period.‘ 
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of the appointment of acting judges. As a result of the loophole there is the possibility 
that the Chief Justice might be tempted to make appointments recommended by the 
executive.  
In order to ensure that acting judges of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court 
are appointed impartially without any hint of political interference it is ideal that the JSC 
should be able to deal with the appointments of acting judges.1229 It also would have 
been plausible for the JSC to make all acting judicial appointments. This is a good 
procedure adopted in Uganda, where the JSC appoints acting judges.1230 This would 
ensure that impartiality is observed in the appointment of acting judges. The inclusion of 
the above measures in the Constitution would have gone a long way in securing the 
independence of the judiciary.  
5.5.3.2.1.9 Appointment of Magistrates and other Judicial Officers  
Before the introduction of the Judicial Service Act1231, Magistrates in the country were 
considered to be civil servants as they were employed by the Public Service 
Commission. As civil servants their conditions of service were fixed by the Public 
Service Commission and as such lacked the basic protection of the independence of 
the judiciary afforded to members of the Supreme Court, High Court and other special 
courts. However, in seeking to improve the independence of the magistracy from the 
control and influence of the executive, the Judicial Service Act now stipulates that 
Magistrates are appointed and administered by the JSC.  Section 182 of the 
Constitution stipulates that: 
‗An Act of Parliament must provide for the appointment of magistrates and other judicial 
officers other than judges, but- (a) magistrates must be appointed by the Judicial Service 
Commission; (b) judicial officers other than magistrates or judges must be appointed with 
                                                          
1229
See the example of Uganda in Article 148 of the Constitution of Uganda states that ‗subject to the 
provisions of this Constitution, the Judicial Service Commission may appoint persons to hold or act in any 
judicial office other than the offices specified in Article 147 (3) of this Constitution and confirm 
appointments in and exercise disciplinary control over persons holding or acting in such offices and 
remove such persons from office.‘ 
1230
Article 148 of the Constitution of Uganda. 
1231
10 of 2006. 
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the approval of the Judicial Service Commission; (c) all such appointments must be made 
transparently and without fear, favour, prejudice or bias.‘ 
The Constitution clearly stipulates that Magistrates must be appointed by the JSC. Such 
provision seeks to protect the independence of the magistracy and ensure that 
magistrates are not appointed according to political considerations. In order to ensure 
that the independence of magistrates is protected in Zimbabwe it is essential that the 
JSC itself should be independent. The JSC should ensure that appointments are free 
from any external influences and that well-qualified and fit and proper individuals who 
will uphold the judicial oath are appointed as magistrates. 
5.5.3.2.2 Removal of Judges from Office 
It should be noted that the removal conditions of judges are important in securing the 
independence of the judiciary. Madhuku notes that if a judge can be easily removed 
from office, it matters very little that the appointment process is rigorous and free from 
political manipulation.1232 International standards have been put into place to preserve 
the independence of the judiciary and place emphasis on the improper removal of 
judges from office.1233 It is therefore crucial that a judge in the case of inability to 
perform judicial duties or serious misconduct must be removed from office by an 
independent and impartial tribunal. 
The Lancaster House Constitution provided for the removal of a judge only for inability 
to discharge the functions of his or her office and for misbehaviour.1234 However, the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe, unlike the Lancaster House one, provides for broad and clear 
reasons that may result in a judge‘s removal from office. Thus, according to the 
Constitution reasons for removal of a judge from office include the inability to perform 
judicial functions, gross incompetence and gross misconduct.1235 The Constitution also 
                                                          
1232
Madhuku L (2010) 96. 
1233
See Guideline IV of the Latimer House Principles on the Three Branches of Government.  
1234
Section 87(1) of the Lancaster House Constitution. It should also be noted that misbehaviour was not 
defined under the Lancaster House Constitution but could be taken to mean misbehaviour in matters 
concerning the office of judge and would include a conviction for an offence that would render the person 
unfit to carry out judicial functions.  
1235
Section 187(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
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stipulates the procedure that must be followed if the possibility of the removal of a judge 
is raised. Section 187 of the Constitution states that: 
‗(2) If the President considers that the question of removing the Chief Justice from office 
ought to be investigated, the President must appoint a tribunal to inquire into the matter; 
(3) If the Judicial Service Commission advises the President that the question of 
removing any judge, including the Chief Justice, from office ought to be investigated, the 
President must appoint a tribunal to inquire into the matter. (4) A tribunal appointed under 
this section must consist of at least three members appointed by the President, of whom- 
(a) at least one must be a person who (i) has served as a judge of the Supreme Court or 
High Court in Zimbabwe; or (ii) holds or has held office as a judge of a court with 
unlimited jurisdiction in civil or criminal matters in a country whose common law is 
Roman-Dutch or English, and English is an officially recognised language…‘ 
The Constitution retains the removal conditions of the Chief Justice under the Lancaster 
House Constitution.1236 Similar to the Lancaster House Constitution, section 187(2) of 
the Constitution empowers the President to initiate removal proceeding against the 
Chief Justice. If such a possibility is raised by the President, the President is mandated 
to appoint a tribunal to enquire into the removal from office of the Chief Justice. Further, 
section 187(3) gives the JSC the power to advise the President on the issue of the 
removal of any judges, including the Chief Justice. If such issue is raised by the JSC, 
the President is mandated to appoint a tribunal to look into the matter.  
Although the Constitution does provide some authority to the JSC with regards to the 
removal process of judges in the country, it however makes the President powerful with 
regards to the removal of judges. The President has the power to appoint a tribunal if a 
question arises with regards to the removal of the Chief Justice and also if the JSC 
advises the President that the removal of a judge, including the Chief Justice, ought to 
be investigated. The involvement of the President in the removal process of judges is 
therefore unacceptable as it is possible that a judge may be removed from office purely 
on political grounds. The fact that the President has the power to unilaterally appoint 
members of the tribunal raises suspicion about the independence of such tribunal. 
                                                          
1236
See section 87(2) of the Lancaster House Constitution of Zimbabwe which stated that ‗If the President 
considers that the question of the removal from office of the Chief Justice ought to be investigated, the 
President shall appoint a tribunal to inquire into the matter.‘ 
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Since the President is bound by the tribunal‘s findings1237, it is possible that a tribunal 
might be appointed with a specific motive to remove a judge that might be viewed as 
―independent‖ by the executive. This is likely to have a direct impact on the 
independence of the judiciary and violates the separation of powers doctrine.  
It is therefore crucial that in order to secure the independence of the judiciary, the JSC 
should have a central role in the removal of judges. The JSC must be given the sole 
power to initiate the process for the removal of a judge and also to establish a tribunal if 
a question arises with regards to the removal of a judge. Such process would ensure 
that the tribunal appointed is independent and hence as a result the tribunal will be 
impartial in its findings as the JSC will have the right to recommend to the President as 
to whether a judge can be removed from office. The Constitution could have been 
informed by a number of jurisdictions in Africa where the JSC is given the sole power to 
initiate the investigation if a question arises as whether a judge ought to be removed 
from office and also to recommend action to the President.  
Article 84 of the Constitution of Namibia restricts the grounds for the removal of a judge 
to mental incapacity and gross misconduct.1238 Only the JSC is empowered to initiate 
the investigation and to recommend to the President. The President as a result can only 
act on the recommendations of the JSC and even with respect to the office of the Chief 
Justice the President cannot initiate removal proceedings.1239 In South Africa two stages 
are established for the removal of a judge. The Judicial Service Commission must make 
a finding whether a judge suffers from incapacity, is grossly incompetent or is guilty of 
gross misconduct.1240 The National Assembly can also call for a judge to be removed by 
                                                          
1237
Section 187 of the Constitution states that ‗(7) A Tribunal appointed under subsection (2) or (3) must 
inquire into the question of removing the judge concerned from office and, having done so, must report its 
findings to the President and recommend whether or not the judge should be removed from office. (8) 
The President must act in accordance with the tribunal‘s recommendations in terms of subsection (7).‘ 
1238
Article 84(2) of the Constitution of Namibia states that ‗judges may only be removed from office on the 
ground of mental incapacity or gross misconduct, and in accordance with provisions of Sub-Article (3) 
hereof.‘ 
1239
Article 84 of the Constitution of Namibia states that ‗(1) A judge may be removed from office before the 
expiry of his or her tenure only by the President acting on the recommendation of the Judicial Service 
Commission… (3) The Judicial Service Commission shall investigate whether or not a judge should be 
removed from office on such grounds, and if it decides that the judge should be removed, it shall inform 
the President of its recommendation.‘ 
1240
Section 177(1)(a) of the Constitution of South Africa.  
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a resolution that is adopted by a supporting vote of at least two thirds of its 
members.1241 The powers of the President in the removal process are therefore limited 
in that the President must remove a judge upon the adoption of a resolution calling for a 
judge to be removed.1242 Therefore, in order to secure the independence of the judiciary 
the Constitution should have limited the powers of the President in the removal of 
judges.   
5.5.3.2.3 Tenure of Judges 
As has been noted earlier, the security of tenure of judges is also crucial to securing the 
independence of the judiciary and seeks to explain the importance of maintaining 
judges on permanent appointment and the abolition of their tenure of office without their 
consent. Although the Constitution provides that judges cannot be removed from office 
unnecessarily, it does provide for a compulsory retirement age so that judges can be 
replaced. Madhuku notes that since judges wield enormous powers but yet are not 
politically accountable to the people, it would therefore be inappropriate for a judge to 
occupy a judicial seat forever.1243 Madhuku also notes that the compulsory retirement 
age of judges takes away from the executive the power to grant a favourable judge the 
privilege of remaining in office longer than others as this would undermine the 
independence of the judiciary.1244 Section 186 of the Constitution states that: 
‗(1) Judges of the Constitutional Court are appointed for a non-renewable term of not 
more than fifteen years, but- (a) they must retire earlier if they reach the age of seventy 
years; and (b) after the completion of their term, they may be appointed as judges of the 
Supreme Court or the High Court, at their option, if they are eligible for such appointment. 
(2) Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Court hold office from the date of their 
assumption of office until they reach the age of seventy years, when they must retire. (3) 
A person may be appointed as a judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court for a fixed 
term, but if the person is so appointed, other than in an acting capacity, he or she ceases 
to be a judge on reaching the age of seventy years even if the term of his or her 
appointment has not expired; (4) Even though a judge has resigned or reached the age 
of seventy years or, in the case of a judge of the Constitutional Court or a judge referred 
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Section 177(1)(b) of the Constitution of South Africa. 
1242
Section 177 (2) of the Constitution of South Africa.  
1243
Madhuku L (2002) 243. 
1244
Madhuku L (2002) 243. 
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to in subsection (3), reached the end of his or her term of office, he or she may continue 
to sit as a judge for the purpose of dealing with any proceedings commenced before him 
or her while he or she was a judge. (5) A judge may resign from his or her office at any 
time by written notice to the President given through the Judicial Service Commission. (6) 
The office of a judge must not be abolished during his or her tenure of office.‘ 
The protection of the tenure of judges under the Constitution is remarkably different 
from that provided under the Lancaster House Constitution. The Lancaster House 
Constitution allowed the President to extend the retirement age of judges.1245 The 
President was given the power to either accept or reject the medical report as to the 
mental and physical fitness of a judge to continue in office. The provision granted the 
President the power to extend the retirement age of a judge provided an avenue 
through which the executive may seek to influence judicial behaviour.1246 This might 
have resulted in only pliant judges having their terms of office extended, which would 
undermine the independence of the judiciary.  
The Constitution of Zimbabwe, unlike the Lancaster House Constitution, has taken 
away the powers of the President to grant a judge the privilege of remaining in office.1247 
In an effort to enhance the independence of the judiciary, the Constitution now provides 
that judges of the Constitutional Court are appointed for a non-renewable term of not 
more than 15 years and a compulsory retirement age of 70.1248 The Constitution does 
not grant the President the discretionary power to extend the term of office of a judge. 
However, a judge of the Constitutional Court upon completion of their term may be 
appointed as a judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court if they so qualify. One can 
infer that the idea behind the non-renewable term of not more than 15 years for 
                                                          
1245
Section 86 of the Lancaster House Constitution stated that ‗(1) Subject to the provisions of section 87, 
a judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court shall retire when he attains the age of sixty-five years 
unless before he attains that age, he has elected to retire on attaining the age of seventy years: Provided 
that (a) an election under this subsection shall be subject to the submission to, and acceptance by, the 
President, after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission, of a medical report as to the mental 
and physical fitness of the judge so to continue in office; (b) the provisions of this subsection shall not 
apply to an acting judge or a judge who has been appointed for a fixed period of office.‘ 
1246
Madhuku L (2002) 243. 
1247
See for example the Constitution of South Africa which also uses the same method. Section 176(1) of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa states that a judge of the Constitutional Court is appointed 
for a non-renewable term of 12 years and must retire at the age of 70 years, whichever occurs first, 
except where an Act of Parliament extends the term of office of the Constitutional Court judge.  
1248
The age of retirement also applies to judges of the Supreme Court and the High Court. See section 
186(2) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
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Constitutional Court judges is to provide a regular rotation of judges in the Constitutional 
Court, so that constitutional interpretation can reflect changing attitudes of society. An 
implication can also be drawn as to why judges of the Constitutional Court can still be 
appointed as judges of the Supreme Court and the High Court before they reach the 
age of 70.  Due to their experience it would be a huge loss to the legal profession if they 
were not to be appointed to the judiciary before they reached their retirement age. 
Hence the Constitution envisages that if they so qualify, they can still be retained as 
judges of the Supreme Court and High Court. Section 186 (6) also protects the tenure of 
judges and stipulates that the office of a judge must not be abolished during his or her 
tenure. 
Although the Constitution states that a judge who has resigned or reached the age of 
seventy years may continue to sit as a judge for the purpose of dealing with any 
proceedings commenced before him or her while he or she was a judge, it is however 
silent on the specific time that the judge should remain in office. Such a gap therefore 
leaves such provision open to abuse as no specific time is mentioned in the Constitution 
as to the period that a judge will be allowed to sit in that regard. Perhaps the example 
set by Uganda1249 and Ghana1250 could have been followed in order to ensure that a 
stipulated time is allocated for any further period to enable a judge to finish proceedings 
                                                          
1249
Article 144 of the Constitution of Uganda states that ‗(1) A judicial officer may retire at any time after 
attaining the age of sixty years, and shall vacate his or her office- (a) in the case of the Chief Justice, the 
Deputy Chief Justice, a justice of the Supreme Court and a justice of Appeal, on attaining the age of 
seventy years; and (b) in the case of the Principal Judge and a judge of the High Court, on attaining the 
age of sixty-five years; or (c) in each case, subject to Article 128 (7) this Constitution, on attaining such 
other age as may be prescribed by Parliament by law; but a judicial officer may continue in office after 
attaining the age at which he or she is required by this clause to vacate office, for a period not exceeding 
three months necessary to enable him or her to complete any work pending before him or her.‘ 
1250
Article 145 of the Constitution of Ghana states that ‗(1) A Justice of a Superior Court or a Chairman of 
a Regional Tribunal may retire at any time after attaining the age of sixty years. (2) A Justice of a Superior 
Court or a Chairman of a Regional Tribunal shall vacate his office- (a) in the case of a Justice of the 
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal, on attaining the age of seventy years; or in the case of a Justice of 
the High Court or a Chairman of a Regional Tribunal, on attaining the age of sixty years; or (c) upon his 
removal from office in accordance with Article 146 of this Constitution… (4) Notwithstanding that he has 
attained the age at which he is required by this article to vacate his office, a person holding office as a 
Justice of the Superior Court or Chairman of a Regional Tribunal may continue in office for a period not 
exceeding six months after attaining that age, as may be necessary to enable him to deliver judgment or 
to do any other thing in relation to proceedings that were commenced before him previous to his attaining 
that age.‘ 
 
 
 
 
271 
 
that would have commenced before the attainment of the retirement age so as to create 
consistency and certainty within the judicial system.  
5.5.3.2.4 Remuneration  
In order to maintain the independence of the judiciary, it is vital that the salary that is 
payable to a judge is not reduced during his or her tenure of office and that such 
salaries payable to judges must be charged to the Consolidated Revenue Fund so that 
Parliament cannot seek to exert influence on judges via the annual discussion of the 
state budget.1251 Principle 11 of the United Nations Basic Principles of Judicial 
Independence recognises that for the judiciary to be independent, sufficient and 
sustainable funding should be provided to enable it to perform its functions to the 
highest standards. The Latimer House Principles also stipulate that appropriate salaries 
and benefits, supporting staff, resources and equipment are essential for the proper 
functioning of the judiciary and that the salaries of judges and benefits should be set by 
an independent body. 1252 
With regards to the conditions of service and tenure of members of the judiciary, section 
188 of the Constitution provides that: 
‗(1) Judges are entitled to salaries, allowances and other benefits fixed from time to time 
by the Judicial Service Commission with the approval of the President given after 
consultation with the Minister responsible for justice and on the recommendation of the 
Minister responsible for finance. (2) An Act of Parliament must provide for the conditions 
of service of judicial officers other than judges and must ensure that their promotion, 
transfer and dismissal, and any disciplinary steps taken against them, take place- (a) with 
the approval of the Judicial Service Commission; and (b) in a fair and transparent manner 
and without fear, favour or prejudice. (3) The salaries, allowances and other benefits of 
members of the judiciary are charged on the Consolidated Revenue Fund. (4) The 
salaries, allowances and other benefits of members of the judiciary must not be reduced 
while they hold or act in the office concerned.‘ 
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Such clauses are included in various Constitutions around Africa. See Article 128 of the Constitution of 
Uganda and Article 127 of the Constitution of Ghana. 
1252
Principle IV of the Latimer House Principles on the Three Branches of Government.  
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Section 188 of the Constitution stipulates that judges are entitled to salaries and 
allowances and other benefits fixed from time to time by the Judicial Service 
Commission with the approval of the President and that such salaries and allowances 
may not be reduced whilst in office. The President thus approves such salaries after 
consulting with the Minister responsible for justice. The President is however not bound 
by the advice of the Minister responsible for justice but is bound by the 
recommendations of the Minister responsible for finance with regards to the setting of 
salaries and allowances for judges.  
Although the Judicial Service Commission is given the role of fixing the salaries and 
allowances of judges from time to time, the Constitution gives a key role to the 
President to approve such salaries. The Constitution thus leaves the determination of 
such salaries in the hands of the executive which does not bode well for the 
independence of the judiciary.1253 Magaisa notes that in order to confer financial 
autonomy on the judiciary, the judiciary must be given the power to determine its 
budget.1254 Magaisa notes that this can be done through clear constitutional provisions 
that guarantee the judicial budget as a percentage of the national budget.1255 This idea 
is also supported by Dakolias and Thachuk who suggest that the financial influence of 
the political branches of the state over the judiciary could be reduced by making judicial 
budgets some fixed percentage of the national budget.1256 As a result, if the funds of the 
judiciary are constitutionally guaranteed, they would be removed from the direct control 
of politicians. Magaisa is of the view that this would ensure that the judiciary has access 
to funds to meet its basic needs.  
                                                          
1253
It should be noted that during the opening of the 2014 legal year, Chidyausiku CJ, criticised 
government for unilaterally reducing the conditions of service for serving judges and other judicial officers. 
Such reduction of conditions of services have been done in direct violation of the Constitution and also 
highlights the dangers of giving politicians to determine the conditions of service of judges. Such actions 
pose a great danger to the independence of the judiciary. For more see New Zimbabwe ―Chidyausiku 
Attacks Government Over Salaries‖ 13 January 2014.  
http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-13854-Chidyausiku+attacks+govt+over+salaries/news.aspx 
(Accessed 17 February 2014). 
1254
Magaisa A ‗Judiciary Must be Financially Independent‘ New Zimbabwe 14 May 2009 
http://blog.newzimbabwe.com/2009/05/amagaisa/judiciary-must-be-financially-independent/comment-
page-13/ (Accessed 23 September 2013). 
1255
 Magaisa A ‗Judiciary Must be Financially Independent. 
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Dakolias M and Thachuk K (2000) 363. 
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Another example that could also have informed the remuneration of judges in 
Zimbabwe is that of South Africa. In South Africa the President is given the power to set 
the remuneration of judges. In doing so the President is guided in terms of the Judges 
Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act1257, by an independent commission 
established by the Independent Commission for the Remuneration of Public Bearers 
Act.1258 The establishment of an independent commission whose recommendations 
would bind the President in Zimbabwe would have gone a long way in securing the 
independence of the judiciary.  
5.6 Do the Constitutional Guarantees on Judicial Independence Suffice? 
This chapter has made an attempt to analyse the provisions in the Constitution of 
Zimbabwe relating to securing the independence of the judiciary and the improvement 
of human rights in Zimbabwe. Constitutional reforms were undertaken that led to the 
adoption of a new Constitution. The lack of protection of the independence of the 
judiciary, the current political and economic situation and human rights abuses 
necessitated the constitutional reforms in order to ensure these issues are addressed.  
Attempts have therefore been made to secure the independence of the judiciary, which 
will subsequently lead to an improvement of the judicial protection of human rights. 
However, key questions need to be asked with regards to the significance of provisions 
of the Constitution relating to the independence of the judiciary.  
An analysis of these provisions has been made in this chapter. The Constitution has 
been accorded supremacy status and seeks to promote the founding principles 
established under section 3. It also provides for a Declaration of Rights in order to 
improve the promotion and protection of human rights. The Constitution also contains 
wider provisions with regards to standing and also contains guidelines for the 
interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution. These are important changes that 
have been introduced by the Constitution and clearly mark a huge departure from the 
Lancaster House Constitution. The separation of powers doctrine is also built into the 
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Constitution with a distinction being made between the three organs of state. However, 
as highlighted, although the judiciary is separate from the other organs of state, there 
are problems regarding the separation of powers between the executive (President) and 
the legislature.  
The Constitution has brought with it substantial changes that seek to promote and 
protect the independence of the judiciary. If the provisions of the Constitution are 
properly implemented there is no doubt that there would be a significant improvement in 
the state of the judiciary. The individual, institutional and substantive independence of 
judges, in accordance with international law, is adequately protected in the Constitution. 
With regards to the personal independence of the judiciary, the Constitution has 
introduced fundamental changes with regards to the appointment of judges. Impartial 
and transparent appointment procedures have been put into place to ensure that fit and 
well qualified individuals are appointed. The appointment procedures seek to enhance 
transparency and impartiality and also mark a huge departure from the appointment 
procedure under the Lancaster House Constitution.  
The Constitution also establishes a broadened JSC with independent representation. 
Although improvements could have been made to enhance the independent 
representation on the JSC, the Constitution however does make changes as compared 
to the one under the Lancaster House Constitution. Thus, the Constitution has provided 
for a broadened JSC with independent representation and has put into place 
appointment procedures that seek to enhance impartiality in the appointment process. 
Despite some concerns about the appointment procedures in the Constitution, it cannot 
be denied that it has enhanced the transparency of the appointment process.  
Although positive changes have been made there are however concerns about certain 
provisions in the Constitution that are still a threat to the independence of the judiciary. 
These provisions relate to the role of the President in appointments, removal of judges 
and the setting of remuneration of judges. The President still has the power to 
unilaterally appoint tribunals that look into the question of the removal of a judge. Such 
unfettered powers do not bode well for the independence of the judiciary. The same can 
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also be said about the powers given to the President to fix the salaries of judges without 
being bound by the advice of the JSC. Such measures have a huge impact on the 
financial independence of the judiciary. As a result one wonders if such gaps identified 
in this chapter will not be used by the executive to negatively impact on the 
independence of the judiciary.  There is a necessity to address the gaps identified in this 
chapter.  
5.6.1 Other Measure to Improve Judicial Independence in Zimbabwe 
A crucial question that needs to be asked is: whether the constitutional protection of the 
provisions relating to the independence of the judiciary will result in the improvement of 
the judiciary in the country? It should be noted that the respect for the independence of 
the judiciary goes deeper than constitutional guarantees as to appointments, security of 
tenure and salaries. The respect for the independence of the judiciary is a product of the 
actual relationship between the judiciary, the executive and the legislature.  Chidyausiku 
notes that the respect for the independence of the judiciary is not achieved solely by the 
presence of a neat structural balance (as theorised by the doctrine of separation of 
powers).1259 He notes that additional factors are also required in order to ensure that 
there is respect for the independence of the judiciary.1260 These factors include, besides 
the attitude of the executive and the legislature to judicial independence and all it 
entails, the commitment of judges themselves to guard and defend their independence 
and the readiness of the people to support the independence of judges as defenders of 
people‘s liberties.1261 The judiciary should closely guard its independence. The 
establishment of a perfect working relationship between the three organs of state is 
therefore essential and will also go a long way to boosting the confidence of the public 
with regards to the judicial system and the administration of justice in the country.  
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Chidyausiku GG Modern Challenges to the Independence of the Judiciary (2010) 5. Conference and 
Annual General meeting of the Southern African Chief Justices Forum, Johannesburg, South Africa. 
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The administration of justice in the country has continued to suffer over the years as a 
result of severe economic difficulties and inadequate resources. The shrinking of the 
economy has resulted in insufficient funding of the judiciary and this has resulted in 
massive corruption within the judicial system.  It is essential that sound economic 
policies are developed in order to improve the situation and ensure that the judiciary is 
well funded. Judges‘ salaries also need to be improved. Better salaries are likely to 
motivate judges and provide a greater propensity for judges to resist corruption. These 
changes listed above are fundamental in seeking to protect the independence of the 
judiciary. 
Crucial to this research is the attitude of the executive towards the judiciary. One 
important change that needs to accompany these judicial reforms is a change in the 
attitude of the executive towards the judiciary. This research has noted that a major 
barrier to the respect for judicial independence in contemporary Zimbabwe has been the 
government‘s intolerance of control and accountability.1262 Over the years the 
government has adopted a policy that has mainly been informed and represented by 
popular interests and the judiciary has been expected to share this policy and be 
responsive to the policies articulated by government.1263 Any contradiction with any 
government ideological, diplomatic and political policies has therefore resulted in the 
judiciary being deemed disloyal to the people and the government at large.1264 It is as a 
result that since the attainment of independence, the executive and parliament have 
expressed displeasure with the notion of a judiciary that is independent. As a result 
                                                          
1262
See speech by ZANU-PF Member of Parliament Webster Shamhu (Hansard 22.02.01) which 
highlights the intolerance attitude that the executive has adopted towards the judiciary. He stated that ‗For 
in a democracy like ours, power belongs ultimately to the people. Those who exercise power do so on 
behalf of the people to which they must always be accountable. No species of power is exempt from the 
universal tendency to corrupt those who wield it.  Our judiciary is no exception. No person who wields 
power should therefore be exempt from the obligation to be accountable to us the people of God.  In a 
democracy, there is need for vigilance so as to ensure that every institution or individual remains within 
the bounds of law. Our judiciary deserves the people‘s critical democratic attention regarding the manner 
in which it exercises the power entrusted to it. It is unfortunate that the propaganda of ‗judicial 
imperialism‘ masquerading as ‗judicial independence‘ has been so insidious that otherwise insightful 
people have failed to see the grave mistakes being perpetrated by some sections of the judiciary.  As a 
result, the current scrutiny of the judicial independence must not be allowed to continue to be used to 
mask the reality of judicial despotism… It is therefore the democratic right and duty of the people of 
Zimbabwe, as free people, to monitor, and control the power of the judiciary.‘ 
1263
Goredema C (2004) 102. 
1264
Goredema C (2004) 102. 
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there have been constant clashes between the executive and the judiciary. Most of 
these clashes have been highlighted in this thesis, where over the years the executive 
has expressed its displeasure with a number of judicial decisions. Such tension has 
resulted in a number of constitutional amendments that have sought to nullify a number 
of judicial decisions and exclude judicial review of some executive decisions.1265  
Presently there are already signs that the current ruling party will not cease its attempts 
of harassing independent judges that seek to protect and promote human rights in the 
country. In April 2013, Chidyausiku CJ reportedly opened an inquiry into the conduct of 
Hungwe J in the wake of allegations of misconduct and negligence levelled against 
him.1266 The allegations against Hungwe J related to conducting a hearing in the middle 
of the night and ordering the release of prominent human rights lawyer Beatrice 
Mtetwa.1267 It is believed that Hungwe J had been under government scrutiny for also 
delivering a number of judgments that have irked the authorities.1268 Such actions by the 
government in victimising independently-minded judges clearly highlight the attitude of 
the government towards such judges. Such actions also portray a culture of intolerance 
and highlight the extent to which the government is willing to go to frustrate the efforts of 
independently-minded judges in human rights protection. Thus, the persecution of such 
judges continues to violate the independence of the judiciary and raises serious doubts 
about the state of the judiciary in the country and its ability to independently protect and 
promote human rights.  
Accusations were also levelled against the President for appointing judges to the 
Supreme Court and High Courts before the July 2013 elections without following proper 
procedure.1269 Accusations have been levelled against ZANU-PF for packing the courts 
                                                          
1265
Goredema C (2004) 102. The author describes how Gubbay CJ described the threat to judicial 
independence in Zimbabwe as emanating from two sources: legislative abuse and unlawful action. 
1266
The Herald ‗Justice Hungwe Under Probe‘ 4 April 2013. 
http://www.herald.co.zw/justice-hungwe-under-probe/ (Accessed 10 April 2014). 
1267
The Zimbabwe Eye ‗Stressed High Court judge Hungwe Takes Vacation‘ 
http://www.zimeye.org/?p=79151 (Accessed 8 April 2013). 
1268
The Zimbabwe Eye ‗Stressed High Court judge Hungwe Takes Vacation‘ 
http://www.zimeye.org/?p=79151 (Accessed 8 April 2013).  
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Sibanda M and Kwaramba F ‗Judges Appointments; Mugabe Did Not Consult Tsvangirai‘ Daily News 
Live 18 July 2013. 
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with party loyalists in anticipation of electoral challenges by the MDC. It is the packing of 
courts with such judges and the courts lack of independence that the MDC-T cited for 
withdrawing its presidential election petition with the Constitutional Court.1270 The 
executive seems therefore not to have relented in its efforts of undermining the 
independence of the judiciary through the violation of appointment procedures and 
packing the courts with pliant judges.  
5.7 Conclusion 
Although the Constitution has tried to address the question of judicial independence in 
Zimbabwe, it has not done so fully. It has introduced crucial changes as compared to 
the Lancaster House Constitution and such changes should improve the state of the 
judiciary and human rights protection. There are loopholes that pose a threat to the 
independence of the judiciary. These loopholes identified throughout this chapter need 
to be addressed as they pose a serious threat to the independence of the judiciary. 
Failure to address such gaps will no doubt impact negatively on the independence of 
the judiciary in Zimbabwe. Measures to rectify the loopholes must be accompanied by 
the several factors discussed in this chapter. This will no doubt lead to an improvement 
in the state of the judiciary and subsequently the protection of human rights by the 
judiciary.  As a result the next chapter offers recommendations that can be implemented 
to further strengthen the independence of the judiciary which will subsequently 
strengthen the judicial promotion and protection of human rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2013/07/18/judges-appointments-mugabe-did-not-consult-tsvangirai 
(Accessed 27 September 2013). 
1270
Reuters ‗MDC-T Drops Court Challenge to Mugabe Re-Election‘ 16 August 2013. 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/08/16/uk-zimbabwe-election-idUKBRE97F0Q820130816 (Accessed 23 
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CHAPTER 6 
ENLARGING THE PLACE OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION IN ZIMBABWE: A 
CRITICAL EVALUATION OF INTERNAL REMEDIES TO ADDRESS HUMAN RIGHTS 
IN ZIMBABWE  
6 Introduction 
The previous chapters of this thesis have made a concerted effort to discuss the need 
for the improvement of the independence of the judiciary in Zimbabwe as a pre-requisite 
for the improvement of the judicial protection of human rights. However, although this 
thesis recognises that the judiciary is the primary institution charged with human rights 
protection, its role in that regard should not be over-emphasised.1271  This is so because 
the judiciary in any democratic society is not the only body that is tasked with the 
protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. For example, there exists another wide 
range of institutions and people who also bear a significant responsibility for the 
protection of human rights in society.1272 In addition to such institutions and individuals 
there are specific measures that also need to be taken in order to improve the human 
rights situation in Zimbabwe. The purpose of this chapter is therefore to identify a 
number of domestic initiatives that need to be adopted (other than the judicial reforms) 
in Zimbabwe in order to improve the protection and promotion of human rights.   
6.1 States’ Obligations to Promote and Promote Human Rights 
 It should be noted that a number of international human rights instruments require 
States to take domestic measures to ensure the protection and promotion of human 
rights.1273 This is mainly due to the fact that States incur the responsibility for not 
complying with their legal obligations which relate to respecting and ensuring the 
effective enjoyment of human rights recognised under the different international legal 
instruments.1274 It is therefore crucial that for individuals to enjoy any fundamental 
                                                          
1271
For example there are other institutions and quasi- judicial bodies that are tasked with the 
responsibility for the protection and promotion of human rights.  
1272
O‘Regan CME (1998) 13. 
1273
Steiner HJ, Alston P and Goodman R International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals; 
Text and Materials 3ed (2007) 1123. See also Shaw M International Law 6ed (2008) 268. 
1274
Evans M International Law 3ed (2010) 290.  
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protection of human rights there should be effective protection of such. Besides putting 
into place pro-human rights laws, it is important that in order to achieve effective 
domestic protection of human rights, a network of complementary norms and 
mechanisms must be put into place for the coordination or supervision of  the 
implementation of laws enacted to protect human rights.1275 Examples of such 
mechanisms include an independent judiciary (which has been discussed in the 
previous chapters), a non-partisan police force service, effective and accessible human 
rights institutions which are given specific statutory powers to enforce human rights 
protection, a lively NGO community, state adherence to international treaties and a 
population with a strong human rights culture.1276 Although some of these mechanisms 
have been in existence over the years in Zimbabwe, such mechanisms have not led to 
the effective domestic protection and promotion of human rights. This therefore implies 
that there is need to have a re-look at the domestic mechanisms put into place to 
protect and promote human rights in Zimbabwe and analyse how best these 
mechanisms can be utilised to improve the human rights situation. The strengthening of 
such mechanisms together with an independent judiciary will bode well for the 
protection and promotion of human rights. This is what the discussion below seeks to 
address.   
6.2 Enhancing the Role of the Police in Human Rights Protection 
The police in any democratic society has an important role to play in the protection of 
human rights.1277  This role becomes important due to the fact that a number of issues 
that relate to human rights never reach the courts and are often solved at the grassroots 
level of the justice system.1278 This therefore makes it important that the police do not 
abuse human rights but instead act in a manner that protects the most vulnerable 
individuals in society.1279 Section 219 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe provides for the 
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Reif LC ‗Building Democratic Institutions: The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in Good 
Governance and Human Rights Protection‘ (2000) 13 Harvard Human Rights Journal 1-69 2. 
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Reif LC (2000) 2. 
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establishment of a police force, namely the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP).1280 
Although the Constitution does not explicitly mention the issue of human rights 
protection as one of the functions of the ZRP, one would argue that human rights 
protection is an integral aspect in maintaining peace and security. The Constitution also 
makes it mandatory for the police to work within the confines of its constitutional 
mandate and the context of international standards.  
The Zimbabwe Police Act 1281 also goes further to elaborate on the duty of the police in 
safeguarding public safety and public order and reinforces the constitutional obligations 
of the police to preserve internal peace and security and maintain law and order. This 
was also the case under the Lancaster House Constitution.1282 The Act also complies 
with the wording of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (section 219) as it seeks to ensure 
that the police are responsible for preserving internal peace and maintaining law and 
order in the country. 
International law also recognises the important role of the police with regards to human 
rights protection. The international Bill of Rights, which consists of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), contain various normative values with regards to human rights protection 
and obliges States to implement the rights by adopting legislative and other measures 
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Section 219 of the new Constitution of Zimbabwe states that ‗(1) There is a Police Service which is 
responsible for (a) detecting, investigating and preventing crime; (b) preserving the internal security of 
Zimbabwe; (c) protecting and securing the lives and property of the people; (d) maintaining law and order; 
and (e) upholding this Constitution and enforcing the law without fear or favour.…(3) The Police Service 
must be non-partisan, national in character, patriotic, professional and subordinate to the civilian authority 
as established by this Constitution. (4) An Act of Parliament must provide for the organisation, structure, 
management, regulation, discipline and subject to section 223, the conditions of service of members of 
the Police Service.‘ 
1281
No.2 of 1995/Chapter 11:10. See also the section 4 Uganda Police Act Chapter 303 which reads 
‗Subject to the Constitution and this Act, the functions of the force are- (a) to protect the life, property and 
other rights of the individual; (b) to maintain security within Uganda; (c) to enforce the laws of Uganda; (d) 
to ensure public safety and order…‘ 
1282
Preamble of the Police Act of Zimbabwe, with reference to section 93 (1) of the Lancaster House 
Constitution which stated that ‗there shall be a Police Force which, together with such other bodies may 
be established by the law for the purpose shall have the function of preserving the internal security of and 
maintain law and order in Zimbabwe.‘ 
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to ensure that these rights are not violated.1283 Further, there exists a comprehensive 
framework of international human rights standards that relate to law enforcement and 
criminal justice systems.1284  International law demands that any police force in any 
democratic society must adopt a comprehensive human rights policy.1285 Further, 
international law also demands that human rights standards must be incorporated into 
standing orders for the police and they also are to be provided with periodic human 
rights training.1286 The Preamble to the Code of Conduct for Police Officials, Southern 
African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation1287, also places human rights 
norms as an important tool in the professionalisation of police services in the Southern 
African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation (SARPCCO) member 
countries.1288 
The obligations of the police in section 219 of the Constitution entrust the ZRP with the 
duty to maintaining the law and order which is imperative for the enjoyment of human 
rights.1289 Makwerere et al note that in carrying out law enforcement duties, the police 
should always apply human rights standards, such as, the right to life, prohibition 
against torture, liberty, privacy and the protection of the law, expression, assembly and 
                                                          
1283
See for example Article 2.1 of the ICCPR which states that ‗Each State party to the present Covenant 
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the 
rights recognised in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status‖ and 
Article 2.2 of the ICCPR states that ―Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other 
measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in 
accordance with its constitutional process and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such 
legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognised in the present 
Covenant.‘ 
1284
The overall framework includes guidelines, principles, codes of conduct and declarations of various 
authoritative bodies. Although some of the guidelines are not binding they do carry persuasive guidance 
with regards to human rights standards that relate to law enforcement. The instruments include amongst 
many others the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials General Assembly Resolution 34/169 of 
17 December 1979, the Conventions against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (1984), the United Nations General Assembly Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement 
Officials (1979), and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1966). 
1285
See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Professional Training Series 
No. 5/Add.3 Human Rights Standards and Practice for the Police (2004) 1.  
1286
See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2004) 1. 
1287
SARPCCO was established in 1995 to foster better cooperation and mutual assistance between 
countries in Southern Africa.  The Code of Conduct was adopted at the 6
th
 General Meeting of SARPCCO 
in Mauritius August 2001. 
1288
Member countries of SARPCCO are: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  
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See also Nsereko DDN ‗The Police, Human Rights and the Constitution: An African Perspective‘ 
(1993) 15:3 Human Rights Quarterly 465-484 466. 
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association.1290 Makwerere also notes that the powers of the police entail great 
responsibilities and impact heavily on the relationship between the police and the 
public.1291 This is so because in cases where law enforcement officials themselves 
flaunt the law, there is little hope for society to function under the rule of law. As a result 
human rights protection can only be effective where the rule of law flourishes.  
However, despite the existence of such guidelines that seek to assist the police with 
issues relating to human rights protection, the police force in Zimbabwe has over the 
years been highly compromised to the extent that it has abdicated its constitutional 
functions, responsibilities and obligations.1292 The IBA has reported that the partisan 
attitude of the Zimbabwean police has been responsible for serious violations of human 
rights and the rule of law in Zimbabwe.1293 The partisan nature of the ZRP is further 
emphasised by Makwerere et al who state that: 
‗The police in Zimbabwe today is seen as a symbol of increasingly bitter social debate 
over law enforcement… Too often as is the case with Zimbabwe, police agencies play 
elitist political games while giving lip-service to the needs of the powerless segments of 
the community. In Zimbabwe this has led to the conclusion by the powerless that the ZRP 
are is there to serve the interests of the rich and powerful.‘
1294
 
The IBA has over the years expressed great concern about the abuse of human rights 
by the ZRP. It has detailed how police officers in Zimbabwe have been responsible for 
some of the most serious human rights and rule of law violations in the country.1295 
Several cases have been reported where members of the ZRP have consistently shown 
disrespect and contempt for the law, lawyers and judicial authorities, thus undermining 
the administration of justice and rule of law in the country. The police in Zimbabwe have 
over the years been accused of serious violations of human rights mainly through the 
carrying out of unlawful action, excessive use of force1296 and torture1297, unlawful 
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Zimbabwe‘ (2012) 2:17 International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 129 132. 
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detentions1298, and the constant contempt of court orders.1299 Such unlawful arrests and 
use of torture have been mainly targetted against individuals that have been deemed to 
be resistant to government policies, mostly members of the opposition political parties 
and also legal representatives carrying out their professional duties.1300 What has been 
most disturbing about such human rights abuses is that such violations by members of 
the ZRP have been done with impunity.1301 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
these examples is that of Murambatsvina (Operation Restore Order) where the police fired teargas 
directly into the homes of residents of Porta farm and where a man who was suffering from tuberculosis 
died shortly after being exposed to the gas. Another example includes the use of lethal force on Gift 
Tandari, Youth Chairman of the National Constitutional Assembly, who was shot dead by the police in 
March 2007 during a rally organised by Save Zimbabwe Coalition.   
1297
The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum reports how the police have been notorious for actively 
perpetrating acts of Organised Violence and Torture (OVT), mainly against MDC supporters with 65% of 
OVT‘s reported in Harare involving the police as perpetrators. See Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO A 
Culture of Impunity in Zimbabwe: A Report on Access to Justice for Survivors of Organised Violence and 
Torture (OVT) in Zimbabwe July 2012. http://www.hrforumzim.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/OVT-
REPORT-2012-AUGUST-2-FINAL-CTP.pdf (Accessed 02 September 2013). 
1298
International Bar Association (2007)27 reports that it had received numerous reports of widespread 
arbitrary arrests by members of the ZRP without any charges ultimately being brought against detainees 
or with charges that were subsequently found by the courts to be baseless. Examples include the case of 
the Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) whose members have been detained on numerous occasions, 
with charges that have been dropped or have yet to be ascertained.  
1299
See Fidelis Charamba and Others v The Minister of Home Affairs and Others High Court Case 
No.6420/08 (Unreported) where the High Court declared the abduction and secret detention of several 
abductees as unlawful and ordered that they be released. Despite the court order, the individuals 
remained incarcerated for two months. See also Jestina Mukoko and 31 Others v The Commissioner 
General of Police and Another High Court Case No.7166/08 (Unreported) where the court granted an 
order for the police to release the abducted persons who were in police custody in defiance of previous 
orders of the High Court. The individuals in this case remained incarcerated until they were granted bail in 
May 2008.   
1300
International Bar Association (2007) 35. The International Bar Association reveals how a shocking 
number of cases and complaints of threatening behaviour, physical and verbal assaults on lawyers and 
court officials have been reported in the country. Most of these incidents mostly occurred when lawyers 
enquired about their detained clients. Examples include the arrests of prominent lawyers Alec 
Muchadehama and Andrew Makoni and after their arrest members of the legal profession, acting upon 
the interests of the two arrested lawyers, secured a High Court order declaring their arrest and detention 
unlawful and ordering their immediate release. Despite this order the ZRP refused to release the lawyers. 
A second High Court order was also defied by the ZRP stating that the two lawyers were to be brought to 
court before the 6
th
 of May 2007. In March 2013  top human rights lawyer Beatrice Mtetwa was arrested 
and detained by the police as she tried to save her clients whose property was being searched by police 
and who in the process refused to produce a valid search warrant. As a result of her interference she was 
arrested and charged with contravening section 184(1)(g) of the Criminal Law (Codification) Act for 
allegedly defeating or obstructing the course of justice. In response to the continued arrest of legal 
practitioners, in December 2012 lawyers marched to parliament delivering copies of a petition 
complaining about harassment by state authorities while executing their duties. After the arrest of 
Beatrice Mtetwa a petition was filed in March 2013 with the Minister of Home Affairs, the Chairman of the 
Judicial Services Commission, Minister of Justice Legal Affairs, the Police Commissioner against 
harassment and intimidation. 
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It is as a result of the continued impunity, that the issue of the continued violation of 
human rights by the ZRP must be addressed so as to ensure that the police are able to 
abide by their constitutional duty of maintaining peace and security. Perhaps the crucial 
question is how the issue of the violation of human rights by the ZRP can be adequately 
addressed? As has been highlighted previously in this chapter, the ZRP has become a 
politicised institution that has over the years carried out its duties in a partisan manner. 
Reforms therefore are necessary in order to improve the ZRP‘s image and mandate 
with regards to policing human rights issues. It is therefore imperative that such reforms 
should ensure that the ZRP must conduct itself as a national security service charged 
by the Constitution and statute with ensuring public order and security in the country. 
The ways in which the ZRP can improve its policing of human rights are discussed 
below: 
6.2.1 De-Politicising of the Police  
In order to improve the image of the police and ensure that it remains non-partisan in 
conducting its duties, the Constitution of Zimbabwe now demands that the Police Force 
must be non-partisan, national in character, patriotic, professional and subordinate to 
the civilian authority established by the Constitution.1302 The inclusion of such provisions 
should therefore serve as a reminder to the ZRP of the importance of upholding its 
constitutional obligations to the people of Zimbabwe. However, for the de-politicisation 
of the police to be effective, the attitude of government is key in ensuring that the ZRP is 
able to conduct its duties without any political interference. Hence the government of 
Zimbabwe must be willing to facilitate such change as it can be seen how politicised the 
ZRP has become.1303 It is therefore important that the government respects the 
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Section 219(3) of the Constitution. See also section 208 of the Constitution which states that ‗(1) 
Members of the security services must act in accordance with this Constitution and the law. (2) Neither 
the security services nor any of their members may, in the exercise of their function- (a) act in a partisan 
manner; (b) further the interests of any political party or cause; (c) prejudice the lawful interests of any 
political party or cause; or (3) violate the fundamental rights or freedoms of any person. (3) Members of 
the security services must not be active members or office –bearers of any political party or organisation.‘ 
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To clearly highlight the politicisation of the ZRP in Zimbabwe and in blatant disregard of section 208(3) 
of the Constitution which prohibits members of the security services from being active members or office 
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Zimbabwe Police Act which makes it an offence for police office bearers from participating in politics, two 
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Constitution and ensures that it brings to an end the partisan use of the police force and 
provides the police force with an environment where the professionalism envisaged in 
the Constitution can be established.  
It is also important to note that the independence of the police from political or other 
societal forces is crucial for them to effectively carry out their constitutional duties.1304 
Nsereko notes that in matters of partisan politics the police must always maintain a 
neutral position as any appearance of partiality is likely to erode the public‘s confidence 
in the police.1305 The International Bar Association has noted that biased policing in the 
country has polarised Zimbabwean society which has led to heightened insecurity and 
political tensions.1306 De-politicising the ZRP will ensure that the members of the Police 
Force are able to serve the people of Zimbabwe and thus ensure that fundamental 
rights and freedoms are protected irrespective of divergent political views or opinions.  
In seeking to maintain the independence of the police in Zimbabwe, it is crucial that the 
methods and procedures of recruiting members of the police must be free from undue 
political interference.   The Police Force is under the command of a Commissioner-
General of Police who is appointed by the President after consultation with the Minister 
responsible for the Police.1307 Although the Constitution creates a Police Service 
Commission1308, the Commission does not have any role with regards to the 
appointment of the Commissioner-General of Police.1309 It should be noted that the 
appointment of the Commissioner-General by the President after consulting the Minister 
responsible for police might raise some doubts about the impartiality of such 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and extent of the politicisation of members of ZRP. For more on the involvement of police officers in party 
politics see Human Rights Watch The Elephant in the Room: Reforming Zimbabwe‟s Security Sector 
Ahead of Elections (2013) 23-24. 
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Nsereko DDN (1993) 472. 
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Nsereko DDN (1993) 472. 
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International Bar Association (2007) 54. 
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Section 222(1) of the Constitution of  Zimbabwe.  
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Section 222(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe stipulates the composition of the Police Service 
Commission and states that ‗There is a Police Service Commission consisting of a chairperson, who must 
be the Chairperson of the Civil Service Commission and a minimum of two and a maximum of six other 
members appointed by the President.‘ 
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Section 223 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe lists the functions of the Police Service Commission 
which states amongst other issues that ‗(1) The Police Service Commission has the following functions- 
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regulate conditions of service, including salaries, allowances and other benefits, of member of the Police 
Service.‘ 
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appointment. Since the President alone determines who can be appointed as 
Commissioner-General, it is highly possible that individuals that have close ties with the 
executive might be appointed to the post, thus ensuring the protection of the political 
interests of the ruling elite. The example of the appointment process of the Inspector-
General of Police in the of the Republic of Namibia could have been used as a 
reference point in ensuring that questions are not raised about the appointment process 
of the Commissioner-General.1310 Nsereko is however of the view that such 
appointment of a Commissioner-General by the President may be justified on the basis 
that the police force, through its Commissioner-General, must be accountable to the 
people through their elected government.1311 As such the government is always held 
liable in cases where issues go wrong. Despite this assertion by Nsereko, it is, however, 
crucial that checks must be put into place to ensure that impartiality is observed in such 
appointments. In the case of Zimbabwe there is no independent body1312 that is 
involved in the appointment of the Commissioner-General, which thus leaves such 
appointment to the President. Thus, it leaves the whole appointment process subject to 
political manipulation.  
The Police Service Commission is given the constitutional mandate of appointing other 
members of the police service in the country.  However, since the Commission is 
virtually composed of members solely appointed by the President, it is therefore 
possible that such appointments may be carried out in a partisan manner. This will 
therefore result in a police service that is partisan and that will seek to protect the 
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In order to ensure that the appointment of the Inspector-General of Police is free from any undue 
political interference, Section 115 of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia stipulates that the 
President appoints the Inspector-General acting on the advice of the Security Commission. Section 114 
of the Constitution of Namibia states that ‗the Security Commission shall consist of the Chairperson of the 
Public Service Commission, the Chief of the Defence Force, the Inspector-General of Police, the 
Commissioner of Prisons and two (2) member of the National Assembly appointed by the President on 
the recommendation of the National Assembly.‘ 
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Nsereko DDN (1993) 472. 
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(according to section 202 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, the Chairperson of the Civil Service 
Commission is appointed solely by the President), and a minimum of two and a maximum of six other 
members appointed by the President. The virtue that all the appointees to the Commission are virtually 
presidential appointees will thus result in their independence being questioned as it is possible that such 
partisan appointment may be made to the Commission.  
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interests of its masters. It is therefore crucial that for any appointments to be deemed to 
be fair and impartial, it is important that the Commission must be independent of any 
political influences so as to ensure that capable individuals who will uphold the values of 
the Constitution are appointed to the force. It is submitted that the appointment of such 
capable and independently-minded individuals will go a long way to addressing the 
violations of human rights by members of the police. 
The protection of the security of tenure and reasonably adequate remuneration of 
members of the Police Force are also crucial in ensuring that members of the police 
force in Zimbabwe are able to discharge their duties without any fear or favour. Nsereko 
also notes that members of the police must be provided with adequate security. Security 
of tenure will thus protect members of the police from any political victimization, and 
adequate remuneration will ensure that suitable and qualified individuals are attracted to 
the profession. The recruitment of such qualified individuals should ensure that 
individuals who are qualified and of good character and willing to observe the values of 
the new constitutional order are appointed.1313 The low salaries of members of the 
Police Force in Zimbabwe have over the years made the profession unattractive and a 
number of police officials have resigned citing poor pay and working conditions as the 
main reasons for such resignations.1314 It is therefore important that the salaries of 
members of the police force should be made attractive as such measures will aid in 
improving conditions of service and also effect an improvement in the policing of human 
rights in the country.  
6.2.2 Adequate Police Training on Human Rights 
The Police Force in Zimbabwe has since 1995 been providing new police recruits with 
human rights training as part of their training programme.1315 However, despite such 
training and the importance of human rights, the police over the years have been at the 
                                                          
1313
Nsereko DDN (1993) 473. 
1314
TalkZimbabwe ‗22 Police Officers ‗Protest Over Poor Pay‘ 19 February 2007. 
http://www.genocidewatch.org/images/Zimbabwe_19_Feb_07_22_police_Officers_protest_over_poor_pa
y.pdf (Accessed 21 August 2013). 
1315
Newsday ‗Human Rights Syllabus Not New for The Police‘ May 21, 2013. 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/2013/05/21/human-rights-syllabus-not-new-for-police/ 
(Accessed 21 August 2013). 
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forefront of human rights violations in the country. However, it is not clear whether 
members of the police force are provided with any further and regular training 
programmes about the importance of promoting and protecting human rights. It is 
crucial that in accordance with international human rights standards, the government of 
Zimbabwe must provide police officials with frequent human rights training in order to 
improve the policing of human rights. The importance of such training was further 
enforced by article 13.2 (a) of the GPA which stated: 
‗For the purposes of ensuring that all state organs and institutions perform their duties 
ethically and professionally in conformity with the principles and requirements of a multi-
party democratic system in which all parties are treated equally, the Parties have agreed 
that the following steps be taken (a) that there be inclusion in the training curriculum of 
members of the uniformed forces of the subjects on human rights, international 
humanitarian law and statute law so that there is greater understanding and full 
appreciation of their roles and duties in a multi-party democratic system.‘ 
The inclusion of such a clause by the political parties in the GPA clearly indicates the 
concern with regards to the abuse of human rights by members of the Police Force, 
hence the emphasis on the importance of providing training to improve human rights 
policing. The need for the provision of human rights training in Zimbabwe is further 
recognised in the fact that during the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process, there 
were recommendations that Zimbabwe should improve human rights training for 
security sector personnel.1316 This was so because it was reported that lower ranked 
officials in the police force were poorly trained on human rights issues.1317 The need for 
providing adequate training to police officials is also emphasised by the former 
Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC) Chairman, Jacob Mudenda, who after 
consultation with the Commissioner-General of the ZRP has advocated for the 
introduction of a human rights curriculum in the police training syllabus.1318 The main 
idea behind the introduction of such curriculum is to expose police officers to human 
                                                          
1316
Human Rights Council Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Zimbabwe 
A/HRC/19/14 (2011) 13-24. 
1317
United States Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011: Zimbabwe  
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2011humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper (Accessed 20 August 
2013). 
1318
Newsday ‗Chihuri Yields to Pressure‘ May 17, 2003. 
https://www.newsday.co.zw/2013/05/17/chihuri-yields-to-pressure/ (Accessed 10 September 2013). 
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rights issues, especially with regards to the promotion and protection of human rights. It 
is submitted that such educational measures should be adopted to guarantee that there 
is no repetition of past human rights violations by the police. It is also crucial that for 
such training to be effective adequate resources must be made available for such 
training curricula. The provision of adequate training will ensure that Zimbabwe 
complies with international standards for the policing of human rights.  
6.2.3 Conforming to International Standards on Policing of Human Rights 
It is important that since international human rights law is binding on all States and their 
agents, the policing standards of the police force in the country should be in conformity 
with international standards for human rights. As a member of the United Nations, 
Zimbabwe should ensure that it provides effective policing to protect the rights in a 
number of international instruments to which the country is a state party.1319 Although 
not binding, the International Human Rights Standards for Law Enforcement1320 puts in 
place various legal and ethical standards that can be used to guide the conduct of the 
police in Zimbabwe with regards to the policing of human rights. Key amongst these 
standards is the importance for law enforcement officials to respect and obey the law at 
all times. The International Human Rights Standards also emphasise on the importance 
of law enforcement officials to respect and protect human dignity and maintain and 
uphold the human rights of all persons.  
As a member of SARPCCO it is also important that Zimbabwe should also be guided by 
the Code of Conduct of SARPCCO. The Code of Conduct which is intended as a 
minimum standard for policing is guided by the respect for human life, reverence of the 
law, integrity, respect for property and service excellence. The Code of Conduct 
recognises the importance of human rights norms and ethical practices as essential 
                                                          
1319
For example Zimbabwe has acceded to a number of international treaties and as such has obligations 
under international law to ensure that there is no violation of such rights. Examples of these treaties 
include amongst many others the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(Accession 13 May 1991), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (accession 13 May 
1991), International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (accession 13 
May 1991). 
1320
Dissel A and Frank C Policing and Human Rights: Assessing Southern African Countries‟ Compliance 
with the SARPCCO Code of Conduct for Police Officials (2012) 2. 
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aspects of professionalising the police service.1321 It is important that Zimbabwe should 
abide by the SARPCCO Code of Conduct in order to address allegations of political 
bias, and the abuse of human rights in the country. The adherence to international 
standards of human rights policing will also contribute to ending the culture of impunity 
that has been associated with human rights violations by the police.1322 
6.3 Enhancing the Effective Protection and Promotion of Human Rights by 
Independent Human Rights Institutions 
Independent National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) which have emerged out of 
the human rights movement play a great role in the protection and promotion of human 
rights.1323 Reif notes that the importance of NHRIs has been widely recognised by the 
United Nations human rights bodies since 1946.1324 In 1992 the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights adopted the Guiding Principles Relating to the Status of 
National Institutions (Paris Principles) and such principles were also adopted by the 
General Assembly in 1993.1325 The Paris Principles provide enormous guidance and 
direction on the formation of NHRIs in general, and also provide standards and 
principles that NHRIs must follow in order to function effectively. 
The importance of independent NHRIs is also emphasised by the Vienna Declaration 
and Programme of Action which was adopted at the end of the Vienna World 
Conference on Human Rights.1326 The Vienna Programme of Action recognises the 
importance played by NHRIs in the promotion and protection of human rights, 
disseminating human rights information and providing education about human rights.1327 
NHRIs supplement the role of other democratic institutions in ensuring that issues of 
                                                          
1321
SARPCCO Harare Resolution on the SARPCCO Code of Conduct for Police Officials 2001. 
1322
Dissel A and Frank C (2012) 209. 
1323
Reif LC (2000) 2.  
1324
United Nations Centre for Human Rights National Human Rights Institutions: A Handbook on the 
Establishment and Strengthening OF National Institutions for the promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights Professional Training Series No. 4 at 4-6 UN Doc. HR/P/PT/4, U.N Sales No. E.95.XIV.2 (1995).   
1325
G.A Res 134, U.N GAOR, 48th
 
Sess., U.N Doc. A/RES/48/134 (1993). 
1326
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted June 25 1993.  
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Vienna.aspx (Accessed 21 August 2013). 
1327
See Paragraph 36 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 1993. 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Vienna.aspx (Accessed 21 August 2013). 
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human rights remain the central focus of political discourse in every society.1328  Over 
the years the United Nations has made concerted efforts to encourage States to focus 
on the domestic enforcement of human rights and also by providing assistance in 
strengthening NHRIs.1329 The African Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights also 
recognises the importance of NHRIs as such institutions are required to assist the 
Commission in the promotion of human rights at country level.1330 NHRIs affiliated to the 
Commission are also entitled to attend and participate in the Commission‘s public 
sessions and are also required to submit reports on their activities to the Commission 
every two years.1331 
6.3.1 Constitution of Zimbabwe and NHRIs 
The Constitution of Zimbabwe establishes a number of institutions to help ensure the 
protection of the rights enshrined therein.1332 These institutions similarly to the South 
African model1333, are charged with supporting and entrenching human rights and 
democracy, promoting constitutionalism, protecting the sovereignty and interests of the 
people, securing and ensuring the observance of democratic values by the State and all 
institutions and agencies of government, and ensuring that all injustices are 
remedied.1334 These institutions which are accountable to Parliament, are independent 
and must perform their functions without fear, favour or prejudice.1335 In order to secure 
the independence of these institutions, the Constitution of Zimbabwe prohibits any 
                                                          
1328
Kumar R ‗National Human Rights Institutions: Good Governance Perspectives on Institutionalisation of 
Human Rights‘ 2003 19:2 AM. U. INT‟ L. Rev 259 278. 
1329
Reif LC (2000) 4. 
1330
African Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights National Human Rights Institutions  
http://www.achpr.org/network/nhri/ (21 August 2013). 
1331
African Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights National Human Rights Institutions 
http://www.achpr.org/network/nhri/ (21 August 2013). 
1332
According to section 232 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, these institutions include the Zimbabwe 
Electoral Commission, Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission, Zimbabwe Gender Commission, 
Zimbabwe Media Commission and the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission.  
1333
Section 181 of the Constitution of South Africa establishes a number of institutions which are 
independent organs with a general mandate of strengthening constitutional democracy in South Africa. 
These institutions are independent and subject only to the Constitution and are accountable to Parliament 
and must report on their activities and the performance of their functions to the House of Assembly at 
least once a year.  
1334
Section 233 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.  
1335
Section 235 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.  
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interference with their activities.1336 The Constitution also mandates members of the 
independent Commissions to be non-political.1337 Although the other independent 
institutions mentioned in the Constitution also play a role in the protection and 
promotion of human rights, this thesis will mainly focus on the Zimbabwe Human Rights 
Commission which has the primary role of promoting and protecting human rights in the 
country. Although the Lancaster House Constitution provided for a Human Rights 
Commission1338, the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission was only established in 
2009, after 29 years of democracy. The Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission only 
began to function in March 2010 when the President appointed the Chairman and other 
members of the Commission1339 and became fully operation in 2012 after the passing of 
enabling legislation.1340  
The functions of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission are dealt with under section 
243 of the Constitution.1341 The Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission has a general 
mandate of promoting awareness and respect for human rights and the realisation of 
such rights. However, it should be noted that the fact that the Constitution has 
established a fully operational Human Rights Commission with enabling legislation, will 
                                                          
1336
Section 235(3) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.  
1337
Section 236 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
1338
Section 100R of the Lancaster House Constitution  
1339
Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission ‗Bill Watch: The Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission‘ 
http://www.swradioafrica.com/pages/billwatch120410.htm (Accessed 21 August 2013). 
1340
Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Act 2 of 2012.  
1341
Section 243 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe states that ‗(1) The Zimbabwe Human Rights 
Commission has the following functions- (a) to promote awareness of and respect for human rights and 
freedoms at all levels of society; (b) to promote the protection, development and attainment of human 
rights and freedoms; (c) monitor, assess and ensure observance of human rights and freedoms; (d) to 
receive and consider complaints from the public and to take such action in regard to the complaints as it 
considers appropriate; (e) to protect the public against abuse and maladministration by Sate and public 
institutions and by officers of those institutions; (f) to investigate the conduct of any authority or person, 
where it is alleged that any of the human rights and freedoms set out in the Declaration of Rights has 
been violated by the authority or person; (g) to secure appropriate redress, including recommending 
prosecution of offenders, where human rights or freedoms have been violated; (h) to direct the 
Commissioner-General of Police to investigate cases of suspected criminal violations of human rights or 
freedoms and to report to the Commission on the results of such investigations; (i) to recommend to 
Parliament effective measures to promote human rights and freedoms; (j) to conduct research into issues 
relating to human rights and freedoms and social justice; and (k) to visit and inspect (i) prisons, places of 
detention, refugee camps and related facilities; and (ii) places where mentally disordered or intellectually 
handicapped persons are detained.‘ See also section 9 of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Act 
2 of 2012 which gives jurisdiction to the Human Rights Commission. However, the jurisdiction of the 
Commission with regards to investigating human rights abuses is limited to only matters that arose from 
13
th
 February 2009.  
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not automatically guarantee the effective protection and promotion of human rights. In 
emphasising this point, Reif notes that: 
‗National human rights institutions may be established by a government with the best of 
intentions, such as when a state is making the transition to democratic government, or 
consolidating its democratic structure, or when established democracies wish to fine tune 
their institutions. However, national human rights institutions can be established by 
governments that are not democratic or by governments who want to give the 
appearance that they are taking steps to improve the human rights and administrative 
justice situation in their countries, while the reality is that there is little material change 
after the institution starts operations.‘
1342
 
The success of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission in effectively protecting and 
promoting human rights goes deeper than its mere establishment. Reif notes that for 
any human rights institution to effectively discharge its functions, there are a number of 
factors, which include legal, political, financial and social factors that need to be 
addressed.1343 These factors are analysed below. 
6.3.1.1 Independence 
The first crucial issue is that the government of Zimbabwe should ensure that the 
Human Rights Commission is independent. Independence is the attribute that underpins 
a national institution‘s legitimacy and credibility and contributes to an institution‘s 
effective discharge of its functions.1344 It is therefore important that the government 
respects the independence of the Commission and recognises the importance of such 
independence in ensuring that the Commission conducts its functions effectively. In 
seeking to maintain such independence the government must ensure that the 
appointment of members of the Commission is done impartially1345 and that such 
members have extensive knowledge of human rights issues and international law. 
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Reif LC (2000) 23. 
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Reif LC (2000) 23. 
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United Nations Centre for Human National Human Rights Institutions: A Handbook on the 
Establishment and Strengthening of National Institutions for the Promotion and protection of Human 
Rights Professional Training Series NP.4 U.N Doc HR/P/PT 4 (1995) 37. 
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See Section 242 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe states that ‗(1) There is a commission to be known 
as the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission consisting of- (a) a chairperson appointed by the President 
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6.3.1.1.1 Appointment of Chairperson of the Human Rights Commission 
Impartiality with regards to the appointment of the members of the Commission is an 
issue that raises questions. This is so because in appointing the Chairperson of the 
Human Rights Commission, the President is not bound by the advice of the JSC and 
the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders. Section 242(3) of the Constitution also 
states that: 
‗If the appointment of a chairperson to the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission is not 
consistent with a recommendation of the JSC, the President must cause the Committee 
on Standing Rules and Orders to be informed as soon as practicable.‘ 
The Constitution is, however, silent on why the Committee must be informed in such 
instance and the appropriate action that the Committee has to take if such a decision is 
made.  The suspicion of partisan appointments in this regard cannot be dismissed with 
regards to such unilateral appointments.  Perhaps a more transparent model of 
appointment, as the one used in South Africa, could have been adopted to effect 
impartial appointments.1346 For example, the appointment of the former Chairperson of 
the Human Rights Commission, Jacob Mudenda, caused controversy as there were 
reports that constitutional procedures were not followed in his appointment.1347 The 
credibility of the appointment of Jacob Mudenda was also called into question as the 
Chairperson was a former Governor of Matabeleland North during the Gukurahundi 
massacres. His political allegiance to the ruling party has seen him being elected as a 
ZANU-PF Member of Parliament in the recently held elections and subsequently as the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Orders; and (b) eight other members appointed by the President from a list of not fewer than twelve 
nominees submitted by the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders.‘ 
1346
See section 193(4) of the Constitution of South Africa states that ‗The President, on the 
recommendation of the National Assembly must appoint the Public Protector, the Auditor-General and the 
members of (a) the South African Human Rights Commission; (b) the Commission for Gender Equality; 
and (c) the Independent Electoral Commission.‘ 
1347
Newsday „Mugabe, Tsvangirai Misfire‘ February 20, 2013.  
http://www.newsday.co.zw/2013/02/20/mugabe-tsvangirai-misfire/ (Accessed 22 August 2013). The MDC-
M led by Welshman Ncube alleged that they were not consulted and neither was the Committee on 
Standing Rules and Orders consulted in the appointment of the current Chairperson of the Human Rights 
Commission. The appointment was as a result in violation of section 237 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
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Speaker of Parliament whilst holding the office of the Chairperson of the Zimbabwe 
Human Rights Commission.1348  
Allegations of corruption and close links with the ruling party have also been levelled 
against the Chairperson of the Commission, thus questioning the credibility of his 
appointment.1349 Reif is of the view that the personal character of the person(s) 
appointed to head a Human Rights Commission is an important contributory factor in 
ensuring that the institution is able to discharge its duties effectively.1350 Taking into 
consideration the close relationship that Mr. Mudenda enjoyed with the government, 
there was a risk that the Commission might have been politicised. Reif notes that it is 
important that individuals with an established history of independence from government 
should be appointed to head human rights institutions.1351 As such, any future 
appointments to the Zimbabwe Human Rights must ensure that individuals with credible 
credentials, who are fit and proper and without any government links are appointed to 
head the Commission. This will ensure that the independence of the institution is 
established and that individuals are able to carry out their duties in a non-partisan 
manner.  
6.3.1.1.2 Appointment of Other Members of the ZHRC 
Other members of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission are appointed by the 
President from a list that is submitted by the Committee on Standing Rules and 
Orders.1352 Considering the fact that ZANU-PF won a majority in the recently held 
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Newsday „Mugabe, Tsvangirai Misfire‘ February 20, 2013.  
http://www.newsday.co.zw/2013/02/20/mugabe-tsvangirai-misfire/ (Accessed 22 August 2013). See also 
New Zimbabwe ‗MDC-T MPs to Boycott Parliament Opening‘ 27 August 2013  
 http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-12173-MDC-T+to+boycott+parliament+opening/news.aspx 
(Accessed 26 August 2013). 
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Newsday „Mugabe, Tsvangirai Misfire‘ February 20, 2013.  
http://www.newsday.co.zw/2013/02/20/mugabe-tsvangirai-misfire/ (Accessed 22 August 2013). 
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Reif LC (2000) 24. 
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Reif LC (2000) 27. 
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Section 242(1)(b) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. See also Section 150(2) of the Constitution of 
Zimbabwe deals with the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders. It states that ‗the Committee on 
Standing Rules and Orders must consist of the Speaker and President of the Senate and the following 
Members of Parliament- (a) the Deputy Speaker; (b) the Deputy President of the Senate; (c) the Minister 
responsible for finance and two other Ministers appointed by the President; (d) the Leader of Government 
in each House; (e) the leader of the Opposition in each House; (f) the Chief Whips of all the political 
parties represented in each House; (g) the President of the National Council of Chiefs; (h) two Members 
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elections, its members will form a large percentage of the individuals appointed to the 
Committee on Standing Rules and Orders. Although members of the opposition sit on 
the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders, their limited number in this regard might 
result in them having a limited say on who gets appointed to the Zimbabwe Human 
Rights Commission. Such a limited say might therefore result in the appointment of 
partisan individuals who will have close ties to government. If such appointments are 
made, the independence of the whole institution will be questioned and this might 
therefore have a negative impact on the promotion and protection of human rights by 
the institution. Efforts therefore need to be made to ensure that members of the 
Committee on Standing Rules and Orders are non-partisan when dealing with such 
appointments. Party politics should therefore not play a role in the appointment of 
members of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission.  
In order to ensure impartiality, the Constitution of Zimbabwe has put into place 
measures that at least seek to guarantee transparency in the appointment process.1353 
Despite the political imbalance with regards to the Committee on Standing Rules and 
Orders, such measures will at least seek to ensure that a degree of impartiality in the 
appointment process is observed. It is therefore crucial that any future appointments to 
the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission must not be based on political considerations 
but must be made on merit as envisaged by the Constitution.1354 It is the duty of the 
President therefore to ensure that fit and proper individuals with extensive knowledge of 
human rights are chosen to contribute towards the improvement of the promotion and 
protection of human rights in the country. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
who are not Ministers or Deputy Ministers, one being a Senator appointed to the committee by the 
President of the Senate and one being a Member of the National Assembly appointed by the Speaker; 
and (i) eight Members who are not Ministers or Deputy Ministers, four elected to the committee by the 
Senate and four elected by the National Assembly.‘ 
1353
Section 237 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe states that ‗(1) For the purpose of nominating persons for 
any appointment to any independent Commission, the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders must- 
(a) advertise the position; (b) invite the public to make nominations; (c) conduct public interviews of 
prospective candidates; (d) prepare a list of the appropriate number of nominees for appointment; and (e) 
submit the list to the President.‘  
1354
See section 242(4) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.  
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6.3.1.1.3 Enabling Environment 
In order to enhance the independence of the ZHRC, it is also important that members of 
the Commission must be given an enabling free environment to discharge their duties 
without any political hindrance.1355 Members of the Commission should exercise their 
powers without the fear of dismissal or non-reappointment. Commissioners of the 
Human Rights Commission are granted security of tenure in order to ensure that they 
exercise their duties without any fear of being removed from office.1356 Commissioners 
thus have clearly defined terms of office in order to ensure that they discharge their 
duties without fear or favour.1357 More importantly the Constitution protects members of 
any independent Commission from arbitrary removal from office.1358 As a result 
members of independent Commissions can only be removed from office on the grounds 
provided for in the Constitution and proper procedure has to be followed in that 
regard.1359 However, the independence of the Commission might be compromised in 
the sense that the President is given the authority to remove members of the Human 
Rights Commission and to appoint members of the tribunal to hear the matter of the 
removal of a member of the Commission.1360 Since the President solely constitutes the 
tribunal it is possible that political considerations can play a part in the removing of 
Commissioners.  
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Section 235(1)(a) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. See also section 7 of the Zimbabwe Human Rights 
Commission Act which deals with the independence and impartiality of the Commission and 
Commissioners.  
1356
See section 3(1) of First Schedule of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Act 2 of 2012 states 
that: ‗A Commissioner shall hold office for a term of five years and shall be eligible for reappointment for 
another term of office not exceeding five years.‘ 
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International Council on Human Rights Assessing the Effectiveness of National Human Rights 
Institutions (2005) 12. 
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Section 237(2) of the Constitution states that: ‗A member of an independent Commission may be 
removed from office only on the ground that the member concerned- (a) is unable to perform the 
functions of his or her office because of physical or mental incapacity; (b) has been grossly incompetent; 
(c) has been guilty of gross misconduct; or (d) has become ineligible for appointment to the Commission 
concerned. (3) The procedure for the removal of judges from office applies to the removal from office of a 
member of an independent Commission.‘ See also section 20 of the Zimbabwe Human Rights 
Commission Act which deals with the removal of members of the Human Rights Commission. 
1359
See section 187 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe which deals with the procedure for the removal of 
judges.   
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See section 20(4) of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Act states that: ‗The tribunal referred 
in this section shall consist of a chairperson and two other members appointed by the President...‘ 
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In order to ensure that the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission is able to discharge its 
duties effectively, the Zimbabwe government needs to ensure that the Commission has 
adequate resources, its members are adequately remunerated, that the institution itself 
is financially independent, and that any public funds should not be under the direct 
control of the government.1361 Zimbabwe has over the last decade faced massive 
economic challenges. Such challenges have already had a negative impact on the 
Commission, with the former Chairperson of the Commission, Reg Austin, resigning and 
citing the lack of facilities, including an office for the Commission, amongst the reasons 
thereof.1362 Thus, the provision of adequate resources to the Commission will prove to 
be a big challenge that the government of Zimbabwe needs to address taking into 
consideration the severe financial challenges that the country has been facing over the 
years.1363 Adequate remuneration needs to be provided in order to ensure 
professionalism within the institution. Concerted efforts should be made to ensure that 
sufficient financial resources are made available to the Commission. Such funds should 
therefore be made available either through local funding or through donations, grants or 
loans made by the governments of other countries. However, considering Zimbabwe‘s 
political relations with other countries, especially Western countries, such funding might 
seem difficult to access.  An improvement in political relations with other countries will 
go a long way to securing such funds. 
6.3.1.2 Accessibility 
The accessibility factor requires that national human rights institutions must be 
accessible to citizens, with the public having knowledge of the institution, its physical 
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The issue of funding of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission is dealt with under section 17 of the 
Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Act 2 of 2002.  
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News24 ‗Zimbabwe Appoints New Rights, Elections Chief‘ February 02, 2013. 
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(Accessed 22 August 2013). 
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UNDP and EC Support for the Strengthening of the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and the 
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location and the diversity of its composition.1364 The accessibility of the Zimbabwe 
Human Rights Commission is crucial in order to ensure that individuals who are 
exposed to human rights violations or non- fulfilment of their rights can seek redress.1365 
It is also crucial that information should be readily available about the role and purpose 
of any Commission.  In order to enhance accessibility national offices need to be 
opened across all the provinces in Zimbabwe and such information should be 
disseminated through the public media. This will ensure that Zimbabweans are aware of 
the existence of such an institution and the purpose that it seeks to serve. The fact that 
the former Chairperson of the Commission, Reg Austin, cited the lack of offices for the 
Commission as one of his reasons for resignation implies that efforts need to be made 
to ensure that the work of the Commission is spread across the country. Adequate 
resources should therefore be made available for such effort to take place. The 
appointment of staff to the Commission should also reflect the diverse cultures in 
Zimbabwe in order to improve accessibility of the Commission. The accessibility of the 
Commission countrywide will also ensure that it is able to carry out general education 
programmes on human rights issues for the general populace. Such programmes will 
ensure that the people of Zimbabwe are taught human rights issues and the aim and 
scope of the Commission with regards to human rights promotion and protection. Such 
education programmes will therefore ensure that individuals know the exact steps to 
take in cases where their rights are violated.   
6.3.1.3 Mandate of the Commission 
Since the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission is charged with the promotion and 
protection of human rights, it is important that the Commission must be given a broader 
mandate. Such broader mandate will ensure that it carries out its functions efficiently. 
Reif notes that such broader mandate will ensure that there are no jurisdictional 
conflicts with other State institutions and also ensure that the police and other security 
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Reif L.C (2000) 26. 
1365
International Council on Human Rights (2005) 16. 
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forces, and prisons which are often the sources of human rights problems, are included 
within the jurisdiction of the institution.1366 
Thus, the Constitution of Zimbabwe grants the Commission a broader mandate with 
regards to the protection and promotion of human rights. In accordance with the Paris 
Principles, the Commission is mandated to receive complaints on any alleged human 
rights violations in the country.1367 The Commission is also mandated with investigating 
the conduct of any person or authority, where it is alleged that any of the rights and 
freedoms set out in the Declaration of Rights have been violated.1368 The Commission is 
given the powers to gather information and evidence and in the process of gathering 
such, the Commission is given a number of powers which include, to require witnesses 
to appear before it1369, and the powers to visit all places of detention to ascertain the 
conditions of such places.1370 In addition the Commission is mandated with securing the 
appropriate redress for such complaints and to recommend the prosecution of 
offenders, where human rights have been violated.1371 The broader powers that are 
given to the Commission will therefore enable it to deal with individual cases and also 
ensure that such violations of human rights are addressed. The constitutional guarantee 
of such powers will further enhance the promotion and protection of human rights and 
further ensure that the Commission is able to discharge its duties efficiently.  
6.3.1.4 Accountability 
The accountability of any independent institution dealing with human rights is essential 
in ensuring the effectiveness of such institution in the promotion and protection of 
human rights. Accountability is usually implemented by imposing a legal duty on the 
                                                          
1366
Reif LC (2000) 25. See also section 243(1)(h) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe which gives the 
Commission to direct the Commissioner-General of Police to investigate suspected cases of human rights 
violations and to report back to the Commission the results of such investigations. See also section 
243(1)(k)(i) and (ii) which also gives the Commission the power to visit prisons, places of detention, 
refugee camp in order to ascertain the conditions under which persons are kept and make any 
recommendations regarding those conditions to the Minister responsible for administering the law to 
those places. 
1367
See section 243(1)(d) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.  
1368
See section 243(1)(e) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
1369
See Section 241 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.  
1370
See section 243(1)(k)(i) and (ii) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.  
1371
See section 243(1)(g) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
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institutions to regularly report on their work to a State body directly (Parliament or 
Parliamentary Committees).1372 Reif emphasises the point that accountability to the 
public is also essential and such can be carried out by ensuring that annual and special 
reports are distributed in the public sphere and through regular communication between 
the institution and complainants during investigations.1373 
In seeking to enhance the accountability of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission, 
sections 2441374 and 3231375 of the Constitution recognise the importance of the 
Commission to report to Parliament about its operations and activities. Parliament is 
given the legal duty to consider reports submitted by the Zimbabwe Human Rights 
Commission. Such checks will ensure that Parliament is able to ensure that the 
Commission is fulfilling its constitutional obligations. The mechanism will strengthen the 
work of the Commission and also ensure that it is properly accountable in relation to its 
mandate.1376 
6.4 Respecting the Role of Human Rights Defenders and Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) in Zimbabwe 
6.4.1 Human Rights Defenders  
Besides the role played by NHRIs, human rights defenders and NGOs also play an 
important role in assisting victims of human rights violations and serve as a crucial link 
between victims and the State. The United Nations defines human rights defenders as 
‗people who, individually or with others, act to promote or protect human rights.‘1377 This 
                                                          
1372
Gregory R ‗Building an Ombudsman Scheme: Provisions and Operation Practices‘ (1994) 12 
Ombudsman Journal 83-116. 
1373
Reif LC (2000) 27. See also International Council on Human Rights (2005) 23. 
1374
Section 244(2) of the Constitution states that ‗In addition to the report it is required to submit in terms 
of section 323, the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission may, through the appropriate Minister, submit 
reports to Parliament on particular matters relating to human rights and freedoms which , in the 
Commission‘s opinion, should be brought to the attention of Parliament.‘ 
1375
Section 323 of the Constitution states that ‗(1) Every Commission must submit to Parliament, through 
the responsible Minister, an annual report describing fully its operations and activities, the report being 
submitted not later than the end of March in the year following the year to which the report relates. (2) An 
Act of Parliament may require a Commission to submit further reports in addition to the annual report 
specified in subsection (1), and may prescribe the way in which reports are to be submitted.‘ 
1376
International Council on Human Rights (2005) 23. 
1377
United Nations ‗Human Rights Defenders: Protecting the Right to Defend Human Rights Fact Sheet 
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broad definition encompasses professional as well as non- professional human rights 
workers , volunteers, journalists exposing human rights violations, lawyers, and anyone 
carrying out, even on an occasional basis, a human rights activity.1378 The role of 
human rights defenders includes investigating and gathering information regarding 
human rights violations and reporting them, supporting victims of human rights 
violations, and conducting human rights education and training.1379 
The work and importance of human rights defenders has over the years received 
international recognition. As a result a number of international instruments have been 
put into place to protect the work of human rights defenders around the world. The main 
instrument that protects the rights of human rights defenders is known as the United 
Nations Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs 
of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognised Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (commonly known as the Declaration on Human Rights 
Defenders).1380  
The Declaration sets out international standards that seek to protect the activities of 
human rights defenders around the world. The Declaration protects the rights of human 
rights defenders around the world and these rights include, amongst many others, the 
right to discuss and develop human rights ideas and advocate for their acceptance1381, 
the right to criticise government bodies and agencies and to make proposals to improve 
their functioning1382, and the right to provide legal assistance or other advice and 
assistance in defence of human rights.1383 States have the responsibility of 
implementing and respecting all the provisions of the Declaration. States also have a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet29en.pdf (Accessed 31 August 2013). 
1378
See the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to 
Promote and Protect Universally Recognised Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
1379
United Nations ‗Human Rights Defenders: Protecting the Right to Defend Human Rights Fact Sheet 
No.29.‟  
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet29en.pdf (Accessed 31 August 2013). 
1380
G.A. res .53/144, annex 53 U.N GAOR Supp., U.N. Doc. U.N. DOC. A/RES/53/144 (1999). 
1381
Article 7 of the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of 
Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognised Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.  
1382
Article 9(3)(c) of the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of 
Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognised Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
1383
Article 8(2) of the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of 
Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognised Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
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duty to protect human rights defenders against any violence, retaliation and intimidation 
and such duty is not only limited to actions by State bodies and officials but also to 
actions of non-State actors.1384  
In an effort to support the work of human rights defenders, the Office of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders was established in August 
2000. The Office was established to provide support for the implementation of the 
Declaration and to gather information on the situation of human rights defenders around 
the world.1385 The duties of the Special Rapporteur include, amongst others, seeking, 
receiving, examining and responding to information on the situation and the rights of 
anyone, acting individually or in association with others to promote and protect human 
rights; and establishing cooperation and conducting dialogue with governments and 
other interested actors on the promotion and effective implementation of the Declaration 
on Human Rights Defenders. Recently the General Assembly has also adopted a 
resolution protecting human rights defenders.1386 The resolution urges States to create 
a safe and enabling environment in which human rights defenders can operate free 
from hindrance and insecurity.  
The African Commission in 2004 also established the Special Rapporteur on Human 
Rights Defenders.1387 The mandate of the Special Rapporteur includes seeking, 
receiving, examining and acting upon information on the situation of human rights 
defenders in Africa. The Special Rapporteur is also mandated to submit reports at every 
session of the African Commission and to raise awareness and promote the 
implementation of the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders in Africa.  
 
 
                                                          
1384
Article 2 of the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of 
Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognised Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
1385
See Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2000/61. 
1386
General Assembly Resolution A/HRC/22/L.13. 
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African Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights ‗Special Rapporteur on Human Rights 
Defenders.‘ 
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6.4.2 Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)1388 
Marcinkute notes that the existing gap between human rights norms and the 
enforcement of these norms has over the years provided space for human rights NGOs 
to play a crucial role in the promotion and protection of human rights.1389 Article 71 of 
the United Nations Charter provides a legal basis for the activities of NGOs.1390 
Charnovitz notes that the consultative norms in Article 71 of the U.N Charter have over 
the years influenced institutional developments in many international organisations 
around the world.1391 For example, the Organisation of American States (OAS) in 1999 
adopted the Guidelines for the Participation of Civil Society Organisations in OAS 
Activities.1392 The Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) in 2001 called for the 
establishment of an advisory Economic, Social and Cultural Council which would 
encompass social and professional groups of the Member States.1393 As such in the 
modern day NGOs have assumed a crucial role with regards to the promotion and 
protection of human rights. With the increased role of NGOs in human rights protection, 
questions have been raised about their effect on the efficient protection of human rights 
and on the State, which through the use of sovereignty has a monopoly on decisions of 
how its citizens are treated.1394 Despite this, it cannot be denied that NGOs around the 
world perform a vital role in the promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of 
law as an integral component of a strong civil society.  
  
                                                          
1388
Charnovitz S ‗Non-governmental Organisations and International Law‘ in Bianchi A Non State Actors 
and International Law (2009) 350 describes NGO‘s as groups of persons or of societies freely created by 
private initiative, that pursue an interest in matters that occur or transcend national borders and are not 
profit seeking. 
1389
Marcinkute L ‗The Role of Human Rights NGO‘s: Human Rights Defenders or State Sovereignty 
Destroyers‘ (2011) 4:2 Baltic Journal of Law and Politics 52 54. 
1390
Article 71 of the United Nations Charter states that ‗the Economic and Social Council may make 
suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organisations which are concerned with 
matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organisations and, 
where appropriate, with national organisations after consultation with the member of the United Nations.‘ 
1391
Charnovitz S (2009) 350. 
1392
CP/RES.759 (1217/99). 
1393
See Article 22 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union: Adopted in 2000 at the Lome Summit 
(Togo) entered into force in 2001.  
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NGOs have made a significant contribution to the formulation and development of 
international human rights law through international litigation, instituting or intervening in 
cases as parties, serving as experts, and testifying as witness.1395 NGOs are also 
consistently involved in monitoring States to ensure that they comply with their 
obligations under international law. In order to ensure that States abide by their 
international law obligations, NGOs are responsible for gathering information with 
respect to the abuse of human rights and freedoms. Such information is gathered from 
the public, governments and other domestic institutions empowered with the protection 
of human rights, and NGOs use such information to make enquiries verifying such 
human rights violations. The gathering of such information therefore makes it important 
that NGOs should work closely with established domestic institutions so as to ensure 
effective promotion and protection of human rights.1396 NGOs also assist victims with 
the redressing of violations, through counselling, rehabilitation and reintegration 
schemes, and providing psycho-social, medical, socio-economic and other assistance. 
The advocacy work of NGOs on behalf of victims of human rights violations contributes 
to the prevention of human rights violations.1397  
However, despite the importance of the work of Human Rights Defenders and NGOs in 
human rights promotion and protection, their work in Zimbabwe has over the years been 
severely frustrated. Human Rights Defenders and NGOs have over the years faced 
enormous obstacles in the country in their quest to promote and protect human rights. 
Such obstacles have ranged from torture, unexplained disappearances and the use of 
restrictive laws to silence their activities. Over the years human rights defenders have 
been harassed, marginalised and become victims of repeated human rights violations. 
More worryingly such violations of human rights have been done with impunity.1398  
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Mertus J ‗From Legal Transplants to Transformative Justice: Human Rights and the Promise of 
Transitional Civil Society (2011) 15:5 American University Journal of International Law 1336 1369. 
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Welch CE NGOs and Human Rights: Promise and Performance (2001) 5.  
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Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) ‗Supplementary Dimension Meeting, 
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Lawyers taking up human rights cases in Zimbabwe have also been subjected to arrest, 
abuse and torture for fighting for the protection of human rights. Such lawyers include 
Gabriel Shumba, a human rights lawyer who has been condemned to exile in South 
Africa for taking up human rights cases.1399 His successful communication before the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights in Gabriel Shumba v Republic of 
Zimbabwe1400  shows how he was tortured for taking up human rights cases. Other 
human rights lawyers, such as, Andrew Makoni, Alec Muchadehama and Beatrice 
Mtetwa, have all been subjected to arrests and threats for taking up human rights 
cases.1401 Human Rights Watch in its interviews with human rights lawyers in the 
country has revealed how lawyers in the country have been unwilling to take on human 
rights cases for fear of personal hazards associated with confronting government.1402 
Restrictive legislation has also been used to restrict the works of human rights 
defenders. Such legislation includes the Public Order and Security Act (POSA)1403 
which has mainly been used to ban public meetings and activities of civil society, thus 
restraining the freedom of peaceful assembly.1404 Other legislation, such as, the Access 
to Information and Protection of Privacy Act1405 and the Criminal Law (Law Reform and 
Codification) Act 1406, have also been used to threaten, harass, criminalise and 
intimidate human rights defenders.  
The work of NGOs in Zimbabwe has also been severely limited through the enactment 
of the Private Voluntary Organisations Act (PVOA).1407  The Act has been used to force 
NGOs involved in human rights work to register with the then Ministry of Public Service, 
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New Zimbabwe ‗Zimbabwe Lawyer Tells US Congress of Torture‘ 19 March 2004.  
http://www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/SHUMBA.1556.HTML (Accessed 31 August 2013). 
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Communication 288/2004. 
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See International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) (2012) 20. 
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Human Rights Watch (2008) 35. 
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Act 5 of 2002. 
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See sections 24-31 of POSA which contain provisions relating to public gatherings. Section 24 of 
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Labour and Social Welfare or risk prosecution.1408 It should be noted that registration in 
this case is not automatic as the government has the right to deny an organisation‘s 
right to registration after the examination of the organisation‘s financial books and 
records.1409 In order to control the activities of NGOs, the PVOA contains restrictions on 
foreign funding to civic organisations and such foreign funding was later banned in a 
later amendment to the Act.1410 Such measures have therefore crippled the operations 
of a majority of NGOs in Zimbabwe and as a result forced a number of them to shut 
down.1411 This has therefore impacted negatively on the promotion and protection of 
human rights in the country.  
The deteriorating relationship between the government and civil society also resulted in 
the government drafting, in 2004, the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) Bill1412, 
which sought to restrict the activities of civil society. Although the President did not sign 
the Bill into law1413, it sought to provide for an enabling environment for the operation, 
monitoring and regulation of all non-governmental organisations and to repeal the 
PVOA. The Bill included repressive measures that violated several provisions of the 
Lancaster House Constitution.1414 Amongst many repressive measures included in the 
Bill was the prohibition of all local NGOs from receiving any foreign funding to carry out 
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See section 6 of the PVO Act.  
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See section 20 of the PVO Act.  
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Private Voluntary Organisations Act 22 of 2001/Chapter 17:05 General Notice of 2007 –Code of 
Procedure for the Registration and Operations of Non-Governmental Organisations in Zimbabwe. 
1411
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The Namibian ‗Mugabe Rejects Notorious NGO Bill‘ 20 May 2005 
http://www.namibian.com.na/indexx.php?archive_id=16418&page_type=archive_story_detail&page=5216 
(Accessed 23 October 2013). 
1414
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expression of NGOs were therefore unreasonable and in direct violation of the Lancaster House 
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activities involving or including issues of governance.1415 The Bill also sought to prohibit 
foreign NGOs from registering if their sole or principle purpose involved or included 
issues of governance which are broadly defined to include the promotion and protection 
of human rights and political governance issues.1416 The United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, expressed great concern about the 
drafting of such laws that sought to limit the freedom of NGOs, and saw them as a 
serious threat to the respect for human rights.1417 A number of scholars expressed great 
concern about the Bill as it would have resulted in the closure of many NGOs around 
the country.  For example, Mapuva and Mapuva note that the threat of closure of NGOs 
would have had a negative effect on a number of projects that different NGOs had 
undertaken and as the government alone could not sustain most of these programmes it 
would have needed the assistance of such NGOs.1418 
The discussion above clearly highlights the importance of human rights defenders and 
civil society organisations in human rights protection. However, as discussed above, an 
unfriendly and hostile environment has been created by the government of Zimbabwe in 
seeking to destabilise the work of human rights defenders and civil society 
organisations. As a result this has had a negative impact on the promotion and 
protection of human rights in the country. It is therefore crucial that the government of 
Zimbabwe respects the Constitution and realise the importance of promoting and 
protecting fundamental rights and freedoms and the institutions established to give 
effect to such.  It is crucial that the Zimbabwean government must improve the 
operational environment of human rights defenders. By so doing this will ensure that the 
rights of human rights defenders enshrined in the UN Declaration of Human Rights 
Defenders are acknowledged by the government. The government should also ensure 
that lawyers are able to perform all their professional functions without any intimidation, 
hindrance, harassment or improper interference.1419 It is also imperative that the 
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See Clause 9(1) of the Non-Governmental Organisation Bill. 
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See clause 9(4) of the Non-Governmental Organisation Bill.  
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UN News Centre ‗Restrictions on NGOs Worldwide Undermining Human Rights‘ 25 April 2012.  
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41858 (Accessed 31 August 2013).  
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security of lawyers must be adequately safeguarded by local authorities in cases where 
such security is threatened as a result of lawyers discharging their functions.1420 
It is also crucial that the government of Zimbabwe must amend or repeal any repressive 
legislation that has been used to negatively affect the work of human rights defenders 
and NGOs. As has been noted above, repressive legislation has been used in 
Zimbabwe to silence dissent, perpetrate human rights violations, and place the 
fundamental rights of Zimbabweans under siege. Repressive legislation has been used 
to systematically harass, arrest and torture with impunity those perceived to be 
supporting the political opposition as well as those who expose human rights violations. 
The amendment or repeal of such legislation must be made a priority by the recently 
constituted Parliament as such legislation is in violation of a number of provisions of the 
Constitution.1421 Since the Constitution is granted supremacy status1422, a number of 
provisions in the repressive legislation are therefore inconsistent with the Constitution 
and should be amended or repealed. Such measures will no doubt bode well for the 
improvement of the promotion and protection of human rights in Zimbabwe and allow 
human rights defenders and NGOs to conduct their duties without any hindrance.  
6.5 Upholding and Maintaining the Independence of the National Prosecuting 
Authority (NPA) 
The Constitution of Zimbabwe creates a National Prosecuting Authority (NPA)1423 to 
replace the office of the Attorney General (AG) which was established under the 
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See Principle 19 of the Basic Principle on the Role of Lawyers 2003. 
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See for example section 58 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe which states that ‗(1) Every person has 
the right to freedom of assembly and association and the right not to associate with others‖. See also 
section 61 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe which states that ―(1) Every person has the right to freedom of 
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discharging any functions that are necessary or incidental to such prosecutions.‘ 
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Lancaster House Constitution. The AG‘s office was charged with instituting and 
undertaking criminal proceedings before any court in Zimbabwe.1424 The AG‘s office 
was supposed to be an independent institution that played a great role in the protection 
of human rights through the prosecution of perpetrators of human rights violations. 
However, there were great concerns about the independence and impartiality of the 
institution. This is so because there were reports that the AG‘s office had lost its 
impartiality especially in cases dealing with political violence.1425 Human Rights Watch 
has reported how prosecutors have over the years been at the centre of abuse of the 
law through the denial of bail1426 to MDC supporters and through the practice of 
selective prosecution of perpetrators of human rights violations.1427 According to Human 
Rights Watch, the AG‘s office had adopted a policy and practice in ―political‖ cases to 
oppose bail in all circumstances, regardless of the merits of each individual case.1428 
Instructions were given by the AG‘s office to all prosecutors to ensure that as a matter 
of policy and as a deterrent to other ―would be offenders‖1429 that no person accused of 
committing or inciting political violence should be granted bail.1430 Thus, the use of 
section 121 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act (CPEA)1431 has been seen as a 
substitute to detention mechanisms and has also been in contravention of the principle 
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Section 76(4) of the Lancaster House Constitution. 
1425
Human Rights Watch (2008) 22. 
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Whilst section 117 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act (CPEA) Chapter 9:07 states that bail 
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that an accused person shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty by a competent 
court of law.1432 
In an effort to improve the prosecution of crimes and human rights violations in the 
country, the Constitution of Zimbabwe now establishes a NPA. The NPA is headed by 
the Prosecutor-General.1433 In order to ensure that there is impartiality in the 
appointment of the head of the NPA, the Constitution stipulates that such appointment 
is made by the President on the advice of the JSC following the procedure for the 
appointment of a judge.1434 In this case it therefore means that the President is bound 
by the advice of the JSC. This will therefore ensure a degree of transparency in the 
appointment of the Prosecutor-General and ensure that appointments are impartial and 
free from any political interference. In order to secure the independence of the 
Prosecutor-General, the Constitution guarantees security of tenure1435and provides that 
removal conditions of judges apply to the removal of the Prosecutor-General. 1436 
In order to ensure that the Prosecutor-General conducts his or her duties without any 
external interference, section 260 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe provides for the 
independence of the Prosecutor-General. The sections states that: 
‗(1) Subject to this Constitution, the Prosecutor-General- (a) is independent and is not 
subject to the direction or control of anyone; and (b) must exercise his or her functions 
impartially and without fear, favour, prejudice or bias. (2) The Prosecutor-General must 
formulate and publicly disclose the general principles by which he or she decides whether 
and how to institute and conduct criminal proceedings.‘ 
                                                          
1432
See section 69 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe which states that ‗(1) Every person accused of an 
offence has the right to a fair and public trial within a reasonable time before an independent and impartial 
court.‘ See also section 18(3) (a) of the Lancaster House Constitution stated that ‗Every person who is 
charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed to be innocent until he is proved or has pleaded guilty.‘ 
See also Article 14(2) of the ICCPR which states that ‗Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall 
have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.‘  
1433
Section 259(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.  
1434
Section 259(3) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.  
1435
See section 259(5) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.  
1436
See section 259(7) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.  
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The constitutional guarantees of the independence of the Prosecutor-General and 
security of tenure are welcome developments that will go a long way in ensuring that he 
or she conducts their duties without fear or favour.1437  
The Constitution also ensures that the Prosecutor-General and officers of the NPA must 
act in accordance with the Constitution and the law in the discharge of their duties.1438 
In seeking to ensure the independence and impartiality of the NPA, section 261 
provides a number of guidelines. It states that: 
‗(2) No officer of the National Prosecuting Authority may, in the exercise of his or her 
functions- (a) act in a partisan manner; (b) further the interests of any political party or 
cause; (c) prejudice the lawful interests of any political party or cause; or (d) violate the 
fundamental rights or freedoms of any person. (3) Officers of the National Prosecuting 
Authority must not be active members or office-bearers of any political party or 
organisation. (4) An Act of Parliament may make further provision to ensure the political 
neutrality of officers of the National Prosecuting Authority.‘ 
The above section therefore seeks to separate the functions of office bearers of the 
NPA from the realm of politics which has previously tarnished the credibility and 
impartiality of the AG‘s office. Such provisions and the accountability of the Prosecutor-
General to Parliament1439 will ensure that the institution is able to discharge its duties in 
a manner that will enhance justice.  
Although the Constitution makes a great effort to protect the independence of the NPA, 
it is important that the executive must also do the same. It is submitted that the 
executive must also seek to ensure that this independence is respected. The institution 
must not be used as an instrument to settle political scores as this will tarnish its image 
and affect its ability to conduct its constitutional mandate. Political will is therefore 
                                                          
1437
See section 259(7) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe states that ‗The provisions relating to the removal 
of a judge from office apply to the removal of the Prosecutor-General from office‖. See also section 259(8) 
of the Constitution of Zimbabwe which states that ‗the conditions of service of the Prosecutor-General, 
including his or her remuneration, must be provided for in an Act of Parliament, but the remuneration 
must not be reduced during the Prosecutor-General‘s tenure of office.‘ 
1438
Section 261 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
1439
See section 262 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe states that ‗The Prosecutor-General must submit to 
Parliament, through the appropriate Minister, an annual report on the operations and activities of the 
National Prosecuting Authority, the report being submitted not later than six months after the beginning of 
the year following the year to which the report relates.‘ 
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crucial in this instance to ensure that the NPA is able to discharge its constitutional 
duties without any fear or favour and in the process ensure that any violators of 
fundamental rights and freedoms, irrespective of their political affiliation, are brought to 
justice. Lack of political will in ensuring the protection of the independence of the NPA 
will result in a lack of public trust in the institution and hence a public distrust in the 
justice system. It is therefore important that there has to be a realisation by the 
Zimbabwean government that human rights constitute a fundamental element in any 
country‘s political, social and economic development.  
6.6 Improved Role of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 
Human Rights Protection in the Region 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a regional economic 
community in Southern Africa with the aim of creating a ‗Free Trade Area‘ amongst its 
members.1440 Zimbabwe is a State Party to the SADC Treaty. The SADC has over the 
years played a critical role in trying to resolve the political impasse in Zimbabwe.1441 It is 
from this role that, in trying to address and improve the human rights situation in the 
country, SADC should also have a role to fulfil and ensure that its Member States are in 
compliance with Article 4 (c) of the SADC Treaty which emphasises the promotion and 
protection of human rights, democracy and the rule of law.1442 Thus, the government of 
Zimbabwe as a Member State of SADC is bound by the provisions of the Treaty and as 
such SADC has a role in ensuring that Zimbabwe fulfils its Treaty obligations. However, 
that is not to say that the wider international community as a whole does not have a role 
to play in seeking to ensure that the culture of human rights protection is observed in 
Zimbabwe. It indeed has such, but the main focus on SADC is as a result of the 
proximity of the institution and the role it has assumed over the years in trying to end the 
political impasse in the country.  
 
                                                          
1440
Cowell F ‗The Death of the Southern African development Community Tribunal‘s Human Rights 
Jurisdiction‘  (2013) 13:1 Human Rights Law Review 153 153. 
1441
Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa ‗SADC‘s Role in Zimbabwe‘   
http://www.osisa.org/openspace/zimbabwe/sadcs-role-zimbabwe (Accessed 24 October 2013). 
1442
Article 4(c) of the SADC Treaty. 
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The SADC Treaty which was signed in 1992 established the Community‘s main 
administrative and political organs and the Treaty was adopted with the aim of 
promoting greater economic, political, and security co-operation within the region.1443 
Article 4 of the SADC Treaty elaborates on a number of principles that Member States 
must observe. Key amongst these principles is the importance of human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law.1444 It should also be noted that the SADC Treaty does 
not refer to any specific human rights instruments other than in the wording of Article 4 
of the Treaty.  
In an effort to promote peace, security and a culture of human rights, SADC adopted a 
number of policies that have recognised the importance of human rights.1445 The SADC 
Organ for Peace, Defence and Security was established in 1996 with its objectives 
including the promotion of peaceful settlement of disputes and the promotion and 
observance of human rights as provided for in the charters and conventions of the 
African Union (AU) and the United Nations.1446 The SADC Treaty in Article 9 also 
established the SADC Tribunal which has a primary role of ensuring adherence to and 
the proper implementation of the SADC Treaty and its subsidiary instruments as well as 
adjudicating on disputes. Although the SADC Treaty does not expressly grant the SADC 
Tribunal jurisdiction with regards to human rights complaints, the SADC Tribunal using a 
number of provisions in the SADC Treaty and SADC Protocol of the Tribunal and Rules 
of Procedure had the capacity to hear applications regarding human rights1447 in cases 
where individuals were not being protected by the legal system in their home state.  
                                                          
1443
See Preamble of the SADC Treaty. 
1444
Article 4 of the SADC Treaty states that ‗SADC and its Member States shall act in accordance with the 
following principles (a) sovereign equality of all Member States; (b) solidarity, peace and security; (c) 
human rights, democracy, and the rule of law; equity, balance and mutual benefit; (e) peaceful settlement 
of disputes.‘ 
1445
Cowell F (2013) 155. 
1446
Article 2(g) of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation 2001. 
1447
It should be noted that the Protocol of the Tribunal and Rules of Procedure of 2000 does not include in 
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal the issue of handling human rights cases. However, articles 17- 20 
elaborate on a series of complaints that the Tribunal may entertain, which include disputes between 
states and natural or legal persons. Article 15(2) of the Protocol of the Tribunal and Rules of Procedure of 
2000 also allows an applicant to bring an action against a state if they have exhausted all available 
remedies or unable to proceed within their domestic jurisdiction. The Preamble to the SADC Treaty also 
emphasises the importance of the guaranteeing of human rights, observance of human rights and the rule 
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However, such capacity was suspended in August 2012 and its jurisdiction to hear 
individual human rights complaints was as a result terminated.1448 This was after the 
Heads of Government meeting in 2012 passed a resolution stating that a new Protocol 
for the Tribunal had to be drafted and that in future its activities had to  be ‗confined to 
the interpretation of the SADC Treaty and Protocols relating to disputes between 
Member States.‘1449 The lack of a clear human rights jurisdiction for the Tribunal might 
have been an indicator as to why the SADC Summit decided to terminate such 
jurisdiction. However, Norlander believes that the decision to terminate the jurisdiction 
of the SADC Tribunal with regards to human rights can mainly be attributed to the fact 
that the Tribunal had become ‗inconvenient‘ for SADC Heads of Government as it had 
issued decisions that were viewed to be ‗too independent‘ for the liking of SADC 
leaders.1450 Some of these cases were against the government of Zimbabwe.  
A number of civil rights groups expressed great concern about the decision of the SADC 
Heads of Government and cited the fact that most national courts in the region were 
often packed with pliant judges and as a result the SADC Tribunal offered victims of 
human rights abuses an opportunity for impartial judgment and redress.1451 Although 
the SADC Tribunal dealt with a number of human rights cases, the lack of enforcement 
mechanisms hindered the Court‘s ability to effectively promote and protect human 
rights.  This is so despite the fact that Article 24 of the SADC Protocol of the Tribunal 
and Rules of Procedure states that the decisions of the Tribunal are final and binding 
and requires States to treat the SADC Tribunal decisions under the law of foreign 
judgments in their jurisdictions.1452 However, in cases of non-enforcement of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of law. See also Article 4(c) of the SADC Treaty which emphasises the importance of human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law. 
1448
Final Communique of the 32
nd
 Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government, Maputo, 
Mozambique, 18 August 2012.  
1449
Final Communique of the 32
nd
 Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government, Maputo, 
Mozambique, 18 August 2012.  
1450
Norlander J ‗Regional Organisations, Human Security, Human Rights and International Law 2011 
Development Dialogue 57.  
1451
Baobab Africa ‗Beheading the Monster‘ August 22, 2012.   
http://www.economist.com/blogs/baobab/2012/08/sadc-summit (Accessed 31 August 2013).  
1452
Article 32 of the SADC Protocol of the Tribunal and Rules of Procedure states that ‗The law and rules 
of civil procedure for the registration and enforcement of foreign judgments in force in the territory of the 
Member State in which the judgment is to be enforced shall govern the enforcement. (2) Member States 
and institutions of the Community shall take forthwith all measures necessary to ensure execution of 
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Tribunal‘s judgment, the Protocol of the SADC Tribunal and Rules of Procedure 
provides for such cases to be referred to the SADC Summit which would take 
appropriate action. However, the effectiveness of this mechanism has been questioned 
and labelled as a ‗tiger without teeth due to its ineffectiveness in addressing such 
issues‘.1453 
The ineffectiveness of the enforcement mechanism especially by the SADC Summit is 
mainly highlighted in the cases that Mike Campell brought to the SADC Tribunal 
challenging the land invasions in Zimbabwe in 2000. Mike Campell and other farm 
owners had their farms compulsorily acquired by the government in its implementation 
of the Land Reform Program. They brought a number of cases before the SADC 
Tribunal alleging that their rights under the Lancaster House Constitution had been 
violated.1454 Despite these judgments being granted in favour of Mike Campell and 
others, the Government of Zimbabwe refused to comply with the judgments and 
subsequent orders declaring that Zimbabwe was in breach and in contempt of the 
decisions of the Tribunal.1455 The President labelled the decision of the SADC Tribunal 
as being ‗nonsense and of no consequence.‘1456 As a result of continued violence, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
decisions of the Tribunal. (3) Decisions of the Tribunal shall be biding upon the parties to the dispute in 
respect of that particular case and enforceable within the territories of the Member States concerned. (4) 
Any failure by a Member of State to comply with a decision of the Tribunal may be referred to the Tribunal 
by any party concerned. (5) If the Tribunal establishes the existence of such failure, it shall report its 
finding to the Summit for the latter to take appropriate action.‘  
1453
Ruppel OC and Bangamwabo F ‗The SADC Tribunal: A Legal Analysis of its Mandate and Role in 
Regional Integration‘ (2009) 8 Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa Yearbook 179.  
1454
See Mike Campell (PTY) Limited v The Republic of Zimbabwe (2/07) [2007] SADCT 1 (13 December 
2007) where the applicants sought an interim measure from the Tribunal restraining the Zimbabwean 
government from, removing or allowing the removal of the applicants from their agricultural land. In the 
case the SADC Tribunal granted an interim order, ordering the Government of Zimbabwe to take no 
steps, or permit no steps to be taken, directly or indirectly, whether by its agents or by orders, to evict 
from or interfere with the peaceful residence and beneficial use of the farms belonging to the applicants. 
See also final judgment of Mike Campell (Pty) Ltd v Republic of Zimbabwe (2/2007) [2008] SADCT (28 
November 2008) where the Tribunal ruled in favour of Mike Campell and 77 other white farmers where 
the Tribunal stated that Zimbabwe was in breach of its obligations under articles 4(c) and 6(2) of the 
SADC Treaty. 
1455
Campell v Republic of Zimbabwe (SADC (T) 03/2009) [2009 SADCT 1 (5 June 2009). 
1456
American Renaissance ‗Mugabe Uses Birthday Bash to Rebuke White Farmers‘ 28 February 2009  
http://www.amren.com/mtnews/archives/2009/03/mugabe_uses_bir.php (Accessed 31 August 2013). See 
also Gramara (Pty) Ltd and Cloete v The Government of Zimbabwe and Others Zimbabwe High Court 
5483/09 (Unreported) where the application for the domestic registration of the SADC Tribunal judgments 
was dismissed as the High was not persuaded that the SADC Tribunal could entertain and adjudicate on 
cases of alleged violation of human rights committed by Member States against their nationals. The High 
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further farm invasions and the non-compliance with its decisions, the Tribunal in 
accordance with Article 32(5) of the SADC Protocol reported its findings to the SADC 
Head of State Summit1457 so that the Heads of State could take appropriate action 
against the Government of Zimbabwe. 
Despite the referral of the cases to the SADC Summit, the Zimbabwean government 
successfully lobbied other SADC Member States for the removal of the capacity of the 
SADC Tribunal to hear individual applications relating to human rights cases.1458 As a 
result of the removal of this jurisdiction the SADC Summit therefore failed to take any 
measures against the Government of Zimbabwe for its failure to fulfil its Treaty 
obligations with respect to promoting and protecting human rights. It should be noted 
that although the SADC Treaty states that sanctions for non-compliance with the 
provisions of the Treaty may be imposed, there is no specific sanction for non-
compliance with judgments of the SADC Tribunal.1459 Ndlovu notes that the decision of 
the SADC Summit to suspend the SADC Tribunal represents a failure by the Summit to 
guarantee the effectiveness of the Tribunal and reaffirm the mandate of the Tribunal by 
calling for the enforcement of its decisions.1460 Ndlovu also notes that a bad precedent 
has thus been set. This is so because the SADC Summit has allowed the principle of 
sovereignty to trump the wider interest of integration despite the fact that by being 
Member States of SADC, members had surrendered some sovereignty to the body.1461 
Cowell notes that the consensus to remove the jurisdiction of the SADC Tribunal with 
regards to hearing human rights cases has led to the weakening of the rule of law 
amongst SADC governments and will clearly jeopardise the protection of human rights 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Court was also of the view that the enforcement of the Tribunal‘s case would be inconsistent with the 
decision of the Supreme Court which had ruled that the farm invasions were lawful.  
1457
The Summit is the SADC‘s principal organ that is tasked with the responsibility of policy direction and 
control of SADC functions. 
1458
Cowell F (2013) 153. 
1459
See article 33 of the SADC Treaty states that ‗(1) Sanctions may be imposed against a Member State 
that; (a) persistently fails, without good reason, to fulfil obligations under this Treaty; (b) implements 
policies which under the principles and objectives of SADC; or  (c) is in arrears for more than one year in 
the payment of contributions to SADC, for reasons other than those caused by natural calamity or 
exceptional circumstances that gravely affect its economy, and has not secured the dispensation of the 
Summit. (2) The sanctions shall be determined by the Summit on a case-by-case basis.‘ 
1460
Ndlovu P ‗Campbell v Republic of Zimbabwe: A Moment of Truth for SADC Tribunal‘ (2011) 1 SADC 
Law Journal 63 78. 
1461
Ndlovu P (2011) 78. 
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in the region.1462 Nathan also states that the politics around the suspension of the 
Tribunal‘s human rights mandate has created the impression that, rather than human 
rights being a common core value of the Organisation, there was a ‗common 
commitment to state solidarity and regime protection.‘1463 
The importance of the establishment of the relevant SADC Tribunal and its importance 
in human rights protection is well articulated in the South African Constitutional Court 
case of Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick and Others.1464 The 
Constitutional Court highlighted the problem of the violation of human rights in Africa 
and stated that the SADC Tribunal had been established to promote and protect 
fundamental rights and freedoms. In response to the suspension of the capacity of the 
SADC Tribunal to hear human rights cases, Mogoeng J stated that: 
‗For the right or wrong reasons, or a combination of both, Africa has come to be known 
particularly by the western world as the dark Continent, a continent which has little regard 
for human rights, the rule of law and good governance. Apparently driven by a strong 
desire to contribute positively to the renaissance of Africa, shed its southern region of this 
development-inhibiting negative image, coordinate and give impetus to regional 
development, Southern African States established the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) with special emphasis on, among other things, the need to respect, 
protect and promote human rights, democracy and the rule of law.‘
1465
 
The Constitutional Court also further emphasised the importance of the SADC Tribunal 
and stated that it was the keystone of justiciability and was set up to ensure that no 
                                                          
1462
Cowell F (2013) 164. 
1463
Nathan L ‗Solidarity Triumphs over Democracy- The Dissolution of the SADC Tribunal‘ (2011) 57 
Development Dialogue 123 136.  
1464
2013 (5) SA 325 (CC); 2013 (10) BCLR 1103 (CC). In this case the Constitutional Court handed down 
a judgment dismissing an appeal against the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal. This was after the 
farmers who had won their case against the government of Zimbabwe in the SADC Tribunal had initially 
approached the North Gauteng High Court for registration and enforcement of the costs order in South 
Africa. The North Gauteng High Court had ordered the registration and execution of the costs order 
against the property of government of Zimbabwe in South Africa. Following the judgment of the North 
Gauteng High Court, the government of Zimbabwe also unsuccessfully appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Appeal (Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick and Others (2012) ZASCA 122) against the 
decision of the North Gauteng High Court. This led to the appeal to the Constitutional Court which 
dismissed the appeal and held that the North Gauteng High was correct in ordering that the enforcement 
of the cost order of the SADC Tribunal in South Africa.  
1465
Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick and Others 2013 (5) SA 325 (CC); 2013 (10) BCLR 
1103 (CC) para.1. 
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SADC Member State was able to undermine the regional development agenda by 
betraying the objectives of SADC with impunity.1466 The SADC Tribunal therefore played 
a crucial role in human rights protection within the region. The decision of the South 
African Constitutional Court to honour the decision of the SADC Tribunal clearly reflects 
the important role that the Tribunal played in protecting fundamental rights and 
freedoms. The decision is a reflection of the general independence of the South African 
courts and clearly sends a critical message to SADC leaders on the important role that 
the Tribunal had in protecting human rights for SADC citizens.   
From the above discussion it evident that the decision of the SADC Summit to not take 
any action against the government of Zimbabwe, but rather suspend the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal to handle human rights cases, has left SADC citizens with no recourse to 
justice when their rights are violated by their governments.  Because of the proximity of 
the Tribunal and the delays in the handling of human rights cases by the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights, the Tribunal offered great hope for the 
protection of human rights for SADC citizens. The decision of SADC Summit reflects the 
hierarchy of values in which human rights and the rule of law have become subordinate 
to the respect for regime solidarity and state sovereignty.1467 Instead of following the 
example set by other regional economic communities, such as, the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS)1468 and the East African Community 
(EAC)1469, that secure the rights of individuals‘ access to their respective courts, SADC 
                                                          
1466
Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick and Others 2013 (5) SA 325 (CC); 2013 (10) BCLR 
1103 (CC) para. 2. 
1467
Nathan L (2011) 136. 
1468
Citizens of ECOWAS Member States are able to file complaints against human rights violations of 
state-actors at the ECOWAS Court of Justice. ECOWAS Member States have given the court which has 
existed formally since 1991, a mandate to hear complaints relating to human rights violations and the 
decisions of the court are legally binding on all ECOWAS Member States and the ECOWAS Court of 
Justice rules according to the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples‘ Rights. The Court 
of Justice has the competence to rule on human rights violations through an individual complaint 
procedure since 2005. It allows applications to made even in cases were local remedies have not been 
exhausted.  
1469
 The East African Community Court of Justice is a treaty-based judicial body of the East African 
Community which has the duty of ensuring the adherence to the law in the interpretation and application 
of and compliance with the East African Community Treaty of 1999. Although the explicit human rights 
jurisdiction of the Court is yet to be formalised, the Court has over the years ensured that basic rights of 
individuals under the Treaty are respected.  
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has pushed its human rights values into the background in favour of protecting political 
regimes within the region.  
The decision of the SADC Summit leaves questions to be answered. These questions 
include who is now going to police any abuse by a SADC Member State? And who will 
also ensure that SADC Member States take appropriate measures to promote the 
principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law? The removal of human rights 
jurisdiction from the Tribunal also calls into question why the Tribunal was established in 
the first place.  
There is no doubt that the SADC Treaty places much emphasis on the importance of 
human rights, democracy and the rule of law in the region. Therefore, it is important that 
a new Protocol on the Tribunal must clearly give the Tribunal express jurisdiction in 
hearing human rights issues. SADC leaders must acknowledge that the political 
instability in a number of Member States has had a negative effect on the promotion 
and protection of human rights in the region1470 and should as a result make concerted 
efforts to ensure that such violations are addressed.  A new Protocol on the Tribunal 
must also ensure that the decisions of the Tribunal are enforced by domestic courts in 
Member States. Such enforcement will provide for an effective means of securing 
compliance with decisions of the Tribunal. 
It is also important that SADC must adopt standards of intolerance towards human 
rights violations within the region and should put to an end the habit of seeking to 
protect regimes that violate the Treaty. SADC Member States can no longer hide behind 
the notion of sovereignty with regards to human rights violations. Human rights have 
assumed great importance and have matured beyond expectation and now exert a 
moral and political force above the legal order of the state.1471 Appropriate actions, such 
as, sanctions and suspension from the regional body, are measures that can be 
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South African Government News Agency ‗SADC Leaders Under Pressure to Solve Political Logjams‘ 
02 September 2009.  
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September 2013). 
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adopted by SADC leaders in punishing Member States that will in future blatantly violate 
the provisions of the Treaty. Failure to address the human rights challenges in the 
region and adoption of mechanisms to stop such human rights abuses will thus 
seriously further undermine the credibility of SADC and its willingness to promote a 
culture of respect for human rights within the region.  
6.7 Executive Policy Shift  
The discussion in this thesis has highlighted the impact that the politicisation of the 
judiciary and various agencies of government has had on the protection and promotion 
of human rights. Executive interference with the judiciary has resulted in its failure to 
adequately protect and promote human rights. The same political interference has been 
extended to other governmental agencies and constitutionally established bodies that 
are given the mandate to promote and protect human rights. The political interference 
by the government in these institutions charged with protecting and promoting human 
rights has over the years been a major barrier to ensuring the effective domestic 
protection of human rights.  
Over the years the government has adopted a policy that has mainly been informed by 
and represented, popular interests and as a result it has been expected of other 
government agencies and any individual to share this policy and be accountable to the 
policies articulated by government.1472 The attitude of the executive and its political 
policies has thus been a major hindrance to the enjoyment of fundamental rights and 
freedoms. The executive‘s intolerance of various political views has fuelled the massive 
abuse of human rights mainly by its law enforcement agencies which have been 
deployed across the country to crush any dissent.1473 Such intolerance has greatly 
contributed to the culture of impunity in the country.  
It is therefore important that the executive initiates a policy shift with regards to the 
political situation in the country and the protection and promotion of human rights. There 
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is no doubt that the tense political climate has resulted in the violation of fundamental 
rights and freedoms. The emergence of opposition political forces with different political 
ideologies to those of the ruling party has resulted in gross violation of human rights. 
Individuals with different political ideologies have been subjected to persecution. In 
order to address such problems it is crucial that the government of Zimbabwe respects 
the different opinions that are in the country and in the process also respect the political 
rights of its citizens.  Policies seeking to promote political tolerance and human rights 
protection and promotion should become a priority for the newly elected government. In 
order to ensure that there is effective domestic protection of human rights, the 
government should lead from the front and adhere to and respect the rights in the 
Constitution and various international treaties to which Zimbabwe is a party. Respect 
also needs to be extended to the institutions that are established so as to bring to an 
end the government‘s violations of human rights.   
6.8 Conclusion 
The importance of human rights protection has over the years assumed great 
importance. Thus, international law mandates States to put into place various domestic 
measures to promote and protect human rights. Zimbabwe has over the years 
implemented such measures but the effectiveness of such measures has been 
undermined by political interference. As such the domestic protection of human rights in 
the country has been undermined. It is therefore important that the domestic measures 
discussed in this chapter are implemented together with the judicial reforms that have 
been discussed in the previous chapters. Political willingness to implement such 
measures is key to addressing the human rights situation in the country. If the measures 
discussed in this chapter are properly implemented and complement the constitutional 
reforms, there is no doubt that there will be an improvement in the promotion and 
protection of human rights in Zimbabwe.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7 Introduction 
This research has dealt with the problem of the judicial protection of human rights in 
Zimbabwe. This problem has been attributed to the judiciary‘s lack of independence. 
Thus, this research has shown the importance of the independence of the judiciary in 
human rights protection. The importance of the establishment of an independent 
judiciary has been emphasised as being critical for human rights protection in any 
democracy.1474 In order to address the issue of the independence of the judiciary in 
Zimbabwe, this study has thus made an analysis of the new constitutional dispensation 
and its guarantees of judicial independence. This has been done in order to ascertain 
the significance of the new constitutional dispensation in improving the independence of 
the judiciary. Considering the importance of judicial independence regarding human 
rights protection, this study has thus advocated for the Zimbabwean judiciary to be 
independent in order to improve its human rights protection. This chapter seeks to draw 
conclusions from all the chapters and provide recommendations on how best the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe should improve the independence of the judiciary, which 
would subsequently lead to an improvement in the judicial promotion and protection of 
human rights.  
7.1 Summary 
Chapter 2 of this study analysed the importance of the independence of the judiciary in 
human rights protection. The independence of the judiciary has been identified as the 
strongest guarantee in upholding the rule of law and the protection of human rights.1475 
This chapter also looked at how efforts have been made internationally to adopt 
instruments that seek to call upon states to adopt such instruments and implement 
measures domestically in order to protect the independence of the judiciary. Although 
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some of these instruments are not binding they offer significant guidelines on how 
states can strive to effectively protect the independence of the judiciary. As a result 
states can measure their domestic protection of the independence of the judiciary 
against these international principles. Any constitutional reforms of the judiciary should 
therefore be closely guided by these instruments.  
Chapter 3 of this study dealt with a historical analysis of the protection of human rights 
by the judiciary in Zimbabwe. This chapter highlighted how historically, the judiciary in 
Zimbabwe had attained the status of being one of the most independent and respected 
judiciaries in Africa. Soon after the attainment of independence, the judiciary was well 
known for its impartiality and independence and its enriching human rights 
jurisprudence advanced the promotion and protection of human rights.1476 However, 
since the FTLRP, the judiciary lost its respected status of being one of the most 
independent judiciaries.1477 Constant interference by the executive greatly affected the 
independence of the judiciary and consequently the promotion and protection of human 
rights.  The executive took advantage of the weak constitutional guarantees under the 
Lancaster House Constitution to constantly undermine the independence of the 
judiciary. As a result a new Constitution has been adopted that seeks to improve the 
independence of the judiciary and consequently the judicial protection of human rights.  
Chapter 4 provided a comparative study of the protection of the independence of the 
judiciary in Uganda, South Africa and Canada. The realisation of the importance of the 
independence of the judiciary in human rights protection in these jurisdictions has 
advanced the cause of human rights. Uganda has had a post-colonial history marred by 
civil war, economic decline, social disintegration and human rights violations.1478 As a 
result the political landscape in Uganda has influenced the judiciary‘s character, its 
independence and its ability to protect human rights. The costly effect of human rights 
violations has thus seen Uganda make significant strides in seeking to ensure that the 
judiciary is independent. Although the judiciary has been faced with various challenges 
that have threatened its independence, there has been general consensus that the 
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Ugandan judiciary has made significant strides in human rights protection. Although in 
some cases the judiciary has exercised restraint, there is still room for improvement in 
the protection of human rights in Uganda. South Africa and Canada have provided the 
best practices with regards to protecting judicial independence. It is no surprise 
therefore that these jurisdictions thrive with regards to human rights protection. As a 
result they offer best practices that can be adopted by Zimbabwe in order to improve the 
independence of the judiciary and its protection of human rights. 
Chapter 5 looked at the constitutional reform that has culminated in the adoption of a 
new Constitution in Zimbabwe. The Constitution of Zimbabwe which is accorded 
supremacy status provides for an improved Declaration of Rights as compared to the 
one under the Lancaster House Constitution. It recognises the doctrine of separation of 
powers, although it does so inadequately with regards to the relationship between the 
executive and parliament. The Constitution has also made a great effort to promote the 
independence of the judiciary. It has instituted a number of changes that seek to 
promote and protect the independence of the judiciary. Fundamental changes have 
been made in the appointment process and the composition of the JSC to ensure 
impartiality and transparency in the appointment of judges. However, there are still 
significant issues that need to be addressed in the appointment process in order to 
ensure that the whole process is fully transparent. Despite efforts to improve 
transparency in the appointment process, the President is still given significant powers 
in the removal and setting of the remuneration of judges in the country. These 
unfettered powers have been highlighted as a major threat to the independence of the 
judiciary. This chapter also noted that constitutional reforms only will not guarantee the 
improvement of the independence of the judiciary and the protection of human rights. 
There has to be a shift in policy by the executive and to provide the judiciary with a free 
environment to deliver justice. This research has also noted the necessity of judges to 
uphold their judicial oath and guard their independence jealously. Such change in 
attitude and the remedying of the loopholes with regards to the protection of the 
independence of the judiciary will bode well for the future protection of human rights in 
the country.  
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Chapter 6 of this research recognises that although the judiciary in Zimbabwe is the 
primary institution charged with human rights protection, its role must not be over-
emphasised. This chapter advocated for other domestic measures to be implemented in 
order to complement the judiciary in the promotion and protection of human rights.   
7.2 Recommendations 
7.2.1 Political Will and Commitment  
The politicisation of the judicial institution in Zimbabwe has been noted as the most 
significant factor that has exacerbated the human rights crisis in the country. As has 
been highlighted in this research, the government in Zimbabwe has over the years 
adopted a policy that has sought to interfere with and frustrate the independence of the 
judiciary and other institutions charged with human rights protection. The government 
has thus purged independently-minded judges and replaced them with pliant judges 
who have over the years defended executive lawlessness. The lack of political will to 
foster a culture of human rights protection has been a major contributing factor to the 
human rights crisis in Zimbabwe.  It is crucial that in order to respect the Constitution of 
Zimbabwe and its values there needs to be a realisation by the government of the 
importance of human rights protection in order to address the social, political and 
economic problems in Zimbabwe. The government of Zimbabwe should therefore learn 
from other jurisdictions, such as, Uganda, of the grave consequences of a lack of 
human rights protection. Political will resulted in several reforms being put into place 
and these have significantly improved the independence of the judiciary and human 
rights protection. Therefore, this research notes that political will should be 
accompanied by the following measures: 
7.2.1.1 De-Politicisation of the Judicial Institution  
In order to enable the judiciary to function effectively, there needs to be respect for the 
rule of law, the separation of powers doctrine and the independence of the judiciary. 
The executive should provide the judiciary with a politically free environment so as to 
enhance the judicial protection of human rights.  
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There is need for the government to respect the supremacy of the Constitution and the 
constitutional mechanisms it has put into place to secure the independence of the 
judiciary. The government should ensure that no individual or state institution interferes 
with this independence. Constitutional provisions on the appointment of judges and its 
process1479, the removal of judges, and the financial independence of the institution 
must be respected. The individual and the institutional independence of the judiciary 
should be respected. Therefore, there needs to be a change from the past where the 
government has constantly interfered with the functioning of the judiciary and thus 
frustrated its quest to promote and protect human rights. Respect for the independence 
of the judiciary should also be extended to implementing its judgments irrespective of 
whether those decisions are against state policy. Such measures will no doubt enhance 
accountability, respect for the rule of law and separation of powers, and the 
independence of the judiciary. Human rights protection thrives where there is respect for 
the rule of law and respect for the independence of the judiciary.  
7.2.1.2 Respect for Institutions that Protect Human Rights  
This research also recognises that in order to improve the promotion and protection of 
human rights in Zimbabwe, there is a need for the government to establish a politically 
free environment that promotes the respect for human rights. Such an environment is 
crucial to ensure that institutions established by the Constitution to promote and protect 
human rights, do so effectively.  
Political will and commitment are also needed to ensure that there is the de-
politicisation of the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), so as to ensure that it carries out 
its mandate in accordance with the new provisions in the Constitution. In order to fully 
carry out its duties, it is crucial that the police must be free from any external 
interference. It is crucial that police officials and their leaders rid themselves of 
impressions of any political affiliation and conduct their duties without fear or favour. 
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The de-policisation of the police force will no doubt be a positive step in arresting the 
culture of impunity.  
Political will is also required to ensure that the independence of the ZHRC is respected 
and that there is no interference with its functioning. Any appointments by the President 
to the ZHRC must be transparent, and ensure that political considerations are not taken 
into account in any appointments. The executive should also ensure that individuals that 
are appointed to the institution are fit and proper persons and have no political link with 
any party. The institution should be well funded and there needs to be commitment by 
the government and Parliament to fully support the operations of the Commission.   
As has been noted in this research, the ruling party has over the years had great 
suspicions about the activities of NGOs and Human Rights Defenders. This suspicion 
has arisen because the ruling party has claimed that NGOs and Human Rights 
Defenders have been working with opposition parties to advance regime change in 
Zimbabwe. Thus, the activities of NGOs and Human Rights Defenders have been 
severely curtailed, worsening the human rights situation in the country.  The ZHRC has 
thus recognised the importance of the part played by members of civil society and has 
urged the government to have a change of attitude with respect to the work done by civil 
society.1480 As has been highlighted in this research NGOs and Human Rights 
Defenders play a crucial role in human rights protection. They are crucial in 
complementing the judiciary in the promotion and protection of human rights. Thus, as a 
result of this crucial role, the government of Zimbabwe should provide them with a 
politically free environment that will effectively promote their activities. There is also an 
urgent need to repeal or amend pieces of legislation that infringe on the activities of 
NGOs and Human Rights Defenders, in order to ensure that they operate in an 
environment that supports their activities. 
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7.2.1.3 Respect for International and Regional Instruments 
Zimbabwe as a member state of the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), and 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) is party to various international 
treaties that recognise the importance of the independence of the judiciary and human 
rights promotion and protection. As a state party to these instruments the government of 
Zimbabwe has a duty to implement the obligations thereof. Decisive steps should be 
taken to adhere to these international and regional mechanisms that seek to promote 
the independence of the judiciary and foster human rights observance. Adherence to 
these international and regional instruments will result in Zimbabwe upholding its 
international obligations and will also go a long way in resolving relations with the wider 
international community, that have expressed great concern about human rights 
violations in the country. 
7.2.2 Reducing the Powers of the President in the Appointment, Removal and 
Setting of Remuneration of Judges 
As has been discussed in chapter five, attempts have been made to constitutionally 
guarantee the independence of the judiciary in Zimbabwe. Although some of the 
reforms have brought with them measures that will significantly improve the judiciary in 
Zimbabwe, there are provisions that still pose a threat to the independence of the 
judiciary. This research advocates that the powers of the President should be reduced 
and that such provisions should therefore be amended or repealed in order to effectively 
secure the independence of the judiciary and improve human rights protection.  Thus, 
the powers of the President need to be reduced in the appointment process, removal of 
judges and the setting of remuneration of judges. 
7.2.2.1 Appointment Process 
The first provision of the Constitution that should be amended is section 185(2)(b) which 
allows the President and the public to nominate any potential candidates to be 
appointed as judges. As has been noted in this research the involvement of the public 
has been a welcome development so as to enhance transparency in the appointment 
process and also to enhance public trust in the judicial institution. However, this 
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research has expressed great reservations about the involvement of the President in 
the nominations process. Since in accordance with the Constitution, judicial 
appointments are made by the President, it is alarming that the President should also 
be given the powers to nominate any individual for judicial appointment. This provision 
grants the President enormous powers in the appointment process of judges in the 
country. The President as a result might refuse to make an appointment if any of his or 
her nominations to the judicial bench are not presented to him by the JSC for 
appointment. Such a scenario where the President is allowed to nominate individuals 
will therefore result in the JSC forcibly forwarding certain names that would have been 
nominated by the President. The provision therefore leaves a loophole that can be 
taken advantage of and result in the appointment of judges that share the same political 
ideologies as the ruling party.  
Therefore, in order to protect the independence of the judiciary, section 185(2)(b) 
should be amended to exclude the involvement of the President in the nomination 
process and should read: 
‗Whenever it is necessary to appoint a judge, the Judicial Service Commission must- (b) 
invite the public to make nominations…‘ 
The exclusion of the President from the nomination process should ensure that there is 
transparency in the appointment process and that any names submitted by the JSC for 
appointment are derived in a democratic manner and free from any undue influence. 
Such a provision will also act as a check on the President to ensure that individuals 
appointed to the judiciary are well qualified and fit and proper. 
Amendments also need to be made to section 180(3) which currently reads: 
‗If the President considers that none of the persons on the list submitted to him in terms 
of subsection (2) (e) are suitable for appointment to the office, he or she must require the 
Judicial Service Commission to submit a further list of three qualified persons, whereupon 
the President must appoint one of the nominees to the office concerned.‘  
This provision does not state the process through which the second list is to be obtained 
(in comparison to the first list where nominations are called for) and as to whether such 
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individuals are also subject to any public interviews. This therefore raises great 
suspicion that the appointment process might be subjected to manipulation. This is so 
because names on the second list can be handpicked and result in the appointment of 
pliant judges to the bench. In order to maintain impartiality in the appointment process, 
section 180(3) should be amended to read: 
‗If the President considers that none of the persons on the list submitted to him in terms 
of subsection (2) (e) are suitable for appointment to the office, he or she must require the 
Judicial Service Commission to submit a further list of three qualified persons and such 
list must comply with the provisions of subsection (2)
1481
, whereupon the President must 
appoint one of the nominees to the office concerned.‘  
The amendment of the provision will therefore bring clarity to how exactly the JSC 
obtains the second list in cases where the President objects to any names forwarded in 
the first list. Such clarity will ensure that the whole appointment procedure is impartial 
and reduce the dangers of names being handpicked to suit the demands of the 
President. This will enhance the appointment process and further protect the 
independence of the judiciary.  
7.2.2.2 Removal of Judges 
This research has highlighted that the President also has substantial powers in the 
removal of judges under the Constitution. Such powers pose a potential threat to the 
independence of the judiciary. The President in accordance with section 187 of the 
Constitution is given the powers to appoint a tribunal if a question arises with regards to 
the removal of the Chief Justice and also if the JSC advises the President that the 
removal of  a judge, including the Chief Justice, ought to be investigated.1482 This 
research has noted that the powers given to the President in the removal process of 
judges are unacceptable as the Constitution leaves loopholes that may be used to 
remove a judge from office purely on political grounds. The fact that the President has 
the powers to unilaterally appoint members of the tribunal raises suspicion about the 
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independence of such tribunal. Since the President is bound by the tribunal‘s 
findings1483, it is possible that a tribunal might be appointed with a specific motive to 
remove a judge that might be viewed by the executive as ―independent‖. This will have 
a direct impact on the independence of the judiciary.  In order to secure the 
independence of the judiciary, the JSC should be given the central role in the removal 
process, the appointing of a tribunal, and recommending to the President if the question 
of the removal of a judge arises.  
Thus, sections 187(2) and (3) should be amended to give the JSC the power to 
investigate or appoint a tribunal to look into the question of the removal of a judge and 
to recommend to the President whether a judge should be removed from office. A new 
section should be included in the Constitution and should read: 
‗A judge may be removed from office before the expiry of his or her tenure only by the 
President acting on the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission. The 
Judicial Service Commission shall investigate whether  or not a judge should be removed 
from office on such grounds in subsection (1), and if it decides that the judge should be 
removed, it shall inform the President of its recommendation.‘ 
The inclusion of the above provision will ensure that the JSC controls the whole process 
of the removal of judges and takes away substantial power from the President which 
might be subject to potential abuse or misuse. The control of the whole process by the 
JSC should reduce fears of political considerations being taken into account in the 
removal of judges. Such measures will augur well for the independence of the judiciary 
and enable judges to discharge their duties without any fear of removal for delivering 
decisions that might be viewed as ―unpopular‖ by the executive.   
7.2.2.3 Remuneration of Judges 
Although the salaries of judges in Zimbabwe are charged against the Consolidated 
Revenue Fund, the Constitution gives the President wide powers in the approval of 
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salaries for judges. Although the JSC is involved in the fixing of salaries, its role is 
diluted in the sense that the President is given the authority to approve these salaries.  
Thus, the Constitution leaves the determination of the salaries of judges in the hands of 
the executive which poses a threat to the independence of the judiciary. It is therefore 
important that section 188(1) of the Constitution should be amended to remove the role 
of the President and ministers1484 in the setting of the salaries of judges. The JSC 
should be given a big role in determining the salaries and financial budgets of the 
judiciary. Such budgets can also be set by Parliament but it should act only on the 
recommendation of the JSC and possibly an independent commission on the 
remuneration of judges which can be established to assist the JSC in determining the 
budget of the judiciary. Thus, section 188(1) should read: 
‗Judges are entitled to salaries, allowances and other benefits fixed from time to time by 
Parliament on the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission and the 
Independent Commission on the Remuneration of Judges established by an Act of 
Parliament‘ 
The inclusion of this clause should result in the removal of executive control of the 
financial budget of the judiciary and leave it in the hands of Parliament acting on the 
recommendations of the JSC and the independent Commission on the Remuneration of 
Judges. This should secure the financial independence of the courts and ensure that a 
sufficient budget is allocated to the judiciary which will enable it to carry out its duties 
effectively and control its own processes. The salaries of judges should be reviewed 
from time to time in order to ensure that they remain competitive so as to reduce the risk 
of corruption. The removal of the executive‘s control of the finances of the judiciary 
should go a long way to ensuring that the judiciary in Zimbabwe remains independent.  
7.2.3 Judiciary must Uphold Judicial Oath, Code of Conduct and Independence 
It should be noted that in line with the Constitution of Zimbabwe, judges are required to 
take an oath before assumption of any judicial duties1485 and must adhere to a Judicial 
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Service Code of Ethics.1486 The judicial oath and the Code of Ethics affirm the 
importance of judges to uphold the Constitution and to administer justice to all persons, 
without fear, favour or prejudice. They reinforce the constitutionally protected principles 
that seek to guide the judiciary in the conduct expected of judicial officers in undertaking 
their duties.1487 The judicial oath and the Code of Ethics of judges seek to ensure that 
members of the judiciary remain impartial in the exercise of their duty, avoid any 
personal gain, and abstain from any conduct that will endanger the public trust if the 
institution. The Code thus seeks to enhance the independence of the judiciary and 
public trust in the judicial institution.  
As has been highlighted in this research, the conduct of the judiciary in Zimbabwe has 
greatly diminished the public confidence in the justice system as judges have 
descended into the arena of politics thus greatly tarnishing the image of the judiciary. Its 
conduct has greatly compromised the rule of law and the protection of human rights as 
the judiciary has sought to defend executive lawlessness. It is therefore crucial that in 
order to improve the independence of the judiciary, judges must respect the Constitution 
and the Judicial Service Code of Ethics. Strict adherence to the judicial oath and the 
Judicial Service Code of Ethics will boost the projection of human rights and public trust 
in the justice system.  
It is crucial that the judicial leadership must also closely guard the independence of the 
institution and address any possible threats or attempts to interfere with the 
independence of the judiciary. Unlike the judicial leadership under Gubbay CJ, the 
current judiciary in Zimbabwe has been lacking in protecting its independence and has 
remained silent despite the constant undermining of its independence by the executive. 
Such silence has greatly contributed to its loss of independence and the lack of 
protection of human rights. This research advocates that the judiciary should be resilient 
in the protection of its independence. The judiciary should be in a position to publicly 
rebuke any attempts to undermine its independence. Such measures have been 
adopted by members of the judiciary and lawyers in Uganda, who in 2007 went on a 
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week-long strike in defence of the independence of the judiciary.1488 In South Africa the 
judiciary has jealously guarded its independence in the light of attempts by the 
executive to undermine it.1489 Such measures have no doubt maintained, and have 
contributed to the increase of the culture of human rights protection. 
7.2.4 Review of Judges’ Conditions of Service 
There is no doubt that the current economic conditions in Zimbabwe have severely 
hampered the delivery of justice in Zimbabwe. The economic difficulties have thus made 
the conditions of service of the judiciary unattractive, thus making it difficult for the 
judiciary to attract more qualified individuals to the bench.1490 It is as a result of the 
economic difficulties that the meagre salaries of judges in Zimbabwe have fuelled 
corruption within the judiciary, affecting the delivery of justice in the country1491. As has 
been noted in this research the executive has taken advantage of the economic 
difficulties to encroach on the independence of the judiciary through the provision of 
seductive gifts. Such gifts have been used by the government as a way of gaining 
loyalty from the judiciary, thus interfering with its independence.  The economic 
difficulties have resulted in endemic corruption within the judiciary and have negatively 
impacted on the justice delivery system. It is no secret that in order to protect and 
maintain the independence of the judiciary, the institution should be adequately funded 
and the remuneration of judges should ensure that the salaries and benefits of judges 
are commensurate with the status and responsibility of their office.  
The major challenge to the improvement of the salaries of judges in Zimbabwe is the 
current economic situation facing the country. However, there is no doubt that in order 
                                                          
1488
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http://www.zimeye.org/chidyausiku-tells-mugabe-to-respect-constitution/ (Accessed 10 April 2014).  
 
 
 
 
337 
 
to protect the independence of the judiciary and enhance the protection of human rights, 
there is great need and urgency to improve the conditions of service for members of the 
judiciary. The provision of adequate remuneration will further enhance the 
independence of the judicial institution.  
7.2.5 Enforcing Separation of Powers 
The principle of the independence of the judiciary has its origin in the doctrine of 
separation of powers, which states that the three arms of government, that is, the 
executive, legislature and judiciary, must be independent from each other so as to avoid 
the concentration of power in one organ of the state.1492  The principle therefore entails 
that at a minimum no branch of government should encroach on the powers of another 
branch of government and neither should a branch deprive another branch of 
government of the powers and resources necessary to performing its core functions and 
duties.1493 However, despite such guarantees the application of this doctrine in 
Zimbabwe has over the years been problematic.   Makarau J has acknowledged that 
Zimbabwe has over the years experienced a gross violation of the doctrine.1494 The 
violation of the separation of powers doctrine has mainly been seen in the way in which 
the executive has over the years used its powers to compromise the independence and 
impartiality of the judiciary. Over the years the powers of the President have also 
overlapped with and infringed on the powers of Parliament. This has mainly been seen 
in the enactment of the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act1495 which allows 
the President to create law.  
Despite efforts to address these problems in the Constitution of Zimbabwe, this 
research has noted that problems still exist with regards to the separation of powers in 
Zimbabwe. Although the Constitution recognises the three arms of government, it has 
been noted that it further legitimises the concentration of powers in the hands of the 
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President and therefore does not provide for a proper separation of powers. It is 
therefore crucial that in order to address the issue of the independence of the judiciary, 
there is need for a strict adherence to the separation of powers doctrine. Thus, there is 
need to address the imbalance of powers that exists between the President and the 
legislature. Although this research has noted that there can never be a total separation 
of powers, the system of checks and balances must be properly established to ensure 
that there is no abuse of power by any organ of the state.  
7.2.6 Adopting Best Practices from Other Jurisdictions 
This research made a comparative analysis in chapter four of the practices in Uganda, 
South Africa and Canada. This comparative analysis was done to establish the 
protection of the independence of the judiciary in these jurisdictions and how such 
independence has greatly contributed to their promotion and protection of human rights. 
Although there are challenges in Uganda, significant efforts have been to improve the 
independence of the judiciary through its constitutional guarantees. As has been evident 
in this research, a number of such suggestions have been made for Zimbabwe to 
perhaps adopt measures found in the Constitution of Uganda to further strengthen its 
constitutional guarantees of judicial independence.   The same has also been done with 
regards to South Africa, where best practices with regards to the constitutional 
protection of the independence of the judiciary have also been identified. The 
comparative analysis cleanly highlighted the crucial effect of the independence of the 
judiciary on human rights protection.  If the best practices are adopted as suggested in 
this thesis, they will go a long way in ensuring that the independence of the judiciary is 
effectively protected in Zimbabwe. This will no doubt also bode well for the judicial 
promotion and protection of human rights.  
7.2.7 Education and Training of Judicial Officers  
This research recognises the great value of education and training of judicial officers on 
the importance of an independent judiciary in human rights protection.  The continued 
training of judicial officers on human rights issues is very crucial for members of the 
judiciary in order for them to maintain and enhance their competence.  This will no 
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doubt enhance the confidence of the public in the judicial system and also enhance the 
independence of the judiciary.  With the law evolving and changing, it is crucial that 
such training should be provided to meet the demands of modern times.  
As has been highlighted in chapter five, in order to improve the independence of the 
judiciary in Zimbabwe, it is crucial that the training of judicial officers must be a 
prerogative of the judiciary itself. This is so in order to avoid any outside interference 
with the functioning of the judiciary. It is also crucial that any human rights training must 
be conducted by experts on human rights issues who will render valuable knowledge to 
judges on international trends and approaches to human rights protection. In order to 
realise this goal, it is imperative that sufficient funds be availed to the judiciary in order 
to carry out this process.  
With regards to judicial training, it is also crucial that judges must be exposed to the 
protection of human rights in other countries. Such exposure can be gained mainly 
through exchange programmes with other countries and through the attendance of 
workshops that deal with human rights protection. Such exchange programmes and 
workshops will enable judges from Zimbabwe to share ideas with other judges from 
foreign jurisdictions on the challenges that the respective judiciaries face with regards to 
their independence and human rights protection. Crucial ideas on how to improve the 
independence of the judiciary and human rights protection can thus be shared, which 
will crucially aid the judiciary in Zimbabwe on how to adopt best practices in human 
rights protection. 
7.3 Conclusion 
This research from chapters two to six has made an attempt to achieve the aims and 
objectives set out at the beginning and also prove the research hypothesis. This 
research has recognised the crucial role that the judiciary plays in the promotion and 
protection of human rights. However, in order to do so the judiciary has to be 
independent from the other two branches of government. After a lengthy period of 
lacking judicial independence, constitutional reforms have culminated in the adoption of 
a new Constitution. There is no doubt that the Constitution has made quite significant 
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improvements to protect the independence of the judiciary. Such reforms should ensure 
that the independence of the judiciary is protected and if correctly implemented there is 
no doubt that there will be an improvement in the state of the judiciary and consequently 
human rights protection. Although improvements have been made there remain some 
loopholes in the Constitution that should be addressed in order to effectively protect the 
independence of the judiciary.  There is also need for political will and commitment to 
enhance the independence of the judiciary and to learn from other jurisdictions, such as, 
Uganda, South Africa and Canada, on how best the independence of the judiciary 
enhances human rights protection. It is also crucial that the judicial reforms must be 
accompanied by a set of viable domestic measures that seek to improve the promotion 
and protection of human rights. Such mechanisms will therefore complement the role of 
the judiciary in human rights protection. 
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